113 Mo. 12 | Mo. | 1892
On the twenty-third of October, 1887, the plaintiff company commenced an action of attachment against Charles R. Smith, a non-resident of this state, upon two promissory notes, amounting to over $41,000. A writ of attachment was issued, and on the the same day the sheriff summoned the St. Louis National Bank, as garnishee, which in its answer to interrogations stated that it had in its custody three certificates of stock, numbers 151, 152 and 153, issued to Charles R. Smith by the Colorado, Chicago & Texas
I. It is a well settled principle of law that stock in a corporation cannot be attached or subjected to a garnishee process unless authorized by express statute. Drake on Attachments, sec. 244; Foster v. Potter, 37 Mo. 526; Plimpton v. Bigelow, 93 N. Y. 593. And the question presented by this record for decision involves the construction of the several sections of our statute on the subject of the seizure and sale of shares of stock in a corporation under execution and attachment. Section 540, Revised Statutes, 1889,.
Turning to the statutes in regard to executions, we find that sections 4915, 4924, 4925 and 4953 in substance provide that shares of stock in corporations may be sold under execution; that, when an execution is issued against a person owning shares of stock in any corporation, it shall be the duty of the secretary or other officer to furnish to the sheriff a certificate of the number of shares held by the defendant, with the incumbrance thereon; that the levy shall be made by leaving a copy of the writ with the secretary or other officer with a certificate attested by the officer; that he levies upon and takes such shares to satisfy the execution; and that when such shares are sold the officer shall execute and deliver to the purchaser a bill of sale conveying the same, and leave with the secretary of the corporation a copy of the execution and his return thereon, and the purchaser shall, thereupon, be entitled to all dividends and stock, and to the same privileges as a member of such corporation as the debtor was entitled to.
In regard to these provisions we remark in the first place that in our judgment they apply to domestic corporations alone. It is true, they are general enough to embrace corporations of other states and countries, but their details, prescribing the manner of seizing and conveying the shares of stock, point unerringly, not only to corporations organized under the laws of this state, but also to corporations alone whose place of business is within the county and jurisdiction of the officer making the levy and sale. Beyond question
In the second place we say the court acquired no jurisdiction of the res in this case, because the levy
II. But it is earnestly insisted that the certificates of the stock were choses in action, and as such were specifically subject to garnishment process under the writ of attachment. There has been much discussion as to'the nature of the property of a shareholder in the stock of a corporation. “The right,” says the court of appeals of New York in Plimpton v. Bigelow, supra, “which a shareholder in a corporation has, by reason of his ownership of shares, is a right to participate, according to the amount of his stock, in the surplus profits of the corporation on a division and ultimately on its dissolution in the assets remaining after the payment of its debts.
Chief Justice Shaw, by way of a definition of a share of stock, says: “The right is, strictly speaking, a right to participate, in a certain proportion, in the immunities and benefits of the corporation; to vote in the choice of their officers; to share in the dividends of profits and to receive an aliquot part of the capital on winding up and terminating the active existence and operations of the corporation.” Fisher v. Essex
In Young v. Iron Co., 4 Am. St. Rep. 752, the supreme court of Tennessee said: “If the presence within the state of the stock certificates was essential in determining the situs of the stock, then it is admitted that the certificates were, both in contemplation of law as well as in fact, with the person of Powell, who was a non-resident. But these stock certificates were the mere evidences of the ownership of the shares — '-indicia of his interest in the earnings and profits of the company. Their seizure by an execution or by an attachment would not be a seizure or levy upon the stock itself without more. Notice to the corporation, or to the officer having charge of the books of the
In Foster v. Potter, i supra, this court held that without an express statute shares of stock even of domestic corporations could not be seized as personal property or evidences of debt, and, if this cannot be done, it is too plain for argument, that the shares óf stock in a foreign corporation cannot be levied on by simply seizing a certificate which may happen to be in this state.
It is not necessary in this case to define the limits of legislative power to authorize the seizure and sale, under judicial process for the payment of debts, of certificates of stock of foreign corporations found in this state. It is sufficient for our present purpose to say that the legislature has not yet seen proper to go that far. Our statute in regard to the sale of shares of stock under attachment and execution applies, as we have seen, to domestic corporations only, and it points out a specific mode by which the levy and sale must be made, which in this case was not and could not be pursued.
The judgment will be affirmed.