Ark. State Highway Comm. v. RussellArk. State Highway Comm. v. Russell
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Smith
This is an action by the State Highway Commission to condemn, in fee simple, a 28.2-acre strip across the appellees’ cattle ranch. The jury fixed the landowners’ damages at $26,000. The Commission’s principal contention for reversal is that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the testimony of Guy C. Bussell, who, together with his wife, owns the land.
On direct examination Bussell explained in detail the damage that he would suffer as a result of the condemnation. He valued his property at $82,800 before the taking and at $40,350 after the taking. He considered the strip actually being taken to be worth $11,200 (about $400
On cross examination the attorney for the highway commission elicited an admission from Russell that the Arkadelphia Country Club had offered him $375 an acre for part of his land and that he had taken this offer into consideration in arriving at his conclusion that the property as a whole was worth $82,800 before the taking. Counsel for the commission, after having drawn this admission from the witness, at once asked the court to strike the witness’s testimony about the value of the property before the taking, on the ground that Russell had taken an inadmissible offer into consideration in forming his opinion. The court denied the motion to strike. It is now insisted, upon the authority of Ark. Highway Commn. v. Wilmans, 236 Ark. 945, 370 S. W. 2d 802 (1963), that the court erred in overruling the appellant’s motion.
We are decidedly of the view that the commission’s contention is untenable. This land has been owned by the Russell family for many years. The present owner, the appellee Guy C. Russell, was intimately familiar with the property and was unquestionably qualified to state
It is at once apparent that if we sustain the commission’s contention it will hardly be possible in the future for a landowner or an expert witness to give an admissible opinion about the value of property. In nearly every instance a landowner who has known his land for years, or an expert witness who has acquainted himself with a piece of property, takes into account facts that he knows only by hearsay or that for some other reason would not be admissible as independent evidence upon the examination in chief. If the witness’s candid admission that he has considered such matters destroys his testimony, only a dishonest or an ill-informed witness can give an admissible opinion about the value of property.
The overwhelming weight of authority is contrary to the appellant’s present contention. It has repeatedly been held that expert or lay testimony is competent even though it is based wholly or partly upon hearsay. H. & H. Supply Co. v. United States, 194 F. 2d 553 (10th Cir. 1952); Finley v. Board of County Commissioners, 291 P. 2d 333 (Okla., 1955); Hanover Water Co. v. Ashland Iron Co., 84 Pa. (3 Morris) 279 (1877).
The point has been considered by two of our great judges. Judge Learned Hand, in holding that an expert witness could and should take into account a matter that would not have been independently admissible, had this to say: “Be that as it may, it would be absurd to exclude a qualified expert’s appraisal because he had considered such
On direct examination a witness certainly should not be allowed to repeat hearsay statements made by others or to testify about mere offers or other matters inadmissible under the rules of evidence.
On cross examination, however, the situation is entirely different. It n true, as the appellant contends, that if cross examination demonstrates that the witness had no reasonable basis whatever for his opinión, then his testimony should be stricken. Ark. State Highway Commn. v. Johns, 236 Ark. 585, 367 S. W. 2d 436 (1963). Furthermore, if cross examination shows that the witness has a weak or questionable basis for his opinion, that fact has a bearing upon the weight to be given the witness’s testimony. The cross-examining attorney, however, is not entitled to embark upon a fishing expedition with immunity from any unfavorable information he may elicit. He acts at his peril in putting a question that may evoke an answer damaging to his own case. (Our opinion in the Wilmans case, sugra, to the extent that it is contrary to the views stated here, is disapproved and will not be followed in the future.)
We reject this argument. For the reasons stated in our discussion of the appellant’s first contention the trial court was actually in error in striking the expert -witness’s opinion about the worth of the land after the taking. That error, however, was brought about at the highway commission’s own request. Moreover, we are not convinced that the commission was prejudiced by the court’s refusal to strike the witness’s testimony about the value of the land before condemnation.
Affirmed.