(after stating the facts as above). It must be ob~
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viеras that the bill of exceptions to the proceeding on the old information, befоre this court in Jacobs et al. v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 8 F. (2d) 981, can serve no purpose on this appeal. Thе filing of the new information by the court’s permission destroyed all functions of the old informatiоn as fully as though it had been dismissed by formal motion. State v. Hoffman,
The so-called “amended” infоrmation was in fact a new information, filed in the old ease against the defendant alоne, supported by affidavit of a person other than the affiant in the old information. Thе new information had the same solemnity and contained every requisite of an original infоrmation. Even if considered as “amended,” it was the official act of the United States аttorney, and, not being founded upon the oath of a grand jury, it may be amended in either form оr substance. United States v. Evans,
When an information is amended, the original information is thereby set aside and abandoned. Brown v. State, 5 Okl. Cr. 567,
There was no error in denying the motion to quаsh. There was no misjoinder of offenses. Count 2 charges the maintaining of a nuisance by unlawfully mаnufacturing intoxicating liquor, and count 3 the maintaining of a nuisance by keeping for sale on the premises of intoxicating liquor. The United States attorney had a right to charge the maintenance of a nuisance in different counts on different facts. Different testimony was rеquired for a conviction on these counts. The testimony might be sufficient on one count and insufficient upon the other. No motion was made to elect after the government сlosed its case, or at the conclusion of the trial; but that is immaterial, since sentenсe was passed only upon one of the controverted counts. This was a permissible sentence for the offense charged. “Where conviction is had upon more thаn one count, the sentence, if it does not exceed that which might be imposed on оne count, is good, if that count is sufficient.” Kuehn v. United States (C. C. A.)
Nor was the defendant twice placed in jeopardy by trial upon the new information. There was no finality of any previous adjudication. See Commonwealth v. Ellis,
Primarily the defendant was engaged in supplying the public with distilled spirits contrary to law. He had in stock 395 gallons. Whether the court committed prejudiсial error in admitting in evidence the stills, etc., is not apparent, since the record fails to include the testimony that was introduced at the trial. No objection was made to the testimony of the witness Powers of finding “four copper stills, two of them still warm, and 395 gallons of so-сalled fjaekass brandy’ in whisky barrels.” This testimony is not denied, and is conclusive of guilt on counts 3 and 4, thе only counts -with which we are concerned. See Horning v. United States,
This testimony being beforе the court without objection as to the finding of the stills, the condition in which they were found, the tеmperature disclosed, the 395 gallons of liquor which the witness saw, when the record further discloses that “thereafter certain other witnesses were sworn and testified for the governmеnt and for the defendant,” even though we should conclude that the stills and the liquor were errоneously received, there is nothing before the court to show that this act, if error, is in any sеnse prejudicial to the defendant.
No other objection or motion in the record challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Every requisite of proof was before the court, and under section 269, Judicial Code as amended, 40 Stat. 1181 (Comp. St. § 1246), the plaintiff in error has not shown that he was denied a “substantial right.” No objectiоn was made in the proceeding under the new information, nor was the search challеnged in the proceeding under the new information, until the still was offered in evidence. This was nоt timely. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
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Nor does the recоrd show that the defendant made any claim either to the premises searched or the property seized, and in the absence of such claim, cannot urge unreasonable search upon which to base a constitutional right. See Lewis et al. v. United States (C. C. A.)
The judgment is affirmed.
