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Arizona State Democratic Party v. State
98 P.3d 214
Ariz. Ct. App.
2004
Check Treatment

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III. herein, we For the set forth reasons may accompliceliability apply to

hold that requiring offense a reckless mens

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rea. L.

CONCURRING: JEFFERSON

LANKFORD, Judge, Presiding and DONN

KESSLER, Judge.

98 P.3d 214 STATE DEMOCRATIC

ARIZONA

PARTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, Arizona, Defendant-Appellee.

STATE

No. 1CA-CV 02-0180. Arizona, Appeals 1, Department

Division A.

Sept.

Review Granted Feb. *3 Kilroy Raup,

Shughart Thomson Goodwin Flood, Gerber, P.C., Rudolph By Kelly J. J. Phoenix, Attorneys Appel- Marty Harper, lant. Smith, County Mohave Attor-

Matthew J. Dollins, County ney Jeffrey Deputy D. Attorney, Appellee. Kingman, Attorneys OPINION BARKER, Judge.

¶ 1 We address Arizona’s constitutional corpora- statutory provisions prohibiting contributing from mo- tions and labor unions “influencing an elec- nies for the question presented specific tion.” The by corporations and whether Party to the Arizona Democratic labor unions (“the Party”) Party’s pay operating expenses prohibited. For the reasons follow, contri- we determine that these present Ari- prohibited butions are under statutory scheme. zona I. prior 2 For time November some election, Party solicited and general and la-

accepted donations expenses. pay operating bor unions to expenses. At overhead administrative time, Party space leased for its investigation, Woods’ office conducted an rent, headquarters. Party addition January then-Attorney Jan- General ordinary had expenses pay- business such as Napolitano et referred the matter roll, utilities, insurance, supplies, and other County Attorney. Mohave expenses. overhead and administrative As a Party Ari- 5 After the and the State solicitations, Party result of the received negotiate zona complete were unable to $100,000 totaling corpo- donations about matter, settlement of the entered State defray rations and labor ex- unions these directing Party an administrative order penses.1 all to return contributions received from cor- separate maintained three porate Party voluntarily sources.2 The checking accounts: an ac administrative agreed stop soliciting corpora- funds from *4 count, account, a federal and a non-federal Party tions and labor unions. The filed also According Party, account. monies de complaint appeal Party the The order. posited into the federal account are used to stipulated the State then to relevant support elections, in candidates federal summary judg- facts and each for side moved are covered the Federal Election Cam ment. (“FECA”), paign §§ Act 2 U.S.C.A. 431-455 (West Supp.2004), pertinent reg federal ¶ Party’s 6 The trial court the denied deposited ulations. in Monies the non-feder granted summary judgment motion and in indirectly support al account are used the judg the favor. State’s The court entered candidacy Party’s Arizona candidates. finding Party ment that the violated Arizona govern election statutes those funds. The (“A.R.S.”) Revised Statutes section 16-919 Party deposited all donations into (Supp.2003). Party deposit It ordered the checking the administrative account and used improperly all received contributions into the salaries, pay funds from that account to for Party Clean Citizens Election Fund. The rent, expenses, supplies, taxes, office post appealed judgment.3 then from the insurance, age, computer repairs, and other expenses. excep overhead-related With two II. tions, Party money the did not transfer from into administrative account either its fed A. checking or eral non-federal The accounts. prohibits 7 cor The Arizona Constitution exceptions September in occurred 1998 when porations contributing money “for the Party $6500) (totaling wrote two checks purpose influencing any of election.” Ariz. the administrative account to the U.S. 14, § provides art. 18. in pay part Postmaster of Const. It full as the return postage requests costs that resulted from follows: application” “vote home for the elec It any corporation, shall unlawful for

tion. state, organized doing or business this election, Shortly any- 4 of before the make contribution then-Attor- ney thing purpose General Grant Woods that the of value learned of influenc- Party using corporate ing pay was donations to election official action. 19, many corpo- 1. The record does disclose how clerk on court December 2001. How- ever, rations or labor were unions involved or how judgment appears no such record. corporation much one or labor union con- January appeal filed its notice tributed. 22, actually judgment signed 2002. The was 2002, 2, 30, April May and entered on Though order administrative refers to Although appeal premature, the notice of was it "corporate contributions from sources” "cor- entered; judgment took effect once the was ac- porations,” apparent have cordingly, jurisdiction appeal. we have this over applying treated the order also contribu- Matison, 418, 421-22, See v. Barassi 130 Ariz. tions from labor unions. We do so as well. (1981); 636 P.2d v. 1203-04 Guinn Schweitzer, entry 838 3. A minute filed the record on December judgment (App.1997). 2001 that the indicates was entered

107 Mesa, (1976); City pre- 1090-91 Heiner (emphasis The first issue Id. (1973), P.2d whether, Ariz.App. as matter of sented us phrase “influenc neither case construes interpretation, given to monies constitutional however, have, re We ing any election.”4 operat- political party phrase in a statu cently construed a similar expenses fall within constitutional ing tory setting. prohibition. We note that refer to does not the Arizona Constitution Tucson, City 10 In Kromko v. we do address labor unions. (App.2002), we were 47 P.3d 1137 Ariz. potential unions from labor phrase statutory required to consider provision.

violation of this constitutional “influencing the elections.” outcomes § 9-500.14 contained within A.R.S. Con construing the Arizona that a provides (Supp.2003). That and the intent of “follow the text stitution we personnel, “city not use its or town shall Fain Land & Co. v. the framers.” Cattle materials, or other re- Hassell, equipment, buildings P.2d (1990). for the sources step first is to “examine Our add- outcomes elections.” City plain language provision.” Jett ed). Though the issue in Kromko was Tucson, direct pur- a communication was provi whether a constitutional “[W]hen pose “influencing the outcomes of elec- logically capa sion is on its face and is clear *5 tions,” that “the the court made clear simply only interpretation,” one we ble of using [public] City from Stevens, prevents follow that text. Ward of an (1959). the outcome elec- 491, to influence P.2d 495 aWhen 344 funds ¶ Kromko, Ariz. 47 clear, tion.” 202 at provision is not “we look constitutional effect, 1141 context, P.3d at consequences spirit (Coro Superior of the law.” State v. ¶ applied the accepted 11 Kromko nado), 365, 927, 363, 922 929 186 P.2d Valeo, Buckley 424 principles set forth in particular, In with (App.1996). when faced 612, (1976), 1, 46 659 U.S. 96 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d phrase multiple susceptible constitutional to an influenced election communications meanings, look we to the intent of dele they “express when to the level of rose gates Corp. who drafted it. Bohannan v. position. advocacy” for a candidate Comm’n, 303, 379, 299, 313 P.2d 82 381 Buckley’s precise not apply did for Kromko (1957). questions constitutional have “When express advo mulation for what constituted arisen, perti court availed has itself Kromko, 502-03, 10, cacy. Ariz. at 47 202 nent records of Constitutional Conven Relying subsequent on au P.3d at 1140-41. insight for tion an into effect intended thorities, court held com Kromko Ward, question.” the provision from 86 elections when the munications influenced “ 229, Ariz. at 495. 344 P.2d at whole[,] as a unam communication ‘taken partic biguously urges’ in a person vote B. (quoting ular v. Ir manner.” Id. Schroeder 14, Council, 174, 118 plain language City Cal.App.4th Article vine 97 9 As to the (2002)). 330, Applying that 18, Cal.Rptr.2d and in 339 of the Arizona Constitution Section here, expended express phrase “influencing holding monies particular the elec- tion,” purpose of “influ advocacy would be for turn first to our own cases. we election”; 14, encing that were not Though an monies we have addressed Article Sec- fall occasions, expended express advocacy would not Bridegroom v. State tion 18 on two Bar, 48-49, term. As the monies here were Ariz.App. 27 P.2d within that Heiner, activities.”). rejected In Bridegroom we ized 4. held that Article expenditure plaintiff's "the of reserve prohibit claim that did the State Bar of Arizona from $14,000.00 support prop- expending passage funds in a sum excess funds for the of a ballot September Ariz.App. at 1967 in effort election osition related to duties. ("This hospital prohibited by was Arti- create a district” at 1091 constitutional Ariz.App. at expending cle Section 18. 21 prohibit Bar does not the State proper its author- in the exercise of itself don3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/780010.html) (last Party’s operating expenses, and not visit Anthony express Party’s position 2004); advocacy, July see also ed Corrado Campaign theory. would correct this The monies Reform-. A al„ et Finance (1997). Indeed, prohi- would not fall within the constitutional this inter Sourcebook against “influencing any pretation (excluding bition election.” As ex here) subsequent portion in a penses discuss this such is de as claimed opinion, suggest primary we do not that Kromko money” scribed as a source for “soft controlling prior here. unregulated passage It is based on that was of the Infra city employees McCain-Feingold money' communications Act:6 ‘soft as “The by corporations loophole contrasted with contributions arose as result of a 1978 FEC advisory party. opinion and labor unions to a But that construed FECA’s limi Kromko illustrative of a of “in- definition tations contributions to as fluencing any applying election” that would exclude not to contributions for state elec tions, prohibition ‘party building’ monies the constitutional or for as purpose registration get-out-the-vote were used for the of ex- voter drives.” advocacy.5 press Weinstein, Campaign James Finance Re and the An First Amendment: Intro form In12 addition to the of “in construction duction, (2002). 34 Ariz. St. L. J. fluencing any Buckley based election” on the recently primary purpose A enacted pertaining express advocacy, rationale oth McCain-Feingold “plug” Act was to phrases er federal authorities construe like money” by legislative “soft conduit action. “influencing any election” a context factu 1071; McConnell v. Fed. Election FECA, ally comparable passed to that here. Comm’n, 93, —, U.S. by Congress in included several similar L.Ed.2d one Whether 431(8)(A)(i) phrases. §§ See U.S.C.A. agrees or not with the construction (“contribution” gift “for includes made creating “loophole,” opposed of influencing election for Fed recognizing legitimate First Amendment 441a(a)(1)(A) (limit *6 office”), (a)(2)(A) eral & conduct, Bopp, see James Jr. and Richard E. ing respect any contributions “with to elec Coleson, The First Amendment Needs No 441b(a) (b)(2) office”), tion for Federal & Protecting Liberty Campaign Reform: from (prohibiting expen certain contributions and ” “Reformers, Finance 51 Cath. U.L.Rev. election”), “in any ditures connection with & (2002), phrases it is clear that like “influenc 441e(a) (prohibiting by foreign contributions ing susceptible an election” are to more than election”). “in nationals connection with an one construction. Congress did phrases. not define these Al though argues the that “in phrase response any clarity State the 13 One of in to lack fluencing any constitution, unambiguously plain election” language refers the the as the to political party, argues here, contribution to a pragmatic the State is the following (“FEC”) Federal Elections Commission con if question: corporations the here did not any election,” cluded otherwise. The FEC construed seek to “influence “what did FECA, consequently phrases, they to think getting these in were expressly all, exclude contributions to a return for their After donations?” the party “party building” get-out-the- objec- in express facts this ease are that the Advisory Democrats, Op.1978-10 vote drives. FEC tive the is to “elect all 1978) (ht (Aug. tp://hern- strengthen party.”7 and to the The United distinction, recognize Buckley particular We that v. and other Valeo the under the facts of this premised part authorities are on a distinction analysis case decline to base our of Arizona's expenditures. between contributions provision upon constitutional it. See infra 19-21, 612; U.S. at 96 S.Ct. Fed. Election Republican Campaign Comm'n Comm., Colo. Fed. Stat. 6. 116 533 U.S. 121 S.Ct. ("Colorado II"). Republican L.Ed.2d phrase excerpted Party’s 7. This Coor- the Using dichotomy, Kromko could be dis- also Campaign, dinated which was entered into evi- tinguished grounds premised on those as it was dence in this case. op- expended, on communications or monies as posed recognizing to monies contributed. While recog expressly Supreme States Court has the Arizona Constitutional Records 1161-63, 728-731, of to Convention have used “contributions nized that donors 1991) (“Records ”). (John Goff, ed., S. ... a funnel from donors party a II, phrased as follows: Republican was candidates.” Colorado 439, 121 at 2351. The noted U.S. S.Ct. any corporation unlawful for It shall be bookkeeping” known “manner of informal state, doing organized, or business this “tallying” that would allow candidate duty by elections or official to influence proportionate contribu amount of receive money, anything of val- a donor made a contribution tions when ue. party than the candidate. Id. rather key issue at the Constitu- Id. at 1163. The 2351; see also Jacobus Convention, constitu- in terms of this tional (9th Alaska, Cir. 338 F.3d or not provision, was whether tional 2003) (noting practice concerns about would be phrase officer thereof’ “or tallying holding Alaska’s corpora- following added the reference to prohibiting contributions “for the debating provi- Id. In tions. at 730-31. an election” included sion, delegates what conduct on discussed operat contributions for administrative and corporation was intended to be part of a Notwithstanding ing expenses). appeal precluded by “to reference argument, author this the other cases and influence elections.” Id. phrases have ities cited above shown “influencing any similar to election” have delegates 17 It is clear that narrowly. been construed more Because corporations, understood that, minimum, do not the issue can be believe precluded were to be contrib plain on a constitutional resolved basis of the uting campaign Portions funds. analysis alone. “I pertinent are as follows: would discussion deprived privilege of con to be hate C. tributing campaign Id. at 730 fund.” (comments Tovrea) Delegate earlier, 14 As noted a consti when prohibits “It to me that this seems passage susceptible multiple tutional member of a from contribut meanings, we intention consider the (com ing money to delegates construing phrase. Bohan fund.” Franklin) Delegate (emphasis add ments of nan, 82 Ariz. at 313 P.2d at 381. ed). Franklin all Delegate continued: “we particular, guided by “pertinent we are *7 very understand that it is one of the well records of the Constitutional Convention ordinary corporation of a to con privileges insight the an into the effect intended from ____ money expenses campaign to tribute Ward, question.” Ariz. at policy is convention to it the this [I]f 344 P.2d at 495. contributing preclude corporations this from 15 In the case of Article ought the money to so this that we there is historical evidence from Arizona’s precluded at as well. Id. officers” would Constitutional Convention to assist us. added). (emphasis Delegate As Cun- 730-31 reading history, eye to our the and with put niff it: us, glean principles: we two the issue before Chairman, corpora- I do not like to see Mr. (1) by plain corpora- it is that contributions elections, I that a governing but feel tions campaign were tions candidate’s fund mining of a may be a director man who (2) primary delegates the concern the may company and wish to contribute $2.60 subsidiary point, language the as broader fund, be com- campaign should not to the adopted delegates the was to allow say: pelled point to to the constitution intent legislature implement delegates’ to the “I cannot contribute this $2.60.” beyond restriction. (emphasis delegates Id. The 16 At Arizona’s 1910 Con- at 730 Constitutional did) (and vention, pass provision that predecessor sought to the to Article Sec- precluded corporate contributions to such approved. The tion 18 was discussed and campaign funds. Id. at 1431. Frank- powers tion of doctrine and the that influence proposition, any lin’s officer should also grounds, a court’s decision on constitutional contributions, making from be barred opposed statutory grounds, upon as to has at thing failed. Id. 731. One was made people. separation the “To ensure the any certainly “influencing election” in- government powers of under the U.S. Consti clear— cludes corporate campaign contributions to tution, consistently federal courts have estab funds. lished doctrines ‘founded in concern about proper properly limited —role of subsidiary point, firmly 18 A not as es —and in society.’” the courts a democratic Ben campaign tablished as the to reference funds Napolitano, 520, 524-25, nett v. expenses present, but still is the use of ¶ 17, (2003) (quoting 315-16 language legislature broader to allow the to Wright, Allen v. instance, 468 U.S. delegates’ purpose. effect the For (1984)). 82 L.Ed.2d language Those same phrased constitutional is principles of simply separation powers apply it make “unlawful ... make money” apply contribution of United States Constitution cam also candidate’s paign fund. The it under Arizona’s is broader: constitution. Id. at ¶ 19, 316; “unlawful ... to make see contribution of also Ariz. Const. art. ... for influencing any 3. When the courts make a decision on con 14, § grounds, election.” Ariz. Const. art. they necessarily 18. Heark stitutional limit the ening corpo back to the same discussion on from rejecting interpretation. officers, Delegate rate effectively Parsons stated: preclude people’s courts ability Chairman, through represen to act their Mr. I elected understand now the object tatives. Elk gentleman See Grove Sch. Dist. v. Maricopa Unified Newdow, U.S. —, —, corporation [Franklin] that he S.Ct. wants C.J., precluded to be contributing, (Rehnquist, L.Ed.2d 98 but is (“When willing concurring) that individual members officers courts extend constitu corporation may prohibitions beyond tional their own indi- previously their limit, vidual capacity recognized they contribute. Then think may I restrict democrat is, bodies.”). is properly section by public stated ic made choices corporation can significant contribute we wield this power sparingly. officers, some of its if right denied the then I contribute think D. say have said all we can with reference phrase “influencing Any may to them. right officer have the reasonably election” can be construed in dif capacity. contribute his It own seems to this, fering ways. express Because me get do all can is to down the delegates pri showing statements principle and leave the details to be mary concern at the Constitutional Conven legislature. worked out contributions, tion to be and the added).8 Delegate Par- on separation powers, consideration based position position sons’ was that prevailed. we decline construe Article Section 18 *8 statement, The “all can get we do is to down necessarily apply to to monies contributed to principle the and leave the details to be political parties operating expenses. by legislature,” worked out the indicates the Rather, the is we believe better course to preference having specific of prohibi- more legislature to if they look the to see have (beyond tions direct contributions cam- to statutorily prohibited such contributions. funds) paign through legislative established so, doing however, we to wish make clear means, through not interpreta- constitutional 14, that we do not hold Article Section tion. only is18 limited to funds contributed to a ¶ 19 Delegate Rather, Parsons’ comments candidate’s fund. de regard in this are separa- reinforced the cide on the narrow issue before us that mo ther proposal Franklin clarified the intent his capacity. of individual Records 730. This the effect that could officers not contribute in motion failed.

111 matter, context, and con- subject and effects political by corporations to nies contributed not expenses sequences.”). neces operating parties provi

sarily prohibited this constitutional ¶ 23 gave in For same reasons we statutory scheme. We turn now to the sion. passage, considering constitutional Arizona’s ¶¶ 9-13, phrase “in we consider the supra,

III. statutory in enact fluencing an election” A. susceptible multiple meani ment to be directly Accordingly, turn ngs.10 ¶ 21 legislature enacted a The Arizona analysis. range of factors our broader 14, statutory implement provision to Article 18, of Arizona Constitution. 16-919(A). provision, utilizing § That A.R.S. B. constitution, provides: language of the adopt possible, If a construction 24 “we corporation “It is for a or limited unlawful it with other of a statute reconciles liability of company make contribution statutes, in giving force to all statutes money anything purpose of value for Sec., Dep’t v. Ariz. Econ. volved.” Lewis legisla influencing of an election.”9 Id. (App. P.2d 755 Ariz. 925 186 pertaining to passed ture a similar section 1996). interpretation be the one Our should 919(B)(“It § un labor unions. A.R.S. 16— statutory scheme “most harmonious with organization lawful for to make Pinto, legislative purpose.” State v. money anything contribution of value (App. Ariz. election”). purpose influencing 1994). prac Our “make constructions should Though legislature defined number Cornish, v. tical sense.” State statute, e.g., operative terms within the ¶ 16, (App.1998). P.2d “election,” “employee,” “employer,” and “la organization,” 16-919(F), § bor A.R.S. only suggest 25 We not that there do not did define what it meant statutory construing the one means of bar “influencing an election.” against corporate and labor contributions purpose We construe statute in the “for the an election” 16-919(A) (B). § same manner we construe of the that is set forth As constitution; out, way reading language points we consider the dissent one first Healthcare, listing of indi- statute. Scottsdale Inc. to conclude that 16-919(A) Sys. may §in Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment viduals who not receive Admin., contributions, polit- P.3d failure to include face, plain parties representatives If the statute is not ical or their its list, statutory we then consider the indicates an intent to treat contribu- conjunction persons being prohib- range with the same tions to listed broad pertinent Logan Living argument This not an raised either factors. Forever ited. was Inc., Int'l, 191, 194, 10, may appeal. Prods. 52 below or on (2002) (“In argument discerning legisla raised because the same have intent, accepting policy, listing pertaining tive we look to the statute’s individuals 16-919(A) words, address, designed was evil it was provides apply that are in- committees 9. That section in Ml as follows: corporated pursuant chapters to title It or a A. is unlawM for lunit- through that are committees liability company ed make contribution liability companies. organized as limited anything of value for the 16-919(A). election, influencing an it is unlawM *9 designating who an for the individual formed "influencing any phrase is The constitutional committee, 10. exploratory exploratory an com- (emphasis § Mttee, Const. art. election.” Ariz. added). campaign a a candidate or candidate’s statutory phrase "influencing is an The money accept committee to contribution 16-919(A) § anything corporation election." A.R.S. a a or of value from or "any” liability company purpose no on the use of We find distinction based limited influencing an election. subsection does as contrasted with "an.” This 16-921(B) (G) regard § not included with to the labor contri- their families. A.R.S. & 16-919(B). Thus, §in may butions identified The come from no other interpretation apply id., dissent’s would “person,” corporation which includes the corporate not 1-215(29) (the and labor contributions.11 “per- § or union. A.R.S. term considering plain language of When associations). corporations son” includes or 16-919(A) (B) § viewing & and Arizona’s Thus, setting what “influ- for constitutes statutory for a scheme finance as encing corporations an election” is that whole, must, plain seems to us that may financially participate, unions “for legislature permit did not intend cor- by political purposes,” separate means of this porations and labor unions to circumvent the 16-920(A)(3). segregated § fund. A.R.S. statutory prohibition against “influencing any That these are the funds “to utilized for be by allowing political election” contributions political purposes” strongly suggests to us parties for “operating expenses.” an Such used, treasury monies were not to be so by exclusion called in the was not out except limiting them be constitu- when would legislature. analysis Our is as follows. impermissible. tionally ¶ 26 Though barring all contributions portions statutory 28 Other corporate and “for purpose labor sources 16-920(A)(2) bear scheme this out. Section election,” influencing § 16- A.R.S. corporations organizations allows and labor 919(A) (B), & specifically pro expend “[n]on-partisan regis- monies for prohibition corporations vided get-out-the-vote campaigns by tration and a apply “does committees” corporation aimed at its stockholders and corporations. nonprofit formed as A.R.S. personnel executive administrative 16-919(A). § statutory scheme then de organization their a labor families “sepa fines committee to include a aimed at members and their families.” rate, segregated fund corpo established added.) (Emphasis We do not consider it organization” pursuant ration or labor inconsequential permissible political that the 16-920(A)(3). § § A.R.S. 16- activity specified “non-parti- that is is both 901(19)(b)(Supp.2003). “stockholders,” san” and limited to “execu- 16-920(A)(3), turn, provides in personnel,” tive or administrative “mem- organizations and labor bers,” and “their families.” Id. establishment, may provide for “[t]he admin- construing When statutes we voluntary istration solicitation of contri- expression consider that “the one more separate segregated butions fund to be items of class indicates an intent to exclude political purposes.” (Emphasis utilized for added.) all items of the same class are not which And while or union establish, administer, expressed.” County Heinfeld, may Pima solicit contri- fund, (1982); funding butions for the is see to come solely voluntary Transp. Freightliner Corp., also PAM contributions from a (1995) corporation’s their “stockholders and families (“[I]f personnel specifies and its executive or administrative a statute under what condi effective, and their or a ordinarily families” union’s members and tions it is we can infer Additionally, plain argues § 16- The dissent also that the definition of 919(A), (1) separate 16-919(F), there are violations for specific § those referencing election elec- purpose “make who contribution” for tions, 919(A) (B) "only pro- means 16— influencing an election and those who “ac- purpose hibit contributions for the cept contribution" for of influenc- influencing elections of individuals for enumerat- ing Identifying may an election. who have political positions.” ed The "elec- Infra liability accepting criminal contribution positions, tion individuals” the enumerated scope does define the of what is for the exactly what are these contributions about. an election those who operating ex- issue may make contributions nor does it limit who penses party express for the Democratic whose making accountable for such contributions. This us, purpose, on the before to "elect all record essentially argues, what dissent infra 16— Democrats” the elections to asserting there is an result. We absurd re- 919(F) refers. spectfully disagree. *10 -921(B) others.”). This also tells & that it excludes all statutes scope corporate and labor corporations to that organizations allow labor us money non-partisan aimed that “influences election” on activities spend stockholders, members, specifically cover includes and was intended to their own pur- clearly expended “political to the monies families. Monies contributed poses.” political party a by very partisan their and not For whatever else definition shareholders, members, be, thing may political or is certain: limited to or their do one “political permit party To such contributions would is at the heart core families. express- directly contrary legislation statutory princi- purposes” which be 39, 96 Buckley, 424 U.S. at just ly directed. See ples stated. need not decide whether S.Ct. We ¶ 30 16-920(A)(5) broadens hip.” “joined at the party and a candidate are political scope permissible contribu II, 448-49, Republican 533 U.S. Colorado “[cjontributions use allowing tions It clear to us that a 121 S.Ct. 2351. seems support oppose an or or initiative referen party very type entity to the dum measure or amendment constitu legislature provided when it had mind appears tion.” The statute to be a direct organizations corporations and labor Supreme response United States separate use a mechanism to make must preclude prohibiting which from cases states “political purposes.” contributions for corporations supporting non-candidate See First Bank elections. Nat’l Boston C. Bellotti, 1407, 55 435 U.S. (1978) (striking L.Ed.2d 707 down a Massa however, Party argues, that the law prohibiting corporate chusetts contribu separate definition of “contribution” in A.R.S. expenditures regard tions with referen 16-901(5), applies generally § da); but Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l cf. whole, campaign permits finance scheme as Comm.,

Right to Work 459 U.S. the contributions at issue here. We do 74 L.Ed.2d (upholding S.Ct. argument persuasive. find provisions prohibiting corporations FECA’s matter, As an initial it is to us unclear using treasury labor unions from funds elections). general that the definition of “contribution” statutory provi in candidate This 16- applies present context. Section legisla sion is consistent with our view the 901(5) provides pertinent part the follow- intent “for political tive that contributions ing definition: purposes organi labor [or] separate zation” be limited to from “a chapter, In this unless the context other- segregated voluntary fund” based contri requires: wise treasury than the mo butions rather use of 16-920(A)(3). See nies. A.R.S. Such reading is consistent Arizona’s with constitu any gift, sub- 5. “Contribution” means in that

tional has loan, scription, deposit advance or (beyond prohibition provided the “details” anything of value made contributing candidate’s an elec- fund) implement necessary to a directive that tion____ through not influence elections their wealth. 16-901(5). We note that the defini A.R.S. note, too, applied “unless the context We tion is be 16-920(A) making requires.” that deter section describes the contributions otherwise (Em mination, permits “political are to “[statutes contributions.” we consider added.) possible, such phasis given, That directs that mo whenever an effect section clause, word is rendered nies “utilized for a cor that no sentence or void, organization” contradictory insignifi poration superfluous, come [or] Deddens, contributions, voluntary corpo cant.” State 16-920(A)(3) 1124, 1128 treasury. §§ ration’s *11 114

¶ provides 34 “to.” The The definition contribution mean 16-901(5) payments political party, § a part A.R.S. is defined in use exclusion political to a phrase party. of the “for the not monies contributed phrase already Party’s statutory an reading election.” This is included The converts the against political a prohibition phrase payment by party” within the “the payment political labor phrase party.” issue here. A.R.S. “the (B). 16-919(A) § If reading & we the defi- obvious effect of a inserted The such is 16-901(5) § exempt given by nition from A.R.S. into monies A.R.S. that are entities 16-919(A) (B), § political party & from one sec- than a whereas other the stat- superfluous. exempt tion or other political becomes ute’s terms would Therefore, substantially party it is not clear to itself. us These are differ- general applies concepts. definition of contribution ent 16-919(A) (B). § particu- A.R.S. & This may “inflate, 37 not Courts ex larly given presence § so of A.R.S. 16- pand, a stretch or extend statute to matters which, described, 920 defines contributions falling expressed provisions.” not within its expenditures in setting corpora- a for Donofrio, City v. 99 Phoenix Ariz. organizations. Though tions and labor not (1965). may 407 P.2d Nor we § controlling, heading is indica- 16-920 something “read into a statute which not heading tive of this as well. The states: legisla within the manifest of the intention expenditures by corporations “Permitted gathered ture statute itself.” organizations.” Anway, State ex rel. 87 Ariz. Morrison ¶ Notwithstanding foregoing, even if (1960). Changing general applies, definition contribution “by” change in to “to” makes a the substan Party’s we do not find it advances tive terms the statute we are not 16-901(5) position. passage § The authorized to do. upon Party primarily which the is the relies Second, even if consider the Par- exemption “payment by party political for a ty’s argument § solely be that 16- expenses.” § for operating 16- 901(5)(b)(v) is descriptive of monies that 901(5)(b)(v) added).12 The excluded, limitation, should rather than a argues payments by political that since earlier, reject we would it. As mentioned party operating expenses for are not contri- including “one or items of a more class indi- butions, par- political monies contributed to a an intent to exclude all items of the cates ty expenses for not operating should be ei- expressed.” class same which are Hein- not disagree. ther. We Here, feld, 134 Ariz. at 654 P.2d at 282. place, payments political party the first when were excluded. unambiguous clear and are to follow There was reason under the statute to do absurdity statutory places unless would result. Bilke v. Arizona’s scheme lim- this. State, 462, 464, 11, P.3d the amount that a its on statutory phrases party can words and contribute to its nominees. A.R.S. 16-905(D) given ordinary meanings must be their (Supp.2003). un- 16- 901(5)(b)(v) less the context indicates Cochise makes otherwise. it clear the funds a County party Health spends operating Care Cost Contain- ex- (as Sys., ment penses well as the other items listed in (App.1991). “By,” quite simply, registration) does not such subsection as voter do ballots, 16-901(5)(b)(v) pro- sample 12. The full text A.R.S. other written materials that substantially promote vides that term not in- "contribution" does or more three nominees clude party public and other office election candidate, specific (v) activities related to payment by political party party except apply that this item personnel, does costs operating expenses, party staff and display respect listing party reports, registra- incurred with newsletters and voter turnout, party of candidates made telecommunications tion and to increase efforts voter organization building systems newspapers, magazines or in and maintenance simi- cards, types printing postage expenses general advertising. for slate lar circulation contributions. treasury monies limits. against these contribution not count Rather, that such legislature intended including one mem- *12 Using principle that voluntary sources not mentioned excludes others of a class contributions ber ” party segregated “payments political separate through that of a means means (and “pay- to allow amended us should not be Kromko principles from fund. The ” by a “payments relies) by corporation persuade ments it do upon which cases be- we do not organization.” intended otherwise. legislature us that regard to the Party’s argument with lieve the “by a expenses paid exemption operating D. party” reflects either the political above, set forth For the reasons legislature’s intent. or the the statute statutory the Arizona conclude that we Krom- argues also that the 39 The by corpora contributions prohibits scheme “influencing the definition of ko case reflects treasury monies unions from tions and labor apply an election” that we should operating expenses. parties for Kromko, 502-03, setting. 202 Ariz. at See concluded, we must now address Having so ¶ 10, Again, we dis- 47 P.3d at 1140-41. is constitutional whether such Kromko, above, illus- agree. as described the United States Constitution under both meanings can be trative of the different that and the Arizona Constitution. “influencing an elec- given phrases like purpose it in our tion.” We cite IV. of constitutional issues because discussion go beyond the the need to demonstrates ¶ 41 Though typically address (as well as plain language of the constitution taking up constitutional issues before Arizona statutory language) to discern its mean- Constitution, under the United States issues certainly the fac- ing. Though we consider Tel. Co. v. Ariz. States Tel. & Mountain Kromko, construing our task when tors from Comm’n, Corp. primarily one of the statute at issue here (1989), reverse the order here. regard discerning legislative intent with extensively devel The reason we do is con- particular to that statute. Kromko United States Con oped case law under the prohibiting cities from send- strued Though dealing with issue. stitution on this ing communications intended to influence rights, our anal significant First Amendment Id. at election. ysis issues under the United States set forth a standard to make Kromko is, view, simple, straight in our Constitution setting in that with which we determination forward, decisions. compelled however, Here, we deal quarrel. no have has directed The Court factual statute in a different with a different subject expenditures Ari- question, in context of setting. The scrutiny different levels scheme, is statutory campaign finance zona’s analysis. This distinction First Amendment that contri- intended whether constitu present United States has been by corpora- political parties made to butions deci jurisprudence since the landmark tional operating organizations for tions and labor 20-21, Buckley, 424 U.S. at sion having been expenses are to be considered there is a “less For contributions S.Ct. 612. influencing an elec- made for ‘closely to match being drawn’ er demand of Kromko, at all In there is no issue tion. Fed. ‘sufficiently important interest.’” whether a contribution about Beaumont, 539 U.S. Election Comm’n v. influencing an purpose party is for the L.Ed.2d 179 123 S.Ct. election; was whether a instead the issue PAC, v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t (quoting Nixon city for that by a communication sent 377, 387-88, 120 S.Ct. 528 U.S. completely purpose. The considerations are (2000)). is con This standard above, L.Ed.2d 886 provisions As discussed different. scrutiny exacting re more trasted with the statutory us to conclude in the scheme lead such limits expenditures, requiring quired of preclude cor- legislature intended to that the compel- “narrowly tailored to serve utilizing to be porations and labor unions 660-61, governmental ling Though regated interest.” Id. funds. Id. at 110 S.Ct. 1391. so, recognized application doing ap- has “[o]ur it noted that the rationale rigorous degree scrutiny plied “corporations of this less has and labor unions with- criticism,” resources, given significant rise to it has great out financial as well as those consistently recently been reinforced. fortunately more situated” based on “Con- McConnell, at —, U.S. S.Ct. at 657 gress’ judgment potential that it is the regulation.” influence that demands (quoting Right 110 S.Ct. 1391 Nat’l importantly, Just under fed Comm., 209-210, Work 459 U.S. at jurisprudence eral constitutional it is also *13 552). being placed clear that when limitation is corporations on contributions or labor ¶45 Applying Austin to this ease unions, scrutiny the level of declines even following: expendi results in the if a on ban Again further. from Beaumont: by corporations tures is constitutional when general- Within realm contributions ability separate segregated to use a fund ly, corporate are contributions allowed, furthest a ban on under the contributions political expression, the core since same circumstances must be constitutional as corporations’ speech First Amendment Otherwise, inescapably well. in would be largely association interests are derived consistent with Austin to hold that such a from those of their members and of the ban on contributions would be unconstitution public in receiving information. A ban on (with scrutiny) al in lesser level of when corporate direct contributions leaves indi- (with expenditures “exacting Austin a ban corporations vidual members of free to scrutiny”) was determined to be constitution contributions, deprives make their own logic al. This is the that the Ninth Circuit public of little or no material informa- dealing in followed with a similar circum tion. Jacobus, Dealing stance. 338 F.3d 1095. 8, 123 n. U.S. S.Ct. 2200 with a ban on soft added). Thus, the Court has made it clear corporations and labor unions in an Alaska corporations that while have associational statute, “Despite the Jacobus court held: speech rights under the First Amend sweep corporate expen broad of the ban on ment, corporate contributions are not enti Austin, in ditures the Court found the ban to scrutiny tled to rights strict and those justified, suggesting corpo that a ban political expres “furthest from the core of certainly rate contributions is almost also sion.” Id. constitutional.” Id. at 1121-22. We note banning further that the Alaska statute cor Against backdrop of more exact- porate and labor contributions was founded ing scrutiny expenditures than contribu- upon “influencing the same an election” lan tions, Supreme the United has States guage as is found in the Arizona statute. upheld Michigan prohibiting indepen- ban at 1100 n. 10. expenditures by corporations dent and labor treasury unions from monies. Austin present juris our under Commerce, Mich. Chamber 494 U.S. prudence, the First does not Amendment 110 S.Ct. 108 L.Ed.2d 652 infringe upon legislature’s ability the Arizona There, “danger the Court held that completely corporate ban and labor contri apparent corruption,” real when combined designat butions to whether unique with “the state-conferred operating expenses ed for or not. We now amassing structure that facilitates the turn to the issues under the Arizona Consti large treasuries” warranted the limit on inde- tution. 659-60, pendent expenditures. Id. at Having compelling S.Ct. 1391. found a inter- V. est, the Austin Court then determined that complete narrowly already ban was Arti tailored be- 47 We have held that cause it of Arizona allowed make inde- cle Section Constitution by corpo- pendent expenditures through separate seg- require does not that contributions bution) corporation expend- opposed political parties be banned. rations directly paying constitu- question ing now Arizona’s either is whether monies legisla- “freely speak” permits right sending payment expense by tional rent conjunction does When read in tion that so. corporate-owned of- providing a landlord or Article we determine (an with Section expenditure). charging fice without rent that it does. failing to see this distinc- are not alone We Mo., See, 528 U.S. at e.g., Shrink tion. the Arizona Article Section (“[0]ur (Thomas, J., dissenting) 120 S.Ct. 897 provides: Constitution Buckley in error----I would decision in was write, may freely Every person speak, subject campaign contribution limitations subjects, being responsible publish on all Republican Fed. scrutiny....”); strict Colo. right. the abuse Comm’n, Campaign v. Fed. Election Comm. Article Our courts have described 2309, 135 518 U.S. protection expres providing greater J., (1996) (Thomas, concurring L.Ed.2d 795 rights sive than the First Amendment. (“In my judgment dissenting part) 354-55, States, 160 Ariz. at Mountain view, sig- lacks constitutional distinction *14 (“[T]his previously P.2d at 459-60 court has it.”); nificance, and I would not adhere to 2, § given greater than the scope art. 6 first v. Nat’l Fed. Election Comm’n Conservative amendment.”); Reinstein, Martin 195 Comm., 519, 480, 470 U.S. Political Action ¶ 293, 321, 103, 779, (App. Ariz. 987 807 P.2d (Mar- 1459, 455 105 S.Ct. 84 L.Ed.2d 1999) (“[T]he Arizona Constitution does in J., shall, joined dissenting) (“Although I provide protec greater some circumstances portion Buckley curiam dis- per that speech tion of than does the constitu federal tinguished independent contributions from tion.”). supreme Our court has invalidated expenditures purposes, for First Amendment governmental action based on the “more I now that distinction has no believe protections stringent of the Arizona Consti significance.”); 424 Buckley, constitutional States, 358, Ariz. at tution.” Mountain 160 (White, J., 261, at U.S. 96 S.Ct. 612 concur- added).13 773 P.2d at 463 Under (“For ring dissenting part) in in part and circumstances, apply we are hesitant to to see constitutional it is difficult protection the reduced standard for contri regulation expen- the difference between” expenditures. with butions contrasted contributions); 290, at ditures and id. ¶¶ Supra 42-46. There is merit substantial (Blackmun, J., concurring part in S.Ct. argument “contributions ex (“I part) persuaded in dissenting am not penditures are two sides of the same First makes, that the or indeed able to Court 241, Buckley, at Amendment coin.” 424 U.S. make, principled distinction constitutional C.J., (Burger, concurring part limitations, the contribution on the between dissenting part). “operating limitations, hand, expenditure one and the us, princi expenses” setting before see no here.”). other, are involved We pled distinction between con however, not, this as a Party need resolve issue tributing pay so that can monies (a matter law. operating expenses such as rent contri- of state constitutional "directly grant[s] every language to Arizo- 13. Some of decisions contain zona Constitution our speech right.” protection "greater ... lies in nan a broad free States, Mountain effect that 354, speech at P.2d at It then of free 160 Ariz. Arizona Constitution’s extension only speech which rights went on to detail instances in the Arizona to cover not limitations im government, Supreme posed speech but had that the Arizona Consti- also limita held provides greater speech protection for emanating other State v. tution free tions sources.” 55, Evenson, 209, 218, 15, against governmental action. Id. n. 354— 780, proceeded (App.2001); ex P.2d at 459-60. court then 789 n. 15 see also State rel. (a ¶ Gravano, Corporation Commission order Napolitano v. invalidate a action) stringent governmental "more (App.2002). n. 7 under the n. 60 P.3d Our protections reading of the Arizona Constitution.” of Mountain States does not lead greater protec- at 463. Mountain States court stated 773 P.2d conclusion. The that, "provides only limited tion the Arizona Constitution not while First Amendment action,” merely against protection government action. Ari- to non-state analysis 48 Our under the Arizona Con election” under Article Section 18. proceeds stitution on a different foundation presence Because of the of Article Section analysis from the under the United States we do not corporate find the ban on Constitution. Unlike the federal constitu contributions to to be tion, Arizona’s expressly prohib constitution in violation of right “freely Arizona’s to' its corporations from “influencing any elec speak.”

tion.” Ariz. Const. art. 18. Whereas federal decisions need consider First VI. rights Amendment when determining wheth 51 The argues also corporate er expenditures contributions or 16-919(A), consequently Article limited, can be we must also consider the unconstitutionally over- express limitation that Arizona’s constitution they broad because nonprofit do not exclude places contributions “for the corporations from their reach. This issue is purpose of influencing any election.” Id. presented to us on the facts. construing When constitution, Arizona’s terms, must consider all of its simply recognize, 52 We as the United States right “freely speak.” Kilpatrick Supe Supreme held, Court has that nonprofit cor Court, rior 24 porations may provide the most effective (1970) (“[Constitutions must be construed as “by large means numbers of individu a whole and their parts various must be read als of join modest means can together together.”). organizations which to ‘ampliffy] serve ” voice of their adherents.’ Nat’l Conserva 49 It apparent that, to us in adopting Comm., tive Political Action 470 U.S. at constitutional prohibits cor- *15 105 S.Ct. 1459 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at porations making any contributions for 612). 22, 96 recognize S.Ct. We also the purpose influencing election, an Court’s view nonprofit corpora that some delegates were aware that certain core tions are “more akin to voluntary political rights political expression only would not associations than business firms.” Fed. Elec limited, completely but barred. This was tion Comm’n v. Mass. Life, Citizens For decision, a deliberate expressly sanctioned Inc., U.S. constitution, Arizona’s delegates that the in- L.Ed.2d 539 Our holding here is in bring above, tended to about. As discussed complete harmony with ap those cases as while we have construed that constitutional plied to the federal constitution and Arizona’s provision to not necessarily preclude all con- right “freely speak.” showing There is no political tributions to parties, we do not find in the nonprofit record of scope outside the of the constitutional that made contributions. Party power granted legislature. to the Clearly, prevail cannot grounds. on these political parties contributions to can be con- purpose sidered for the influencing an earlier, election. As noted the record shows VII. express purpose Party of the is “to elect conclude, 53 To we hold that Article all Democrats.” Section 18 of the Arizona Constitution does to, 50 Our possible, mandate is “[i]f not necessarily preclude corporations from

... construe[ ] statutes to rendering avoid contributing political party’s operating them Hayes unconstitutional.” expenses. hold, however, Cont’l Ins. We also that the Co., 872 Arizona corporate banned and la- (1994). By providing a corpora- means for political bor parties oper- contributions to for tions organizations and labor participate ating expenses § when it enacted A.R.S. 16- through separate funds, 919(A) segregated (B) legis- & and statutory the related lature has authorized a corpora- method for scheme. We further hold that statutory those organizations tions and participate labor comply enactments with the First Amend- effecting “political purposes” that is consis- ment to the United States Constitution and tent against with the “influencing mandate the Arizona Accordingly, Constitution. and any politi- above, any election judgment “Election” means the reasons set forth for office, any political con- election affirmed. cal the trial court is caucus, any primary election or or vention F. WILLIAM CONCURRING: selecting any candi- purpose held GARBARINO, Judge. person or other date, committee political office, or cau- convention any political TIMMER, dissenting. Judge, cus. respectfully applying I dissent. After 16-919(F)(1). Employing this defi- statutory § accepted principles of construction (B) 16-919(A) 16-919(A) nition, only prohibit (B), § and § I conclude to A.R.S. purpose company, corporation, liability corporate limited contributions that a enu- provi- influencing of individuals for organization14 violates these elections or making pro- positions. when contributions sions merated candidates, candidates, their corporate contributions spective proscribes neither initiative, representatives purpose to influence elections made involving referendum, candi- influencing proposi- elections or other measure corporate prohibits dates. Because contribu- nor other tion15 in this were influencing at issue case purpose of not made for the tions purpose, I would prohibited made for this Majority there- of individuals. elections summary judgment 16-919(A) and remand reverse § by interpreting errs fore to enter to the trial court with directions (B) corporate con- broadly prohibiting all Party. judgment in favor of “political purposes.” See made for tributions supra ¶ 55 Majority agree Both the I (B) 16-919(A) pivotal language in supported This is further conclusion prohibits corporations examining identity who anything of value contributing lawfully corporate contribu receive cannot influencing purpose “for the an election.” made “for the tions however, ways my colleagues, part I with prohibiting After election.” they see phrase ambiguous, label this when 16-919(A) contributions, continues, in rele ¶ 23, supra, proceed employ second part, as follows: vant construction, ary statutory see principles of *16 designating it is for the ... and unlawful ¶¶ 24-40, considering first the supra, without exploratory com- who formed an individual meaning phrase of within the context of the committee, mittee, exploratory a candi- an v. the entire statute. Calmat Arizona of campaign committee date or candidate’s Miller, 190, 193, ex rel. 176 Ariz. 859 State money of or accept contribution (concluding that P.2d 1326 anything of value from legislative first intent court must determine liability of company limited language); statute’s State review influencing an election.” Williams, 98, 100, 131, 133 175 854 P.2d (1993) (holding language that statute’s is best candidates, candi only prospective meaning). guide most and rehable its dates, representatives campaign their and examined, § entirety of 16-919 the is

When receiving proscribed cor prohibited are phrase “influencing an election” must be the 16-919(A) does porate contributions. Section one construction than the given narrower are and entities that prohibit individuals ¶ 31. Majority. supra See offered the an individual’s not associated with

¶ 16-919(A) (B), accepting corporate § contributions. and 56 For limiting the list only logical reason for so as follows: the term “election” defined Indeed, reference, explicitly legislature approves this § ease 16-919 15. 14. For because § 16- distinguish providing in A.R.S. significantly construction its treatment does 920(A)(5) support liability companies, la- use corporations, "[c]ontributions limited collectively oppose an initiative or referendum measure organizations, refer to I hereafter bor be con- to the constitution” shall not “corporations” otherwise amendment entities unless as prohibited political contributions. specified. strued as prohibited recipients legislature is that the Finally, although unnecessary it is prohibit corporate intended to beyond § contribu look language 16-919 to tions made to influence elections to meaning individual discern the “influenc- political positions.16 election,” Supply, ing See Westburne compelled I am to address Design Inc., Inc. v. Majority’s § contention that A.R.S. 16- Const. Diversified 598, 600, 170 Ariz. (App. 826 P.2d 920 sets forth permitted an exclusive list of 1992) (“What necessarily implies corporate contributions. supra See part 16-920(A) as much a of the statute as what it provides expendi- list of explicit.”). makes tures that “shall polit- not be construed to be ical prohibited by contributions law.” The ¶ Additionally, correct, if Majority Majority, citing legal principle that “the 16-919(A) (B) application §of pro- would expression of one or more items of a class duce absurd City results. Phoenix v. Su- indicates an intent to exclude all items of the Court, perior 175, 178, 139 Ariz. 677 P.2d expressed,” same class which are not Pima (1984) (concluding court should County Heinfeld, 133, 134, 134 Ariz. interpret give statute to it fair and sensible (1982), § concludes that 16-920 meaning); Medrano-Barraza, State v. permissible delineates the class of corporate 949 P.2d (App.1997) ¶¶ supra contributions. See 29-31. I dis- (‘We presume the framers of the statute did agree with this conclusion for two reasons. not intend an absurd result and our construc- tion must consequence”). 16-920(A) avoid such a Spe- First, § purport does not cifically, Majority concludes that cor- establish an permissible exclusive class porate contributions for purposes, Rather, contributions. provi- statutorily unless excepted, prohibited merely sion expenditures directs that certain 16-919(A) (B), § under including shall not prohibited be construed Party made to the Second, this case contributions. if had ¶¶ operating expenses. supra by § See 39- intended 16-920 to set forth an exclu- although But corporations permissible corporate sive class of contribu- made crimes, tions, contributions committed § its enactment of broadly 16-919 to 16-919(C), A.R.S. did not prohibit corporate be- contributions made for the they cause are not among prohibit- listed purpose of influencing an election would be funds, recipients ed meaningless. A.R.S. 16- Tucson, City See Herman v. 919(A). Conversely, if the had contributed for an (App.1999) individual’s cam- (noting interpreting court avoids paign operating expenses, corpora- both the statute “so render of recipient subject tions and the would be ‘surplusage,’ to mere give [and instead] mean- prosecution. 16-919(A), §§ criminal word, ing clause, phrase, ‘each and sen- (D). (C), appears No reason for such anoma- ... part tence so that no of the statute will *17 results, lous only logical void, and the inert, redundant, ”). conclusion is be trivial.’ legislature solely punish intended legal upon by maxim relied who, recipients respectively, Majority, which applied great should be with caution, contribute and anything receive Lou Grubb Chevrolet v. Indus. value for the purpose Comm’n, of influencing elections 171 Ariz. 829 P.2d political positions. individual Atkinson, Bros., (App.1991) (citing Kier Majority so, 16. point infers that this should be certainly funds. While this is whether the ignored parties because the did not raise it. Su- prohibit recipients intended list- ¶pra considering proper 25. But when inter- (A) similarly receiving ed in subsection con- statutes, pretation application we are not organizations tributions from labor must be left arguments parties. limited to the made for resolution in a future case. For State, Evenstad v. however, discern, appeal, I do not and the (App.1993). Majority also notes Majority explain, does not how the omission in 16-919(B), prohibits organi- (B) implication subsection affects the derived contributing money anything zations from partial listing prohibited recipients election, value for (A). subsection any prohibited recipients does not list of such a con- Likewise, support the record does Comm’n, Spicer Indus. Co. v. tun- Party impermissibly clusion (1929)), inapplicable. P. 634 individual’s to an the contributions neled § 16- sum, I conclude that 61 In would, therefore, reverse I campaign. (B) 919(A) contri- only prohibit corporate trial court with instructions remand Party. judgment to indi- favor influence enter made to elections butions stipu- political positions. The vidual made

lated that defray were intended to expenses. facts in the

Party’s operating No were suggest that the contributions

record influencing an elec- purpose

made for the position.

tion of an individual

Case Details

Case Name: Arizona State Democratic Party v. State
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Arizona
Date Published: Sep 30, 2004
Citation: 98 P.3d 214
Docket Number: 1CA-CV 02-0180
Court Abbreviation: Ariz. Ct. App.
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