Petition unanimously dismissed without costs. Memorandum: Petitioner in this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeks a judgment prohibiting respondents from proceeding to trial on counts one and three of Herkimer County indictment No. 96-33. She asserts that a writ of prohibition should be granted because Herkimer County Court lacks geographic jurisdiction over those counts {see generally, Matter of Steingut v Gold,
Petitioner was charged in a Herkimer County indictment with the crimes of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, committed on January 30, 1996 (count one), and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree, committed on January 24, 1996 (count three). Both counts allege that defendant sold cocaine in the Village of Herkimer. In their bill of particulars, the People allege with respect to those counts that petitioner facilitated and acted as the accomplice to sales between the codefendant and a third party in the Village of Herkimer. The record indicates that, while in Oneida County, petitioner provided the codefendant with the cocaine that he had agreed to sell to the third party and that petitioner knew that the cocaine was to be resold in Herkimer County.
A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that will be granted "only where there is a clear legal right” and when a court "acts or threatens to act without jurisdiction in a matter over which it has no power over the subject matter or where it exceeds its authorized powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction” (Matter of State of New York v King,
Petitioner has failed to establish a clear legal right to entitle her to a writ of prohibition. CPL 20.40 (1) (a) endows a county with geographic jurisdiction to prosecute an offense where an element of the crime charged is committed within the county. Because the sales or agreements to sell cocaine set forth in counts one and three of the indictment are alleged to have occurred in Herkimer County, respondents at least arguably have geographic jurisdiction over those offenses pursuant to CPL 20.40 (1) (a) (see, People v Pilgrim,
The record also supports the conclusion that respondents
Finally, petitioner is not entitled to a writ of prohibition because she does not seek to abort the entire action, but rather seeks only to prohibit respondents from proceeding on two counts of the indictment (see, Matter of State of New York v King, supra, at 64). Consequently, we dismiss the petition. (Original Proceeding Pursuant to CPLR art 78.) Present— Green, J. P., Lawton, Fallon, Callahan and Doerr, JJ.
