CHRISTINA M. ARNETT, Plаintiff-Appellant, - vs - CAROL J. MONG, Defendant-Appellee.
CASE NO. CA2015-10-022
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO FAYETTE COUNTY
5/9/2016
[Cite as Arnett v. Mong, 2016-Ohio-2893.]
HENDRICKSON, J.
George R. Oryschkewych, 6100 Oak Tree Blvd., Suite 200, Independence, Ohio 44131, for plaintiff-appellant
David A. Caborn, 6265 Riverside Drive, Suite A, Dublin, Ohio 43017, for defendant-appellee
{1} Plaintiff-appellant, Christina Arnett, appeals from the decision of the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas granting summаry judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Carol Mong, in a negligence per se action. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the decision of the trial court.1
{2} In February 2014, Arnett went to visit her mother-in-law who rented a residential home owned by Mong. Although the steps leading to the home were partially covered in ice аnd snow, Arnett initially entered the home without issue. Several minutes later, Arnett exited the home using the same set of steps, but lost her footing and fell to the ground causing the injuries that are the subject of this lawsuit.
{3} After the fall, Arnett filed a negligence complaint against Mong to recover damages. Following discovery, Mong moved for summary judgment on the basis that, among other things, the condition was open and obvious. Arnett‘s response in opposition specifically alleged that Mong was negligent per se because the gutter on the front of the home caused an unnatural accumulation of ice on the front steps. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mong, a decision that Arnett now appeals, raising the following assignment of error for review.
{4} THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT.
{5} In her single assignment of error, Arnett alleges the trial court erred in granting Mong‘s motion for summary judgment. We disagree.
{6} This court reviews summary judgment decisions de novo, reviewing the trial court‘s judgment independently and without deference to the trial court‘s determinations, using the same standard in our review that the trial court should have employed. Ludwigsen v. Lakeside Plaza, L.L.C., 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2014-03-008, 2014-Ohio-5493, ¶ 8. Pursuant to
{7} The moving рarty bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Robinson v. Cameron, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-09-191, 2015-Ohio-1486, ¶ 9. Once this burden is met, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden to set forth specific facts showing there is some genuine issue of material fact yet remaining for the trier of fact to rеsolve. Id. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence must be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Vanderbilt v. Pier 27, L.L.C., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-02-029, 2013-Ohio-5205, ¶ 8.
{8} Initially, we note that Arnett did not specifically reference a violation of
Negligence Per Se Standard and the Open and Obvious Defense
{9} The trial court found that the ice and snow was open and obvious and granted summary judgment in favor of Mоng.2 Arnett argues her claim is based upon negligence per se, not common law negligence, therefore, the open and obvious defense is inapplicable. Appellant is correct in noting that the open and obvious doctrine is inapplicable to claims for negligence per se because of the Ohiо Supreme Court‘s decision in Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362.
In that case, the Court held that a negligence per se claim predicated upon a landlord‘s duty to repair cannot be defeated merely because the danger that caused the plaintiff‘s injury was open and obvious. Id. at ¶ 25. See also Base-Smith, 2014-Ohio-349, ¶ 20, fn. 4-5. Accordingly, we note that the open and obvious defense only aрplies to Arnett‘s common law negligence claims.
{10} Arnett alleges that her fall was caused by an unnatural accumulation of ice due to the defective condition of the gutter, which amounted to a violation of statutory duties. Specifically, Arnett claims Mong violated
(A) A landlord who is a party to a rental agreement shall dо all of the following:
(1) Comply with the requirements of all applicable building, housing, health, and safety codes that materially affect health and safety;
(2) Make all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition;
* * *
{11} A violation of the statute that sets forth specific duties constitutes negligence per se. Id. at ¶ 22. In a negligence per se action, “proof of a landlord‘s violation of the statute dispenses with the plaintiff‘s burden to establish the existence of a duty and the breach of that duty.” Butler v. Wyndtree Housing Ltd. Partnership, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-03-056, 2012-Ohio-49, citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Henry, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2006-07-168, 2007-Ohio-2556, ¶ 10; Chambers v. St. Mary‘s School, 82 Ohio St.3d 563, 656 (1998). However, negligence per se does not equate to liability per se, as negligence per sе does not dispense with the plaintiff‘s obligation to prove the landlord‘s breach was the proximate cause of the injury, nor does it remove a plaintiff‘s obligation to prove the landlord received actual or constructive notice of the condition causing the statutory violation. Id.; Base-Smith at ¶ 21 (“[n]egligence per se does not equate to liability per se“); Mann v. Northgate Investors, LLC, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-684, 2012-Ohio-2871,
¶ 25. Thus, to establish a negligence per se claim, Arnett was required to show: (1) a violation of a statute, (2) the violation of the statute proximately caused her injuries, and (3) that Mong knew or should have known of the defective condition.
{12} Based on our review of the evidence, we find the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Mong as Arnett has failed to establish that Mong violated
Violation of Statutory Duties
{13} First, with respect to the statutory violation requirement, the only instances in which Arnett has addressed allegations of a statutory violation are contained in her motion in оpposition to summary judgment.3 In her deposition, Arnett stated that she observed the snow and ice condition on the front of the steps. Arnett thought ice had unnaturally accumulated because the gutter was damaged and “[t]here was a hole in it.” In addition, the affidavit of Arnett‘s mother-in-law stated:
* * *
2. Affiant further says that when she moved in, she notified her landlоrd * * * that the gutter on the front of the house was sagging, and that it needed to be cleaned out, and that when it rained, water would overflow over the sagging portion of the gutter onto the front stairs and bushes below.
3. Affiant further says that neither * * * [landlords] * * *, nor anyone on their behalf ever repaired the sagging gutter.
4. Affiant further says that, due to safety conсerns, she had her son repair the sagging gutter in 2014.
5. Affiant further says that when the gutter overflowed during the cold weather, an unnatural accumulation of ice would form on
her front stairs.
{14} As to a violation of
{15} Next, Arnett argues Mong violated
Appellаnt also maintains that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment with respect to
R.C. 5321.04(A)(2) , which, as previously noted, requires a landlord to “[m]ake all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition.” Under5321.04(A)(2) , a plaintiff must first establish that a defective condition exists on the premises which renders it unfit or uninhabitable. “The meaning and interpretation of the statutory phrase ‘fit and habitable’ will not be liberally construed to include that which does not clearly fall within the import of the statute. * * * Fitness and habitability entails such defects as lack of water or heat, faulty wiring or vermin infestations’ and does not include such items as missing handrаils.” Avila v. Gerdenich Realty Co., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-07-1098, 2007-Ohio-6356, ¶ 9, quoting Parks v. Menyhart Plumbing and Heating Supply Co., Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
75424, 1999 WL 1129591 (Dec. 9, 1999); Accord Mullins v. Grosz, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-23, 2010-Ohio-3834, ¶ 34 (“[W]e cannot find that the lack of a handrail or gating in the porch/step/walkway area of the premises constitutes a defective condition rendering the premises unfit and uninhabitable.“)
The facts in this case indicate that the front porch was not equipped with gutters or downspouts for the duration of appellant‘s tenanсy and indeed for the entire time appellee has owned the home since 1999 or 2000. We find that the absence of gutters, in this case, did not as a matter of law render the home unfit or uninhabitable. Accordingly, liability may not be predicated under
R.C. 5321.04(A)(2) , and appellant‘s second assignment of error is not well taken.
Id. at ¶ 20-21. We agree with the Sixth District‘s analysis of
{16} We similarly note another case involving the application of negligence per se. In Base-Smith, 2014-Ohio-349 at ¶ 28, this court reversed a trial court‘s decision granting summary judgment in favor of a property owner where triable issues of fact existed as to whether the property owner was negligent per se. That case also involved a wintertime slip-and-fall incident allegedly occurring as a result of a “defective” drainage system, which could constitute a violation of statutory duties. Id. at ¶ 2-3. However, in that case, the plaintiff presented testimony and photographs demonstrating that the defective drainage system was malfunctioning and “not properly channeling the water away from the walkway into the in-ground drainage pipes, as it was intended to do.” Id. at ¶ 24-26.
{17} Here, there is evidence that Arnett slipped and fell while walking down steps and there is testimony related to a hole in the gutter, or that the gutter was “sagging.” However, Arnett offers no evidence to support her claim that this creates a statutory violation.
Unlike this court‘s decision in Base-Smith, Arnett has not presented any evidence to support her argument thаt the gutter created a statutory violation which caused her injuries. While Arnett‘s mother-in-law had the gutter
Proximate Causation
{18} Even if we were to conclude a specific statutory duty was violated, we would still find that the record in this case fails to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact that Arnett‘s injuries were proximately caused by Mong‘s breach of a statutory duty. “Normally, the issue of proximate cause involves questions of faсt and cannot be resolved by means of summary judgment.” Welch v. Bloom, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-04-1003, 2004-Ohio-3168, ¶ 11. However, if the facts are undisputed, the issue becomes a question of law which can be determined on summary judgment. Proximate causation, even in instances where the elements of duty and breach have been established, cannot be established through “mere speculation.” Holbrook v. Kingsgate Condo. Assn., 12th Dist. Butlеr No. CA2009-07-193, 2010-Ohio-850, at ¶ 27; Workman v. Linsz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102473, 2015-Ohio-2524, ¶ 15.
{19} During her deposition, Arnett testified that she was walking on the opposite side of the accumulating ice and had “no idea” what caused her fall, “but an educated guess would be probably something was underneath that made me slip. I would say ice or snow.” Thus, from Arnett‘s testimony it is clear that she cannot determine what caused her fall. This distinction is critical in a case such as this, as it is well-established that “[n]egligence cannot be established by the mere fact that a person slipped and fell.” Hess v. One Americana Ltd. Partnership, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-1200, 2002 WL 392368, *2 (Mar. 14, 2002); Stamper v. Middletown Hosp. Assn., 65 Ohio App.3d 65, 67-68 (12th Dist.1989) (noting that
usually, “[t]o establish negligence in a slip and fall case, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to identify or explain the reason for the fall“). Rather, ““[a] plaintiff will be prеvented from establishing negligence when he, either personally or with the use of outside witnesses, is unable to identify what caused the fall.” Mann, 2012-Ohio-2871, ¶ 26, quoting Beck v. Camden Place at Tuttle Crossing, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-1370, 2004-Ohio-2989, ¶ 12.
{20} Instead, Arnett‘s testimony merely suggests that the possible cause of her fall could be either a natural accumulation of snow or ice or an unnatural accumulation of ice. Again, such speculation is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See, e.g., Holbrook, 2010-Ohio-850 at ¶ 27; Workman, 2015-Ohio-2524, ¶ 15. It is undisputed that the record cannot establish, nor does Arnett know, whether she slipped on ice or snow or, if she in fact slipped, whether it was on ice that had accumulated naturally or unnaturally.
{21} We note that the facts in the present case are distinguishable from those found in this court‘s recent case Estate of Jennifer Merrill v. Meijer Stores Limitеd Partnership, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-10-090, 2016-Ohio-1432. That case involved a fall by a customer in a Meijer store where the customer slipped on a wet floor and there was an “ongoing issue” with employees stacking water on top of pallets that had damaged the bottles, resulting in “leakers.” Despite Meijer‘s knowledge of this ongoing problem, the trial court found that the plaintiff‘s observation that she slipped
{22} On appeal, we reversed the decision of the trial court, in part because we found the plaintiff was not speculating as to what the substance was and where it came from. Id. at ¶ 20. Rather, we acknowledged that there was a distinction between “speculation” and “a reasonable inference based upon factual observations.” Id. Furthermore, we noted that
unlike other decisions addressing similar issuеs, “our record does not reveal any viable cause for the water being on the floor other than the cases of water stacked on the pallet [were] recently transported and deposited at the endcap.” Id. at ¶ 19.
{23} As previously noted, while Arnett testified and introduced averments regarding the gutter, her argument here is that the gutter possibly caused an unnatural accumulation of ice that possibly caused her fall. However, Arnett also stated that she possibly slipped on snow, which would be a naturally occurring condition not caused by a breach of a statutory duty. In other words, there is no evidence that Arnett establishes, beyond speculation, that shе slipped on ice as a result of an unnatural accumulation created by a violation of
{24} Judgment affirmed.
PIPER, P.J., and RINGLAND, J., concur.