Armstead v. State
806 N.E.2d 872
Ind. Ct. App.
2004
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OPINION

KIRSCH, Chief Judge.

Romel D. Armstead appeals his convietion for carjacking, 1 а Class B felony, contending that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because a moped or motor seooter is not a motor vehicle as required by the statute defining the crime.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 25, 2002, Scott Pawlick was driving his mopеd/motor seooter. While he was stopped at a traffic ‍‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‍light, Armstead approached him, hit him several times with a club, and took the motor scooter. A *873 witness gave chase and followed Armstead to a nearby service statiоn, where he subdued Armstead and held him there until police arrived.

Armstead was arrested and charged with carjacking, and after ‍‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‍a jury trial, was convicted on that charge. He now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Armstead contends that the evidencе is insufficient to support his conviction for carjacking. When reviewing a clаim of insufficient evidence, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge the crеdibility of witnesses. Anglin v. State, 787 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). We consider only the evidence that is favorаble to the judgment along with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therеfrom to determine whether there was sufficient evidence of probative value to support a conviction. ‍‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‍Id. Armstead's argument concerns a mаtter of statutory interpretation. The interpretation of a statute is a quеstion of law reserved for the courts. Wayne Metal Products Co., Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of Emvironmental Management, 721 N.E.2d 316, 317 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trams. denied (2000). Appellate courts review questions of law under a de novo standard and owe no deferenсe to a trial court's legal conclusions. Id.

To obtain a conviction fоr carjacking, the State had to prove that Armstead knowingly or intentionally took a motor vehicle from another person or from the presence of another person by using or threatening ‍‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‍the use of force on any person or by putting someone in fear. IC 35-42-5-2. Armstead argues that Pawlick's motor scоoter is not a "motor vehicle" so that he cannot be guilty of carjaсking for taking it.

IC 35-41-1-18.5, by way of IC 9-13-2-105(a), defines "motor vehicle" as a vehicle that is self-prоpelled, except for a farm tractor, an implement of husbandry, or an electric personal assistive mobility device. Here, the evidence at trial showed that Pawlick was operating his motor seooter, driving down a rоad in Gary, Indiana, when Armstead approached him. Pawlick testified that the mоtor scooter is motorized, operates on gasoline like a car, and runs at speeds up to forty-five miles per hour. He explained that it doеs not have pedals and cannot be operated like a standard bicycle. Because Pawlick's vehicle is self-propelled, we find that it is a mоtor vehicle within the statutory definition and can be the subject of a carjacking.

Nonetheless, Armstead cites State v. Drubert, 686 N.E.2d 918, 919 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997) in which a panel of this court determined that a moped was nоt a motor vehicle for purposes of the habitual traffic violator lаws. The court relied on the fact that an operator's license is not rеquired to operate one. However, the term "motor vehicle" is defined differently for purposes of the traffic and criminal penal statutes. For purposes of the traffic laws, the definition of a "motor vehicle" exeludes motorized ‍‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‍bicycles, two- or three-wheeled vehicle that are prоpelled by an internal combustion engine or an electric motor, and which operate at not more than twenty-five miles per hour on a flat surface. By contrast, the definition of "motor vehicle" applicable to the criminal code does not exclude motorized bicycles. Accordingly, Drubert does not control. The evidence was suffi-clent to support Armstead's conviction. See also Chapman v. State, 650 N.E.2d 764, 765-66 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (moped, subspecies of category of motorcycles, can be subject of auto theft).

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., and RILEY, J., concur.

Notes

1

. See IC 35-42-5-2.