ARCHDIOCESE OF MIAMI, INC., Petitioner,
v.
Yolanda G. MIÑAGORRI, Respondent.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
*641 J. Pаtrick Fitzgerald and Roberto J. Diaz, Miami; Gaebe, Mullen, Antonelli, Esco & Dimatteo and Benjamin M. Esco, Coral Gables, for petitioner.
Eddy O. Marban, for respondent.
Before RAMIREZ, WELLS, and LAGOA, JJ.
WELLS, Judge.
The Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. seeks to prohibit the court belоw from entertaining Yolanda Miñagorri's whistleblower claim stemming from an altercation between Miñagorri and her immediate supervisor. See §§ 448.101-.105, Fla. Stat. (2006) (Florida's Private Sector Whistleblower Act). We grant relief but withhоld our writ on the assumption that the court below will comply with this opinion.
Miñagorri's complaint alleges that in August 2005, while the principal of St. Kevin Catholic School, Miñagorri was assaulted and battered when Father Jesus Saldaña, her immediate supervisor, grabbed her by the arm and verbally threatened her. According to Miñagorri, when she complained to the Archdiocese about Father Saldaña's behavior, the Archdiocese retaliated by terminating her employment.
In count II of her four count complaint, Miñagorri makes a Private Sector Whistleblower Act claim under section 448.102(3), which рrohibits employers from taking retaliatory action against employees who object to or refuse to participate in activities, policies or practices of the emрloyer which are "in violation of a law, rule, or regulation." § 448.102(3), Fla. Stat. (2006). Miñagorri seeks equitable and monetary relief provided under the Act, including front pay and reinstatement to her position. § 448.103(2), Fla. Stаt. (2006). The Archdiocese claims that the court below lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this claim under the First Amendment's bar against secular court review of religious policy and administration. Wе agree.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in pertinent part, provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const. amend. I. In Watson v. Jones,
[W]henever the questions of disciрline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.
Id. at 727; McClure v. Salvation Army,
This interpretation, known as the "ecclesiastical abstention doctrine," precludеs courts from exercising jurisdiction where an employment decision concerns a member of the clergy or an employee in a ministerial position:
The First Amendment and the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine preclude civil courts from inquiring into ecclesiastical matters. Courts may not consider employment *642 disputes between a religious organization and its clergy because such matters necessarily involve questions of internal church discipline, faith, and organization that are governed by ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law. See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,280 U.S. 1 , 16,50 S.Ct. 5 ,74 L.Ed. 131 (1929); see also Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc.,203 F.3d 1299 , 1304 (11th Cir.2000).
Se. Conference Ass'n of Seventh-Day Adventists, Inc. v. Dennis,
Thus, where, as here, a claim challenges a religious institution's employment decision, the inquiry is whether the employee is a member of the clergy or serves a ministerial function. See Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
The ministerial exception, a doctrine rooted in the First Amendment's guarantees of religious freedom, precludes subject matter jurisdiction over claims involving the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministerial employees, based on the institution's constitutional right to be free from judicial interference in the selection of those emplоyees. See generally Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich,426 U.S. 696 ,96 S.Ct. 2372 ,49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference,978 F.2d 940 (6th Cir.1992).
Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc.,
In this case, the parties concede that Miñagorri is a ministerial employee. Although the ministerial exception has most often been raised in response to employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., which specifically bars discrimination on the basis of religion, it has also been applied to *643 claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., as well as to common law claims brought against a religious employer. See, e.g., Ogle v. Church of God,
Accordingly, we grant relief with the writ withheld.[1]
NOTES
Notes
[1] In light of this holding, we do not address whether Miñagorri has stated a claim under the Private Sector Whistleblower Act. We also find Miñagorri's whistleblower claim distinguishable from third-party tort actions brought by parishioners against their respеctive churches based upon alleged sexual misconduct by a clergy member, see Doe v. Evans,
Although we find that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Appellant's clаim, we acknowledge our supreme court's holdings that permit third parties to file negligent-hiring and negligent supervision claims against hierarchical churches. We find Appellant's claim distinguishable from both Evans and Malicki bеcause Appellant's claim would excessively entangle civil courts in the resolution of a completely internal church matter involving no third parties.
Malichi,