ARIZONA MINORITY COALITION FOR FAIR REDISTRICTING, an unincorporated association; Ramon Valadez; State Representative Peter Rios; Carlos Avelar; Maricopa County Supervisor, Mary Rose Garrido Wilcox; Esther Lumm; Virginia Rivera; Los Abogados, an Arizona Corporation, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION; Steven W. Lynn, in his official capacity as Chairman and a Commissioner thereof; Andrea Minkoff; in her official capacity as Vice Chairman and a Commissioner thereof; Daniel R. Elder, in his official capacity as a Commissioner thereof; Joshua M. Hall, in his official capacity as a Commissioner thereof; James R. Huntwork, in his official capacity as a Commissioner thereof, Defendants/Appellants.
No. CV-08-0161-PR.
Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.
May 20, 2009.
208 P.3d 676 | 211 Ariz. 337 | 587
Gammage & Burnham PLC, by Lisa T. Hauser, Cameron C. Artigue and Haralson Miller Pitt Feldman & McAnally PLC by Jose de Jesus Rivera, Peter T. Limperis, Phoenix, Attorneys for Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, Steven M. Lynn, Andrea M. Minkoff, Daniel R. Elder, Joshua M. Hall, and James R. Huntwork.
OPINION
McGREGOR, Chief Justice.
¶ 1 Arizona‘s Independent Redistricting Commission (the Commission) has the sole task of drawing congressional and state legislative districts. The Arizona Constitution provides procedural and substantive guidance to the Commission. This decision considers the nature of this guidance and the extent to which a court can review Commission decisions.
I.
¶ 2 In November 2000, Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, a citizen initiative that amended the Arizona Constitution by removing the power to draw congressional and state legislative districts from the state legislature and reassigning this task to the newly created Independent Redistricting Commission. See
¶ 3 The constitution permits no more than two members of the Commission to be from the same political party and requires that the fifth commissioner not be registered with any party represented on the Commission at the time of appointment.
¶ 4 The Commission requires a quorum of three commissioners, including the chair or vice-chair, to conduct business, and the Commission can take official action only with three or more affirmative votes.
- Districts shall comply with the United States constitution and the United States voting rights act;
- Congressional districts shall have equal population to the extent practicable, and state legislative districts shall have equal population to the extent practicable;
- Districts shall be geographically compact and contiguous to the extent practicable;
- District boundaries shall respect communities of interest to the extent practicable;
- To the extent practicable, district lines shall use visible geographic features, city, town and county boundaries, and undivided census tracts;
- To the extent practicable, competitive districts should be favored where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other goals.
II.
¶ 6 In May 2001, the Commission commenced the mapping process by creating a map with “districts of equal population in a grid-like pattern across the state” and adopting that map on June 7, 2001. See
¶ 7 On August 17, 2001, the Commission adopted a draft map. The Commission advertised this draft map for the constitutionally required thirty days and held another series of public hearings to obtain additional comment. After reviewing public comments and making further modifications to the draft map, on November 9, 2001, the Commission adopted a legislative map. It certified the legislative district boundaries and delivered the certification to the Arizona Secretary of State on November 15, 2001.
¶ 8 As required by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
¶ 9 In May 2002, the Commission developed an emergency interim legislative plan to address the DOJ objections. On May 29, 2002, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona authorized use of the interim plan in the 2002 legislative elections. Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm‘n, 230 F.Supp.2d 998, 1000-01 (D.Ariz.2002).
¶ 10 In June 2002, the Commission adjusted the interim plan, taking into consideration all six of the constitutional goals, including competitiveness. The Commission adopted a new draft map on June 25, 2002, and advertised that map to the public for thirty days. Following the comment period and some final minor adjustments, the Commission adopted a final legislative district map on August 14, 2002.
¶ 11 On March 6, 2002, the Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting and others (the Coalition) filed this action in superior court asserting that the legislative plan did not sufficiently favor competitive districts and therefore violated Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14)(F) because it did not create competitive districts when it was possible to do so.3 The Coalition alleged that the Commission‘s final map created “fewer, rather than more, competitive legislative districts” and it offered an alternative plan to better accomplish all the constitutional goals.
¶ 12 After a six-week bench trial in November and December 2003, the trial court concluded that the Commission had failed to favor the creation of competitive legislative districts and that this failure was arbitrary and capricious and a violation of section 1(14)(F). In reaching its conclusions, the court placed significant weight on the existence of two alternative plans presented to the Commission. The court found that both the “Hall-Minkoff Plan,” developed by the Commission, and the “Hall-Modified Plan,” submitted to the Commission by the Coalition, “allowed the Commission to create a greater number of competitive legislative districts without causing significant detriment to the other goals.” According to the trial court‘s findings, both alternative plans created seven competitive districts, whereas the Commission‘s August 2002 plan created only four competitive districts. On January 16, 2004, the court ordered the Commission to adopt a new legislative plan that would favor competitiveness and be at least as competitive as the Hall-Minkoff Plan or the Hall-Modified Plan.
¶ 13 The Commission appealed the trial court‘s ruling to the court of appeals and, in the interim, prepared a new legislative plan that the trial court approved on April 16, 2004. Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm‘n (Redistricting I), 211 Ariz. 337, 343 ¶ 10, 121 P.3d 843, 849 (App.2005). The court of appeals reversed the trial court‘s January 2004 judgment, holding that the “competitiveness goal is subordinate to [the] other goals listed in Section 1(14)(B)-(E), and the trial court erred by entering a contrary ruling.”4 Id. at 364-65 ¶ 113, 121 P.3d at 870-71. The court of appeals also reversed the trial court‘s April 2004 judgment approving the new redistricting plan and remanded to the trial court to decide whether the Commission violated Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14) and (15) or the state or federal equal protection clauses.5 Id. at 366 ¶ 120, 122, 121 P.3d at 872; see also
¶ 14 On remand, the trial court again found that the Commission‘s August 2002 legislative plan violated Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14) because the Commission did not suffi-
¶ 15 The Commission appealed. The court of appeals again reversed, this time observing that the Commission “considered competitiveness and made a finding that a more competitive plan would cause a significant detriment to the other five constitutional goals” and concluding that “the Commission‘s findings were supported by substantial evidence.” Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm‘n (Redistricting II), 219 Ariz. 50, 54, 55 ¶¶ 20, 26, 192 P.3d 409, 413, 414 (App. 2008).
¶ 16 The Coalition petitioned this Court for review and asked us to decide (1) whether the Commission must “favor” or merely “consider” competitiveness; (2) whether the Commission must include all six of the constitutional goals before advertising a draft map; (3) whether the Commission must make objective findings of significant detriment to the other constitutional goals when rejecting more competitive redistricting plans; and (4) whether the findings of the trial court are entitled to review under the clearly erroneous standard. We granted review to decide these recurring issues of statewide importance. See ARCAP 23(c). We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5.3, of the Arizona Constitution and
III.
¶ 17 The level of judicial review afforded Commission enactments depends in large part on whether we regard the Commission as a “legislative body” or as a “constitutional administrative body.” In Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission v. Fields (Legislative Immunity Opinion), the court of appeals treated the Commission as a “legislative body,” see 206 Ariz. 130, 139 ¶ 24, 75 P.3d 1088, 1097 (App.2003), but in Redistricting II, the court of appeals referred to the Commission as a “constitutional administrative agency.”6 219 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 9, 192 P.3d at 411. We must resolve this conflict in the court of appeals’ decisions to determine what standard of review courts should employ when reviewing Commission actions.
A.
¶ 18 In the Legislative Immunity Opinion, the court of appeals held that Commission members are entitled to legislative privilege because the Commission performs a legislative function. 206 Ariz. at 139 ¶ 24, 75 P.3d at 1097; see also Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg‘l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405 & n. 30, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979) (taking a functional approach to legislative immunity). We agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that if an entity performs a legislative function, courts should regard that entity as a legislative body. See Legislative Immunity Opinion, 206 Ariz. at 138-39 ¶¶ 20-24, 75 P.3d at 1096-97. An entity‘s action is legislative if it bears “the hallmarks of traditional legislation [by] reflect[ing] a discretionary, policy-making decision [that] may have prospective implications.” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55-56, 118 S.Ct. 966, 140 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998).
¶ 19 To determine whether the Commission is a legislative body, therefore, we examine the nature of its acts. The Commission‘s acts bear “the hallmarks of traditional legislation” in that commissioners exercise discretion and make policy decisions. Commissioners do not merely implement established redistricting policy; rather, guided by the Arizona Constitution, they decide where to draw district boundaries. In addition,
B.
¶ 20 We next address the standard that applies to judicial review of legislative acts. Courts generally afford substantial deference to legislative enactments.7 When reviewing a legislative enactment, courts exercise the deference that “we customarily must pay to the duly enacted and carefully considered decision of a coequal and representative branch of our Government.” Walters v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319-20, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 87 L.Ed.2d 220 (1985). We do so not only because legislative enactments originate with a coequal branch of government, but also because that “institution is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195-96, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665-66, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶ 21 Courts also operate under the expectation that “the legislature acts constitutionally.” State v. Murphy, 117 Ariz. 57, 61, 570 P.2d 1070, 1074 (1977). The United States Supreme Court has observed that judging “the constitutionality of an Act of Congress [is] ‘the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to perform.‘” Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981) (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148, 48 S.Ct. 105, 72 L.Ed. 206 (1927) (Holmes, J.)). Accordingly, “statutes are constitutional unless shown to be otherwise,” Chevron Chem. Co. v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 431, 438, 641 P.2d 1275, 1282 (1982), and “when there is a reasonable, even though debatable, basis for the enactment of a statute, we will uphold the act unless it is clearly unconstitutional.” Murphy, 117 Ariz. at 61, 570 P.2d at 1074.
¶ 22 A redistricting plan receives the same deference as we afford to other legislation. See Wise, 437 U.S. at 539, 98 S.Ct. 2493 (noting that the United States Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task which the federal courts should make every effort not to preempt“). “[J]udicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to . . . constitutional requisites. . . .” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). “[I]n the absence of any finding of a constitutional or statutory violation . . ., a court must defer to the legislative judgments the plans reflect. . . .” Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 40-41, 102 S.Ct. 1518, 71 L.Ed.2d 725 (1982).
¶ 23 Most challenges to redistricting plans question whether a plan violates the
¶ 24 Arizona‘s constitution, however, adds unique procedural and substantive requirements to the mandate that redistricting plans comply with equal protection principles. The Coalition‘s challenges in this case rest upon those provisions. Our review of the Commission‘s actions thus involves a two part analysis to determine (1) whether the Commission followed the constitutionally mandated procedure and (2) whether the Commission adopted a final plan that satisfies substantive constitutional requirements.
IV.
¶ 25 When considering the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, we usually limit our inquiry to testing the final enactment against constitutional requirements. See, e.g., State v. Stummer, 219 Ariz. 137, 194 P.3d 1043 (2008) (analyzing hours-of-operation statute under free speech requirements); State v. Casey, 205 Ariz. 359, 71 P.3d 351 (2003) (analyzing burden of proof statute under due process requirements); Aros v. Beneficial Ariz., Inc., 194 Ariz. 62, 977 P.2d 784 (1999) (analyzing consumer lender regulations under equal protection requirements). We typically do not examine the process the legislature follows in adopting statutes. The separation of powers required by Article 3 of the Arizona Constitution “prohibits judicial interference in the legitimate functions of the other branches of our government. We will not tell the legislature when to meet, what its agenda should be, what it should submit to the people, what bills it may draft or what language it may use.” Mecham v. Gordon, 156 Ariz. 297, 302, 751 P.2d 957, 962 (1988).
¶ 26 But when the voters adopted Proposition 106, they not only transferred the redistricting task from the legislature to the Commission, but also imposed a specific process that the Commission must follow in performing this task. See
¶ 27 We cannot use the constitutional requirement that the Commission follow a specified procedure, however, as a basis for intruding into the discretionary aspects of the legislative process and then, having intruded, base our review on whether we conclude that the courts or another entity could offer a “better” redistricting plan; doing so would impermissibly enlarge our role. See, e.g., In re Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 189 (Colo.1992) (“The choice among alternative plans, each consistent with constitutional requirements, is for the Commission and not the Court.“); Jensen v. Ky. State Bd. of Elections, 959 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Ky.1997) (“Our only role in this process is to ascertain whether a particular redistricting plan passes constitutional muster, not whether a better plan could be crafted.“); Hartung v. Bradbury, 332 Or. 570, 33 P.3d 972, 980-81 (Or. 2001) (“In reviewing a plan of reapportionment, this court is not privileged to substitute its judgment about the wisdom of the plan. . . . Rather, our task is to determine whether the Secretary of State has complied with [all applicable law].“); In re Senate Bill 177, 132 Vt. 282, 318 A.2d 157, 159 (1974) (“Review by this Court will be limited to testing the reapportionment by the appropriate constitutional and statutory standards, even in the presence of alternatives which give the appearance of better representation.“).
¶ 28 In reaching their decisions, the commissioners perform legislative tasks of the sort we make every effort not to pre-empt. The Commission adopts its final map only
A.
¶ 29 To comply with the mandatory constitutional procedure, the Commission must complete several steps. In Redistricting I, the court of appeals identified these steps as the four “phases” of the redistricting process. 211 Ariz. at 352 ¶ 53, 121 P.3d at 858. That framework provides a useful tool to use in determining whether the Commission fulfilled the constitution‘s procedural requirements.
B.
¶ 30 The parties agree that the first phase involves the creation of “districts of equal population in a grid-like pattern across the state.”
C.
¶ 31 In the second phase, the Commission must make adjustments to the grid “as necessary to accommodate” the six constitutional goals.
¶ 32 The first goal mandates that districts comply with the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, and the second goal requires that congressional districts and state legislative districts “have equal population to the extent practicable.”
¶ 33 The Commission must also accommodate the remaining four goals “to the extent practicable.”
¶ 34 The Coalition challenges the Commission‘s compliance with the procedural requirements only with regard to competitiveness, the sixth constitutional goal. To show that the Commission failed to follow the constitutionally mandated procedure as to this goal, the Coalition must establish that the Commission failed to engage in a deliberative effort to accommodate the goal. If the record demonstrates that the Commission took this goal into account during its deliber-
¶ 35 The constitution directs the Commission to favor competitiveness when doing so is practicable and will not cause “significant detriment” to the other goals.
[I]f drawing competitive or more competitive districts would not be practicable or would cause significant detriment to the goals listed in subsections (B)-(E), the Commission must refrain from establishing such districts. Conversely, if it would be practicable to draw competitive or more competitive districts and to do so would not cause significant detriment to the goals listed in subsections (B)-(E), the Commission must establish such districts.
211 Ariz. at 354 ¶ 59, 121 P.3d at 860. The direction that competitiveness should be favored unless one of two conditions occurs does not, contrary to the Commission‘s assertion, mean that the competitiveness goal is less mandatory than the other goals, can be ignored, or should be relegated to a secondary role. The constitutional language means what it says: The Commission should favor creating more competitive districts to the extent practicable when doing so does not cause significant detriment to the other goals.10
¶ 36 The record demonstrates that the Commission did engage in the required deliberative process in meetings open to the public. As the court of appeals pointed out, the Commission used three different statistical methods for measuring competitiveness: Judge It,11 Arizona Quick and Dirty,12 and voter registration records. Redistricting II, 219 Ariz. at 53 ¶ 14, 192 P.3d at 412. The Commission also considered alternative maps that would have increased competitiveness. Id. Minutes from the June 2002 meetings indicate that the Commission discussed ways to increase the competitiveness of each legislative district. The record is sufficient to establish that the Commission followed the mandatory constitutional procedure by attempting to accommodate the competitiveness goal, while taking into account whether greater competitiveness would cause significant detriment to the other goals.
¶ 37 The Coalition also argues that the Commission failed to make objective findings of significant detriment to the other goals. The constitution, however, does not impose such an obligation. In fact, the constitution does not require the Commission to record any specific information as evidence of its deliberation.13
¶ 38 We conclude that the Commission fulfilled its responsibility to attempt to accommodate all the constitutional goals during its deliberative process.
D.
¶ 39 The Coalition next asserts that the Commission failed to comply with the constitutional direction that, during the third phase, the Commission must “advertise . . . a
¶ 40 The Coalition‘s argument depends upon an overly technical application of the court of appeals’ four-phase analysis, which provides an analytic framework, but can neither add to nor subtract from constitutional requirements. The only constitutional requirement related to draft maps and public comment requires that a draft map be advertised to the public for at least thirty days.
¶ 41 Due in part to sequential legal challenges to the actions of the Commission, its advertisement of draft maps took place over a considerable period. In 2001, the Commission held three weeks of public hearings after it adopted its initial grid map. In August 2001, after adjusting for the first five of the six constitutional goals, the Commission allowed another thirty-day comment period. At that point, the Commission had not adjusted for the competitiveness goal. Had the Commission‘s work ended at this point, we would conclude that the Commission advertised no map that resulted from Commission efforts to accommodate all constitutional goals, and therefore did not comply with the constitution. In addition, a substantial question would exist as to whether the record adequately demonstrated any effort to accommodate the competitiveness goal. But the Commission‘s drafting process did not end in the fall of 2001.
¶ 42 After the DOJ rejected the Commission‘s legislative map, the Commission adjusted its redistricting plan. When the Commission met in June 2002, the commissioners discussed all the constitutional goals, including the competitiveness of each legislative district, as well as the impact that any changes to district boundaries would have on other districts. The Commission then adjusted the map in an attempt to enhance competitiveness.14 After making efforts to accommodate all the constitutional goals, the Commission again advertised a draft map to the public for the constitutionally mandated thirty days. By advertising this final draft map, the Commission complied with the publication and comment requirements of the map-drawing process.
¶ 43 Measured against this record, the Coalition‘s argument devolves to the assertion that the Commission may advertise a plan for public comment only after it has attempted to accommodate all constitutional goals. We see nothing in the constitutional language that would lead us to conclude that the multi-step approach the Commission followed, which allowed public comment on more than one draft map, violates any constitutionally mandated procedure. The Commission
E.
¶ 44 In the fourth and final phase of the mapping process, after the public comment period has ended, the Commission must “establish final district boundaries” and certify the new districts to the Secretary of State.
V.
¶ 45 Once we determine that the Commission complied with the procedural requirements of the constitution, the only remaining question for our review is whether the final district map complies with substantive constitutional requirements. Because this action does not involve the alleged deprivation of fundamental rights, we ask if the party challenging the redistricting plan demonstrated that no reasonable redistricting commission could have adopted the redistricting plan at issue. See, e.g., Aros, 194 Ariz. at 67-68, 977 P.2d at 789-90; Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen‘s Found., 130 Ariz. 550, 556, 637 P.2d 1053, 1059 (1981); see also Murphy, 117 Ariz. at 61, 570 P.2d at 1074 (“[W]hen there is a reasonable, even though debatable, basis for the enactment of a statute, we will uphold the act unless it is clearly unconstitutional.“).
¶ 46 We conclude that the Coalition did not meet its burden of establishing that the plan lacks a reasonable basis. The Coalition‘s challenge largely rests on its contention that more competitive maps were presented to and rejected by the Commission. Even if we accept those assertions as true, the fact that a “better” plan exists does not establish that this plan lacks a reasonable basis. Although the Commission‘s decisions may be debatable, the Coalition did not show that no reasonable commission would have adopted this plan.
VI.
¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the opinion of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the Commission.
CONCURRING: REBECCA WHITE BERCH, Vice Chief Justice and MICHAEL D. RYAN, Justice.
HURWITZ, Justice, concurring in all but Section IV(D) of the Court‘s opinion and concurring in the result.
¶ 48 The Court today neatly describes the proper judicial role in reviewing decisions of the Independent Redistricting Commission. When the Commission adjusts the grid map “as necessary to accommodate” the six constitutional goals in Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14) of the Arizona Constitution, it acts, as the Court concludes, in a quintessentially legislative fashion. The Constitution requires that four potentially conflicting goals be balanced against each other “to the extent practicable.”
¶ 49 I also agree with the Court that, in adopting legislative maps, the Commission must follow the procedures mandated in
¶ 50 I part company with the Court‘s well-reasoned opinion only on one point. In my view, the Constitution does not allow the Commission to advertise a draft map without first making adjustments for all six of the goals specified in subsections 1(14)(A) through (F). I do not believe the Constitution countenances the procedure used by the Commission here—first adjusting the grid only for goals (A) through (E), advertising a draft map, and then only after receiving public comments, turning to the goal of competitiveness.
I.
¶ 51 The Constitution, as the Court recognizes, identifies four phases in the redistricting process. See ¶ 29, supra. After adopting an initial grid-like map of districts of equal population in phase one, the Commission undertakes phase two, in which “[a]djustments to the grid shall then be made as necessary to accommodate the [six] goals as set forth” in subsections (A) through (F).
¶ 52 The Commission did not follow the constitutional roadmap here. Rather, in phase two it adjusted only for goals (A) through (E). The Commission then advertised the draft map, and only after receiving comments considered further adjustments for competitiveness. The Court concludes that no constitutional violation occurred because after adjusting for competitiveness, the Commission advertised the adjusted map anew before final adoption.
¶ 53 The sequential requirements of subsections 1(14) and (16), however, are clear—after propounding the initial grid in phase one, the Commission is required in phase two to make necessary adjustments to serve all six constitutional goals. The Constitution plainly states that in phase two “[a]djustments to the grid shall then be made as necessary to accommodate” goals (A) through (F).
¶ 54 The Court suggests that such a constitutional construction is “overly technical.” See ¶ 40, supra. But I would strictly construe the Constitution because its plain language serves an important purpose. Each of the five goals in subsections (B) through (F) must be accommodated “to the extent practicable.”
¶ 55 The current Commission has wisely recommended that its successor adjust the draft map to reflect all constitutional goals before advertising it for public comment. See ¶ 43 n. 15, supra. But such a recommendation has no binding effect. I would make clear that this procedure is not simply preferred, but rather mandated by the Constitution, and therefore cannot join Section IV(D) of the Court‘s opinion.
II.
¶ 56 I nonetheless concur with the Court‘s ultimate disposition of this case. Only one cycle of legislative elections remains under the plan now at issue. As a practical matter, it makes no sense to require a lame-duck Commission to begin the process anew for only one set of elections. I doubt that the constitutional procedures could be completed—and review by the Department of Justice finished—in time for the 2010 elections. Even ignoring time pressures, the product of such a process would necessarily be based on now well-outdated census data, resulting in districts malapportioned at birth.
¶ 57 In addition, as the Court notes, after the Department of Justice found that the Commission‘s initial plan did not pass Voting Rights Act muster, the Commission effectively was required to begin anew. See ¶ 10, supra. After an interim plan was adopted to meet the Department‘s concerns, the Commission adjusted the interim map, at least considering during that process all six constitutional goals.
CONCURRING: GARYE L. VÁSQUEZ, Judge.*
GARYE L. VÁSQUEZ
Judge*
* Justice W. Scott Bales has recused himself from this case. Pursuant to Article 6, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Garye L. Vásquez, Judge of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, was designated to sit in this matter.