82 Iowa 499 | Iowa | 1891
The plaintiff claims that he rendered services as an attorney for and at the request and for the benefit of Hattie Hosford, in two actions specified, and that such services were reasonably worth' the sum of four hundred dollars. Judgments were rendered in each action in favor of Mrs. Hosford, and a lien for the amount due the plaintiff was secured in the manner provided by section 215 of the Code. For the purpose of releasing such lien, the defendant, Hattie Hosford, as principal, and defendants, Reuben Newton and E. Puddy, as sureties, executed a bond, as provided by section 216 of the Code, which was duly approved by the proper clerk, and filed in his office. The plaintiff , demands judgment on the bond, and also generally for the amount claimed. The defendants deny that Mrs. Hosford is indebted to the plaintiff in any sum whatever, and allege that the services for which a recovery was sought were rendered for S. H. Cochrane; who had
I. At the proper timé the plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury as follows: “1. The incontrovertible
“2. The only questions for your determination are: Was the plaintiff employed to act as attorney for Mrs. Hosford in the proceedings referred to, and did he perform the services for her ? What were the services of plaintiff reasonably worth % ”
The court refused to give these instructions, and charged the jury, in effect, that, if the sureties were told by the plaintiff that he was not to receive any compensation for his services from Mrs. Hosford, and they executed the bond relying upon and in consequence of such statements, the plaintiff could not recover of. them; The appellant complains of this
II. The sixth paragraph of the charge to the jury is as follows : “If you do not find from a preponderance
The appellant urges against this portion of the charge objections as follows: “First. It states substantially that the attorneys who testified were not of a class who are worthy of credit, and that the jury are not bound by what they say. Second. The question of the credibility of attorneys is made so prominent as to create or add to the already existing prejudice against them. Third. It states and directs the jury to base their verdict on their own common knowledge, rather than upon evidence.” We do not understand that the jury were told that they might disregard evidence given in the case, and determine the amount which the plaintiff was entitled to recover by facts within their own knowledge; but they were told in effect to consider all the evidence offered, whether given by experts or others, and, in estimating its proper weight, to consider it in the light of relevant facts commonly known. The conclusions of juries must be drawn from the evidence submitted for their consideration, and not from particular facts within their private knowledge. But in weighing evidence jurors must be permitted to exercise a judgment founded upon the common knowledge of mankind. Head v. Hargrave, 105 U. S. 45 ; Stevens v. City of Minneapolis, 42 Minn. 136 ; 43 N. W. Rep. 842. The portion of the charge in question was applicable to the facts in this case. Mr. Cochrane assumed the management of the cases in which Mrs. Hosford was interested, drew the pleadings.
III. The jury returned four special findings. The first was, in substance, that Mrs. Hosford did not
IY. It is claimed that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. The jury might have found for the plaintiff for a larger sum, no doubt; but wé cannot say the amount they fixed is so unsupported by the.evidence that the verdict should be set aside.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.