*1 that, in certain suggest decisions this Court While prior scenarios, ineffectiveness claims review of appellate factual facially appar- credibility where a lack of is may be conducted Gibson, 402, 20, see, 450 n. ent, 597 Pa. v. e.g., Commonwealth (2008), I that our recent A.2d 1139 n. 20 believe makes mani- reinvigorates and properly decision Johnson deter- credibility courts make PCRA requirement fest Thus, in our proper first light instance. minations review, point superior court limited role as an appellate credibility make determi- the PCRA court to of view held nations, forth express credibility court’s to set duty the PCRA and, instance, importantly, the first most findings in I believe capital unique underlying appeal, circumstances of action to remand the course jurisprudentially prudent express credibility findings court for matter to the PCRA Elzy. witnesses Sofi and concerning reasons, I For dissent. respectfully these
Gerald E. Rothschild, Beth Lisa Fox Throne Philadel- phia, Com’rs, for Nat. Ass’n of Ins. appellant amicus curiae. Richards,
Deirdre M. Rebmann Obermayer Maxwell & Hip- pel, L.L.P.; Hillary Matour, C. James Michael Steinberg, Hangley P.C.; Aronchick Pudlin, & Segal Hoffman, Bruce R. Philadelphia, Co., Ins. appellee. Williams,
Matthew Steptoe Johnson, PLLC; Allender & Vice, AZ, Bennett Evan Cooper, Phoenix, Pro Hac for North- *4 Co., land Ins. appellee amicus curiae. Dorval,
Mark Franceski, Ronon, Jason David Carl Stradley L.L.P., Stevens Young, Philadelphia, & Citicorp for North Inc., America, intervenor. Kauffman, Browne, Smith,
Robert A. Michael L. Reed L.L.P.; Abrams, Elizabeth C.F. Philadelphia, for Vitas Healthcare Corp., intervenor. Bellew, O’Connor,
Joseph James Cozen Wilmington, DE, for Pool, Ltd., Clients Assur. intervenor. Newell, for Americas Celanese Philadelphia,
Francis P. Corp., intervenor. Kutz, Kimberly Co- Tokarsky, William
Diane Marie James Nurick, LLC, lonna, McNees, Harrisburg, for Wallace & Inc., Tech., Earth intervenor. BAER, CASTILLE, SAYLOR, EAKIN, C.J.,
BEFORE: GREENSPAN, TODD, JJ. McCAFFERY OPINION Justice GREENSPAN. Act, Department 544 of the Insurance
We evaluate Section (the “Act”) determine what priority 221.44 40 P.S. claim to be held ought assigned classification insurer an insolvent under by company against an insurance claim of claim is a loss type the Act. hold We that the which loss has been indemnified therefore (g) forth in classification is set appropriate holding the Act. We reverse the Section 533 of therefore a referee’s improperly adopted Commonwealth Court which classification was set forth determination that appropriate (b). in subsection
I. Facts vehicle
This arises from motor accident caused case 9, 1998, the horse “Pocket Rock- escaped January horse. On Sports Raceway et” ran of the Creek into premises from motor accident traffic and caused a vehicle automobile injured. At the time which Sheila Follen-Davis was owners, accident, Pocket Rocket’s the Members Har- ness, Company Reliance Insurance Appellee were insured (“Reliance”). accident, At the time of the Ms. Follen-Davis (“Farm Bureau”). by Farm Bureau Insurance was insured accident, Ms. Farm Bureau settled with Fol- Following ($7,000) her thousand dollars her paid len-Davis and seven $7,000 Bureau then to recover from injuries. sought Farm and the Members May Reliance. 2001 Reliance On
495 agreement pursuant Harness executed a settlement to which $7,000. they agreed pay Farm Bureau Reliance, check was Although issued Farm Bureau allowed the check to become stale. Farm Bureau When bank, finally presented check to its the check dishon- was 3, 2001, ored due lapse to the of time. On October placed was into and thereafter was issue liquidation unable to Farm new check to Bureau.1 Farm Bureau therefore never $7,000 received the from payment Reliance. reimbursement,
In an to seek effort Farm Bureau submit- $7,000 ted Proof Claim of No. 1010161 for in the Reliance “Claim”).2 (the liquidation priority Claim the Reliance Act, liquidation governed by is Section 544 of the which sets forth the of of an order distribution insolvent assets. insurer’s subsections, In its Act classifies claims into types different each categories, afforded more than the (a) next. Claims classified under subsection Section for have a than example, higher priority those classified under (b). subsection It is anticipated Reliance will not have result, assets sufficient to all claims. pay As a claim priority is all important to claimants in the liquidation.
The parties agree that the Claim be only could classified (b) under either subsection else or the “catch all” subsection (b) (g) 221.44(b), § 544. Section (g). P.S. Subsection generally policies claims applies “[a]ll under for losses incurred, claims, wherever including third party all claims against the liability injury insurer for for bodily injury to or of tangible property destruction are which not under 221.44(b). § ...” policies major 40 P.S. There is a “carve-out” (b), in subsection however. Pursuant to the language loss, portion any “[t]hat indemnification which is provided by other benefits or advantages recovered Ario, Appellant Acting 1. Pennsylvania Joel S. Insurance Commis- (the "Commissioner”), sioner liquidator acts as the for the Reliance 221.15(a). liquidation. P.S. 2. have Hundreds of claims been filed in the Reliance liquidation. Although at the amount stake in the instant matter small, significant impact resolution of this case will have a on other, substantial, subrogation numerous more claims. ...” Id. To claimant, in this class not be included shall *6 Act, policies under of the claims the language paraphrase the loss has unless subsection under categorized loss are advantages. or by other benefits compensated been other by compensated has been that a loss In the event under be classified the claim would advantages, benefits Pursuant to 221.44(g). § of the Act. P.S. (g) subsection this section under (g), classification of subsection language claims, of which is payment or portions applies “[c]laims by recovered advantages other benefits or by provided the lan- To 221.44(g)(3). paraphrase claimant.” P.S. to the carve-out Act, subject if a claim is guage (b), claim is classified then the in subparagraph described Act, claim receives a and that (g) subsection under liquidation. lower Claim, Appellant Farm Bureau’s Proof of review of Upon being as classified under the Claim designated Commissioner the Commis- designation, As the basis for this (g). subsection could be no rights great- Farm Bureau’s reasoned that sioner Follen-Davis, insured, who was Ms. er than those of its objection filed an Farm Bureau compensated. otherwise Court, that the should have arguing Claim the Commonwealth (b). one classified under designated been liquidation. Reliance claims There are numerous classification subject disputes regarding claims are Some these Com- disputes, In an effort to resolve priority. referees to review has various appointed monwealth Court and issue recommendations. claims Marine Insurance by claim Fire & subrogation Empire A Refer- by was reviewed Company (“Empire”) against from the fact This claim arose ee C. Schwartzman. James injur- vehicle accident Reliance insured caused a motor that a Wyrick Mr. Wyrick. Empire paid David ing Empire’s insured Reliance. After then from injures sought payment for his claim, Referee Schwartz- underlying the facts reviewing claim should be that Empire’s man determined rec- Referee (g). under subsection Schwartzman’s classified by affirmed ommendation was the Commonwealth on Court May 2005.
A subrogation claim by Factory Mutual Insurance Company (“Factory”) against by Reliance was reviewed Referee G. Alan This claim a Bailey. building arose from fire by insured by Factory gasoline was caused created spill of a employee Factory Reliance insured. its paid insured the fire and sought payment then from Reliance. After claim, reviewing underlying facts Bailey Referee de- claim Factory’s subrogation termined should be classified (g). under subsection Bailey’s Referee recommendation was affirmed Commonwealth on July 2005. year after
Nearly the resolution of the Empire *7 claims, Factory February dispute on regarding the instant Claim was referred to Referee Luther E. Milspaw. 3, 2006, May On Referee Milspaw report issued a and recom- mendation concluding that the Claim should be classified (b) (the Recommendation”). under subsection “Report and As Recommendation, basis for Report his and Referee Mil- spaw found that Farm Bureau is a “claimant” under a policy (b). for loss as defined by the Act in subsection Referee Milspaw further reasoned because Farm Bureau has no reimbursement, other source the carve-out does not apply so the (b), Claim must be under classified subsection rather than subsection (g).
The Commissioner filed to Referee exception Milspaw’s Report and Recommendation in the Commonwealth Court. 14, 2007, On December the Commonwealth Court overruled Co., Commissioner’s exception. Ario Reliance Ins. (Pa.Commw.2007). A.2d 1004 The Commonwealth Court agreed with Referee that the Milspaw “claimant” was Farm Bureau, Follen-Davis, not Ms. paid who had been in full. Id. at 1006. Because Farm Bureau was claimant had not been loss, otherwise compensated for its the Commonwealth (b) reasoned that the fit squarely Claim into of the Act. Id. at 1007-1008. The Commonwealth Court further reasoned that the language subsection (g) referring to “other benefits or advantages” did not apply a primary language Farm because this issued Bureau policy
insurance Id. at 1007. coverage.” to “excess applied In Reconsideration. for filed Motion The Commissioner thereof, cited the referee determi- the Commissioner support subrogation Factory relating Empire to the nations noted, had been these claims As the Commissioner claims. similar Act and therefore (g) under subsection classified dissimilarly liqui- in the Reliance had been classified claims the Motion The Commonwealth Court denied dation. timely appeal filed the Commissioner Reconsideration and this Court.
II. Analysis following two posits
In his brief the Commissioner review: issues for Court’s Report the lower err when it affirmed Did court insur- Referee who found that Milspaw Recommendation of in- having its Company, paid Insurance er Farm Bureau wrongs allegedly committed payment sured a settlement insured, under its required as it was do Reliance’s (b) insured, priority (pursuant with was entitled to policy 221.44(b)) Reli- against for its claim 40 P.S. (1) claim is ance, Company’s Bureau Insurance where Farm rights of its entirely fully-compensated derivative of (2) out [insured]; carves from explicitly the statute loss, for which is any indemnification portion “[t]hat *8 the advantages or recovered by other benefits provided ...;” (3) (b) where should be priority and claimants of insurance for loss. policies reserved claims under (1) fail to adhere to the improperly the lower court Did (2) decisis; jurisdic- of stare the rule of coordinate doctrine (3) (4) doctrine; tion; the case applicable law of asset and fairness or administration and principles equity estate, insurer’s creditors an insolvent among distribution when, affirming Referee having prior Orders two decisions subroga- to insurer assigning priority (g) indistinguishable claims, Compa- it Insurance ordered the Farm Bureau tion (b) ny subrogation priority. claim first, These can be concisely issues restated follows: did the err in affirming Commonwealth Court Referee de- Milspaw’s (b); termination that Claim was classified under subsection second, permitted was the Commonwealth discount or depart from referee decisions that it affirmed in prior had our Liquidation. Reliance resolution of the first Although matter, disposes issue we discuss both in an issues issues arise attempt may to elucidate that on an basis ongoing liquidation. Proper A. of the Claim Classifícation
First, we evaluate whether the Commonwealth Court erred in affirming Milspaw’s Referee determination that (b) the Claim properly was classified under subsection of the Act. The Commissioner and amicus Northland Insurance (“Northland”)3 Company characterize the divergent Claim in ways, and these would in characterizations result seemingly different under the classifications Act. argues Commissioner that Claim should be
classified (g) under subsection Commonwealth Court erred in giving According it classification.4 Commissioner, “claimant” Follen statutory is Ms. Davis, and Farm Bureau her merely posture assumes as her subrogee. The that argues Commissioner Ms. Follen-Davis loss, had policy a claim under a but that the loss was compensated Farm Bureau. The Commissioner therefore appeal, 3. Farm Bureau not filed a brief in apparently has due to the Instead, money small amount at stake. amicus Northland filed a decision, support brief in presented Commonwealth Court’s argument oral this Court. Northland has a claim in stayed another pending matter that has been resolution of this matter. Northland impor- believes that the outcome in provide this matter will precedent tant for its own case. (the 4. Amicus the National Association of Insurance Commissioners “NAIC”) support position. filed a brief of the In its Commissioner's brief, argues regarding the NAIC revisions Model Act liquidation proceedings classification insurance it clear make first, designed protect policyholders these are statutes before Moreover, subrogated points insurers like Farm Bureau. as the NAIC out, this decision will have Court’s nationwide other ramifications liquidation proceedings. *9 the Claim pushes of the loss the compensation that concludes (b) classification (g) into subsection outside of subsection 221.44(b). The Commis- § the carve-out. P.S. pursuant can be entitled insurer subrogee that emphasizes sioner Moreover, Com- than its insured. greater payment no this result because supports argues, public policy missioner been recovery already has claims as to which “[subordinating contractually responsible that is from another source secured recov- all claimants to seek encourages of claims for payment the insol- conserving possible, where from other insurers ery else to who have nowhere assets for claimants vent insurer’s Brief, 22. Appellant’s turn.” was properly that the Claim argues
Amicus Northland (b) that the Commonwealth classified under Northland, statutory According did not err. agree- Bureau to a settlement pursuant “claimant” is Farm that Farm Bureau has argues Reliance. Northland ment with therefore compensation. source of Northland no alternate so subsection inapplicable that the carve-out is concludes Moreover, that the argues Northland proper. classification is subroga- excluded all Assembly expressly could have General (b), in these claims are way from subsection tion claims As- in later Model Act but General provisions, excluded argues Northland Accordingly, chose not to do so. sembly to include some subroga- must have meant legislature (b) classification. tion claims within subsection it is liquidation, anticipat- in the context of atypical As is not all fully pay will not be sufficient ed that Reliance’s assets result, As a the classifica- liquidation. claims asserted great is a matter of liquidations tion of claims in this and other here the liquidator, to claimants. The Commis- significance sioner, claims to ensure charged properly classifying with 221.36(b)(3). of assets. 40 P.S. equitable distribution claims, the classifying General Recognizing importance Act that claimants entitled to Assembly enacted the to ensure claims. Section 544 of the prioritized more have protection states, claim in each class “[e]very in relevant part, Act retained for such adequate in full or funds paid shall be
501 payment before the of the next class receive any members payment.” plain § 40 221.44. The of the Act language P.S. the for starting point must therefore be classification of any claims. 544, in
At issue this matter is the of language Section (b) subsection and subsection the Act. to (g) of Pursuant the (b), of the language following claims are classified thereunder: incurred,
All policies claims under for losses wherever in- claims, cluding third and all claims the insurer party against liability for for or bodily injury injury or destruction of tangible which are under property policies, not shall have the next All priority. claims under life insurance and annuity policies, whether for death proceeds, annuity pro- ceeds, or investment values shall be treated as loss claims. loss, any That of portion provid- indemnification for which is ed other by benefits or recovered claim- advantages by the ant, class, shall not be included other than benefits or advantages recovered or recoverable discharge of familial obligations support by of or way of succession at death or as insurance,
proceeds of life or gratuities. No payment by employer made his shall be employe treated as a gratuity. 221.44(b). §
40 P.S. Pursuant to the language of subsection “[cjlaims (g), the claims are following classified thereunder: claims, of portions of payment which is provided by other benefits or advantages recovered the 40 claimant.” P.S. 221.44(g). §
Here, the Claim arises in a subrogation context. The equitable doctrine of subrogation places the subrogee the precise position of the rights subrogated. one whose are Fund, Pa. Emp. 627, Wimer v. Trust 595 Pa. 939 A.2d Benefit 843, (2007); Rosen, 369, 587, 853 v. Chow 571 Pa. 812 A.2d 590 (2002); Pennsylvania Ins. Wolfe, Ass’n Co. v. 534 Pa. Mfrs.’ 68, (1993); 522, 626 A.2d 525 see also Paxton Nat’l Ins. Co. (1987) 513 Brickajlik, (“Subrogation Pa. 522 A.2d is the called into existence the equity purpose of enabling liable, debt, party secondarily paid but who reap has may against which the creditor hold any of securities benefit debtor, paying party the use of which principal whole.”) made may thus be erred
To determine whether Commonwealth in a Claim, must engage we in assigning 544 of (g) Section statutory analysis of subsections objective interpretation construction Act. of the and effectuate the intention statutes is ascertain 1921(a). the best Assembly. Generally, General Pa.C.S. plain language intent legislative indication *11 185, 478, Pa. A.2d Shiffler, 583 879 statute. Commonwealth Rendell, (2005); County Sportsmen’s League v. Allegheny 189 (2004). 149, 10, 15 It is well settled 580 Pa. 860 A.2d they are and unambiguous, the words of a statute clear when pretext pursuing [the are “not to be under the disregarded 1921(b). is the § 1 It when spirit.” only Pa.C.S. statute’s] the not that the court should seek explicit words of statute are intent Assembly’s through the consider determine General 1921(c). § statutory ation of construction factors. Pa.C.S. that a plain language The of Section 544 demonstrates claim, matter, in is like the Claim at issue this subrogated (b) the and therefore is subject to carve-out subsection First, plain classified under subsection the properly (g). under of subsection states that claims language “[a]ll incurred, including party losses wherever third policies for (b). 40 claims” are entitled to under subsection P.S. 221.44(b) added). Therefore, (emphasis to be order subsection, a under claim must be under alleged classified this a for loss. policy
Second, loss, alleged even if claim is under a for it policy be to the carve-out in subsection may exempt pursuant still (b). (b) states that a plain language “por- The of subsection loss, provided by tion for which is other any indemnification claimant, not be advantages or recovered shall benefits added). Therefore, ...” included in this class Id. (emphasis loss, a not compensation may where there has been claim (b). In evaluating be under subsection properly classified Act, of the subsection we note that use of the word “shall” mandatory. renders the carve-out See Koken v. Reliance Ins. Co., (2006) 586 Pa. 893 A.2d that the (holding term mandatory purposes “shall” is statutory construction unambiguous). when the statute is (b),
If is to the subject a claim carve-out subsection plain of the Act be language dictates that claim classified under (g). plain subsection Pursuant to its subsec- language, “[cjlaims claims, tion (g) applies portions payment of which is other benefits or provided advantages recovered by the claimant.” Act In language is clear. order be classified 1) (b),
under claim must: derive from a policy 2) loss; and must not been covering compen- have otherwise true, sated. If neither is claim classified under subsec-
tion (g). to the of this
Applied plain facts matter language Act directs classification of the Claim under subsection (g).5 Northland’s to the it in argument contrary places hand, double bind. On one Northland argues that Claim arises from subrogation not but from directly, the settlement agreement between Farm Bureau and If Reliance. this is true, element, then the fails to Claim meet first that a *12 claim derive from a policy loss. is no covering There policy between Farm Bureau and Reliance. The only applicable policy is insurance contract between Reliance and the of the Members Harness that applies parties injured third by Pocket Rocket. matter, Under facts the instant policy injury covers to Ms. Follen-Davis Farm but not Bu- reau. In order to avail itself of any coverage under the policy, Farm Bureau must stand the shoes of its insured Ms. context, Follen-Davis. Without this subrogation there is no policy under which Farm Bureau can payment seek from Moreover, Reliance. interpretation Northland’s of the Claim urges 5. legislative Northland this Court to examine the intent and history underpinning necessary the Act. Such an examination is not where, here, appropriate language unambiguous as the Act’s is interpretation contrary Northland's plain language. is the Act’s 504 merely claimant” party not a “third Bureau is Farm faulty. Bureau would Farm agreement. the settlement a result of insured, its without against of action no cause
have in the Reli- posture entire Farm Bureau’s Follen-Davis. Ms. its insured. with relationship its is vis-a-vis liquidation ance hand, acknowledges Northland If, the other on Bureau “stands then Farm subrogation, arises from Claim Beane, 541 Johnson Ms. Follen-Davis. See shoes” of (1995) an insurance 96, (holding that 449, 664 A.2d Pa. pursuing when of the insured “stands in the shoes” company tortfeasor). statutory “claim- The true against an action steps Bureau into Even when Farm Follen-Davis. ant” is Ms. Ms. Follen- subrogation, to the rules pursuant her position already she has Because the true “claimant.” Davis remains Ms. Claim. applies the carve-out compensated, been party a “third Farm Bureau —is thus Follen-Davis —and injuries committed a claim Reliance for against claimant” with compensation by it not for Reliance’s insured. Were a claim Bureau, could have asserted Ms. Follen-Davis Farm (b). Follen- But Ms. under subsection subject to classification Bureau, insurer, Farm her own coverage through had Davis any higher cannot claim Farm Bureau compensated. was herself, have claimed Follen-Davis could status than Ms. triggers application Follen-Davis to Ms. payment not be Therefore, Follen-Davis would since Ms. carve-out. (b), Bureau cannot Farm entitled to under subsection if argument, accept- to such Northland’s priority. be entitled than its having rights Bureau more ed, result Farm would subroga- principles to the contrary This result is insured. Slezak, See, Pa. Bell v. e.g., Law. Pennsylvania tion and (2002) (“a no subrogee greater has 812 A.2d subrogor”). held than those rights Classifications Precedential Effect of Other Claim B. evaluate whether Commonwealth We now prior from referee deci depart to discount or was permitted *13 theAs Liquidation. affirmed in the Reliance that it had sions have been out, appears the Claim points Commissioner differently than other in the treated similar claims asserted Commissioner, liquidation. According to the stare decisis, case, the of law the and the doctrine of coordinate jurisdiction reconciled, mandate that the decisions be and that regarding aberrant decision Claim be reversed. claims, distinguish
Northland attempts inconsistent that the settlement arguing agreement creates a different set Northland, of According circumstances. no prior decisions by referees or Commonwealth are binding prece- dent on Claim because the facts surrounding Claim are distinguishable.
Although explicit there is no rule governing referee matters, liquidation decisions in general principles of law in support uniformity these decisions. Pennsylvania gen law erally favors certainty stability and these principles are in embodied various doctrines. Under doctrine of stare decisis, a conclusion reached in one matter should be applied to future substantially similar matters. See v. Stilp Common wealth, 539, 918, (2006) (“The 588 Pa. 905 A.2d legal basic of principle stare decisis generally judicial commands respect for prior decisions of this legal Court and the rules contained decisions.”). in those The law of the case doctrine sets forth embody various rules that the concept that a court involved phases later of a litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by judge another of that same court or higher court in the earlier phases of the matter. Commonw Starr, (1995). ealth 541 Pa. 664 A.2d doctrine, Pursuant to the jurisdiction coordinate judges equal jurisdiction sitting same case should not overrule each others’ decisions. Id.
We not need decide whether the particular doctrines cited strictly above apply the context referee recommen dations liquidation matters. It is clear that the broader principles uniformity equity apply and would direct result here. In the liquidation, context where thousands referees, claims will be evaluated by various there is value in an attempt promote uniformity. Assuming the sake *14 litigation in the same involve claims argument multiple be each facts, outcome should ordered the same
similar claim. above, the Claim length at
Here, the reasons discussed claim. subrogation a of a holder against is one immaterial, the agreement of a settlement The existence and Facto- Empire different from functionally is not Claim subrogation and Factory claims. The ry Empire (g) subsection Act. assigned claims under were departure justify the Claim do not surrounding The facts Factory and subro- reasoning Empire to the applied from the including All in the Reliance litigation, claims. claims gation therefore the Claim, uniformly, treated and ought to be assigned priority (g). have also been Claim should
III. Conclusion erred we hold that Commonwealth Court
Accordingly, Act. classify (g) the Claim under failing decision, Court’s therefore reverse the Commonwealth We remand, the Claim entry classifying and direct the an order Act.6 (g) under subsection join opinion. EAKIN and BAER Justice join I Parts Justice TODD and Justice McCAFFERY IIA of opinion. which concurring opinion,
Chief Justice CASTILLE files join in part. Justice TODD and McCAFFERY Justice in which Chief concurring opinion, Justice SAYLOR files joins. Justice CASTILLE CASTILLE, Concurring.
Chief Justice
join
Saylor’s
I
I
Mr. Justice
Concur-
concur
result.
I write
ring
respecting
presented.
first issue
Opinion
my
jurisprudential
view of
separately only
express
appeal
participated in this
6.
Court commends all counsel who
This
well-researched,
well-crafted,
persuasive
exceptionally
briefs and
arguments.
stability and uniformity
implicated
concerns
in Part II.B of the
Majority Opinion.
504-06,
See Majority Op. at
the law of the case
or the
jurisdiction rule,
coordinate
the Commonwealth Court’s disposition is erroneous because it
does not
conform to two of that court’s
single-judge
adjudications in the
Empire
matters,
Factory Mutual
*15
even though those cases are materially indistinguishable on
the claims classification issue presented.
In those earlier
matters,
the court approved and affirmed referee recommen-
dations that assigned the subrogated insurers’ claims to “class
(g)” priority status. The Majority recognizes the importance
issue,
of the preclusion
but then
determines
we “need not
decide” whether the three preclusion doctrines
cited
Commissioner “strictly apply” in this
because,
context
Majority holds summarily,
is clear
“[i]t
the broader
principles of uniformity and equity
and
apply
would direct the
505,
result here.” Majority Op. at
The core doctrine of stare decisis teaches that: [F]or purposes certainty law, and stability conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those 1. Madame Justice Todd and McCaffery join Mr. Justice this concur- point rence on the to which I write. Majority identify 2. The does not principles the broader to which it adverts, authority nor it support does cite them.
508 same, even follow, substantially if facts are
which decisis While stare may be different. though parties inexo- it is not an salutary principles, and serves invaluable when such adherence blindly to be followed rable command Dep’t v. Pa. [Mayle error. See perpetuating leads (1978)] (“[T]he 709, 384, A.2d 720 479 Pa. Highways, vehicle for perpetuating not a of stare decisis is doctrine to the error, concept responds rather a which legal but thus, and, orderly growth justice permits demands flourish.”). of the law to processes 918, Commonwealth, 966-67 Pa. 905 A.2d v. Stilp omitted). (citation (2006) marks For quotation and internal must establish bind- judicial decision apply, decisis stare actually to issues only applies “The doctrine ing precedent. raised, where the decision adjudicated, only argued the case. The doctrine to the determination of necessary was litigated respect limited to actual determinations not to dicta or necessarily questions, applicable decided and is 499, 798 Perry, 568 Pa. A.2d obiter dicta.” Commonwealth (2002) Newman, J., (Castille, J., joined by concurring) omitted) (internal (citing marks quotation Black’s Law Dictio- *16 (6th 1990)). nary decisions of this precedential 1406 ed. The Pennsylvania, including upon binding throughout Court are Court, of the and the decisions lower courts precedential Comp. Pries v. Workers’ bind those courts as well. See (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) (Verizon Pa.), 136, 144 Bd. 903 A.2d Appeal (“Under decisis, are to follow the decisions of stare we bound or where by Supreme unless overruled our Court demonstrated.”); see also reasons can be compelling other Ins., 1071, A.2d Dep’t Mut. Auto. Ins. 720 State Farm Co. of (Pa.Cmwlth.1998). Thus, is an of insti- imperative 1073 there and horizon- consistency stability, vertically and both tutional tally. the case refers to:
The law of doctrine concept that a court family embody a of rules which in the later a matter should not phases litigated involved of of that same by judge decided another reopen questions phases in the earlier by higher court or a court but Among matter. the related distinct rules which make (1) law of the case are that: up upon doctrine remand trial proceedings, may further a court not alter the of legal previously resolution a decided question by matter; (2) appellate court in upon appeal, second appellate may court of not alter the resolution a legal court; question previously by decided the same appellate (3) upon and transfer of a matter between trial of judges jurisdiction, coordinate the transferee trial may court not alter question the resolution a legal previously decided by the transferor trial court.
The various rules which make the law of the up case doctrine serve only promote judicial not goal (1) ... but also economy operate protect, the settled (2) expectations of the parties; to insure uniformity of decisions; (3) to maintain consistency during the course of a case; (4) single to effectuate the proper streamlined (5) justice; administration of to bring litigation to an end. Starr,
Commonwealth v. Pa. 664 A.2d (1995) (citations omitted). doctrine, This no less than stare decisis, promotes certainty stability, but with particular emphasis on the various phases individual cases. jurisdiction coordinate rule likewise addresses individu- it
al cases as
provides
“judges of coordinate jurisdiction
sitting
same case should not overrule each others’
Starr,
Starr,
decisions.”
510 matter, or in the where dispute rise giving
or evidence
create
and would
a
clearly
was
erroneous
prior holding
if
Id.
injustice
manifest
followed.”
Empire
dispositions
prior
The
Court’s
Commonwealth
or
unpublished, single-judge
were both
Mutual
Factory
Section
Gardner Cohns.
by
Judge
then-President
James
ders
Proce
Operating
Internal
414 of the
Court’s
Commonwealth
(“IOPs”)
even if
opinion,
a
provides
“single-judge
dures
value, not
persuasive
cited
for its
only
be
reported, shall
67.55;
§
also
see
Otter
binding precedent.” See 210 Pa.Code
1276,
(Pa.Cmwlth.),
Cortes,
10
aff'd per
A.2d
1284 n.
v.
969
(2009)
follow);
curiam,
634,
(opinion
Pa.
Given the nature of single-judge decisions of Common- Court, wealth it readily apparent is decisis not stare is thus, matter, applicable; this did doctrine not com- fidelity mand previously decided Empire Factory Mutual matters. It equally is that the law of apparent case doctrine does not is not: apply, this a case returned remand, a trial on a court appeal, second or a matter that has been jurisdiction transferred. The coordinate rule poses slightly If question. dispute closer were subsequent portion Mutual, of the “same case” as Empire Factory then the Commonwealth Court be would bound the coordi- nate jurisdiction But rule. the hundreds of distinct insurer 150,000 claims within the more than claims com- prising the entire liquidation Reliance do process not quite component resemble parts the “same case” in the manner understood jurisdiction Thus, coordinate rule. jurisdiction coordinate rule does not apply.
But this does not end the The inquiry. preclusion doctrines evolved in response to particular cases and specific problems. scenario, concern here poses forwarded new deriving largely from the unique nature of the Commonwealth Court. The question then is whether the principles animating preclusion measure, doctrines should in some apply, in this distinct paradigm. my view, In although none the three preclusion primary issue fits precisely, doctrines this situation uniformity, con- stability, they promote certainty, the policies — given be sistency, protection expectations settled —should extremely liquidation complex effect. The light In many layers parts operate. which process the Insurance undertaking, inherent such an challenges (“Act”) in its “Construction and expresses Act Department *19 is of this article the that Purpose” purpose section “[t]he insureds, creditors, and the the interests of of protection the normal minimum interference with generally, with public insurers, managers through the owners and of prerogatives of (iii) economy liquidation, efficiency ... enhanced and of law, through to specification and the mini- clarification ” legal uncertainty litigation.... mize and P.S. 221.1(c) added). Act provides statutory The (emphasis in Sections 221.19-221.52. liquidation scheme for set forth outset, the the recognized From Commonwealth Court sui litigation of the difficult task the Reliance generis nature 9, 2002, Thus, posed. September Judge on then-President deadlines, procedures, re- outlining Colins issued Order to and instructions quirements, responsibilities, specific judicial Reliance Both and the liquidation. legislative of the response unique challenges liquidation to the uniform, consistent, predicta- have and attempted provide not unlike paradigm, concept ble the Newtonian uni- A degree consistency, verse. certain stabili- regularity, similarly-situated claims ty terms of treatment the primary goals. claimants is one of The Commissioner’s for reconsideration sets application inconsistency in detail the internal single- forth between here and decided Em- judge previously decision those Factory Mutual matters. One of the considerations pire “[wjhere to allow governing reargument whether court (as misapprehended by misquotation has overlooked or text result) controlling directly or misstatement of relevant The authority.” Pa.R.A.P. 2543 cmt. circumstances here (in seem to indicate an instance where the court would a single judge) “directly form of overlooked relevant” authori- controlling. even that is not ty though authority strictly of patent Commonwealth Court’s allowance inconsisten- cy in litigation may decisions in the Reliance single-judge derail other critical For liquidation example, activities. as the notes, Commissioner an actuarial study estimates the ultimate to Reliance payout obligations claimants in most “(b) already priority” category desirable has been commis- study’s sioned. The Commissioner uses this projections to the appropriate determine interim distributions to those claim- “(b) are clearly ants who status. eligible priority” If judges individual of the Commonwealth Court are free to issue inconsistent even when with rulings, confronted the existence prior cases, the indistinguishable projections will study need adjusted to be in order potential include hundreds of Nor, warns, claims. the Commissioner does the current procedures scheme have place likely address reaction of past subrogation claimants who sta- accepted “(g) tus” under the understanding such was the settled rule.
A failure to appreciate disruption, or to attempt *20 acknowledge distinguish issue head-on and or criticize the decisions, context, prior course, in this is intolerable. Of in single-judge decisions the context of the litigation, matter, like single-judge any decisions in may be erroneous. But, so, if the corrective measure should be the usual ones available when a preclusion applies: prompt, doctrine open, and formal reconsideration before a Commonwealth Court addition, In panel. there nothing is to a preclude single judge from an issue referring to the Commonwealth Court as a whole. A single judge who that prior is convinced deci- sions are problematic may explain the basis for that view and invite correction a higher single judges at level. But liquidation context of complex litigations like one this should be mindful of the stakes involved and should be discouraged essentially from ignoring prior appear cases that be directly on-point. And the Commonwealth Court as a whole should take disruptions measures to ensure that are minimal.
An supporting additional reason a directive that the Com- monwealth Court pay ensuring consistency more heed to and in regularity liquidation its decisions in the Reliance derives single- The that authority. fact supervisory from this Court’s as an not taken judge precedential are not should be decisions a to be onto this Court disruption passed invitation to demonstrable, arising doctrinal review of issue from forced case, In in decisions. single-judge inconsistencies his deci- inconsistency no for the judge provided explanation He the resolutions suggest sion created. did not inor error distinguishable Mutual were Empire Factory and changed; the law has not against precedent; when measured The as a whole light. evidence has come court no new inconsistency. explain to correct or the obvious nothing did consistently rule obligation Court’s Commonwealth imperative an institutional that must similarly situated cases is seriously, by single judges be taken both Common- a wealth as whole.3 Court SAYLOR, Concurring.
Justice I majority’s position language differ with the Majority Opinion is clear and See unambiguous. Section 544 502-03, Rather, I find at at 595. that Northland A.2d subroga- a colorable that Farm Bureau’s argument advances a qualifies tion claim for subsection under literal statute, since Farm Bureau a “claimant” reading of in the shoes of a “third to Reliance standing party” policy under pursuing polic[y] “claim[ [such] losses.” P.S. ] that, recognize Appellate 3. I Rules under the Procedure cases Valley, supra, such as Great Commissioner could have taken petitioning measures short of for review this Court to ensure the i.e., desires, reargument consistency by seeking he formal before the Commonwealth as a whole Pa.R.A.P. As I under 2541-2547. it, however, practice, an op- understand the court as whole has portunity application to consider the reconsideration made *21 single judge, practice generally acknowledged although that is not in practice Appellate the the That IOPs or Rules of Procedure. informal may explain why copies application eleven of an for reconsideration pursuant required to the Commonwealth Court are Pa.R.A.P. to only though say application even the IOPs that the is exited to court’s single judge. litigants the such as the Institutional Commissioner may single-judge that at least measure be aware denial has some my approval by the Commonwealth Court as a whole. Whether un- not, derstanding is should have accurate Commonwealth Court place police matters. some formal mechanism in better these 221.44(b).1 Since, however, deriving interest a potential third-party from claimant even further removed itself, from the policy than underlying third-party claim arises whether the question Legislature intended such (b) claims subsection enjoy priority. National Associa- Commissioners, tion Insurance legisla- drafter of the model on based, tion which the Section 544 priority scheme is provides history extensive discussion of intent of statute, I which believe ambiguity addresses material deriving from the indirectness of the subrogee’s connection to policy of the insolvent insurer. on the
Principally, drafting history based and associated I policies, persuasively believe NAIC demonstrates subrogation claims were not type considered the “loss (b) claim” that designed subsection priority is address. See Indeed, NAIC Brief at 7-11. the NAIC observes that changes in 1994 were made which “merely clear what make[ ] was intended all along: subrogated claims insurers are not included the same those of priority as third- [direct] party policyholders.” claimants and Id. at 11.
Chief
joins
Justice CASTILLE
this concurring opinion.
regard,
argument
1.
In this
placing
I do not read Northland’s
it in a
504-05,
Majority Opinion,
"double bind.”
at
Lawrence M. Appellant Judge, County Common Pleas Court of CORTES, Secretary the Commonwealth Pedro A. Elections, Appellees. Harhut, Commissioner Chet Pennsylvania.
Supreme Court of March 2009. Submitted 2, 2009. Decided Oct. rights they after —indemnification its existed assumes before—not Northland Brief at 13-15. occurred.”