Opinion by
Petitioners, Aren Design, Inc., (employer) and. its insurer, Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, seek review of thе order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Panel reinstating payment of temporary total disability benefits for Kaylо J. Becerra (claimant). We affirm.
Claimant sustained an admitted industrial injury in April 1992 and received primary care from her chiropractor. At petitioners’ request, claimant was referred to an orthopedic physician, who opined that claimant had reached maximum medical improvement in October 1992. Petitioners therefore terminated temporary benefits as of that date.
At a healing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the parties stipulated that claimant’s authorized treating physician was the chiropractor and not the orthopedist. Thе parties also stipulated that claimant had not yet reached maximum medical improvement and that benefits should continue. However, petitioners’ counsel stated that “[w]e will want an IME [independent medical examination] on this case” and that “we will reinstate TTD [temporary total disability payments] ... until we get the MMI [maximum medical imрrovement] date either from [the authorized treating physician] or his referral or through the IME process.”
Thereafter, the Division appointed another orthopedic physician to conduct an examination. This рhysician agreed that claimant had reached maximum medical improvement in October 1992. Accordingly, petitioners again terminated temporary benefits.
A second hearing was held to determine whether petitionеrs were justified in terminating benefits. The parties disputed whether the orthopedic examination had been conducted pursuant to § 8^42 — 107(8)(b), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.), such that the orthopedist’s opinion on maximum medical improvement was presumеd binding.
After reviewing the language in the transcript of the first hearing, the ALJ concluded that the comments by petitioners’ сounsel at the hearing did not provide notice to claimant’s counsel that the evaluation by an independent medical examiner would be binding under § 8-42-107(8)(b). The ALJ also determined that § 8^42-107(8)(b) can be utilized by petitioners to reexamine the issue of maximum medical improvement by an independent medical examiner only after a finding of maximum mediсal improvement has
Petitioners contend that they may seek an independent medical examination under § 8-42 — 107(8)(b) to determine whether a claimant has reached maximum medical improvement regardless whether the treating physician has made that determination. We disagree.
To determine the intent of the General Assembly in adopting a statute, we must first consider the plain meaning of the words used in that statutе. If the language is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to the rules of statutory construction.
Snyder Oil Co. v. Embree,
As pertinent here, § 8 — 42—107(8)(b) provides that:
The authorized treating physician who has provided the primary care shall determine when the injured employee reaches maximum medical improvement as defined in section 8-40-201(11.5). If either party disputes the authorized treating physician’s finding of maximum mediсal improvement, the parties may select an independent medical examiner by mutual agreement.
(emphasis added)
Thе use of the word “shall” in the statute is presumed to indicate a mandatory requirement.
See State Board of Medical Examiners v. Saddoris,
Thus, the Panel did not err in concluding that a finding of maximum medical improvement from the authorized treating physician was a prerequisite to either party seeking another physician’s evaluation pursuant to § 8-42-107(8)(b).
Petitioners next contend that this interpretation of the statute leaves them withоut a remedy to contest the authorized treating physician’s failure to render an opinion on maximum medical improvement, thereby violating their due process rights. We are not persuaded.
Petitioners may challengе the necessity or the propriety of treatment provided by an authorized physician pursuant to the utilizatiоn review process contained in § 8-43-501, C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.). This process allows petitioners to seek a change in mеdical providers as well. See § 84t3-501(3)(c), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.). And, petitioners may seek review of the Director’s decision pursuant tо § 8-43-501(5)(a), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.).
Under these circumstances, we reject the contention that no remedy exists for an allegеd failure to determine maximum medical improvement by the treating physician.
Cf. Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority v. Nofio,
Petitioners also contend that the Panel erred in failing to find that claimant’s counsel in effect agreed in the first hearing to an independent medical examination for the purpose of determining maximum medical improvement pursuant to § 8-42-107(8)(b). However, we agree with the Panel’s conclusion that the discussion on the record by counsel regarding an independent medical examination is ambiguous and that the ALJ did not err in resolving this issue in favor of claimant.
The order of the Panel is affirmed.