Armstead v. StateArmstead v. State
Brenda Armstead petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See
Armstead has technically not filed a response to the order to show cause. Instead, she has returned her original copy of the order to show cause with scribblings in the margins. Most of these comments are similar to her other pleadings—incomprehensible. Further, since the order to show cause was issued, Armstead has continued to file numerous, incomprehensible pleadings.
We must conclude that Armstead‘s “response” provides no reason whatsoever why this Court should not sanction her as proposed in the order to show cause. We have previously noted that this Court has the inherent power to regulate and sanction a litigant who disrupts its proceedings when such litigation becomes so disruptive that it threatens to deny other litigants their rights. See Jackson v. Florida Dep‘t of Corrections, 790 So.2d 398, 400-01 (Fla. 2001); see generally Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (concerning a court‘s inherent power to sanction a litigant who employs bad faith in filing frivolous pleadings despite any lack of specific statutory or rule authority); United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir.1991) (same); Patsy v. Patsy, 666
Like this Court, the Supreme Court has had to confront the bitter realization that significant restraints must be placed on some of its pro se litigants in order to ensure access to the courts in general. See id. The Supreme Court stated:
A part of the Court‘s responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice. The continual processing of petitioner‘s frivolous requests for extraordinary writs does not promote that end.
Id. We have previously recognized that “[t]he resources of our court system are finite and must be reserved for the resolution of genuine disputes.” Rivera v. State, 728 So.2d 1165, 1166 (Fla.1998). Further, as the Fifth District Court of Appeal noted many years ago in Platel v. Voorhis & Wells, P.A., 436 So.2d 303, 304 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), in reference to another litigant:
The consequence of Mr. Platel‘s litigious disposition and apparent lack of legal training is that this court has been inundated with voluminous and, for the most part, incomprehensible documents from him. This court has spent an unreasonable amount of time and effort attempting to decipher his pleadings, often with no success.
This court recognizes the constitutional mandate that courts be open to all persons under
Article I, § 21, Florida Constitution . Because the judicial process is the recognized dispute-settlement method, access to courts should not be placed beyond the reach of any citizen. However, when one person, by his activities, upsets the normal procedure of the court so as to interfere with the causes of other litigants, it is necessary to exercise restraint upon that person. ...
Likewise, we conclude that Armstead‘s activities have sufficiently upset the normal procedures of this Court such that we find it necessary to exercise restraint upon her ability to file petitions in this Court. Therefore, at this time, we hereby dismiss the instant petition for habeas corpus as facially insufficient. Henceforth, this Court will not accept for filing any pleadings, petitions, motions, documents, or other filings from Armstead that are facially insufficient or incomprehensible. All such filings will be placed in an inactive file with no further action or response. Pleadings will neither be acknowledged nor returned. Upon this case becoming final, all of Armstead‘s other pending cases also will be dismissed because they are facially insufficient.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.