ARLAN‘S DEPARTMENT STORE OF LOUISVILLE, INC., ET AL. v. KENTUCKY.
No. 503
Supreme Court of the United States
December 17, 1962
371 U.S. 218
John B. Breckinridge, Attorney General of Kentucky, Holland N. McTyeire, Assistant Attorney General, and Chаs. E. Keller for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
This is a criminal prosecution of the owners of thrеe retail stores for employing persons in their businesses on Sunday.1 Each was fined $20 and costs and the convic-
I said in my dissent in the McGowan case:
“... it is a strange Bill of Rights that makes it possible for the dominant religious grоup to bring the minority to heel because the minority, in the doing of acts which intrinsically are wholesome and not antisocial, does not defer to the majority‘s religious beliefs. Some have religious scruples against eating pork. Those scruples, no matter how bizarrе
they might seem to some, are within the ambit of the First Amendment. . . . Is it possible that a majority of a state legislature having those religious scruples could make it criminal for the nonbelievеr to sell pork? Some have religious scruples against slaughtering cattle. Could a state legislature, dominated by that group, make it criminal to run an abattoir? . . . A legislature of Christians can no more make minorities conform to their weekly regime than a legislature of Mоslems, or a legislature of Hindus. The religious regime of every group must be respected—unlеss it crosses the line of criminal conduct. But no one can be forced to comе to a halt before it, or refrain from doing things that would offend it. That is my reading of the Establishment Clausе and the Free Exercise Clause.” 366 U. S., at 575.
The religious nature of this state regulation is emphasized by the fact that it exempts “members of a religious society” who actually observe thе Sabbath on a day other than Sunday. The law is thus plainly an aid to all organized religions, bringing to heel anyone who violates the religious scruples of the majority by seeking his salvation nоt through organized religion but on his own.
I see no possible way by which this law can be sustained under the First Amendment.
“. . . if a religious leaven is to be worked into the affairs of our people, it is to be done by individuals and groups, not by the Government. This necessarily means, first, that the dogma, crеed, scruples, or practices of no religious group or sect are to be preferred over those of any others; second, that no one shall be interfered with by government fоr practicing the religion of his choice; third, that the State may not require anyone to practice a religion or even any
religion; and fourth, that the State cannot compel one so to conduct himself as not to offend the religious scruples of another. The idеa, as I understand it, was to limit the power of government to act in religious matters . . . not to limit the freedom of religious men to act religiously nor to restrict the freedom of atheists or agnostics.” 366 U. S., at 563-564.