*1 judgment of products” as the the Wraps not “tobacco Blunt are 39-28.5-101(5). respectfully dissent. therefore in section defined ¶40 Moreover, agree with the court to state that JUSTICE am authorized ejusdem generis principle of appeals that the join in this EID and JUSTICE GABRIEL catch-all in section 39- mandates dissent. 28.5-101(5)—“other kinds and forms tobac co, to be suitable prepared such manner as or smoking pipe in a chewing or for Wraps. Blunt include See
otherwise”—cannot Co., Dep’t
Creager Inc. v. Colo. Mercantile - Revenue, 10, 16, COA P.3d -. ejusdem generis, general “where
Under ... things in a statute follows a list
term only applied to those general terms are CO 51 things general kind or class as of the same Cheryl ARMSTRONG, v. Peo specifically mentioned.” Winter
ple, (Colo.2006)(concluding equip apparatus or phrase “other things that share applied only to those ment” PEOPLE items listed characteristics of the Colorado, Respondent. Sandstrom, statute); Davidson Supreme Court Case No. 13SC945 (“[Wjhen (Colo.2004) general or word persons or phrase specific follows list Colorado. things, general phrase or word interpreted only persons things or to include May 22, 2017 listed.”) (quoting type as those same Dictionary, Ejusdem Generis, Black’s Law (7th 1999))). ed. specifically enu- products Each of the 39-28.5-101(5) can be
merated in section Although or on their own.
smoked chewed “sweepings” disagreement
there is chewed, or independently
can be smoked rolling paper
they placed pipe can in a or however, Wraps, cannot smoked. Blunt pipe, as the by placing
be smoked them a Rather, Blunt witnessed. pipe rolling paper—
Wraps are akin to the or tobacco, delivery are the vessel
marijuana, product. consumable or other
Thus, products all of the enumerated being on their capable
list are consumed
own, Wraps not. There- whereas Blunt ejusdem generis
fore, principle ex- scope of section 39-
cludes them from
28.5-101(5).
II. Conclusion reasons, I conclude Wraps may not “to-
that Blunt be taxed as products” is defined
bacco as that term 39-28.5-101(5). Accordingly, I also 2017 section would See WL *2 count, prison
in on each to be served consec- utively, resulting aggregate in an ninety-six years custody Depart- ment of Corrections.
¶2 Following decision Graham v. L.Ed.2d 825
categorically banned sentences life without juveniles who were not convicted homicide, Armstrong filed a motion with arguing aggregate district court that her sentence is the functional equivalent of life without is there fore unconstitutional under Graham. The dis trict Armstrong’s court denied motion. On appeal, appeals affirmed, the court of con cluding Armstrong eligi ble for at about she has a release, to obtain thereby complies with Graham Attorneys for Petitioner: MS&M Law Of- subsequent and the case of Ala Miller v. fice, Denver, Mooney, Nicole M. Colorado Cynthia Attorneys Respondent: H. Armstrong L.Ed.2d 407 Coffman, General, Attorney Patricia R. Van (Armstrong II), 11CA2034, slip op. Horn, General, Attorney Assistant Jo- Senior 21-23 Oct. Michaels, seph Attorney Assistant G. Gener- granted certiorari and now affirm al, Denver, Colorado the court of albeit on different Attorney for Amicus Curiae Colorado grounds. length For reasons discussed Philip Cherner, Criminal Defense Bar: A our lead Denver, Colorado 2017 CO also announced Attorneys for Amici Curiae Law Juvenile today,1 we hold that Graham and Miller do Center, Center, Colorado Juvenile Defender to, invalidate, not apply and therefore do not Policy, Children’s Law Center Coali- Armstrong’s aggregate term-of-years sen- Justice, tion for Juvenile National Center tence. Law, and Youth Law Center: Youth Juvenile Center, Levick, Philadelphia, Law Marsha I. Pennsylvania, Colorado Juvenile Defender April Armstrong In Center, Dvorchak, Denver, drove two Kim boyfriend
friends to the house of a former
expecting
who she
a child
believed was
with
Upon arriving, Armstrong
someone else.
Opinion
EID
delivered
parked
stayed
the car and
Her friends
inside.
the Court.
house,
got
out and entered the
where
jury
Cheryl
boyfriend
Arm-
his
shot and killed the former
second-degree
pregnant
companion. Armstrong
of two counts of
mur-
female
was
complicity theory.
offenses,
der
sixteen at the time
but she
charged
jury
was sixteen at the time
tried as an
A
adult for her role.
fenses,
complicit
and she was tried as an
adult. The
found
forty-eight years
trial court
her to
sentenced
murders and eonvicted her of two counts
People Rainer,
1. We also decide
2017 CO
tenced count, resulting invalidate, to, an year for each sentences and therefore do ninety-six years in the Armstrong’s aggregate Department of Corrections. custody of the tence.4 we Armstrong’s The court affirmed *3 appeal. v. Arm on direct convictions strong, 14, No. 96CA0044 Nov. JUSTICE concurs GABRIEL judgment. ¶5 2010, Supreme held Florida, 560 U.S. 130 S.Ct. Graham GABRIEL, concurring in the (2010), Eighth to 2011 that the Amendment judgment. prohibits imposition Constitution U.S. ¶8 parole juvenile on my sepa
of sentence a life a the reasons set forth without For commit Sub- who did not homicide. offender 2017 opinion rate Lucero v. CO a motion sequently, in filed ¶¶ 36-50, (Gabriel, J., concur 394 1128 pur- post-conviction for relief district ring), disagree majority’s conclu with the 35(c)2 Rules the Colorado suant to Rule sion that the United States here, she Procedure. relevant Criminal Florida, opinions in 560 Graham U.S. ninety-six-year vio- argued her that Alabama, (2010), 130 2011 and Miller v. S.Ct. Eighth under Graham lates the Amendment (2012), limit 567 U.S. S.Ct. 2455 is a it “virtual life sentence” because juvenile to cases in which a re ed offender for re- her a denies “specific of life ceives sentence” without motion, court denied the lease. (“LWOP”), Maj. believe, op. I7. affirmed, concluding appeals and the court instead, apply to that Graham Miller de for eligible facto sentences. LWOP meaning- age sixty, she has a about ¶9 conclude, however, to opportunity obtain release and ful further that would thereby complies with if, Graham Armstrong argues, a even as conviction Armstrong II, op. 21-23. slip Miller. degree complicity a second murder under offense, theory is a nonhomicide she has affirm granted certiorari3 and We now she, fact, de established received a on the court albeit different Specifical- facto sentence in this case. LWOP grounds. ly, the record reflects will II. eligible at about the expectancy. which is within her life natural Armstrong, the defendant our like Graham, 560 U.S. at under 2017 lead given Arm- 130 S.Ct. has to not sentenced CO meaningful Instead, opportunity “some to ob- parole, possibility of life without the maturity on tain release demonstrated she sentenced to two consecutive sen- based years forty-eight separate and rehabilitation.” tences two 35(c) degree of the Rules of Criminal 2. a second 2. Rule Whether conviction challenge con- theory a defendant to a complicity Procedure allows is a non- murder under grounds. on viction or sentence constitutional meaning offense homicide within 35(c)(2)(I). See Crim. P. Florida, Graham v. following granted 3. certiorari to consider issues: Miller 4.Because we conclude that by ex Whether the erred do tending Graham v. tences, question we need not address (2010), S.Ct. 2011 Miller v. Ala conviction murder U.S. theory is complicity a nonhomicide to invalidate a consecutive juvenile imposed on a those decisions. fense under multiple offenses. reasons, majority, I like Armstrong’s sentence, albeit on grounds from on different .Accordingly, respectfully
majority relies. judgment by ma-
concur in the reached
jority analysis not in its but issue
presented.
ST. VRAIN SCHOOL RE-1J,
DISTRICT LOVELAND, minor, BY AND
Alexa Rae parents next
THROUGH
friends, Randy Mary LOVELAND and Loveland; Randy
Nicole Loveland Mary Loveland, individually, Nicole
Respondents.
Supreme Court Case 15SC933 Court Colorado.
May