Lead Opinion
{¶ 3} On April 9, 2002, a review was conducted. Subsequently, an Administrative Adjustment Recommendation was issued by CSEA.
{¶ 4} Appellant filed a request for an administrative adjustment hearing. That hearing took place on April 30, 2002. On May 30, 2002, an Administrative Adjustment Hearing Decision was issued.
{¶ 5} Thereafter, appellant filed Objections and a Request for a court hearing. As a result, a hearing took place on August 6, 2002. At that court hearing, evidence was heard from the parties as to whether and to what extent appellee was voluntarily unemployed. Testimony was also taken concеrning appellee's current day care costs.1
{¶ 6} On September 4, 2002, a Magistrate's Decision was issued. In that decision, the Magistrate found that appellee was capable of working twenty hours per week. The Magistrate also found that as a result of such part time employment, appellee wоuld incur resulting child care costs.
{¶ 7} On September 11, 2002, appellant filed a Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which resulted in the filing of an Amended Magistratе's Decision on December 19, 2002. Both parties filed Objections to the Magistrate's Decision. On September 12, 2003, the trial court issued a Judgment Entry which overruled most of аppellant's Objections.
{¶ 8} It is from the September 12, 2003, Judgment Entry that appellant appeals, raising the following assignments of errors:
{¶ 10} "II. The trial court abused its discretion and errеd as a matter of law in imputing income to appellee based on only parttime employment and ignoring the factors set forth in the Ohio revised code for determining potential income.
{¶ 11} "III. The trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in imputing day care costs to appellеe both as a matter of law and under the circumstances herein.
{¶ 12} "IV. The trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in ignoring the stipulations оf the parties as to the issues presented for hearing.
{¶ 13} "V. The trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in adopting findings of fact that were not supported by the evidence presented at hearing.
{¶ 14} "VI. The trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in adopting conclusiоns of law that were not supported by the evidence presented at hearing and are contrary to law."
{¶ 16} Specifically, appellant claims that the trial court failed to addrеss the objection contained in paragraph 1, which incorporated by reference his objections and supplemental objections to thе original Magistrate's Decision of September 4, 2002. Those objections dealt with the Magistrate's determination of the amount of "potential income" аs a result of her voluntary unemployment and the imputation of work related day care expenses.
{¶ 17} Civil Rule 53 governs Magistrates' Decisions. It provides that ". . . court shall rule on any objections. The court may adopt, reject, or modify the magistrate's decision, hear additional evidence, recommit the mаtter to the magistrate with instructions, or hear the matter." In Dorton v. Dorton (May 22, 2000), Delaware App. No. 99CAF11061 and in O'Brien v.O'Brien (June 4, 2003), Delaware App. No. 02 CA-F-08-038, this Court held that because of the language used in Civ.R. 53(E)(4), a trial court is required tо specifically rule on objections to a magistrate's decision before adopting, rejecting, or modifying said decision.
{¶ 18} We have reviewed the trial court's Judgment Entry and find that the trial court did not rule on all of appellant's objections, as claimed by appellant. The trial court did not specifically denote in its entry that it had ruled on all the objections set forth in paragraph 1 of appellant's objections. Although the trial court, when ruling on other objеctions of the appellant, appears to have addressed the substantive issues set forth in appellant's Supplemental Objections to Magistrаte's Decision and Objection Number 1 of appellant's Objections to Magistrate's Decision, the trial court does not specifically mention those objections. In addition and of the most significance for purposes of our decision in this case, the trial court failed to rule on the substance of Objeсtion Number 2 of the Objections to the Magistrate's Decision.3 Thus, because the trial court did not rule on all of the Objections, the Judgment Entry is not a final, appeаlable order. Kochalko v.Kochalko, Guernsey App. No. 01-CA-23,
{¶ 19} The appeal of the decision of the Knox County Court of Cоmmon Pleas, Juvenile Division, is dismissed.
Edwards, J.
Gwin, P.J., dissents.
Boggins, J. concurs.
Notes
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 20} I dissent from the result reached by the majority because I believe the trial court's judgment entry addresses all the issues raisеd by appellant's numerous and overlapping objections.
{¶ 21} When we review an assignment of error that a trial court has failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Civ. R. 52, we do not require the court use any particular format. We do not require they be labeled "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law" in order to satisfy the rule. What is necessary is the trial court's judgment entry contain sufficient facts and legal conclusions, Creggin Group Ltd. v.Crown Diversified (1996),
{¶ 22} I believe we should adopt a similar rule here. My reading of the allegedly overlooked objections leads me to conclude they are expressed in the later objeсtions. I would not send the matter back to the trial court for failing to expressly overrule the objections where the judgment entry demonstrates the trial court rеviewed all the issues those objections raise.
{¶ 23} I would find this is a final appealable order.
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the appeal of the decision of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is dismissed. Costs assessed to appellant.