54 A.2d 831 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1947
DITCHRICH and ROSS, JJ., dissented.
Argued April 15, 1947. The court below entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding plaintiff's verdict for damages for personal injuries sustained while leaving defendant's theatre.
Plaintiff and her daughter-in-law had purchased tickets of admission and witnessed the "first show" of a motion picture, and immediately thereafter started to leave. A goodly number of other persons were also leaving and a number were entering the theatre.
A pair of swinging doors separated the lobby from the street. These doors opened outward and were controlled by a combination of a spring closing the door rapidly, and a pneumatic check which started to operate when the door had closed to a point ten to fifteen inches from the door jamb. At this point the pneumatic check slowed down the motion of the door which became slower and slower, so that when it arrived at the jamb it hardly moved at all.
The plaintiff followed her daughter-in-law out of the theatre at the conclusion of the first showing. The daughter-in-law pushed open the door on the left with her elbow. This door was then grasped by a young man who was entering the theatre with a girl, and the daughter-in-law stepped out of the way. The man released the door, which struck the plaintiff and injured her.
It is at least doubtful whether, under the facts presented, there was any negligence on the part of the defendant. The patron of a theatre is owed only the *387
duty of reasonable and ordinary care: Kmiotek v. Anast et al.,
But in the view we take of this case the question of the defendant's negligence need not be passed upon, for the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. She testified that she had attended the theatre a number of other times; yet on this occasion she neither looked, watched, waited nor stepped aside, and until she was struck did not know that the door was closing. Being a door, ipso facto it opened and closed. She did not *388
place her hand on it to hold it open or to fend it off. In fact she did nothing to protect herself. She was not reasonably vigilant (Restatement, Torts, § 480), and, having made no attempt to guard herself from danger, she was negligent unless excused. As justification for her absence of care she testified that, as on previous occasions, she relied on her daughter-in-law to hold the door for her. But this cannot be an excuse because she was well able to protect herself and to put her hand on the door. While it is argued that she was seventy-five years old, the evidence shows she could see, could walk, and could easily have held the door. In any event, if she had an infirmity, it imposed upon her a greater vigilance: Karl v. Juniata County,
Judgment affirmed.
Judges DITHRICH and Ross dissent.