74 Md. 443 | Md. | 1891
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have just decided in the preceding case that, under the clause of the Constitution which declares that the term of office of the Treasurer “shall he for two years and until his successor shall qualify,” Archer’s term of office, under his first appointment in January, 1886, commenced from the time of his due qualification under that appointment on the 2nd of February, 1886, and continued until the due qualification of his successor.
He was appointed by the Legislature his own successor on the 13th of January, 1888, hut failed and neglected
Article 6, see. 5, declares that “the Treasurer shall qualify within one month after his appointment by the Legislature.” Article 1, sec. 6, provides that “every person elected or appointed to any office of profit or trust under this Constitution, or under the laws made pursuant thereto, shall, before he enters upon the duties of such office, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation.” Then the oath is set out, and the following section (sec. 7) declares that “every person hereafter elected or appointed to office in this State, who shall refuse or neglect to ■ take the oath or affirmation provided for in the sixth section of this Article, shall be considered as having refused to accept the said office, and a new election or appointment shall he made as in case of refusal to accept or resignation1: of an office.” Taking this oath is what is meant by the terms “qualifying” and “qualification” as used in the Constitution. But in the case of the Treasurer, the Constitution provides that he shall also “take such oath and enter into such bond for the faithful discharge of his duties as are now or may hereafter be prescribed by law,” (Art. 6, sec. 1,) and the statute law has provided that in addition to the oath prescribed by the sixth section of the first Article of the Constitution, he shall take an oath faith
It is with one only of these requirements that we are now particularly concerned. The plain mandate of the Constitution is that a person appointed by the Legislature to the office of Treasurer shall qualify by taking the. constitutional oath of office within one month after his appointment, and with equal explicitness it is declared that if he refuses or neglects to do so %oithin that period of time, such refusal or neglect shall operate as a refusal to accept the office, and a new appointment must be made as if he had by affirmative words declined or refused to -accept it. We are unable to give these clauses of the Constitution any other interpretation. We cannot treat them as merely directory and not mandatory. Not only is the language of the Constitution too plain to admit of doubt, but the great weight of authority is against a directory construction of them. As said by Judge Cooley : “Courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a Constitution. Constitutions do not usually undertake to prescribe mere rales of proceeding, except when such rules
If, then, we are right in adopting this construction of these constitutional provisions, it follows that Archer’s attempt to qualify in November, 1889, by then taking the constitutional oath of office under his appointment in January, 1888, was of no effect. He had no right then to take the oath, and the Governor had no authority to administer it to him. There is no power given to the Legislature, or to the .Governor, or to any one else, to condone the failure to quality within the prescribed time. The appointment did not of itself confer the office, and entitle him to assume its duties and responsibilities ; qualification within the limited period was an essential prerequisite to that. Thomas vs. Owens, 4 Md., 220. Nor could the qualification in November, 1889, relate ba.ck to his appointment in January, 1888, for that proposition is expressly repudiated in the case just cited, 4 Md., 220. After the expiration of a mouth from his appointment in January, 1888, nothing but a new appointment, followed by a due qualification, could interrupt his holding the office under his first appointment and qualification, in January, 1886. He, therefore, held the office after November, 1889, just as he held it before that time, and continued so to hold it until his third appointment, and due qualification thereunder in January, 1890.
The approval of the bond by the Governor in November, 1889, was equally ineffectual to make it a binding obligation upon the sureties. It is familiar law that the contract of a surety upon an official bond is subject to the strictest interpretation. They undertaké, in the language of Judge Ooolet, “for nothing which is not
But it has been argued that, though it may not be good as a statutory bond, still, upon the principle of estoppel and' of voluntary bonds, the sureties are liable in this action. We cannot, however, accept that doctrine as applicable to this case. We have already shown that this bond was intended to be a statutory official bond, and nothing else. Btrt, apart from this, what is this doctrine of voluntary official bonds ? The foundation on which rests the validity of what are known as voluntary official bonds is that, by virtue of the execution and lawful delivery of the bond, the principal has been inducted into office, and become possessed of the things appertaining thereto, and in such case it is held that, the surety having by his act enabled the principal to obtain the office, he is estopped to deny his liability for the official acts of the officer. Mechem on Public Offices and Officers, sec. 271; Brandt on Suretyship, sec. 445. But that is not the case here. This instrument on its face declares to all the world that it was given for securing the faithful discharge of his duties by Stevenson Archer, as a legally constituted Treasurer under his appointment of 13th of January, 1888, and we have shown-he never became such. It is trae that where a bond is executed by sureties, and delivered by them to .their principal, they thereby clothe him with authority to deliver it for the purpose for which it was executed; but they, give him no authority to deliver it for any other purpose than that which its terms show it was intended to serve. This bond bore date the 27th of January, 1888, and the record shows that the sureties had nothing to do with having it presented to the Governor for approval in November, 1889, when, according to the
The case has been argued with great ability on both sides, and these are the conclusions we have reached,0 after giving it our best consideration. Several of the rulings excepted to are in conflict with these views, and we,need not specify them in detail. Eor these errors the judgment will be reversed, and, as we have decided no action can be maintained on the bond, a new trial will not be granted.
Judgment reversed, and neto tried refused.