Armstrong v. StateArmstrong v. State
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- Per curiam
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM: In this second attempt seeking habeas corpus relief from his sex crimes convictions, Daryl Wayne Armstrong Jr. failed to show the court any exceptional circumstances that would permit a second try. Accordingly, his motion was summarily dismissed. The court was correct in doing so, and we therefore affirm its decision.
A jury trial leads to several convictions and an unsuccessful appeal.
A jury found Armstrong guilty of six off-grid felonies—four counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy—and two grid felonies all related to the sexual assault of Armstrong‘s young relative. His sentence is 150 years to life plus 98 months. Armstrong directly appealed his convictions and sentence, which were affirmed on appeal. See State v. Armstrong, No. 112,942, 2016 WL 3960171 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 306 Kan. 1320 (2017).
After that, Armstrong sought postconviction relief by moving to overturn his convictions under
Armstrong moves for postconviction relief a second time.
Armstrong moved to overturn his convictions in a second
A few days later, on December 15, 2023, Armstrong also filed a “Petition of Actual Innocence under
The district court reviewed Armstrong‘s petition of innocence and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition while his prior
We have only one question to answer. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Armstrong‘s second
Our answer will be based on our review of the record. In State v. Roberts, 310 Kan. 5, 12, 444 P.3d 982 (2019), the court held that when the district court summarily
Then, in making our review, we recognize that Armstrong bears the burden of proof. A movant has the burden to prove that an evidentiary hearing is warranted by making more than conclusory contentions and showing that an evidentiary basis exists or is available in the record. Noyce v. State, 310 Kan. 394, 398, 447 P.3d 355 (2019).
Because this is Armstrong‘s second attempt at habeas corpus relief, some additional rules apply. Under
Exceptional circumstances can include ineffective assistance of counsel claims and can also include a colorable claim of actual innocence based on the crime victim‘s recantation of testimony that formed the basis of the charge against the defendant. See Beauclair v. State, 308 Kan. 284, 304, 419 P.3d 1180 (2018) (colorable claim of actual innocence); Rowland v. State, 289 Kan. 1076, 1087, 219 P.3d 1212 (2009) (ineffective assistance of counsel).
In deciding whether a district court erred in summarily denying a
The parties stake out opposing claims about this motion.
Armstrong argues that his
Because Armstrong believes that he was entitled to at least a preliminary hearing, he claims the district court‘s summary denial of his motion was erroneous. His reasoning for why he should be granted a preliminary hearing is based on new evidence which shows exceptional circumstances to consider his second
The State argues that Armstrong has alleged no facts to support a finding that exceptional circumstances allow the district court to consider Armstrong‘s second
Mere conclusions that are unsupported by facts or citations to the record fail to convince us.
Arguments of counsel painted with a broad brush are seldom convincing. Details matter.
Armstrong fails to explain what issues his lawyer failed to raise or preserve in his first
Armstrong‘s argument lacks any citation to the record. Points and issues that are unsupported by pertinent authority and legal issues that are not adequately briefed are waived or abandoned. State v. Gallegos, 313 Kan. 262, 277, 485 P.3d 622 (2021); State v. Meggerson, 312 Kan. 238, 246, 474 P.3d 761 (2020).
In our view, Armstrong‘s argument has been waived or abandoned because the majority of his argument lacks any citation to the record or any supporting authority. Armstrong also fails to explain why his lawyer failed to provide effective assistance of counsel; instead, he simply states that his lawyer failed to address or properly preserve issues. Armstrong does not describe what issues were improperly addressed or preserved, nor does he explain what he wished his lawyer had done differently. Therefore, Armstrong‘s argument lacks adequate briefing and thus his argument has been waived or abandoned.
We must point out that the record contradicts Armstrong‘s claim that his petition of actual innocence was never seen or ruled on by the district court. Thus, Armstrong‘s
Finally, without explaining what issues Armstrong‘s postconviction counsel should have raised or had properly preserved, we cannot conclude his counsel failed to provide effective assistance of counsel. These mere allegations are not proof of exceptional circumstances that would permit a second habeas corpus motion.
We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding Armstrong‘s allegations were conclusory and successive and by denying Armstrong‘s second 60-1507 motion.
Affirmed.