Plаintiff appeals by leave granted an order granting defendant’s motion to
i
Plaintiff operated as a wholesale distributor of children’s toys until 1995. Defendant was employed by plaintiff as a bookkeeper from 1970 to 1991, during which time she handled all of plaintiffs banking and cash. In 1991, plaintiff alleged that defendant had embezzled more than $562,000 over a 10-year period. Plaintiff commenced a civil aсtion against defendant and her husband, Gary Jones. Defendant failed to defend the action, and a default judgment was entered on July 24, 1991, against defendant in the amount of $562,664.97, plus interest totaling $165,743.56. Following a bench trial on the remaining claims against Gary Jones, on January 8, 1993, the trial court granted plaintiff constructive trusts in cеrtain assets owned by defendant and Jones, such as bank accounts and real property.
In separate criminal proceedings, defendant рleaded nolo contendere to 24 counts of embezzlement by an agent or trustee of more than $100, former MCL 750.174. Pursuant to resentencing ordered by this Court in People v Jones, unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 10, 1995 (Docket No. 165512), defendant was sentenced on July 17, 1995, to 4 to 10 years in prison, with restitution of $537,432.10 to be a parole condition. Defendant was apparently released from prison IV2 years later. As a condition of her parole, defеndant began making monthly payments of at least $200 in May 1998. According to defendant’s pleadings, she was discharged from parole in January 2003, but the record shows that defendant made monthly payments of $230 to plaintiff until January 2008.
As a result of Gary Jones’s death on June 15, 2007, defendant received additional assets, and plaintiff bеgan collection proceedings on the 1991 default judgment. Defendant maintained that the 10-year statutory limit on the default judgment had expired and requested that the trial court quash the execution and return financial assets already seized. The trial court ruled in favor of defendant, reasoning that payments made by defendant under the restitution order in the criminal case did not revive defendant’s obligation to make payments under the civil order.
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On appеal, plaintiff argues that defendant’s monthly partial payments revived and extended the period of limitations for the default judgment. We agree. The quashing of an execution rests in the discretion of the trial court. See Schmidt v Bretzlaff,
Plaintiff acknowledges that the 1991 default judgment is subject tо the 10-year period of limitations set forth in MCL 600.5809(3), which provides:
Except as provided in [MCL 600.5809(4)], the period of limitations is 10 years for an action founded upon а judgment or decree rendered in a court of record of this state, or in a court of record of the United States or of another state of the United States, from the time of the rendition of the judgment or decree.... Within the applicable period of limitations prescribed by this subsection, an action may be brought upon the judgment or decree for a new judgmentor decree. The new judgment or decree is subject to this subsection.[ 1 ]
Nevertheless, “any payment on a debt, whether before or after the running of the period of limitations, acts to extend the limitations period.” Wayne Co Social Servs Dir v Yates,
The Parole Board, within the Department of Corrections, possesses exclusive jurisdiction over parole matters. Hopkins v Parole Bd,
If a paroled prisoner has faithfully performed all of the conditions and obligations of parole for the рeriod of time fixed in the order of parole, and has obeyed all of the rules and regulations adopted by the parole board, the prisonеr has served the full sentence required. The parole board shall enter a final order of discharge and issue the paroled prisoner a certificate of discharge.
A discharge “ ‘is a remission of the remaining portion of the sentence.’ ” People v Gregorczyk,
“Unless and until parole is successfully completed, the prisoner is deemed to be serving the sentence imposed by the trial court.” Harper v Dep’t of Corrections,
Nothing in the record contradicts dеfendant’s claim that she was discharged from parole in January 2003. Regardless, even if defendant was not discharged at that time, her maximum discharge date bаsed on her 10- year maximum term of imprisonment was December 4, 2004.
Despite the abatement of the parole condition for restitution, defendant continued to make monthly payments to plaintiff of $230 until January 2008. With these partiаl payments, defendant acknowledged the remaining obligation under the default judgment to compensate plaintiff for the loss suffered as a result of the embezzlement. Yates,
In light of our conclusion, we need not address plaintiffs remaining claim on appeal.
Reversed. Plaintiff, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
Notes
At the time of the 1991 default judgment, the formеr version of MCL 600.5809(3) similarly provided:
Except as provided in [MCL 600.5809(4)], the period of limitations is 10 years for actions founded upon judgments or decrees rendered in a court of record of this state, or in a court of record of the United States or of another state of the United States, from the time of the renditiоn of the judgment... . Within these periods an action may be brought upon the judgment for a new judgment, which in its turn, will be subject to this subsection.
For purposes of this appeal, defendant’s maximum discharge date includes 215 days’ credit for time served, but not good time and disciplinary credits.