42 W. Va. 473 | W. Va. | 1896
This was an actiou of ejectment, brought in the Circuit Court of Lewis county, by George J. Arnold, Cora Martin (late Cora Arnold) S. B. Hall, Porter W. Watson, and Charles A. Watson (the last two being infants, who sued by their next friend, John B. Watson) against E. N. Bun-nell, Watson M.Bunto'n, Robert P. Underwood, J. M. Bennett, and James Crawford, to recover a tract of land described in the declaration as lying in said Lewis county, W. Va., on the left hand fork of the West Pork river and Laurel run, a tributary of said river, and containing ninety eight acres, setting forth the boundaries. There was also a separate count, in the name of S. B. Hall, for the recovery of the same land. The judge of that circuit court being so situated that it was improper for him to preside at the trial, lion. Edwin Maxwell was elected special judge to try the same, but tendered his resignation at the same term, and on the 27th day of March, 1894, C. C. Higginbotham was elected special judge to try the same, and qualified as such. The following statement of the facts is taken-from the petition of the plaintiffs in error:
The land in controversy appears to be a portion of a tract of one thousand two hundred and twenty acres which belonged to one John Sims, who died intestate some time in August or the latter part of the year 1851, leaving surviving him the following named children and heirs at law, viz.: Lucy (who married Job Houghton) Millie, Phoebe, Pendleton, Haney (who married Laban Racer) Margaret (who married S. H. Wilson) Mahlou Sims, John Sims, Armstead Sims, Alfred Sims, Joel Sims and J. H. Sims, who, at the death of said John Sims, became entitled by descent to said lauds. That, just before or soon after the death of said John Sims, Samuel Ii. Wilson, who had married Margaret Sims, purchased the interests of John Sims, Alfred Sims, and Mahlon Sims in said lands, and that he and Laban Racer, Joel Sims and James H. Sims claimed, in their own right and in the right of their wives, to be the
The first error assigned and relied on by the plaintiffs in error is that “it was error in the court not to set aside the judgment, and in overruling the motion of the plaintiffs in error asking that said judgment be set aside.”
The sole question for our consideration in this case is whether the plaintiffs in this action were barred by the statute of limitations at the time their declaration in ejectment was filed on the first Monday in February, 1887. It appears, from the record, that one John.Sims, a resident of the county of Lewis, died in the year 1850, owning in fee one thousand, two hundred and twenty four acres of land. At the time of his death, he had five sons and three daughters, named as follows: Mahlon, John, Alfred, James II., and Joel Sims; Lucy, the wife of Job Houghton; Haney, the wife of Laban Racer; and Margaret, the wife of S. II. Wilson — -who were the heirs at law of John Sims, and to whom said tract of land descended. On the 8th day of March, 1851, an agreement was entered into between
It is apparent that the parties under whom the plaintiffs in error claim this tract of fifty eight acres of land only derived from Laban Racer his life estate in said fifty eight acres of land, and the parties claiming under the deed made by Laban Racer, Haney Racer, his wife, to George Blair, only took and held such title as Laban Racer had in said tract, which estate terminated at the death of said Laban Racer in 1885. Laban Racer, having married Haney Sims, by whom he had children, was a tenant by curtesy, and entitled to make partition, as the law on this point is thus stated in 2 Lomax, Dig. side page 96, § 10: “It is to be observed that at common-law no deed of partition was necessary between coparceners. A parol partition was equally efficacious. A partition makes no degree between them. It only adjusts the different rights of the parties to the possession. There is no purchase. The parceners continue
As has before been shown, the fee simple estate of said fifty eight acre-tract of land was conveyed by Laban Racer and wife to Porter M. Arnold, and to the children and heirs at law of Porter M. Arnold, and by them was conveyed to George J. Arnold, the plaintiff in this case,-while the life estate of Laban Racer was conveyed by successive conveyances to the defendants, and, although the parties holding said life estate were in possession thereof, the statute of limitations did not commence to run in their favor until the death of Laban Racer, which occurred in the year 1885, his wife having previously died. So in the case of Merritt v. Hughes, 36 W. Va. 356 (15 S. E. 56) — third point of syllabus — this Court held that, “where a wife is seised in fee of land not separate estate, and her husband makes a deed purporting to convey the fee, but void as to the wife, such deed vests in the grantee a life estate, either for the joint lives of the husband and wife, or by the cur-tesy, according to facts, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run against the wife’s reversion until the termination of such life estate.”
In the case we are considering, the husband only had a life estate by curtesy, and as a matter of course that was all he could convey. The acknowledgment of the wife to the deed, being defective, rendered the same inoperative as to her, and she retained the fee, which was afterwards conveyed by successive conveyance to the plaintiff in this suit, who had no right of entry during the continuance of the life estate. See Land Co. v. Laidley, 32 W. Va. 135 (9 S. E. 61) where it was held (point 5 of syllabus) that where, by deed, land was conveyed directly to a married woman, prior to the Code of 1868, such conveyance did not create in her a separate estate, but the husband became entitled to a freehold estate in the land, which would continue, at least, during the joint lives of the husband and wife, with remainder in. fee to the wife. Also (point 6) “In such case, if the husband andwife, by deed void as to her for want of aproper certificate of her examination and acknowledgment, convey the land to a party, and put him in possession, such pur
It is clearly shown, from the evidence, that Laban Nacer and Haney, his wife, took possession of the ninety eight acre-tract in pursuance of the agreement for partition. To this no objection appears to have been made by any of the other heirs of John Sims. Forty acres of the ninety eight was conveyed to Alfred Holt, leaving the tract of fifty eight acres in controversy. This fifty eight acres was taken posession of and held by George Blair under the deed of June 5, 1857, said deed conveying merely the life estate of Laban Nacer; and those holding under said George Blair merely took the life estate of said Laban Nacer in said fifty eight-acre boundary of land; and the deed made by Laban Nacer and wife to Wilson Leu is, February 2, 1874, conveyed nothing more, as they had, in 1860, parted with all interest in the land to Porter M. Arnold. Haney Nacer, by joining the deed to Porter M. Arnold for all the right, title, and interest they had remaining in said one thousand two hundred and twenty four acres of land, surely intended her fee simple right in remainder in and to the fifty eight acre-tract, because she had signed the deed which conveyed the life estate of Laban Nacer in said tract to George Blair, which conveyed said tract to said George Blair by metes and bounds. Of these recitals she had notice, and the said George Blair and all claiming under him had notice, also. See Wiley v. Givens, 6 Gratt. 277, where it is held the recitals in a deed, though evidence against the grantor and all claiming under him, are not evidence against third persons claiming, not under, but adversely to, the deed. The defendants here are claiming under this deed, and the recitals show what fifty eight acres were meant. Haney Nacer, wife of Laban Nacer, knew
I therefore think the trial court committed no error in refusing to hear proof as to what Laban Racer stated, on the 2d day of February, 1874, was the intention by employing the words, “remaining,” etc., in the deed of himself and wife to Porter M. Arnold, of the 24th of July, 1860; and for the same reason I think the trial court committed no error in refusing to allow the question mentioned in bill of exceptions No. 3 to be read to the jury.
It is claimed, further, that the court erred in rendering judgment against the defendants, because the said Racer and wife’s, as well as the plaintiff’s right of entry, was barred by the statute of limitations. We have, however, seen that the plaintiff’s right of entry did not accrue until the death of Laban Racer in 1885, his wife then being dead, and the plaintiffs, claiming the remainder in fee under her deed, could not enter or bring suit for the. recovery of the land until the termination of the life estate; and our conclusion is that the right of action was not barred at the time of the institution of this suit, that there is no error in the judgment complained of, and- the same is affirmed, with costs, etc.