304 F.2d 404 | D.C. Cir. | 1962
Lead Opinion
Armour and Company filed suit November 6, 1961, in the United States District Court against Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture,
Armour moved for a preliminary injunction and the appellees moved for summary judgment. At the hearing on the motions it was made to appear that
After making findings of fact, the District Court concluded “There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture * * * acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in adopting the amendments here in issue.” It also concluded Armour would not suffer irreparable injury from the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction and that the public interest would be adversely affected if such an injunction were granted. Consequently, an order was entered denying the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment and also denying Armour’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Armour appeals.
On consideration of the papers before us, we think it was clearly error to deny Armour’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
Irreparable injury to Armour from the enforcement of the regulation is apparent without demonstration, for the attempted marketing of meat products thus officially required to be grossly misbrand-ed could not fail to damage its good name. Withdrawal from the interstate market— Armour’s only other alternative — would of course cause loss of profits which could never be recaptured.
We see nothing in the record before us to indicate the public interest would be adversely affected by the grant of a preliminary injunction. The requirements of the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers case
Reversed and remanded.
On Appellees’ Motion for an En Banc Rehearing of Motion to Extend Time to File Petition for Rehearing.
Mr. John G. Laughlin, Jr., Atty., Dept, of Justice, was oh the motion for appel-lees.
Mr. Harry A. Inman, Washington, D. C., was on the opposition for appellant.
ORDER — Filed April 2, 1962
This cause came on for consideration of appellees' motion for en banc rehearing of their motion to extend the time-fixed by our Rule 26, 28 U.S.C.A., within which they might file a petition for rehearing, an extension having theretofore been denied by the Chief Judge after consideration of the motion and appellant’s opposition thereto. It appearing to the court that no valid reason has been shown for the extension sought, and that an extension would be unfair to the appellant, it is
The opinion was handed down February 8, 1962, and a petition for rehearing was lodged with the Clerk March 9— about two weeks after the time for filing had expired. Although the tardily tendered petition is not being received for filing, the court has examined it and found it without merit. It follows that, had the petition for rehearing been seasonably tendered and formally filed, it would have been denied.
Motion denied.
EDGERTON, BAZELON, FAHY and WASHINGTON, Circuit Judges, dissent.
(in support of the foregoing order).
This case originally came before us on appeal from an interlocutory order of the District Court denying Armour’s motion that the Secretary of Agriculture be preliminarily enjoined from enforcing his regulation that the label Imitation Ham must be attached to hams which contain a certain percentage of added moisture due to the curing process. In a unanimous opinion handed down February 8, 1962, we held a preliminary injunction should have been issued.
Our Rule 26, 28 U.S.C.A., provides that a petition for rehearing may be filed within fifteen days after judgment or decision, “unless the time is shortened or enlarged by the court or a judge thereof.” It applies to all litigants, and does not provide that extensions of time shall be automatically granted when requested. On the thirteenth day of his fifteen-day period, the Secretary of Agriculture moved for an extension of time within which he might file a petition for rehearing. It is a weighty matter, he said in effect, to decide whether his Imitation Ham regulation should be suspended 'pendente lite, and he needed more than fifteen days allowed by the Rule to prepare and present .his argument for rehearing.
As Chief Judge, I considered the motion and opposition and denied the extension, because I was convinced there was no excuse for the Secretary’s inaction, that further delay would be unfair to Armour, and that the preliminary injunction we ordered February 8 should be made effective.
The matter is now before us on the Secretary’s motion for en banc reconsideration of the application for extension of time within which to file a petition for rehearing, and we have denied it in the foregoing order. As four members of the court favor overruling my denial of enlargement of time, and have filed a dissent from the above order, I think it proper to state why I denied the extension in the first place.
The notion that grave departmental deliberation had to precede a decision to seek rehearing in this case is, of course, absurd. The decision could have been— and in all probability was — made within thirty minutes after reading our opinion. The case is simple, and our opinion is brief and, I think, reasonably clear. A petition for rehearing could easily have been prepared in two or three hours.
Any suggestion that our opinion of February 8 decided the case on the merits is without foundation. We carefully stated we were deciding as we did on the basis of the record as then constituted. We said, inter alia:
“On consideration of the papers before us, we think it was clearly error to deny Armour’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The Secretary’s amendatory regulation, which is under attack, is capricious and arbitrary on its face in requiring a packer to label a genuine ham as Imitation Ham, thus forcing him into violating the statute which forbids misbranding; and nothing in the record as presently constituted supports or justifies such an enforced distortion of the truth. The Secretary could easily have made this litigation unnecessary by mere-*408 Iy requiring that Jabela on moist hams bear a legend showing the nature and extent of the added moisture. Instead, he chose to require the false and deceptive Imitation Ham label.
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“ * * * Upon remand, such an injunction should be entered. Thereupon, the appellees will of course have an opportunity to plead in justification of their position, and to introduce proof on the issues formed by the pleadings.” (Emphasis added.)
Of course we considered, on the basis of the then present record, whether Armour probably would prevail on the merits. Surely nobody will say that was improper. After considering the papers before us, we decided Armour probably would prevail, and that was one of the reasons for directing a preliminary injunction. The leg of a pig is a natural product, and a ham is still a part of a pig’s leg even though treated with a curing solution. The injection of moisture cannot transform it into an imitation of a real ham.
There may be cases indicating that a manufactured product should be labeled “imitation” if it does not conform to accepted standards for that product; or that a synthetic product which approximates the properties of a natural product, but in fact is not that product, should bear the label “imitation.” But such cases cannot apply here: a natural ham is not made into a manufactured or synthetic imitation of a real ham because it has been subjected to a curing process which leaves in it a residue of moisture.
I repeat these sentences from our opinion:
“ * * * The Secretary could easily have made this litigation unnecessary by merely requiring that labels cn moist hams bear a legend showing the nature and extent of the added moisture. Instead, he chose to require the false and deceptive Imitation Ham label.”
In fact, in oral argument, it was suggested from the bench that the case could easily be disposed of if the regulation were changed in that manner so as to reflect the facts; the Secretary has not accepted the suggestion.
In spite of the denial of his motion for more time, the Secretary of Agriculture lodged a petition for rehearing with the Clerk on March 9 — some two weeks after it was due. Although it has not been filed, we have examined it and have decided it states ho reason for changing the conclusion we reached in our opinion of February 8. Hence, the foregoing order is being entered.
I am authorized to say Judges Pretty-man, Danaher, Bastían and Burger concur in the order and in this statement. Judge Prettyman will file a concurring opinion at a later date.
(Judge Prettyman’s concurring opinion, filed April 13, 19C2, follows.)
I agree with Chief Judge Miller’s opinion, but in view of the Government’s vehement insistence upon its position I add some further comments.
As my brother Bazelon points out, our function in reviewing the denial of a preliminary injunction by the District Court is to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion, and one factor in that consideration is the likelihood that the movant will ultimately prevail on the merits.
The regulation
The presently acute controversy, however, arises upon a collateral result of the foregoing basic mandate. If the proposed regulation is promulgated, say the defendant officials, all hams offered for sale weighing more than their original, uncured weight, must bear a label Imitation Ham. Defendant Clarkson, Administrator of the Agricultural Research Service, states in an affidavit in the record, “The amended regulations will protect the consumer by providing that products not meeting the moisture requirements of the regulations shall be identified as ‘Imitation’.” Defendant officials repeat that assertion in their brief here. On the fore-page of its brief, where our rules require that the questions presented by the appeal be stated, appellant states one question only. It is:
“Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying appellant a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of an amendment to certain federal meat inspection regulations promulgated by the appel-lees requiring that certain of appellant’s smoked pork products, no different than its other smoked pork products except that they contain up to 10% more moisture, bear the label ‘Imitation’ rather than some other label such as ‘Containing Not More Than 10 Per Cent Added Moisture’ when produced in appellant’s federally inspected plants?”
In their statement of the questions presented, the defendant officials do not mention the label. However we found from the record before us that the label issue is a real one of considerable consequence. We therefore had to, and did, deal with it in so far as it was posed on the papers in the record thus far.
The weight problem in respect to hams involves their moisture content. Hams, of course, are cured pork. In the curing process water is added to the meat. The Secretary would require that this extra moisture be dried out of the product before sale. The proposed regulation would require packers to proclaim that a ham containing more water than was in the original, uncured article, is an “imitation ham”. Such a label, says the plaintiff, is deceptive, false, unauthorized by the statute, and the requirement is therefore arbitrary, capricious and illegal.
As authority for their labeling requirement the defendant officials point to another, long-established regulation which reads:
“(b) A label for product which is in imitation of another food shall bear the word ‘imitation’ immediately preceding the name of the food imitated and in the same size and style of lettering as in that name and immediately thereafter the word ‘ingredients’ and the names of the*410 ingredients arranged in the order of their predominance.”4
The quoted regulation treats of a label for a “product which is in imitation of another food". So the validity of the proposed regulation, under authority of the regulation just quoted, depends upon whether a ham weighing more than its initial, uncured weight by reason of added water is in imitation of some product other than ham. Of course it is not. Everybody knows that a ham made of the cured thigh of a hog and otherwise unaltered save by the addition of a bit of water is not an imitation of some product other than ham. It may be more moist than the unwetted pork meat, but it is still ham if it is cured hog thigh. As a matter of plain fact, such a ham is not even an imitation ham. It is a real ham, a ham by definition and by universal common acceptance. When a housewife, presented with a dry ham, soaks it in water or boils it, thus adding moisture, she knows, and everyone knows, that she has not thereby transmuted the real ham into an imitation .ham. This understanding is common knowledge. If you add water to a ham, what other product do you imitate? Obviously no other product. Since the regulation relied upon by the Secretary validates an Imitation label only for a product which is an imitation of another product, the foregoing plain facts should end the matter.
But there is another conclusive provision in the statute itself. It prohibits sale of any meat product “under any false or deceptive name”.
“The correct standard was the reaction of the ordinary consumer under such circumstances as attended retail distribution of this product. When a statute leaves such a matter as this without specification, the normal inference is that the legislature contemplated the reaction of the ordinary person who is neither savant nor dolt, who lacks special competency with reference to the matter at hand but has and exercises a normal measure of the layman’s common sense and judgment."7
“Ham" and “imitation” are ordinary words with well-established meanings. They are contradictory words. An imitation cannot be a genuine; the two terms are antithetical. Water and other similar inert additives do not transform a genuine article into an imitation in common understanding — or in scientific understanding either, for that matter. Real drugs bottled with water are not “imitations” of the drugs. Boric acid sold in solution as an eyewash is not imitation boric acid. Whiskey-and-water is not imitation whiskey. As Chief Judge Miller points out, real peaches canned in syrup are not Imitation Peaches. The addition of 10 per cent water content (which is what is at issue here) does not change a ham into an imitation. I think the label here required by the Government is a false label.
The other critical word in the statute governing labels is “deceptive”. This means, according to the unanimous authorities, deceptive of the consumers to whom the product is offered for sale. These consumers, in major measure in respect to hams, are the housewives of the country. No article of food is more familiar to them. This is a staple of the American table — ham and eggs for
And this brings me close to the serious phase of this aifair. There are, I suppose, packaged foods which are truly “imitation hams”, containing foodstuffs other than the cured hind leg of a pig. Suppose two packages sit side by side on a grocer’s shelf. One contains a real ham, with a bit of water added. The other contains a composite substance, not cured pork, made up to resemble ham. Both are labeled Imitation Ham. Is the shopping housewife deceived? To my way of thinking, an unconscionable fraud is being perpetrated on her by order of the Government. I suggest that when she realizes that genuine and ersatz are alike required to be labeled “imitation” her faith in the processes of the Government to protect her in her purchases of food for her family will surely dissolve into disbelief of the rawest sort. A serious infraction of the faith upon which our citizens live and upon which the Government exists would be in the making. It would start, not in some cloistered, contemplative atmosphere, but on the shelves of the markets where people in the mass come into direct contact with the Government and its operation. Faith in government at this point, faith in the veracity, the objectiveness, the accuracy of government agencies at this level, in affairs such as these, are the priceless, irreplaceable ingredients of democratic government. We should brook no loose handling in these mundane but delicate matters. If executive officials fail here, or grow autocratic, the judicial branch of government must bring them within the confines of their duty.
I return to the statement of Chief Judge Miller. This controversy could be avoided if the Secretary would require simply that ham with water be labeled ham with water, thus indicating its true nature and content.
I now examine the official reasoning supporting the label requirement. The defendant officials say that “As far back as October 1, 1925, the word ‘Imitation’ had been required by the regulations to be applied to meat food products simulat
The defendant officials say the purpose of the label Imitation on these hams is to protect consumers, "the public’s interest in knowing what it buys and getting what it pays for”. Just how a label Imitation on a genuine ham, overweight because of water content, tends to show the public what it buys escapes me. The public, by that label, is told it is not buying genuine ham. That information is not true, and is not in the public interest as I see it.
A copy of the required label is an exhibit in the record before us. A look at it fails to disclose consumer protection of any sort. Besides the Imitation Ham in large letters, and some cooking instructions, the label has this: “Ingredients: Pork Ham, Water, Salt, Sodium Tripolyphosphate, Sugar and Sodium Nitrate.” The label does not show the amount or percentage of water content! The ingredients listed would be the same whether the ham was green weight or weighted with additional water! Even if a consumer were alerted by the scare-head Imitation Ham, he would learn nothing from the rest of the label. He could not tell what amount of water was in the ham or whether it was dry or moist. He would be left to believe that the product in the package was an imitation, not a real ham.
The chemicals named among the listed ingredients are those used in the curing process. They are the same whether the added water is left in the ham or is dried out as the Government would require. The authorities make no point about these chemicals; they do not suggest that consumers need be protected against these ingredients. The label requirements involved in this case have nothing whatsoever to do with deleteriousness, harmfulness or adulteration. Ham is a healthful product with or without water, indeed one of the healthiest products on the American market. The proposed regulation is aimed at controlling the weight of the ham and its moisture, and nothing else.
The protection which the Government says the label affords consumers is against economic deception. Water, says the Government, is a cheap and simple means of economic adulteration. The papers now before us contain uncontra-dicted affidavits, filed by plaintiff, asserting that as the water content of hams has increased the price has decreased; so that, as a fact, the price of the protein has remained relatively constant. The Government has made no factual allegation as to price. It did not in its pleadings or affidavits supply any factual support for this argument as to economic adulteration. It has not alleged as a fact that the added water content increased the price of the protein content.
In support of this contention the Government makes a statement that ham with water added is an inferior ham. Appellant says to the contrary. This, of course, poses an issue of fact which must be tried on the merits. We note it here only because the Government asserts it as justification for the label. We consider it only for that purpose, and only on the papers now before us. All the evidence in those papers, including Government statements in December, 1960, is to the contrary of the Government’s present contention. A statement by a deputy administrator of the Agricultural Research Service, repeated at hearings on the now-proposed regulation, was that Department scientists found that the drying-out back to uncured weight caused some loss of proteins, fats and other nutrients. Appellant alleges that hams produced under the former regulation (i. e., with up to 10 per cent water
Defendant officials say that a label showing the water content of a ham would not suffice, because “consumers do not read everything on a label” and even those who read such a label of water content might not, understand it. This reasoning is a blow at the whole theory of labeling. It is wholly untenable. Then follows this, to me amazing, justification for the proposed label requirement:
“The presence of the word ‘imitation,’ however, serves as a signal designed to alert even the most complacent or undiscerning consumer that the product he is buying is not all that it might appear to be. The word invites inquiry as to the nature of the product they are buying and this they may determine by the statement of contents appearing on the label.”
Of course this sort of in terrorem labeling is used where danger lurks in an article — Beware, Poison, etc. But for the Government to require a label Imitation on a genuine article, in order to invite inquiry as to the weight of the water content, seems to me to be wholly without reasonable warrant.
The defendant officials say the effect of the prior regulation (effective from December, 1960) was to permit the marketing of wet hams without special labeling, and that this caused heavy protest and vigorous opposition. They do net say the protests urged the label Imitation, and such a label is surely not the only special label ayailable to indicate added water.
To my mind, the reasoning in the defendants’ brief here is a curious bit of syllogistic effervescence. They say they had deemed it best for consumer protection to set up standards for hamburgers and sausage. Of course so; if any meat products on the market require an authoritative prescription of ingredients, these are such products. They say a deviation from those standards requires special labeling. Quite correct, I think. But I cannot follow the jump in reasoning from labels showing the ingredients of sausage and hamburger to a label “imitation” on a ham containing only water. The mental process seems to be that since the Secretary can prescribe ingredients he can require any deviation from his prescription to be labeled "imitation”. That the word “imitation” has a factual meaning in ordinary usage has no place in this reasoning. The assumption seems to be that since he can prescribe labels for deviations from standards he can use any words he chooses for those labels. To my mind this is not only logistically fallacious but is a flat violation of the whole statute on labeling and branding.
We are told that this policy of labeling “imitation” any variation from unmodified purity runs all through the administration of the pure food and drug laws. If this were so, I for one would advocate that the whole enforcement machinery of these statutes be overhauled and made to conform to terms understandable to consumers. But I do not find this to be so. Of course labels bearing the word are commonplace, as the defendants say. There are many, vast numbers I would suppose, of imitation, counterfeit, fake, synthetic, ersatz, spurious foods and drugs. The statute repeatedly uses the word in its true sense. It talks about “imitation butter”
My own opinion is that the Secretary’s regulation is illegal on its face as a matter of law. His authority under the statute is to prescribe labels which are not deceptive to consumers. He has no power to require a label which is deceptive in its use of words of common usage and meaning.
I would not have written at such length had not the defendant officials so vigorously insisted upon' what seems to me to be a wholly untenable position, and had not that position involved a gross deception (or so it seems to me) of plain, ordinary people in the mass. If the Government can do this in this case, in what case can it not require labels using words in an assumed sense opposite to their ordinary meaning?
On the second factor which, as my brother BAZELON points out, must be considered by us, we concluded that plaintiff is suffering irreparable harm. We were of opinion that every day on which plaintiff is compelled by Government edict to sell genuine products as imitations, it is suffering injury to its reputation and enormous, irrecoverable losses in profits.
In summary my view is:
(1) No authoritative support is offered, or exists, for the proposed label regulation, so far as the papers presently on file are concerned;
(2) the proposed label is false;
(3) the proposed label is deceptive to consumers;
(4) the proposed label is illegal;
(5) no excuse exists for insistence upon this label, as all recognizable purposes could easily be achieved by a simple, accurate labeling, indicating the proportion of water content in these hams;
(6) the proposed label is contrary to the public interest in the most serious sense; and
(7) the trial judge, in the applicable legal idiom, abused his discretion in denying the preliminary injunction.
I have tried to treat seriously and soberly the Government's contentions in respect to this label, although much of its argument seems to me to border on the fantastic.
. M. R. Clnrkson, Acting Administrator of the Department’s Agricultural Research Service, was also sued.
. The regulation concerning the use of the word imitation in the labeling of food products, which the challenged amendment made applicable to moist hams, is 9 C.F.R. § 17.8(b) (1959). If is as follows:
“(b) A label for product which is in imitation of another food shall bear the word ‘imitation’ immediately preceding the name of the food imitated and in the same size and style of lettering as in that name and immediately thereafter the word ‘ingredients’ and the names of the ingredients arranged in the order of their predominance.”
.Act of March 4, 1907, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1260, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 74, 75. The language quoted above is in § 75.
. Cox v. Democratic Central Committee, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 416, 200 F.2d 358 (1952).
. Virginia Pet. Jobbers Ass’n v. Federal Power Comm’n, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921 (1958).
. Virginia Petroleum Job. Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm., 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 110, 250 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C.Cir.1958) ; Embassy Dairy v. Camalier, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 364, 367, 211 F.2d 41, 43 (D.C.Cir.1954) ; Perry v. Perry, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 337, 338, 190 F.2d 601, 602 (D.C.Cir.1951).
. 9 C.F.R. § 17.8(c) (49), (54) (Supp. 19C2).
. 34 Stat. 1204 (1907), 21 U.S.C.A. § 89.
. 9 C.F.R. § 17.8(b) (1959).
. 34 Stat. 1202 (1907), 21 U.S.C.A. § 75.
. 9 C.F.R. § 17.8(a) (1959).
.United States v. 88 Cases, More or Less, Etc., 187 F.2d 967, 971 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861, 72 S.Ct. 88, 96 L.Ed. 648 (1951).
. See 62. Cases, etc., of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 599, 71 S.Ct. 515, 95 L.Ed. 566 (1951), where Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking of the word “imitation" in 21 U.S.C.A. § 343(c), said: “In that section Congress did not give an esoteric meaning to ‘imitation.’ It left it to the understanding of ordinary English speech.”
. See United States v. 95 Barrels of Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438, 443-444, 44 S.Ct. 529, 68 L.Ed. 1094 (1924) ; United States v. Lexington Mill Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409, 34 S.Ct. 337, 58 L.Ed. 658 (1914).
. See Brougham v. Blanton Mfg. Co., 249 U.S 495, 500, 39 S.Ct. 363, 63 L.Ed. 725 (1919) ; Houston v. St. Louis Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479, 483-484, 39 S.Ct. 332, 63 L.Ed. 717 (1919).
. Cf. Nolan v. Morgan, 69 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir. 1934).
. 21 U.S.C.A. § 25.
. Id. § 61.
. Id. § 352.
. See 62 Cases, etc., of Jam v. United States, supra note 8.
. 21 U.S.C.A. 5 352(e).
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
The Court’s action today is the latest phase in a controversy over the Secretary of Agriculture’s regulations governing the content and labeling of smoked products moving in interstate commerce. In the period 1952-60, the Secretary’s regulations had required that the weight of smoked cured products, including hams, not exceed the weight of the fresh uncured article.
The regulations were amended in December 1960 to permit cured hams to weigh ten percent more than the fresh, uncured product.
Just before the Secretary’s order reinstating the earlier regulations became effective, Armour brought suit attacking their validity and seeking a permanent injunction against their enforcement. Ai’mour also moved for a preliminary injunction pendente lite. The District Court denied the motion, and Armour appealed. We rejected Armour’s application to stay the effective date of the regulations pending appeal. Thereafter the appeal was heard and this Court reversed the District Court in an opinion which, in terms, held that’ the Secretary’s imitation labeling requirement was “arbitrary and capricious on its face.” The validity of that requirement had not been challenged in the complaint below: what had been challenged was the Secretary’s directive that smoked meats moving in interstate commerce be processed to “green” (i. e., uncured) weight.
Before expiration of the period for seeking rehearing, the Secretary requested an extension of time in which to file a petition for rehearing in banc. That request was denied by the Chief Judge after the period for filing a timely petition had expired. The case is now before us on the Secretary’s petition for a rehearing in banc of that denial. I vote to allow the Secretary to file the petition for rehearing of this Court’s decision granting preliminary relief.
In support of its motion for an extension of time, the Government alleges in substance that the Court’s characterization of the regulation as “arbitrary and capricious on its face” and as “forcing packers to violate the statute” is virtually a conclusive adjudication of the merits of the controversy.
Our records show that a litigant’s first request for a reasonable extension of time to file a petition for rehearing is ordinarily granted as a matter of course. Moreover, there are compelling reasons for granting an extension here.
The injury to Armour is hardly sufficient to warrant our extraordinary haste. The opinion says injury “is apparent without demonstration” because Armour’s good name will be besmirched if it is compelled to market its watered ham': under the label Imitation. The District Court did not agree. Nor do I.
I think, moreover, there are strong arguments in support of the Secretary’s authority to issue the challenged regulations. Under the Meat Inspection Act of 1907,
der to implement the statute, the Secretary of Agriculture has long specified the ingredients which may be included in certain products. His power to do so was upheld in Houston v. St. Louis Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479, 39 S.Ct. 332, 63 L. Ed. 717 (1919), where a meat packer protested the Secretary’s determination that water or ice must not exceed three percent and cereal two percent of the weight of a product labeled “sausage.” The issue there was whether the Secretary could refuse to stamp a product “inspected and passed” which did not comply with the regulation. The Court held that he could, pursuant to the section of the statute to which we have just referred. Indeed, the Court said:
“Whether or not the term ‘sausage,’ when applied to the product of the appellee, in which more than the permitted amount of cereal and water is used, is false and deceptive is a question of fact, the determination of which is committed to the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture by the authority given him to make rules and regulations.for giving effect to the act, and the law is that the conclusion of the head of an executive department on such a question will not be reviewed by the courts where it is fairly arrived at with substantial evidence to support it.” [249 U.S. at 484, 39 S.Ct. at 334.]
It would appear that the regulation specifying the water which may be added to a product labeled “ham” may be valid under the authority of the Houston case. See also Brougham v. Blanton Mfg. Co., 249 U.S. 495, 39 S.Ct. 363, 63 L.Ed. 725 (1919).
There is also authority for the Secretary’s use of the word “imitation” to describe a product which does not conform to the standards he has established — although this Court’s opinion seems to say that such usage is itself misbranding.
“ * * * nothing can be legally ‘jam’ after the Administrator promulgated his regulation in 1940, 5 Fed.Reg. 3554, 21 C.F.R. § 29.0, unless it contains the specified ingredients in prescribed proportion. Hence the product in controversy is not ‘jam.’ It cannot lawfully be labeled ‘jam’ and introduced into interstate commerce, for to do so would ‘represent’ as a standardized food a product which does not meet prescribed specifications.
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“ * * * the name ‘imitation jam’ at once connotes precisely what the product is: a different, an inferior preserve, not meeting the defined specifications. * * * A product so labeled [as imitation] is described with precise accuracy. It neither conveys any ambiguity nor emanates any untrue innuendo, as was the case with ‘Bred Spred’ considered by Congress in its deliberation on § 403(g). See H.R.Rep.No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5; House Hearings on H.R. 6906, 8805, 8941 and S. 5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47. It purports and is represented to be only what it is — an imitation. It does not purport nor represent to be what it is not—the Administrator’s genuine ‘jam.’ ” [340 U.S. at 599-600, 71 S.Ct. at 519-520.]
In the period 1952-60, moreover, the Secretary required watered hams to be labeled Imitation without provoking protest from the industry that his action was arbitrary and capricious. The IMitation label requirement which this Court has struck down has been in force since 1941. Finally, when this suit was instituted, approximately 1,300 labels bearing the legend “Imitation” were on file with the Department of Agriculture and were being used by several hundred packers (including Armour) to identify a host of products (e. g., bologna, chicken, frankfurters, chicken loaf, sausage, salami, and, of course, ham) solely because they did not conform to the Secretary’s standards.
The Secretary contends that in deciding the issue of preliminary relief, this Court’s opinion effectively disposed of the final issues in the case. He finds this in the Court’s statement that:
“The Secretary’s amendatory regulation which is under attack, is capricious and arbitrary on its face in requiring a packer to label a genuine ham as Imitation Ham, thus forcing him into violating the statute which forbids misbranding; and nothing in the record as presently constituted supports or justifies such an enforced distortion of the truth. * * * he chose to require the false and deceptive Imitation Ham label.” [page 405.]
This calls to mind the dissenting opinion of Judge Amidon of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. Houston, 242 F. 337, 346 (1917):
"This case has followed an unusual course, and has led to unfortunate results. When it was here on appeal from the order denying the preliminary injunction, this court, without any judicial investigation of the facts, decided that the name ‘sausage’ could be deprived of its false and deceptive character, when applied to plaintiff’s product, by the use of qualifying words, and ordered the temporary injunction to issue.9 The case then went back to*418 be tried in the lower court upon the merits, but this court had already precluded such an investigation. Our decision was held to be binding upon the trial court that the name was not false and deceptive, and that court was shut up to an investigation of whether plaintiff's product was unwholesome. The result is that the question whether the name is false and deceptive, as used in the channels of trade, is finally decided by this court against the decision of the Department solely on bill and answer, and without any investigation of the question. Fortunately, if this case shall be taken to a higher court for review, our decision on the appeal from the order denying a temporary injunction will be open for re-examination.”
The dissent was vindicated by the Supreme Court. Houston v. St. Louis Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479, 39 S.Ct. 332 (1919), reversing 242 F. 337 (8th Cir. 1917).
Not only does the Government argue that the Court's opinion in this case is too broad, but further that it is otherwise wrong. The question on appeal from the denial of a temporary injunction is whether the District Court abused its discretion. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944). In reviewing the exercise of that discretion, we have said that four factors are to be considered: (1) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction were denied; (2) the likelihood that the Aiovant will prevail on the merits; (3) the effect of granting or denying the motion on the public interest; (4) the effect óf grant or denial upon other interested persons. Virginia Pet. Jobbers’ Ass’n v. Federal Power Comm., 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921 (1958). There is strong reason to believe that the District Court correctly resolved these factors in denying preliminary relief. Accordingly, I would allow the Government to file its petition for rehearing in banc. And only after Armour has had an opportunity to reply would I decide whether a rehearing in banc is warranted.
. 17 Fed.Reg. 4845 (1952) ; 18 Fed.Reg. 7536 (1953).
. 6 Fed.Reg. 1142 (1941), 9 C.F.R. § 17.8 (b).
. 25 Fed.Reg. 13952 (1960).
. In Young v. Motion Picture Ass’n, 112 U.S.App.D.C. -, 299 F.2d 119 (1962), this Court recognized:
“ * * * the general rule that a de* nial of a preliminary injunction will not be set aside on appeal unless the District Court’s action constitutes clear error or abuse of discretion, and that ordinarily this court will not consider the merits of the case further than necessary to determine whether that discretion was abused." [Emphasis supplied. J
. The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 17.
. 34 Stat. 1260 (1907), as amended, 21 U.S.C.A. § 71 (1958).
. Houston v. St. Louis Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479, 39 S.Ct. 332, 63 L.Ed. 717 (1919).
. 34 Stat. 1262 (1907), 21 U.S.C.A. § 75.
. In our case, the Court wrote: “The Secretary could easily have made this litigation unnecessary by merely requiring that labels on moist hams bear a legend showing the nature and extent of the added moisture.” [Slip opinion, pp. 3—4.]