35 Ind. App. 94 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1905
On February 7, 1903, appellee published notice of his intention to apply to the board of commissioners of the county of Scott, at the regular session to. be begun and held on the first Monday of March in said year, for a license to sell intoxicating liquors in less quantities than a quart at a time, with the privilege of allowing them to be drank on the premises described, in the town of Scottsburg, Vienna township, Scott county, Indiana. On February 27, there was filed in the auditor’s office of said county a remonstrance, in accordance with the provisions of section nine of an act approved March 11, 1895 (Acts 1895, p. 248, §7283i Burns 1901), purporting to be signed by 372 resident voters of said township. On March 2 appellee filed in said office his verified application for license in accordance with the terms of the notice, and also a verified motion to strike from the remonstrance the names of 341 persons. The motion was overruled, and the cause continued until the 6th day of March, at which time appellants Ervin and Cline filed a remonstrance against the issuance of said license, averring therein that the appellee was not a man of good moral character, and setting out facts tending to show
The propriety of the action of the court in striking out said names must be determined with reference to tire following facts: The persons whose names were written on said remonstrance had, prior thereto, separately executed instruments, of which the following is a copy of one, and sample of all, to wit: “October 2, 1902. I, Charles Ardery, the undersigned, resident and voter in Vienna township, in Scott county, Indiana, do hereby respectfully authorize, empower and request Thomas A. Wilson and William II. Cranford, or either of them, to sign my name to any and all remonstrance or remonstrances against persons who may give notice of intention to apply for license to sell intoxicating liquors in said township, and also properly to file and present such remonstrance or remonstrances
In Hamilton v. State, supra, under a statute requiring an instrument to be signed by' the prosecuting attorney, it was held that the name of said attorney printed at the bottom of the indictment was sufficient. Williams v. McDonald (1881), 58 Cal. 527; Hancock v. Bowman (1874), 49 Cal.
In an opinion given in 1824 by William Wirt, then Attorney-General, the question submitted being whether the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized by a statute- requiring warrants to be drawn and signed by him to have his name impressed thereon by means of a copper plate, the following language was used: “There would be great difficulty in maintaining the proposition as a legal one, that, when the law required signing, it means that it must be done with pen and ink. No book has laid down the proposition, or even given color to it. I believe that a signature made with straw dipped in blood, would be equally valid and obligatory; and if so, where is the legal restriction on the implement which the signer may use ? If he may use one pen, why may he not use several? — a polygraph, for example, or types — or a stamp. * * * The law requires signing merely as an. indication and proof of the parties’ assent.” 1 Opinions of Attomeys-General, 670. The quotation is an apt one, as applied to the facts now under consideration. The typewriter is a modern convenience. The signature mad© by it was in this case the signature of the attorney; the operator being in fact his agent, exactly as the keys and the types were his agents. It has the same validity as if written by his own kand^-indeed, within the meaning of the law, it becomes his proper handwriting. Nye v. Lowry (1882), 82 Ind. 316; Croy v. Busenbark (1880), 72 Ind. 48. It follows that the court erred in sustaining the motion to strike from the general remonstrance the names signed thereto in typewriting. It is noted, as corroborative of the conclusion thus reached, that the attorneys for appellee have signed their brief in this causa in typewriting, and not otherwise.
Judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.