Kimberly Ardis, Donna Kendrick, and Bridgett Bland (collectively “the Appellants”) filed a complaint against Fairhaven Funeral Home & Crematory, Inc. (“Fairhaven”), alleging that Fairhaven
In their lawsuit, the Appellants alleged that Fairhaven provided obituary services to its customers, which included forwarding the obituaries to the Savannah Morning News for pricing and publication. The Appellants contended that Fairhaven failed to disclose to its customers that a portion of the obituary fees was used to cover publication costs associated with inclusion of the Fairhaven logo in each obituary.
In their class certification motion, the Appellants sought to serve as representatives of the class of
[a] 11 customers of Fairhaven ... in the preceding four (4) years who have paid for obituary services and have suffered damages due to Fairhaven’s concealment of the fact that a portion of the fee paid for such services went towards an advertisement for Fairhaven in the obituary notices found in the Savannah Morning News.
The Appellants filed a brief in support of their motion, explaining that the advertisement at issue consisted of Fairhaven’s contact information followed by a diamond-shaped branding logo. The Appellants contended that the Savannah Morning News charged between $12.00 and $64.50 for inclusion of the logo depending on whether the customer’s obituary was fewer than 20 lines or more than 20 lines respectively.
Fairhaven responded to the motion, arguing that the trial court should deny the class certification motion because adjudicating the misrepresentation claim would require an individualized inquiry into whether each purported class member relied to their detriment on Fairhaven’s failure to disclose the inclusion of its logo. Moreover, Fairhaven contended that it was unaware of the newspaper’s policy to provide 20 free lines of text, and it merely passed on the final cost quoted by the newspaper to its customers.
Certification of a class action is a matter of discretion with the trial judge, and, absent abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb the trial court’s decision. We apply the*484 clearly erroneous standard of review to the trial court’s ruling, and we must affirm if the ruling is supported by any evidence. We will not reverse the factual findings in a trial court’s class certification order unless they are clearly erroneous.1
In order to receive class certification, the complainant must first fulfill the requirements set forth in OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) by establishing that
(1) [t]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) [t]here are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) [tjhe claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) [t]he representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Additionally, OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) requires that proposed class members establish that one of the following elements exists: (1) separate prosecutions would create a risk of either (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class would impair or impede other members’ ability to protect their interests; (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class; or (3) questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, making a class action superior to other methods of adjudication. Here, the complainants chose to proceed under OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) (1) and (b) (3).
After a hearing on the motion to certify the class, the trial court issued an order finding that the proposed class had satisfied the requirements of numerosity, typicality, and adequacy of representation in OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (1), (a) (3) and (a) (4).
1. The Appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the proposed class failed to meet the commonality requirement of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (2). We disagree and affirm.
In order to determine whether the trial court erred by finding that the commonality requirement was not met, this Court must determine whether the Appellants were similarly situated.
The tort of misrepresentation requires a plaintiff to establish
(1) that the defendant made the representations; (2) that at the time he knew they were false; (3) that he made them with the intention and purpose of deceiving the plaintiff; (4) that the plaintiff relied on the representations; [and] (5) that the plaintiff sustained the alleged loss and damage as the proximate result of their having been made.5
“In general, claims of fraud based upon oral misrepresentations are not appropriate for class treatment because the reliance element must be proved factually for each individual class member.”
As tbe trial court determined, such proof in this case would require an inquiry of every class member to determine whether they were told that the obituary fee included a charge for the logo and, if not, whether they would have declined to include the logo in the event they were given such information.
The Appellants contend that in this case, the trial court erred because it is possible to establish that Fairhaven intentionally concealed inclusion of the logo and its pass-through cost to customers because the record evidence shows that Fairhaven did not include the logo on the obituary proofs it forwarded to customers and because Fairhaven claimed that it was not aware of the cost of including the logo in the obituary. Nevertheless, this evidence is not sufficient to establish as a matter of law that the trial court should have granted the Appellants’ motion for class certification.
2. Based on our holding in Division 1, we need not address the Appellants’ argument that the trial court erred by determining that the common issues lacked predominance over the individual issues pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) (3).
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Liberty Lending Svcs. v. Canada,
Fairhaven conceded at the hearing the issues of numerosity and counsel’s adequacy.
We note that the Appellants only were required to fulfill one of the requirements listed in OCGA § 9-11-23 (b).
See Peck v. Lanier Golf Club, Inc.,
(Punctuation omitted.) Ekstedt v. Charter Medical Corp.,
(Punctuation omitted.) Fortis Ins. Co. v. Kahn,
See Perez v. Atlanta Check Cashers, Inc.,
Carnett’s, Inc.,
Compare with Fortis Ins. Co.,
See Garnett’s, Inc.,