Argo Plastic Products Co. v. City of ClevelandArgo Plastic Products Co. v. City of Cleveland
Lead Opinion
The question facing this court in the present case is whether the trial court erred in denying the city’s request for relief under
“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; * * *.”
In GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries (1976),
“To prevail on a motion brought under
Thus, we stated in Svoboda v. Brunswick (1983),
“In order to prevail on a motion brought under
The city proposes that its “meritorious defenses” to the judgment entered by the trial court were as follows: appellants were not entitled to relocation expenses from the city since no federal funds were used in the project; appellants failed to follow federal regulations in applying for relocation assistance; and appellants were not entitled to the amount of damages agreed to by the city’s counsel. The city relies on Colley v. Bazell
At the outset, the first two of the aforementioned “meritorious defenses” go to the issue of liability which was litigated in appellants’ motion for summary judgment. The city never responded to appellants’ motion for summary judgment despite a personal request to do so by the trial court. However, the trial court specifically found that summary judgment was granted in favor of appellants on the merits of the motion and not due to the failure of the city to respond. The city never appealed this determination of liability. Even though it claims surprise under
We turn now to a consideration of whether the trial court properly denied the city’s
This court held at paragraph four of the syllabus in GTE, supra, that:
“As a general rule, the neglect of a party’s attorney will be imputed to the party for the purposes of
In GTE, supra, we declined to allow relief from judgment under
“ * * [I]f an attorney’s conduct falls substantially below what is reasonable under the circumstances, the client’s remedy is against the attorney in a suit for malpractice. But keeping this suit alive merely because * * * [defendant] should not be penalized for the omissions of his own attorney would be visiting the sins of * * * [defendant’s] lawyer upon the * * * [plaintiff].’ ” Id. at 152, quoting Link v. Wabash RR. Co. (1962),
In our view, the principle expressed in GTE, supra, with respect to excusable neglect under
In the case sub judice, the city occupies the same position as did ARC Industries in GTE, supra. As we did in GTE, we therefore impute Kless’ actions to the city in considering whether the city may obtain relief from judgment under
While we have sympathy for the city’s situation, we feel that it would be manifestly unjust to appellants herein to vacate the judgment entered below pursuant to the settlement on the amount of damages. Using the language employed in GTE, supra, we would be “ ‘visiting the sins of * * * [the city’s] lawyer upon the * * * [appellants].’ ” Id. at 152. Such would run afoul of the established purpose of
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court being correct, the judgment of the court of appeals is thus reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Notes
Footnote 3 states in part that “[t]he movant’s burden is to allege a meritorious defense, not to prevail with respect to the truth of the meritorious defense.”
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. For the following reasons I am compelled to respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly points out that to sustain a
The basis for the trial court’s belief, as it stated in its opinion, was: “* * * [I]f the ‘Agreed Judgment Entry’ had not been entered by the Court and approved by counsel on April 15,1982, the case would have proceeded to trial on April 19, 1982. At trial, the City would surely have produced Ms. Park as its expert witness and her testimony at that time would have been that $553,673.74 represented a reasonable relocation figure based upon plaintiffs’ claims.” The city, however, through the affidavit of a second expert, William Von Klug, and the subsequent reconsideration by Park, demonstrated that the trial court’s assumption was erroneous—a far smaller relocation expense figure would have been presented. As a number of my colleagues in the majority agreed, by their respective concurrences in the case of Colley v. Bazell (1980),
Moreover, from the standpoint of public policy, I might agree to the general principle that an attorney’s actions be imputed, in some instances, to a client to the extent that the general issue of liability is determined. It is, however, difficult for me to accept the majority’s proposition that the amount of liability also be attributed without legal recourse from incompetent or consciously malicious counsel to the client. What good is a malpractice claim, the majority’s suggested means of redress, against a judgment-proof “attorney” with only thousands of dollars in legal malpractice insurance coverage who could not pay for millions of dollars of potential settlement expenses incurred by acts of spite, malice, or incompetence? Additionally, I see no reason for this court to give the appellants herein a windfall in lieu of a just and reasonable settlement established through due process of law. Apparently, summary judgment is appropriate, regardless of the facts, against defendants and yet inappropriate, regardless of the facts, for plaintiffs. See, e.g., Shinaver v. Szymanski (1984),