*1 a claim complaint fails to for man’s Ark. exaction. illegal ARKANSAS REALTORS Consequently, to the extent that Nelson ASSOCIATION, Appellant/Cross- it overruled. In inapposite, should be distinguish it is my opinion, difficult case. present Although from the Nelson distinguish attempts Takeda Nelson on FORMS, LLC, Appellee/Cross- REAL appropriation that the challenged
the basis (when Appellant. was illegal at the time it made was at paid asphalt price- the state for the a No. CV-13-87. amount) appropriation versus the fixed case, illegal at present becomes Supreme Court of Arkansas. (when future, time some indeterminate court law determines Takeda is Sept. 2014. theory presented), under either I liable think this distinction is without merit. Im- purchased
portantly, at the time it sufficiently
asphalt, State was author- yet
ized to do so. No court had deter- companies
mined that the oil had acted
unlawfully. Similarly, yеt no court has that Takeda for wrong-
found is liable
doing connected to its Actos-related medi-
cations.
Moreover, majority distinguishes on the basis Nelson alleged
Nelson asphalt the State overpaid of an grade
inferior than what had been con- for, case, present
tracted whereas in the paid drug State exactly prescribed by physician. The ma- misses the
jority point. State was pay expenditure
authorized to both
instances; third-party potential liability in way expenditure
no transforms the lawful illegal the State into an exaction. significant
Because I can differ- find no present
ence between the case and the locase, I it
Nelson would overrule to the
extent conflicts with decision. this HOOFMAN, JJ., join
CORBIN opinion.
this *3 Grooms,
Quattlebaum, Tull & Burrow PLLC, III, by: John E. Tull E.B. Chiles IV, IV, and Everett Tucker appel- C. lant. PLC, digitally edit Group, real-estate transaction Law Asa Hutchinson Hudson, III, In Matt each form. appellee. Asa Hutchinson
by: W. company, Lynergy, negotiated through his CORBIN, Justice. an Appellant L. a contract with DONALD comple- of the software to online version | ,This arises from a breach-of appeal Bodily’s desktop Appel- version. ment in which Real contract action to use both the online lant’s members were LLC, Forms, Appellant sued Arkansas desktop synchronize versions and to Association, Appellant after ter- Realtors However, the online and them as needed. agree- software-development minated a synchro- always versions did not desktop appeals an order ment. bids properly, nize solicited denying Washington County Circuit Court for another software vendor. *4 notwithstanding judgment motion for its ultimately Lynergy hired instead of Bodi- (“JNOV”) or, alternative, in the the verdict brother, and his David Hud- ly. Hudson reversal, ar- Appellant trial. For for new son, Appellant’s Director of Tech- who court erred because gues that the circuit nology, Appellee. then formed the does not substantial evidence 12, 2010, Hudson, Matt August breach-of-con- On jury’s finding Appellee’s law, claim; that, Appellee, Henry, of and Mike as as a matter of three behalf tract entered into a cus- parties’ agree- Appellant’s president, separate provisions (“contract”), tom-development agreement to terminate the Appellant ment entitled contract; provide Ap- that would specifying Appellee that the circuit court abused its services, software refusing pellant including to instruct the with by discretion development, support, that the technical mainte- impossibility; on the law of and nance, to make record on the and other related services for an circuit court failed a years. five to parties’ Appellee period motions in limine. cross- initial of ^Pursuant parties’ agreement, circuit soft- appealed Appellee’s from the court’s the were de- | gpostjudgment computer programs denial of its motion for at- ware and jurisdic- signed require- and costs. have to meet the “business torneys’ fees We Supreme Appellant specifically Arkansas ments” of and “to pursuant tion to Court 2(b)(1) (5) (2014), create, execute, report, print, manage as this and ap- Rule and 1— impression of first and all of the forms and contracts associated peal presents issues in compli- of the law. affirm with a real-estate transaction needing clarification We laws, rules, governing we reverse and remand the ance with all appeal, and regulations.” Appellant’s Because cross-appeal. expire
contract forms were set to at the I. Facts year, parties’ end of the con- calendar required Appellee complete tract to instal- organization Appellant, a statewide Decem- lation of its software no later than whose members work the real-estate 1, ber 2010. business, provides standard real-estate reasons, Appellee aid its in con- For several did contract forms to members not by complete transactions. Between the installation of its software ducting real-estate 1, 1998, Appellant, into a the December 2010 deadline. Appellant 1997 and entered contract, to required by attempted Robert to create soft- as contract with software, but, Bodily’s copy ware of the con- obtain a of as for an electronic version owner, Bodily refused to release it tract that members the sole forms so Because of refusal prepare separate Appellant. could forms for each to software, $1,500 contrary though Appellant, paid Ap- his had to to release contract, pro- pellee premium. Appel- of for the insurance terms Appellee requested policy in a format lant vided its fоrms to insurance result, acquired Appellee As than Microsoft Word. be amended to cor- other time rect required deficiency, up- additional to devel- but it was never Appellee However, software, Appellant. its allowed dated to cover ac- op Hudson, Appellee requested. cording testimony time David additional of he was also scheduled to tried obtain the insurance but of the “type coverage with a Microsoft Word version learned that days sixty they asking contract no later were for” did exist." forms When than Ap- conveyed Ap- the date of the While Hudson that information to from contract. No- pellant, response. made most of revisions he never received a pellant its the last contract form in vember On March Appellee launched a final submitted Appellee version was not final version of the on Appel- December 2010. until lant’s Twenty-five Appellant’s website. Crowson, given beta testers were access continue On December Karen Robinson, testing the software. J.D. representa- one authorized beta tives, tester Director of Software De- permission gave Appellee to launch *5 velopment Technologies, at with Mainstream software as it existed on that date the repeatedly gained unauthorized access to understanding Appellee would the user’s Ap- individual software accounts. function as continue “to address errоrs pellant by later notified e-mail Appellee day, arise.” The next on December those allegedly that it “an 2010, had identified issue 29, its 2011 Appellee launched soft- regarding |5the security provided the system, was available pur- ware which for Real Forms software solution that has Appellant’s by chase and use members. However, 14experienced protect failed to the confidential client in- those members (1) system.” formation contained in the problems, Appellant identified as exposure of ac- Appellant’s an financial 21, 2011, On sent Appellant March writ- improper by parties; to third count access terminating ten parties’ notice the contract (2) an access and unintentional of confiden- pursuant to sections 16.2 and 16.4 of the data tial of other realtors’ Subse- clients. soft-, on that the contract based its belief a letter from quently, Appellee received ware allowed users to access confidential the alleging that software “failed Appellant improperly client that the soft- data and protect the adequately confidential requisite ware did not meet the business sys- information contained in the client requirements set forth in the contract. tem,” Appellee and requiring deactivate letter, Appellant With the also enclosed a software. honored Appellee Appel- the alleged the purportedly depicting video request lant’s and deactivated the software deficiency in the referenced no- 12, 2011, January Ap- day. that same On sent Appellant subsequently Appel- tice. leadership, pellee met with notification, clarifying lee an additional staff, legal specif- and team discuss citing in reason for termination and detail deficiency. the software ics improper-access issue. In its alleged communication, Appellant identified the January Appellant In that' learned reason for termination as follows: acquired an and Appellee had not “Error policy Appellant’s security system for of the Omissions” insurance failure benefit, is an required by agreement, protect as al- confidential information by the productive separately use of the shall be determined prevents
error that was not corrected Court.” system. The error (2) days two business Real Forms within 4, 2012, filed its mo- Appellee On June Therefore, the ARA being notified. and costs attorneys’ pursuant tion fees terminating right to and
has the Annotated section 16- Arkansas Code Paragraph 5.6 of the contract under motion, In (Repl.1999). Appel- 22-308 its agreement. $100,000 attorneys’ lee fees requested $1,341.75 and in costs based on hours against Ap- Appellee complaint filed a attorneys representing Appellee. of two 11, 2011, alleging wrongful pellant May motion, pur- later filed a JNOV contract on termination Rule of Procedure suant to Arkansas Civil 21, 2011. filed its answer March 50(b), jury’s verdict was arguing that counterclaim, including a counterclaim evidence and supported substantial contract, tortious interfer- for breach that, law, a matter of court as circuit relationship or busi- ence with contractual jury must set the verdict aside and enter deceit, expectancy, ness fraud and violation or, judgment in favor of in the Deceptive of the Arkansas Trade Practices alternative, trial. order a new On June Act, parties defamation. Both filed ruled that the the circuit court summary judgment. cross-motions supported by verdict was substantial evi- trial, Prior to the circuit court dismissed dence, motion, denied JNOV prejudice Appellant’s with counterclaims and denied motion for attor- Appellee’s for fraud and deceit and for a violation of |7July 27, 2012, neys’ fees and On costs. Deceptive Trade Practices Arkansas Appellant timely appeal, filed a notice of Act. cross-appeal filed a notice of August parties 2012. Both now |fiOn May five-day jury trial *6 bring appeals. their trial, At the circuit court commenced. off-the-record, an in-chambers
conducted II. Substantial Evidence parties’ conference the five motions in on Material Breach and, record, the ruled on one of limine on concerning the motion limine mention of Appellant makes two substantial-evi- evidence, insurance. At the close of the arguments appeal. dence on For the first the a verdict in favor circuit court directed point on the appeal, Appellant argues that counterclaim Appellee Appellant’s on for denying circuit court erred in its motions with a intentional interference contractual for directed verdict and JNOV motion be- expectancy or and relationship business support cause substantial evidence did not prej- later dismissed the counterclaim with jury’s finding on the breach-of-eontraet Ap- udice. The circuit court also denied Specifically, Appellant counterclaim. con- pellant’s jury motion to instruct the on the evidence not tends substantial does impossibility. jury law of returned a allegation inability of its on Appellee verdict favor of the breach- deliver the software that constitut- breach; of-contract and defamation counterclaims Appellee ed a material failed $150,000in Appellee compen- and awarded complete installation of the software in a manner; satory damages. May On timely Appellee’s and that failure reflecting policy circuit court entered its order an for Appel- to obtain insurance jury “payment verdict and stated that Appellant’s perform- lant’s benefit excused Alternatively, Appellee requests of the ance. on parties’ attorneys’ costs and fees appeal procedures that this court reverse remand Appellee termination. also jury’s for a new trial because the verdict argues that substantial evidence pre- was clearly against preponderance was sented at trial that Appellant did give not the evidence. Appellee proper notice or a chance to cure alleged deficiency found in that the circuit Appellee responds court Appellee March 2011. maintains Ap- motion for di- properly Appellant’s denied pellant was not any entitled to effect ter- motion, rected verdict and as sub- JNOV mination under these three provisions, nor supported stantial evidence its breach-of- did comply with the contract’s Specifically, Appellеe contract claim. as- required procedures for termination. serts that the found evi- substantial by Ap- dence of three different breaches We discuss two (1) pellant as follows: failure breach-of-contract arguments in tandem. to deliver software and source Our standard of review for a denial' of ¾ contract, by the required code as directed-verdict motion is well settled: any predated alleged breaches (2) Appellee; Appellant’s failure to act in reviewing the denial of a 19[I]n motion good performance par- faith in its verdict], directed [a we will reverse which, contract, claims, ties’ only if there is no substantial evidence (3) ability perform; thwarted its verdict, to support jury’s wrongful termination of the [scontract moving party is entitled to judgment as Appellant. Appellee further asserts a matter law. Substantial evidence is breaches of.these excused its future goes beyond that which suspicion or con- obligation perform as a matter of law. jecture and is compel sufficient to way conclusion one or the other. It is
For the point appeal, Appel- second fact; place try our issues of we argues jury’s finding lant that the that it simply review the record for substantial breached the contract not supported by evidence to support jury’s verdict. substantial evidence. asserts determining In whether there is sub- that, law, separate as a matter of three еvidence, stantial we view the evidence provisions of the contract entitled it to and all reasonable arising inferences terminate the contract repercus- without light therefrom the most favorable to Specifically, Appellant sion. contends that party judgment whose behalf conclusively substantial evidence showed *7 entered. A motion directed verdict (1) Appellee failed to correct an error should be denied when there conflict prevented productive use of the soft- n inthe evidence, or when the evidence is ware, (2) contract; per section 5.6 of the people might such that fair-minded Appellee’s Appel- software failed to meet reach different conclusions. requirements, required lant’s business as (3) contract; by section 16.2 of the Cline, 474, 10, Carter v. 2011 Ark. at 385 Appellee materially agree- breached the 745, Nance, (quoting S.W.3d 752 Carr v. ment and failed to cure the breach within 497, 15-16, 826, 2010 Ark. at 370 S.W.3d thirty days prescribed by the section 16.4 836). The same standard holds true for a of the contract. motion for Id. A may JNOV. circuit court
Appellee responds that only substantial evi- enter a JNOV if there is no substan- supported jury’s dence the verdict be- tial evidence to the verdict and the support cause, law, as moving party judgment a matter of did is entitled a to as comply with the required contract’s matter of law. Id.
852 code, 2.4 .try required by issues of fact source as section of do nоt but
We parties’ to determine whether the contract. claims examine the record to the support Appellee materially pro- evidence breached this there is substantial Study v. by failing Boellner Clinical the contract to deliver jury’s verdict. vision of 88, Ctrs., LLC, Ark. 378 745. 2011 S.W.3d Appellee’s timely software a manner sufficiency of the evi testing the Appellee’s inability When and that to obtain a review, only we need appellate copy Bodily delayed dence of the its testimony appellees consider the obligation complete of the of installation and. appel- most favorable to that is evidence system. Stores, Dolph, Inc. v. 308 lees. Wal-Mart Section 2.4 of the contract states (1992). 439, 810 dеfer S.W.2d We Ark. 825 copy would of the of the issue unless resolution jury’s to the Bodily Appel- software and source code to say probabil is no reasonable we can there lee “to enable Real Forms to convert the Appellee’s version. ity prior years ARA Realtor Forms for into Roth, 318, v. 315 Ark. Motor Co. Wheeler Management Real Forms Contract (1993). will not over 867 446 We S.W.2d According testimony Software.” to the clearly unless it is turn a verdict Bryan Ruggeri, Matt Hudson and Matt prejudice. Duggar v. passion or result partner, Hudson’s former business Lines, Inc., 288 Ark. 707
Arrow Coach Bodily software and source code were es- (1986). Upon appellate 316 review S.W.2d they provided sential because would have light the evidence most we сonsider quick to the access 2010 forms in a Micro- | Tnsupported if favorable to the verdict and format, soft and those forms could Word evidence, we affirm. by substantial will easily been converted into new lnhave Davis, Chrysler-Plymouth v. 283 Petrus system. Bodily Because the- software and (1984). Ark. 671 749 S.W.2d accessible, Appellee code were not was claim, On a breach-of-contract documents, forced to use converted PDF duty under a con performance when original instead Microsoft Word for- contemplated, any nonperformance tract is mat, reason, project and for that v. duty of that is a breach. Archi delayed. Additionally, source Zufari Plus, tecture 323 Ark. S.W.2d Appellee cap- code would have allowed (1996). rule, general As a the failure of ture, system the data in the old without party perform one his contractual obli having program import- to write a new gations party from releases the other his ing the data from the 2009 2010 data- Hall, obligations. 269 Ark. Stocker system. bases into the 2011 software (1980). However, a rela S.W.2d 662 that, reasons, Hudson testified for these tively on the performance minor failure of away took time from its software part party justify of one does not the other development to its revision of the forms. seeking escape any responsibility un “painstaking” Hudson testified to the as- contract; der the for one terms of *8 pects project of this because of party’s obligation рerform be dis failure to the software 'and charged, party’s the other must be breach testified, expecta- source code. He “Our Boellner, 83, material. 2011 Ark. 378 [y]ou just basically tion was.... would S.W.3d 745. make the then changes print Word However, We now turn to first it in PDF. that was not allow- argument concerning got they breach-of-contract able. We were Word but it — Bodily’s Forty-four junk,” its failure to deliver a mess. forms of was
853
that,
Hudson testified
because the forms
the
Foods,
whole case. Tyson
Inc. v.
formatted,
Davis,
were not properly
spent
he
566,
347 Ark.
source code was a material breach.
615,
Id. at
Therefore,
We have stated that a because substantial evidence supported determines the credibility jury’s of the witnesses and the breach-of-contract verdict this in- stance, weight evidence, and value of their we and it decline to reach Appellant’s re- may maining believe or testimony disbelieve the breach-of-contract arguments. witnesses, Boellner, one or all See though 2011 Ark. 378 S.W.3d 112of such evidence is 745. uncontradicted and unim-
peached.
Co.,
Dovers v. Stephenson Oil
Jury Instruction
11SIII.
Inc.,
(2003).
354 Ark.
S.W.3d
For
point
the third
appeal, Ap
such,
As
jury
determined the credibili-
pellant argued that
the circuit court
ty of the parties’ witnesses
gave
abused its
discretion
refusing to in
weight
to these witnesses’
testimony.
struct the jury on the law impossibility
Viewing this evidence in the light most
proffered
when it
AMI Civ. 2439 regarding
Aрpellee,
favorable .to
we hold that sub-
the impossibility
performance.
Specifi
stantial
supports
evidence
jury’s
ver-
cally, Appellant claims that
the circuit
dict that Appellant materially breached its
court’s conclusion that
the impossibility
Appellee
contract -with
by failing to deliver
subjective,
objective,
constituted a
Bodily’s software and source code as re-
mistake
of law.
responds that
quired by
Thus,
contract.
we
there was no basis in the evidence
sup
jury’s
affirm the
verdict on
grounds.
these
port
giving
of AMI Civ. 2439 and that
Further,
recognize
we
jury
that the
re-
the circuit court did not abuse its discre
turned a verdict for Appellee
Appel-
tion in denying
proffered
instruction.
lant’s breach-of-contract counterclaim on a
general verdict form without specifying
law,
Under
party
Arkansas
particular
breach occurred. With
entitled to a
instruction
when
is a
regard
general
forms,
verdict
we stated
correct statement of the law and there is
Inc.,
in Hyden Highcouch,
353 Ark.
some basis in the evidence
support giv
(2003),
instruction
[Counsel
or, we also somewhat talked about an
Id.
discretion.
that
I don’t
impossibility instruction
the standard to deter
This cоurt set out
I
typed up
proffer.
have
to
think
[it]
in
performance
Fri
impossibility
mine
AMI 2439.
266 Ark.
gillana
Frigillana,
v.
Well,
I
as
discussed
Court:
(1979), which states as follows:
S.W.2d 30
chambers,
going
give
I’m not
to
that
impossibility of
proving
The burden of
I think there is a
instruction because
its nature and extent and
performance,
subjective impossibil-
difference between
upon
party
causative effect rests
In
ity
objective impossibility.
and
this
show that he took
alleging it. He must
view,
subjective im-
Court’s
this involves
virtually every
power
action within his
possibility,
objective impossibility.
duty
his
under the contract.
perform
to
referring to the
And of course we’re
be
thing
It must be shown
to
.that
code,
will,
provision
you
of the source
if
by any
done cannot be effected
means.
software
previous
to Real Forms
an
question requires
Resolution of the
your proffer
I’ll
developer. And
note
par-
examination into the conduct of the
supposed
for the record.
I do think it’s
ty pleading the defense
order to de-
an
to be tendered and marked as
exhib-
or
fault
presence
termine the
absence of
it.
failing
perform.
his
part
[to]
Appellant]:
We’ll mark
[Counsel
(citations
302-08,
at 33
Id. at
584 S.W.2d
copy.
omitted). This court has drawn a “distinc-
Here,
agree
we
with the circuit court’s
objective impossibility,
tion between
which
give
refusal to
AMI
as the evidence
thing cannot be
saying, ‘[t]he
amounts to
at trial did not
the im-
presented
done,’
| ^subjective impossibility[,] T
and
According Meters,
defense.
to
possibility
”
Pilkinton,
Christy
cannot do it:’
procure Bodily’s
was unable to
(1954)
Ark.
273 S.W.2d
stated,
Meyers
and source code.
software
(First)
(quoting Restatement
of Contracts
get
right
it. We
no
“[We] [c]ouldn’t
[had]
(1932)).
§ 455 cmt. a
to it.... He owned it.” He testified that
bar,
In
at
Appellant proffered
the case
understanding
was his
11fithat
Jury
Arkansas Model
Instruction-Civil
years
doing
found out after thirteen
as
provides
follows:
Bodily
business with
that he owned the
Appel-
source code. When asked whether
of the contract was im-
[P]erformance
attempted
buy
lant
the software or the
possible
[Appellant]
has the burden
Bodily, Meyers respond-
source code from
proving
each of the two essential
ed,
Meyers
that I
“Not
know of.”
also
propositions:
testified that he was not aware of
offer
First,
[Appellant] diligently
at-
by Appellant
buy Bodily’s
either to
soft-
contract;
tempted
perform
Mey-
ware or source code or to license it.
Second,
im-
performance
became
simply
ers stated that he
understood that
possible
a result of
as
Robert
Bodily for the soft-
Appellant had asked
ownership
sole
of the 2010 ARA Realtor
code,
Bodily
ware and
refused. This
Forms Software and his
unwillingness
suggests
evidence
failed to
ARA.
“every
’power
take
action within
[its]
duty
The circuit
under the contract”
subsequently
perform [its]
court
refused
neglecting
instruction
as
to obtain the
and ruled
follows:
*10
courtroom,
Frigillana,
code.
266 Ark. at
and source
circuit court stated as
reasons,
follows:
to be asked concerning or whether insurance by was obtained Real Forms IV. Motions in Limine Contract, pursuant to the for the limited argument For the fourth on ap purpose of showing breach- in a term of peal, Appellant argues that the circuit the Cоntract. court failed to make a to trial prior record Furthermore, I’ve instructed the De- parties’ on four of the five motions in fendant that they way, in no shape, or Appellee responds
limine.
that the circuit
form will infer the amount of the cover-
court’s failure to make a
on the
record
Further,
age.
they
question
will not
or
motions in limine is not reversible error
infer that
liability
it was
E
coverage, &
alleged
and that
has not
that the
coverage,
any
or
coverage
other
any
rulings
circuit court erred in
of its
provision
would relate to either
of dam-
limine,
subject
in
nor has it
motions
ages
by party
sustained
in this lawsuit
alleged
any
subject
motions are
provision
litigation
or
of
costs
this
material to the outcome
Ap-
case.
my
lawsuit. So that is
intent.
pellee maintains that
this omission bars
... So that’s where we stand. Mr.
seeking
from
a remand to the
Hutchinson,
your
I’ll consider
argument
circuit court.
your
motion at this time.
point,
At that
parties pre-
counsel for both
|
relevant facts
this
supporting
is-
mThe
sented argument
motion in
trial,
sue are as follows. Prior to
the par-
limine,
circuit court reiterated its
ties filed five
motions in limine.
ruling that it would allow a reference to
lay-
filed two motions in limine to exclude
insurance for a
purpose
limited
in the
opinion testimony
witness
that its software
breach-of-contract
action. The circuit
functionality
design
had
flaws that did
court made no
remaining
reference to the
not meet
require-
business
four
motions
limine at that time.
ments and to exclude evidence of insur-
ance.
then filed three motions
issue then is whether the circuit
117The
to exclude evidence of
failing
contract
court erred in
to make a record on
Appellant;
with
to exclude the interpreta-
motions in limine. Adminis-
by
that,
tion of the contract
terms
provides
Hunter
trative Order No. 4
“[u]nless
Jones, a software-development expert
wit- waived on
parties,
the record
ness; and to
duty
any
exclude the evidence of hours
shall be the
circuit court to
worked Matt
require
Hudson and David Hud-
that a verbatim record be made of
'
trial,
son. On the
day
proceedings
first
the circuit
all
... pertaining
con-
court held a motion-in-limine hearing
tested matter before the court or the
added.)
where it considered
jury.” (Emphasis
these motions off the
See also Ark.
n §
returning
record
chambers. When
Ann.
(Repl.2010).
Code
16-13-510
We
*11
Thus,
applied
given
specif-
Admin-
the circuit court.
these
construed and
strictly
have
State,
circumstances,
No. 4. Robinson v.
Order
ic
we adhere to our rule
istrative
(2003);
372,
with the well-established
is
neys’
and properly
fees
exercised that dis
upon
appellant
bring up
incumbent
an
cretion.
record sufficient
error.
demonstrate
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-
Admin.,
Dep’t
Hankins v.
Fin. &
330
(1997).
gives
authority
22-308
the circuit court
492,
Here,
Ark.
hibits in
the motion. On June
Co.,
Stave
Ark.
because provi with the notice comply
ARA did not in the con set out termination
sions for
tract, affirm the case without would I appeal. on point first
reaching the reach the issue of
I also would denying court erred the circuit
whether in- impossibility-of-performance
ARA’s I would affirm on Because
struction. reaching without appeal point
second software,
the matter of point under that impossibility
matter of *13 no moment.
appeal is of Ark. 398 SLOCUM,
Kenneth Petitioner Arkansas, Respondent.
STATE
No. CR-95-1039. of Arkansas.
Supreme Court 25, 2014.
Sept.