Armijo v. NeherArmijo v. Neher
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Parker
But in regard to the time when the statute of limitations begins to run in favor of a cotenant as to rents and profits received by him over and above his just share, there is much difference of opinion. At common law an ousted cotenant could maintain ejectment and after recovery could maintain trespass for mesne profits against his cotenant. But where there was no ouster the common law furnished no remedy against the cotenant for rents and profits received by him above his just share, except where he was appointed the bailiff of his coten-ant. Freeman Coten. & Par., sec. 269; 17 A. and E. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 688. To remedy this defect the statute of 2 and 5 Anne, ch. 16, sec. 27 was passed, which statute is substantially re-enacted or adopted as a part •of the common law in nearly all the states. 17 A. and E. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 688; Freeman Coten. & Par., secs. 270, 272. That statute created a new relation between cotenants, similar to that of principal and agent or trustee and cestui que trust. This being so, the statute of limitations could be set in motion as to rents and profits received by one cotenant only under such circumstances as would operate in favor of a trustee, such as a repudiation of the relation and adverse holding to the knowledge of the beneficiary. Northcot v. Casper, 6 Ired. Eq. 306; Huff v. McDonald, 22 Ga. 164; Robinson v. Robinson, 173 Mass. 233; McGowan v. Bailey, 179 Pa. St. 470; Almy v.
However, in our view of tbe case it becomes unnecessary to determine which of the two doctrines is the better. All the cases agree that a repudiation of the relation of cotenancy and adverse holding at once starts the running of the statute of limitations, both as to the possession and the rents and profits received. 17 A. and E. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 697. This repudiation of the relation is usually evidenced by a demand to be let into possession and a refusal, in other words an actual ouster or by a demand and refusal to account for rents and’ profits received. In such case no difficulty in determining when the statute was set in motion could arise.
In this case it appears from the pleadings that the plaintiffs in error brought ejectment against their co-tenant, the defendant in error, on August 28, 1896, but it does not appear that plaintiffs in error ever had actual notice of the adverse holding by defendant in error prior to that time. ‘ If the statute of limitations was first set in motion upon the filing of the ejectment suit then the filing of the cross-complaint, by plaintiffs in error, on January 9, 1899, was within the four year period of limitation, and their recovery was in all respects rightful.
It appears however that the entry of defendant in error was long prior to the beginning of the four-year period ante-dating the filing of the cross-complaint. We held (9 N. M. 325), that this entry by the defendant in error was an ouster of the plaintiffs in error. It was not an actual ouster in the sense that notice was brought home to the cotenants of the adverse holding. It was what we may call a constructive ouster, but one which the law recognizes as sufficient to put the cotenant upon notice and to start the running of the statute of limitations at least as to the possession. No good reason can be assigned, it seems to us, for holding this construe-tiye ouster
We therefore hold that the entry of the defendant in error, claiming title under his deed purporting to convey the whole estate, operated as a constructive ouster and notice to his cotenants sufficient to start the statute of limitations in his favor as to the rents and profits received by him. It may be here noticed that at least one of the plaintiffs in error was an infant at the time of the filing of the cross-complaint, but the disability of infancy is not pleaded nor is -it relied upon in the case.
It follows that the plaintiffs in error rightfully recovered their share of the rents and profits in controversy during the four years next prior to the filing of their cross-complaint on January 9, 1899, and that their recovery for rents and profits accruing prior thereto was unjustifiable.
Bnt in this case a different question is presented.
It follows from the foregoing that the plaintiffs in error are entitled to interest on each monthly receipt of rents and profits accruing within four years prior to the filing of their cross-complaint on January 9, 1899 and amounting to $263.54 together with $46.20 erroneously charged against them for repairs and improvements, making a total of $309.74 for which judgment will be rendered against defendant in error in this court.
Mills, C. J., Baker and McFie, JJ., concur.