I,Arkаnsas Department of Human Services (DHS) appeals from a permanency-planning order entered by the Grant County Circuit Court. We accepted certification of this case from the court of appeals because DHS seeks an extraordinary writ as an altеrnative to reversal. See Ark. Sup.Ct. R. l-2(a)(3) (2009).
On September 13, 2007, the Grant County Circuit Court granted emergency custody of appellee Tammy Denmon’s three children to DHS based on allegations of neglect. The circuit court entered a permanency-planning order on Septеmber 25, 2008, stating that returning the children to Denmon’s custody was contrary to their welfare, and that it was in the best interest of the children to remain in the custody of their aunt, Huida Stephenson. Additionally, the circuit court stated that reunification of the children and Denmon continued as the “goal of the case” due to Denmon’s compliance with the case plan and court orders, and because she made “significant measurable progress toward achieving the goals established in the case plan.”
[>DHS submitted a February 4, 2009 report to the circuit court that reсommended termination of Denmon’s parental rights and granting Stephenson permanent custody of the children, based, in part, on Den-mon’s failure to demonstrate “the mental ability to care for herself or her children” and other behavioral issues. On February 11, 2009, the circuit court held а permanency-planning hearing, rejecting DHS’s recommendation to terminate Denmon’s parental rights, stating as follows:
We leave this permanency planning hearing with [DHS’s] position to terminate parental rights. The children need stability but I’m not willing to give up on the mother at this point. If I was tо do that, [DHS] would cut all the services off. We’ve been over a year in this case and haven’t got to the point we need to be, I don’t think that’s all Ms. Denmon’s fault.... I want to give her the opportunity to get her children back. But I’ve got to have some permanency in these children’s lives. I’m gоing to permanently place custody with Ms. Stephenson. The children need to be stable. But I’m not giving up on the mother’s position to work with Timber Ridge [Ranch Neurological Center] and try to get her cognitive skills back together after the stroke to try to get her to where she can takе care of the children. I want the kids to be and know they’re safe. I’m not giving up on you.... I’m going to order that she be placed in Timber Ridge. I want [DHS] to get that set up, get her placed. I want the evaluations done. I want to review this case in 60 days.
The circuit court continued to state that
I’m not going to do a guardianship, I’m just going to leavе the children permanently with her right now with the option to go back and revisit after we get through what I deem to be the final test of whether Ms. Denmon’s cognitive skills are going to work. And I know that’s probably against the law, but that’s fine. Because I’m, sitting here and I am the law and I don’t think that you’re going to aрpeal it.
DHS objected to the circuit court’s order for DHS to specifically place Denmon at the Timber Ridge Ranch facility for family services; however, DHS did not otherwise object to the ruling.
[¡On February 26, 2009, the circuit court entered a “Fifteen Month Permanency Planning Order,” stating thаt
[t]he juveniles are placed in the permanent custody of Huida Stephenson because the juveniles are in need of permanency. However, the Court is not willing to give up on the mother and thus, the goal of reunification shall continue.
DHS filed a notice of appеal on February 27, 2009. The same day, DHS also filed separate motions to stay and modify the February 26, 2009 order. In its brief in support of the motion to stay, DHS stated that it did “not seek a stay of any child custody dispositions,” but only that portion of the order directing DHS to place Den-mon at Timber Ridge Rаnch. In its motion to modify the circuit court’s order, DHS made three requests: (1) to modify the portion of the order that required DHS to specifically place Denmon at Timber Ridge Ranch because of a lack of jurisdiction; (2) to clarify “whether the goal of the case is to be рermanent custody with Huida Stephenson, or reunification with family services,” because the order’s stated goals were incompatible; (3) failing modification of the order, to certify the February 26, 2009 order as final under Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The circuit court did not enter an order ruling on DHS’s motions within thirty days, thus they were deemed denied. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(b).
DHS brings two points on appeal. First, DHS argues that the circuit court’s February 26, 2009 order is clearly erroneous, because Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-338(c) requires a court to enter only one permanency goal for a dependent-neglected juvenile, and here, the circuit court entered concurrent, conflicting goals of permanent custody and reunification. Second, DHS argues that the circuit court clearly erred as a matter of law by ordering DHS to l4specifically place Denmon at the Timber Ridge Ranch facility. However, before we can address the merits of these arguments, we must determine whether there is a final, appealable order in this case. See Gilbert v. Moore,
Citing Ark. R.App. P.-Civ. 2(d) and our decision in West v. Arkansas Department of Human Services,
there is no direct conflict between Rule 2(d) and Rule 6-9, as Rule 6-9 does not state that permanent custody orders are not final аppealable orders or that a Rule 54(b) certificate is necessary for a permanent custody order relative to one child to be appealable. Rule 2(d), on the other hand, specifically states that custody orders are final, appealablе orders.
West,
Here, the circuit court specifically stated in its February 26, 2009 order that Denmon’s | .^children “are placed in the permanent custody of Huida Stephenson because the juveniles are in need of permanency.” “However,” the order stated, “the [cjourt is not willing to give up on the mother and thus, the goal of reunification shall continue.” The language in the order mirrors the circuit court’s statements from the bench at the February 11, 2009 hearing, quoted above.
This court stated in Gilbert, supra, that the question of “[w]hether a custody order is final or temporary is not dependent upon the style of the order.”
I’m not going to do a guardianship, I’m just going to leave the children permanently with her right now with the option to go back and revisit after we get through what I deem to be the final test of whether Ms. Denmon’s cognitive skills are going to work.
Statements such as these, coupled with the language in the order regarding reunification, | (¡indicate that the trial court granted temporary custody to Stephenson. Accordingly, we hold that the February 26, 2009 permanency-planning order is not a final, appealable оrder absent Rule 54(b) certification.
Although we hold that there is not a final, appealable order in this case, DHS alternatively requests that this court treat its second point on appeal — that the circuit court erred in ordering DHS to provide family services to Denmon by placing her in the Timber Ridge Ranch facility — as a petition for extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of prohibition or writ of certiorari. 1
A writ of prohibition is not applicable in this case. It is well settled that a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ that is only appropriate when the lоwer court is wholly without jurisdiction. Erin, Inc. v. White County Circuit Court,
This court has repeatedly stated that it will not issue a writ of prohibition for 17something that has already been done. Allen v. Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Ninth Div.,
A writ of certiorari is extraordinary relief that this court will grant only when there is a lack of jurisdiction, an act in excess оf jurisdiction on the face of the record, or the proceedings are erroneous on the face of the record. Cato v. Craighead County Circuit Court,
Here, the circuit court’s February 26, 2009 order states that “DHS is to place Tammy Denmon at Timber Ridge.” Because we hold there is no final, appealable order in this case, no other adequate remedy exists for DHS regarding this ruling by the circuit court except the writ of certio-rari. See Jordan v. Circuit Court of Lee County,
[¡Although the requirement of the lack of another adequate remedy is met, as noted above, this court will only grant a writ of certiorari if (1) there is a lack of jurisdiction, an act in excess of jurisdiction on the face of the record, or (2) it is apparent on the face of the record that there has been a plаin, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion. This court granted writs of certiorari in cases similar to the present appeal in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Collier,
In dependency-neglect cases, a court may order DHS to provide family services. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-334(a)(1). However, “the court shall not specify a particular provider for placement or family services if [DHS] is the payor or provider.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-] 335(b).9 The circuit court’s February 26, 2009 order directing DHS to place Denmon at Timber Ridge Ranch clearly violates the plain language of § 9-27-335(b); therefore, the order is erroneous on its face. Further, although a court can ordеr DHS to make family services available, its custodial jurisdiction is limited to juveniles. See Collier, supra. Accordingly, we grant the writ of certiora-ri.
Writ of prohibition denied; writ of cer-tiorari granted; appeal dismissed.
Notes
. DHS argues for extraordinary relief solely in reference to its second point on appeal.