*1
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
S UPREME C OURT OF THE S TATE OF TAH J ORGE A RMENTA , Appellant , v. IRE A UTHORITY
Appellee . No. 20240540 Heard May 13, 2025 Filed August 7, 2025 On Direct Appeal Third District Court, Salt Lake County The Honorable Coral Sanchez No. 220906811 Attorneys: Terence L. Rooney, J. Adam Sorenson, Salt Lake City, for appellant
Andrew L. Roth, Salt Lake City, for appellee
A SSOCIATE C HIEF J USTICE P EARCE authored the opinion of the Court, in which C HIEF J USTICE D URRANT , J USTICE P ETERSEN , J USTICE H AGEN , and J USTICE P OHLMAN joined. SSOCIATE HIEF J USTICE P EARCE , opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION Jorge Armenta sought medical attention after he
experienced shortness of breath and chest pain. Unified Fire Authority (UFA) emergency medical technicians (EMTs) responded to the 911 call. They evaluated Armenta and told him everything looked normal. One week later, Armenta found himself in the emergency room, suffering a heart attack. Armenta sued UFA, arguing that its failure to properly diagnose him caused him injuries.
¶2 UFA, a governmental entity, moved to dismiss. It argued that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA) shielded it from suit. The district court granted the motion and held that UFA retained governmental immunity for “the activity of . . . providing emergency medical assistance.” See TAH § 63G-7- 201(4)(s)(i). The court also determined that this application of the UGIA did not violate the Utah Constitution’s Open Courts Clause. Armenta contends that the district court erred in both determinations. Because we conclude that the UGIA provides no immunity to UFA in this instance, we need not reach the constitutional question. We reverse the district court’s grant of UFA’s motion to dismiss and remand.
BACKGROUND [1] One November day, Armenta experienced shortness of
breath and chest pain after attending an exercise class. He lost consciousness, and his wife called 911. UFA EMTs responded to the call and, after evaluating Armenta, told him that “everything looked normal” and “a trip to the emergency room was unnecessary.” The EMTs assumed Armenta had experienced an anxiety attack and recommended that he talk to his doctor about managing stress. Armenta’s condition continued to worsen, landing him in
the emergency room one week later—pale, sweaty, and barely able to walk. There, staff told him that he was “having a massive heart attack.” During surgery, doctors “found a 100% blockage of Armenta’s right coronary artery.” Armenta believes that his injuries “will likely lead to heart failure and early death” unless he undergoes a heart transplant. Armenta sued UFA for negligence. He alleges that “the
damage to his heart and the shortening of his life” would have been
[1] “On appeal from a motion to dismiss, we review the facts only as they are alleged in the complaint. We accept the factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gregory v. Shurtleff 2013 UT 18, ¶ 8, 299 P.3d 1098 (cleaned up). We stress that the allegations we recite here have yet to be tested.
avoided if UFA had “properly and timely diagnosed and cared for him.” Armenta contends that UFA breached its duties of care by, among other things, misdiagnosing him. [2] UFA moved to dismiss Armenta’s complaint. It argued that the UGIA provided it immunity from suit. Utah Code subsection 63G-7-201(4)(s)(i) directs that a governmental entity is “immune from suit, and immunity is not waived, for any injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission . . . , if the injury arises out of or in connection with, or results from: . . . providing emergency medical assistance.” The district court applied a three-part test to determine
whether UFA could claim immunity under the UGIA. The court evaluated “(1) whether the activity undertaken is a governmental function; (2) whether governmental immunity was waived for the particular activity; and (3) whether there is an exception to that waiver.” (Quoting Van de Grift v. State , 2013 UT 11, ¶ 8, 299 P.3d 1043.) The court first concluded that “responding to a 911 call
and providing emergency ambulance medical services” was a “governmental function.” The court next determined that the government waived immunity for that activity. (Citing U TAH C ODE § 63G-7-301(2)(i).) And it concluded that the UGIA contained an exception to the waiver that restored immunity: “the activity of . . . providing emergency medical assistance.” See TAH C § 63G-7- 201(4)(s)(i). [3] The court granted UFA’s motion and entered judgment
under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissing UFA from the case. See R. IV . P. 54(b) (allowing a court to
[2] Armenta also sued the Foothill Clinic, LLC (dba Foothill Family Clinic) and a physician assistant he had consulted at that practice, alleging the same claims against them. Armenta’s claims against these defendants are not relevant to this appeal.
[3] The court also considered and rejected Armenta’s argument that this application of the UGIA violates the Utah Constitution’s Open Courts Clause. Because we conclude that the UGIA does not extend immunity to UFA in this circumstance, we do not reach the merits of that decision.
“enter judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties”). Armenta appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 Armenta contends that the district court erred when it
granted UFA’s motion to dismiss. A “district court’s dismissal of a
complaint under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure”
and its interpretation of a statute are legal questions that we review
for correctness.
Phillips v. Henderson
,
ANALYSIS The UGIA protects governmental entities and employees
from some lawsuits for torts committed within the scope of their employment. See generally §§ 63G-7-101 to -904. That immunity is retained “unless [it] has been expressly waived.” Id. § 63G-7-101(3). But “even if immunity from suit for the injury is waived,” immunity is retained if the “injury arises out of or in connection with, or results from” certain conduct or conditions. Id. § 63G-7-101(4). The State of Utah waives “[i]mmunity from suit . . . as to
any injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment.” Id. § 63G- 7-301(2)(i). But that waiver is subject to exceptions. Relevant here, “immunity is not waived[] for any injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment, if the injury arises out of or in connection with, or results from: . . . the activity of: (i) providing emergency medical assistance.” § 63G-7-201(4)(s)(i). “Generally, to determine whether a governmental entity is
immune from suit under the [UGIA], [Utah courts] apply a three-
part test . . . .”
Van de Grift v. State
,
“responding to a 911 call and providing emergency ambulance medical services” is a “governmental function” under the UGIA; [4] immunity is waived for UFA’s activity; and UFA’s activity falls within the UGIA’s “providing emergency medical assistance” exception. The court acknowledged that the UGIA does not define
“emergency medical assistance.” So the court parsed that phrase’s
“terms and combin[ed] the meanings of those terms into a cohesive
whole.” The court relied on dictionary definitions to conclude that
the ordinary meaning of “emergency medical assistance” was “any
medical treatment provided in response to an urgent need for relief
or help.” The district court reasoned that the conduct at the center
of Armenta’s complaint was exactly that, leading the court to
conclude that UFA was immune from suit for that activity.
Armenta contends that the district court erred because
UFA’s response to a 911 call does not fall within the “providing
emergency medical assistance” exception to the immunity waiver.
Armenta raises a question of statutory interpretation. Our
primary goal when trying to wring the meaning out of statutory
language “is to evince the true intent and purpose of the
Legislature.”
Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship
, 2011 UT 50,
¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (cleaned up). “The best evidence of the
legislature’s intent is the plain language of the statute itself.” (cleaned up). In some cases, “statutory text may not be ‘plain’ when
read in isolation, but may become so in light of its linguistic,
structural, and statutory context.”
Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City
we don’t go looking for non-textual interpretive tools to use. See Marion Energy , 2011 UT 50, ¶ 15. “[W]e generally resort to non- textual sources of meaning when the text, and textual tools of interpretation, have failed to yield an answer.” Midwest Fam. Mut.
[4] The UGIA defines “governmental function” as meaning “each activity, undertaking, or operation of a governmental entity” and including “each activity, undertaking, or operation performed by a department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity,” as well as “a governmental entity’s failure to act.” U TAH § 63G-7-102(5). Armenta, at least for the purpose of this appeal, does not contest that UFA’s activity qualifies as a governmental function within this definition.
A
Ins. v. Hinton
, 2025 UT 4, ¶ 60 n.11, 567 P.3d 524. That is, “when
statutory language is ambiguous—in that its terms remain
susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have
conducted a plain language analysis—,”
Marion Energy
,
interpretation on a flawed definition of “emergency medical assistance.” UFA disagrees, maintaining instead that the “district court undertook its plain-language analysis just as . . . [this court] ha[s] instructed—using the dictionary as a ‘starting point’ to assess the ordinary meaning of an undefined statutory phrase.” Because the UGIA does not define “emergency medical assistance,” and because no Utah court has interpreted the phrase in the context of the UGIA, the district court looked first to a dictionary to determine the ordinary meaning. The district court took the Black’s Law Dictionary definitions of “emergency,” “medical examination,” and “assistance,” and stitched together an interpretation. The district court opined that emergency medical assistance means “any medical treatment provided in response to an urgent need for relief or help.” The court explained, “Combining the meaning of [the relevant] terms into a cohesive whole, UFA’s allege[d] conduct of responding to a 911 call, providing emergency ambulance services, and assessing, diagnosing, and triaging Plaintiff’s emergent medical condition, amount to ‘emergency medical assistance.’” We agree with Armenta that combining the dictionary
definitions of the individual words in this provision did not result
in a correct interpretation of the statute. The court’s interpretation
rested on “the hyperliteral meaning of each word in the text.”
See
NTONIN S CALIA & B RYAN A. G ARNER , R EADING L AW : T HE
I NTERPRETATION OF L EGAL T EXTS 356 (2012). Such an interpretation
risks “los[ing] sight of the forest for the trees.”
See id.
(cleaned up). We have similarly observed that dictionaries, while often
helpful, are not always the alpha and omega of the search for
statutory meaning. Indeed, we have opined that “the dictionary
alone is often inadequate to the task of [statutory] interpretation
because different definitions may
support different
interpretations.”
GeoMetWatch Corp. v. Utah State Univ. Rsch.
Found.
,
court relied includes two definitions of “emergency.” The first is “[a] sudden and serious event or an unforeseen change in circumstances that calls for immediate action to avert, control, or remedy harm.” Emergency , B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). And the second is “[a]n urgent need for relief or help.” The district court seemed to favor the second definition and that colored the way the court interpreted the pertinent language. But, from this dictionary alone, we cannot be sure that the Legislature did not have another definition of emergency in mind. For example, the Legislature could have intended “emergency medical assistance” to mean any medical assistance provided in response to “an exigent circumstance in which immediate assistance is needed . . . to lessen or avert the threat of disaster .” Emergency , B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (Emphasis added). [5]
[5] The Legislature could also have intended “emergency” to mean “something dangerous or serious, such as an accident, that happens suddenly or unexpectedly and needs fast action in order to avoid harmful results,” Emergency , C AMBRIDGE D ICTIONARY , https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/emerg ency (last visited July 30, 2025) (listing as synonyms “catastrophe,” “crisis,” “disaster,” and “calamity”), “an exigency,” Emergency L EGAL I NFO . I NST ., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/emergency (last visited July 30, 2025), “a sudden, generally unexpected occurrence or set of circumstances demanding immediate action,” Emergency , C OLLINS D ICTIONARY , https://www.collinsdictionary.c om/us/dictionary/english/emergency (last visited July 30, 2025), or “[a]ny incident, whether natural, technological, or human- caused, that necessitates responsive action to protect life, property, critical infrastructure, or environment,” Emergency , U.S. D EP ’ T OF E NERGY , https://www.directives.doe.gov/terms_definitions/eme rgency (last visited July 30, 2025). While an “emergency” could mean a routine event that local emergency medical service personnel handle day to day, it can also mean a “[m]ajor fire[],” a “disaster[],” Emergency Definition and explanation , S AFE REACH, https://safereach.com/en/glossary/emergency-definition/ (last visited July 30, 2025), a “[h]azardous [m]aterials [a]ccident[],” or a severe-weather incident, Types of Emergencies , P URDUE NIV ., https://www.purdue.edu/ehps/emergency-preparedness/emer
(continued . . .)
“[T]he dictionary alone is often inadequate to the task of
interpretation” for an additional reason.
GeoMetWatch
,
other exceptions Utah Code subsection 63G-7-201(4)(s) contains. That subsection excepts from the government’s waiver of immunity
the activity of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; (ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes;
(iv) an emergency evacuation;
(v) transporting or removing an injured person to a place where emergency medical assistance can be rendered or where the person can be transported by a licensed ambulance service; or (vi) intervening during a dam emergency[.] § 63G-7-201(4)(s). Armenta posits that the exceptions listed in subsections (s)(ii)–(iv) and (vi) are “specific and clear[,] . . . describ[ing] responses to catastrophic disasters that admittedly have historically been the purpose of governments.” This resembles one of the definitions in a more recent edition of Black’s Law Dictionary than the one the district court used: “an exigent circumstance in gency-preparedness/types-of-emergencies.php (last visited July 30, 2025) .
which immediate assistance is needed to protect property, public health, or safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of disaster.” Emergency , B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Armenta’s argument evokes the interpretive canon
“
noscitur a sociis
, which means ‘it is known from its associates.’”
Rosser v. Rosser
,
emergencies of a certain type—fires and dam bursts, for example— it stands to reason that what the Legislature had in mind when it enacted subsection (s)(i) was the government’s ability to respond to those types of emergencies—namely, to provide “medical assistance” resulting from those types of emergencies. UFA challenges this interpretation on several grounds. It
first argues that we apply certain canons of construction, including
noscitur a sociis
, only when the statutory language is ambiguous. It
finds support for that proposition in three of this court’s
declarations. In
Graves v. North Eastern Services, Inc.
, we said that
the
ejusdem generis
canon, a cousin to
noscitur a sociis
, “comes into
play only in cases of ambiguity as to the meaning or scope of the
general term.”
discussed when we apply certain textual canons of construction,
UFA’s argument might be persuasive. But that is not the way we
have described statutory interpretation. We consistently begin that
exercise with the statute’s plain language, “from which we seek to
ascertain the intent and purpose of the legislature.”
Thayer v. Wash.
Cnty. Sch. Dist.
,
¶35 In other words, UFA’s argument that we apply the noscitur a sociis canon only when statutory language is ambiguous is incorrect. Here, we need not discern a textual ambiguity to employ the noscitur a sociis canon. Rather, it, like other textual canons, is a tool in our plain-language toolkit that we use to interpret text without resort to non-textual sources. UFA argues in the alternative that Armenta misapplies the
noscitur a sociis canon because he has chosen an inapt commonality. According to UFA, some of the activities subsection (s) immunizes, like “fighting fire” or “regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes,” do “not necessarily entail catastrophic destruction.” (Quoting U TAH C ODE § 63G-7- 201(4)(s)(ii), (iii).) We understand UFA’s point. There are small fires and hazardous waste spills that do not cause a calamity. The regulation of hazardous materials or wastes, too, does not necessarily describe an emergent situation. But we nevertheless conclude that when we look at the list and the activities that the Legislature chose to include in the list, the better reading is one based on a commonality of a disastrous—or potentially disastrous—event. UFA similarly argues that “reading [Armenta’s] ‘disaster’
limitation” into the statute nullifies Utah Code subsection 63G-7-
201(4)(p). That subsection excepts “the management of flood
waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters” from the waiver of
immunity. U C ODE § 63G-7-201(4)(p). We understand this point
as well. We frequently apply the independent meaning canon to
presume that the Legislature intends each of a statute’s subsections
to have independent significance.
See, e.g.
,
Lancer Ins. v. Lake Shore
Motor Coach Lines, Inc.
,
Code subsection 63G-7-201(4)(p) references emergencies of a certain scope and scale, it immunizes a different activity than those listed in subsection 201(4)(s). Subsection (p) retains immunity for “ the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters.” TAH § 63G-7-201(4)(p) (emphasis added). In contrast, subsection (s) largely immunizes the actual response to those emergencies. See id. § 63G-7-201(4)(s). UFA’s proffered interpretation of subsection (s) does not, therefore, rob subsection (p) of independent meaning. Finally, even if we were uncertain about what the
Legislature intended—i.e., if we concluded that after reviewing the
UGIA’s plain language, the statute “can reasonably be understood
to have more than one meaning,”
see Arnold v. Grigsby
,
presume that the Legislature “did not intend the interpretation
which raises serious constitutional doubts.” ¶ 59 (cleaned up).
Another rationale underlying constitutional avoidance is that we
“avoid[] constitutional questions except as a last resort.”
Utah
Stream Access Coal. v. VR Acquisitions, LLC
, 2019 UT 7, ¶ 104, 439
P.3d 593 (Himonas, J., concurring in part) (cleaned up);
see also Lyon
v. Burton
,
CONCLUSION Armenta argues that the district court misinterpreted the
UGIA when it applied the “providing emergency medical assistance” exception to immunize UFA’s response to Armenta’s 911 call. When we consider that provision in context, we agree. The exception does not apply, and UFA is not immune from Armenta’s suit. We reverse and remand.