RULING RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dоc. Nos. 58, 59)
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff George A. Arasimowicz (“Arasi-mowicz”) commenced this action against defendants All Panel Systems, LLC (“All
The defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 58) with respect to Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5. Arasimow-icz filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 59) as to the same Counts.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
All Panel is a Connecticut Limited Liability Company consisting of four members, including Venance LaFrancois (“LaFrancois”). Defs.’ Local Rule (“L.R.”) 56(a)l Stmt. (Doc. No. 58-8) ¶ 1. LaFran-cois was Arasimowicz’s supervisor at another firm before leaving to start All Panel. Id. ¶ 2. Sometime after All Panel was formed, Arasimowicz informed LaFrancois that he was seeking employment. Id. On April 19, 2010, Arasimowicz was hired by Massey’s at a starting salary of $65,000 a year, equivalent to a base salary of $1,250 a week. Id. ¶¶ 3-4; Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)l Stmt. (Doc. No. 61) ¶3. From that date until December 31, 2010, Arasimowicz was employed on paper by Massey’s, although he effectively worked for All Panel. Defs.’ L.R. 56(a)l Stmt. ¶3; PL’s L.R. 56(a)l Stmt. ¶ 4. Starting January 1, 2011, Arasi-mowicz was officially transferred to All Panel’s payroll. Defs.’ L.R. 56(a)l Stmt. ¶ 3.
LaFrancois and another individual at All Panel, Phil Delise (“Delise”), were the two persons responsible for the decision to exempt Arasimowicz from the FLSA and CMWA overtime provisions. PL’s L.R. 56(a)l Stmt. ¶¶ 15, 17. When LaFrancois offered Arasimоwicz a job in 2010, LaF-rancois and Delise had not discussed whether it would be legal to classify Arasi-mowicz as an exempt employee. Id. ¶ 16.
During the time that Arasimowicz was employed by Massey’s and by All Panel, he had the job title of “Project Detail-er/Fabrication Shop Coordinator,” and he worked under the direct supervision of LaFrancois. PL’s L.R. 56(a)l Stmt. ¶¶ 6-7. Although the parties disagree as to what Arasimowicz’s “primary” duties were, they agree that his duties included such tasks as drafting plans for building panels and drawing elevation layouts for panels. PL’s L.R. 56(a)l Stmt. ¶¶ 8-9; Defs.’ L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. (Doc. No. 66) at 2. The parties also agree that Arasimowicz never took on any duties related to either company’s taxes, insurance, or payroll. PL’s L.R. 56(a)l Stmt. ¶ 10; Defs.’ L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt, at 2.
On November 17, 2010, Arasimowicz sent LaFrancois an email containing a link to a section of the website of the Connecticut Department of Labor (the “CDOL”) that had information regarding whether employees may be exempted from overtime payment.
On September 9, 2011, Arasimowicz’s employment with All Panel ended. Pl.’s Mem. Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. No. 60) at 5.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment “may properly be granted ... only where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.” In re Dana Corp.,
“[T]he moving party bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to summary judgment.” United Transp. Union v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Statutes
1. The FLSA
Congress enacted the FLSA “to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and opрressive working hours.” Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,
The FLSA exempts certain categories of employees from its overtime requiremеnts, including “any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Such exemptions “are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc.,
2. The CMWA
Like the FLSA, the CMWA requires employеrs to compensate non-exempt employees for any work over 40 hours a week. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31-76c. Also, like the FLSA, the CMWA places the burden on the employer to prove that an employee fits within an exemption. Butler v. Hartford Tech. Institute,
B. Exemptions
The defendants argue that Arasimowicz qualified as an exempt employee under two of the FLSA’s categories: administrative employees and professional employees. Defs.’ Mem. Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. No. 58-9) at 6-9 (administrative employee), 10-18 (professional employee). The defendants also argue that Arasimowicz qualified as an exempt employee under the CMWA’s administrative and professional exemptions. Those exemptions mirror the FLSA’s administrative and professional exemptions and are applied in the same manner. See Hendricks v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
Arasimowicz disputes both classifications and also argues that he was not an exempt executive employee or computer
1. Executive Exemption
An exempt “bona fide executive” under the FLSA is one: (1) who is paid a salary of at least $455 per week; (2) whose “primary duty is management” of the employee’s company or department or subdivision thereof; (3) who “customarily and regularly directs the work” of at least two other employees; and (4) who “has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions and recommendations” regarding such decisions are accorded “particular weight.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.100.
Arasimowiez argues that he is not a “bona fide executive” under the FLSA because, according to his supervisor LaFran-cois’s testimony, Arasimowiez “only ever directed the work of one other employee,” and even with respect to that employee, “did not have the power to fire him or have any input into his status as an employee.” PL’s Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 11; Deposition Transcript of J.R. LaFrancois, dated Dec. 13, 2012 (Doc. No. 60-1) (“LaFrancois Tr.”), Ex. A to PL’s Mem. Mot. Summ. J., at 47:22-48:13.
2. Administrative Employee Exemption
An exempt administrative employee under the FLSA is one: (1) who is paid a salary of at least $455 per week; (2) whose “primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations” of the employer or its customers; and (3) whose primary duty also “includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.200. With respect to (2), “work directly related to the management or general business operations” must be “work directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of the business.” Id. § 541.201(a). With respect to (3), whether an employee exercises “discretion and independent judgment” requires а holistic assessment of the employee’s situation, including the consideration of such factors as:
whether the employee has authority to formulate, affect, interpret, or implement management policies or operating practices; whether the employee carries out major assignments in conducting the operations of the business; whether the employee performs work that affects business operations to a substantial degree ...; whether the employee has authority to commit the employer in matters that have significant financial impact; whether the employee has authority to waive or deviate from established policies and procedures without prior approval; whether the employee has authority to negotiate and bind the company on significant matters; whether the employee provides consultation or expert advice to management; whether the employee is involved in planning long- or short-term business objectives; whether the employee investigates and resolves matters of significance on behalf of management; and whether the*218 employee represents the company in handling complaints, arbitrating disputes or resolving grievances.
Id. § 541.202(b). There is no dispute that Arasimowiez meets the first requirement, so this court turns to the second requirement — whether Arasimowiez performed work “directly related to the management or general business operations” of All Panel.
The defendants argue that Arasimowiez assisted in “running or servicing” All Panel by “obtaining bid quotations, buying parts[,] ... and establishing drafting protocols for outside pеrsonnel that were being utilized by All Panel.” Defs.’ Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 8 (citing Resume of George R. Arasimowiez (Doc. No. 58-2) (“Arasimowiez Resume”), Ex. A to Affidavit of LaFrancois, dated Jan. 24, 2013 (“Jan. 24, 2013 LaFrancois Aff.”) (Doc. No. 58-1), and Deposition Transcript of George Arasimowiez, Jr. (“Arasimowiez Tr.”) (Doc. No. 58-4), Ex. C. to Jan. 24, 2013 LaFran-cois Aff.).
Arasimowiez argues that his primary duties at work consisted of “producing] panels аnd architectural drawings for [All Panel]” through the use of Computer Assisted Design (“CAD”) software, and that such work is properly characterized as “production” that falls outside the administrative work contemplated by section 541.202(a). The Second Circuit has recognized the distinction between employment “belonging in the administrative category, which falls squarely within the administrative exception, [and] production/sales work, which does not.” Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.,
In Davis, the Second Circuit held that an underwriter tasked with approving loans performed production work and did not qualify for the administrative exemption. The court noted that the employee’s primary duty was to sell products rather than to advise customers about what products were appropriate for them. Id. at 534. Accordingly, the employee’s work related to “the ‘production’ of loans — the fundamental service provided by the bank,” not “to setting ‘management policies’ []or to ‘general business operations’ such as human relations or advertising.” Id. The court also distinguished the employee’s work, which was “functional,” from “conceptual” work related to the bank’s strategy, overall efficiency, or mode of operation. Id. at 535. Drawing from case law in this and other Circuits, the Davis court noted “an important distinction between employees directly producing the good or service that is the primary
Applying Davis’s framework to this case, this court finds no evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Arasimowicz’s primary duties involved administrative, not production work. The evidence in the record shows that Arasimowicz’s primary duty was the production of drawings for panels that would be manufactured by All Panel. Arasimowicz testified that his primary duty was using CAD to draft plans for panels that were manufactured by All Panel. Aff. of George Arasimowicz, Ex. B to Pl.’s Mem. Mot. Summ. J. (Doe. No. 60-2) (“Arasimowicz Aff.”) ¶¶ 3-4. Although the defendants allege that Arasimowicz also performed other tasks “essential to the general business operations of All Panel,” they provide no evidence showing that those other tasks comprised Arasimowicz’s primary duties. See Defs.’ Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 8; see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.700 (defining “primary duty” as the “principal, main, major or most important duty that the employee performs,” and noting that “employees who spend more than 50 percent of their time performing exempt work will generally satisfy the primary duty requirement”). Moreover, LaFrancois, Arasimowicz’s supervisor, testified that, although Arasimowicz was not “merely” a CAD designer, his primary duty was “CAD detailing.” LaFrancois Tr. at 147:15-148:4 (“Q: [W]hat was [Arasimowicz’s] primary duty? A: He did CAD detailing as a primary.”).
Arasimowicz’s primary duty, i.e., his CAD detailing, constituted production, not administrative, work. According to Arasi-mowicz, his work involved drawing lines, or “geometry,” on a computer using a program called AutoCAD; sending the geometry to a machine, which created a product of those cut-out lines; and using that product to create dimensions on a blueprint for a panel. See Arasimowicz Tr. at 93:12-19. The defendants argue that Arasimowicz’s work required “great skill, technique and judgment” in “making certain that his plans conformed with architectural designs,” and that his job as a draftsman was “at the core or heart of [All Panel] and critical to its operation.” Defs.’ Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 9. However, these arguments do not explain why Arasimowicz’s duties should be classified as “administrative” rather than “production.” In fact, the defendants’ descriptions of Arasimow-icz’s work — as a “draftsman” and ensuring conformity with architectural designs, see, e.g., Jan. 24, 2013 LaFrancois Aff. ¶ 13 — is the type of work “directly producing the good or service that is the primary output of [All Panel],” and is not “general administrative work applicable to the running of any business.” Davis,
Moreover, much of the email correspondence presented by the defendants in support of their argument illustrates that Ar-asimowicz’s role involved the production of the drawings rather than a more general “running or servicing” of All Panel. See emails attached as Ex. D to Jan. 24, 2013 LaFrancois Aff. (Doc. No. 58-5) (“Arasimowicz Emails”) at 1 (describing work on drawings); id. at 4 (describing preparation of drawings for production of panels); id. at 12 (discussing possible errоrs in dimensions in drawings, and suggesting corrections). Even much of the “other” work that the defendants allege Arasimowicz performed appears to relate to production of the panels rather than to
Because Arasimowicz did not perform work directly related to management policies or general business operations, no reasonable factfinder could find under the FLSA that Arasimowicz’s primary tasks constituted administrative, rather than production, work. “Because an administrative employee must both perform work directly related to management policies or general business operations and customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment, ... [Arasimowicz] was not employed in a bona fide administrative capacity.” Davis,
The administrative exemption under the CMWA applies similar standards.
3. Learned Professional Exemption
An exempt learned professional employee under the FLSA is one: (1) who is paid a salary of at least $455 per week; and (2)(i) whose “primary duty” is the performance of work that requires “knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning- customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction.”
The defendants argue that Arasimowicz has “acquired advanced knowledge and a high level of skill as an ‘architectural draftsman,’ mechanical draftsman and designer[,] and fabricator/detailer.” Defs.’ Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 10-11. The defen
Arasimowiez argues that he is not an exempt learnеd professional because he does not meet the three elements of the primary duty test. See Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 13-15. Specifically, Ara-simowiez argues that his work does not require a college degree, and the fact that he took a “short, technical course” in Auto-CAD drafting does not show that his work requires advanced knowledge in a field of learning “customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction.” Pl.’s Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 14-15 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.300). Second, Arasimowiez argues that the federal regulations “specifically distinguish an exempt engineer from a non-exempt draftsman” such as Arasimowiez. See id. at 15-16 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.308(b) (“The field of ‘engineering’ has many persons with ‘engineer’ titles, who are not professional engineers, as well as many who are trained in the engineering profession, but are actuаlly working as ... draftsmen.”).)
This court finds that there is no evidence before it upon which a reasonable jury could find that Arasimowiez is an exempt learned professional. The Second Circuit’s decision in Young v. Cooper Cameron Corp.,
Here, the defendants have offered no evidence suggesting that Arasimowicz’s position required prolonged advanced educational training or instruction. See Defs.’ Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 10-18. As noted earlier, Arasimowiez does not have a college degree. See id. at 11 (noting that Arasimowiez received a diрloma in CAD drafting, where he learned “basic drafting skills”); Ex. F to Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (describing school where Arasimowiez received his diploma as a “technical school” that provides “career training”); see also Zubair v. En-Tech Engineering, P.C.,
Two cases that the defendants cite in support of their position are also unhelpful. The Second Circuit and other courts in this district have criticized Dingwall v. Friedman Fisher Assocs., P.C.,
The second case relied on by the defendants, Aulen v. Triumph Explosive, Inc.,
Because Arasimowicz’s primary work— CAD detailing and drawing — does not require “knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction,” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301, no reasonable jury could find that Arasimowiez is an exempt learned professional under the FLSA. Accordingly, this court grants summary judgment for Arasimowiez as to that issue. Additionally, because similar standards apply to the professional exemption under the CMWA,
4. Computer Professional Exemption
An exempt computer professional is one who is paid a salary of at least $455 per week and whose “primary duty” consists of:
*223 (1) The application of systems analysis teсhniques and procedures ... to determine hardware, software or system functional specifications; (2) The design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing or modification of computer systems or programs ...; (3) The design, documentation, testing, creation or modification of computer programs related to machine operation systems; or (4) A combination of the aforementioned duties, the performance of which requires the same level of skills.
29 C.F.R. § 541.400(b). Arasimowicz argues that he was not an exempt computer professional, because the exemption is “aimed at IT professionals whose work related to computers per se, not at em: ployees whose work happens to be performed using a computer.” PL’s Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 9-10 (citing Pellerin v. Xspedius Mgmt. Co. of Shreveport, LLC,
5. “Combination” Exemption
This court concluded that no reasonable jury could find, based on the record before the court, that Arasimowicz was an exempt administrative employee, because his primary duty, ie., his CAD detailing, constituted non-exempt production work. See, supra, Part IV.B.2. This court also concluded that no reasonable jury could find, based on the record before the court, that Arasimowicz was an exempt learned professional, as his work did not qualify as exempt under the federal regulations. See, supra, Part IV.B.3. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Arasimowicz is exempt based on the “combination exemption,” which requires that an employee’s “primary duty involve[] a combination of exempt ... work.” 29 C.F.R. 541.708;' see Kadden v. VisuaLex, LLC,
C. Arasimowicz’s Ability to Recover
Arasimowicz has also moved for summary judgment on the issue of liquidated damages under the FLSA.
The defendants argue that summary judgment on liquidated damages is inappropriate because Arasimowicz has not satisfied his prima facie burden of showing that he actually worked uncompensated overtimе, and because the defendants’ classification of Arasimowicz as exempt, even if incorrect as a matter of law, “was either reasonable or in good faith.” See Defs.’ Opp. to PL’s Mot. Summ. J. at 6-10 (prima facie case), 11-13 (liquidated damages). This court examines each argument in turn.
A plaintiff bringing a FLSA claim under section 207 bears the burden of proving that he worked uncompensated overtime. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,
Once an employee has produced sufficient evidence of uncompensated overtime and “sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference,” the burden shifts to the employer to provide evidence showing “the precise amount of work performed” or challenging the reasonable inference drawn from the employee’s evidence. Anderson,
HereJ the defendants “did not produce records that definitively established the number of hours worked by the plaintiff.” Tran v. Alphonse Hotel Corp.,
Arasimowiez has provided evidence in favor of his claim that he worked uncompensated overtime. First, Arasimоwiez testified that he “usually worked between 47 and 52 hours per week” for the defendants, but he “was never paid for any overtime.” Arasimowiez Aff. ¶ 6. Second, Arasimowiez provided email correspondence in which he told LaFrancois that he worked 47, 48, and 49 hours in consecutive weeks in August 2011, and to which email correspondence LaFrancois responded, “George, That is acceptable!;] thank you.” Email from LaFrancois to Arasimowiez and Delise, dated August 19, 2011 (“August 19 Email”), Ex. A to Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. No. 71-1). Finally, Arasimowiez apparently produced timesheets to the defendants during discovery, several of which are annexed as exhibits to the defendants’ papers, purporting to show overtime worked for which Arasimowiez claims he was uncompensated. See Exs. E-M to Affidavit of LaFran-cois, dated Feb. 14, 2013 (“Feb. 14, 2013 LaFrancois Aff.”) (Doc. No. 65).
As stated previously, the defendants do not have records showing how many hours Arasimowicz worked each week. However, they have put forth evidence challenging Arasimowicz’s claim that he worked uncompensated overtime. LaFrancois testifies that Arasimowiez never worked any overtime. Defs.’ Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 8; Feb. 14, 2013 LaFrancois Aff. ¶ 6 (“[P]laintiff was never asked to work overtime, never worked overtime, never requested to be paid for overtime and never submitted any written documentation or purported time sheet indicating that he had worked overtime.”). Additionally, LaFrancois testifies that Arasimowicz’s “purported timesheets ... are totally unreliable and proof of ... plaintiffs fraudulent intent.” Feb. 14, 2013 LaFrancois Aff. ¶ 9; Defs.’ Opp. to PL’s Mot. Summ. J. at 9-10. To support this statement, LaF-rancois spends several pages of his February 14, 2013 Affidavit discussing apparent inconsistencies or contradictions between the timesheets and Arasimowicz’s deposition testimony. See Feb. 14, 2013 LaFran-cois Aff. ¶¶ 5-23.
This court concludes that the evidence offered by the defendants, while thin, is sufficient to create a material issue of fact as to whether Arasimowiez worked uncompensated overtime. First, the defendants contest that Arasimowiez worked any overtime at all.
2. Liquidated Damages
An employer who violates the FLSA is liable for unpaid оvertime compensation and “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Liquidated damages “are not a penalty exacted by the law, but rather compensation to the employee occasioned by the delay in receiving wages due caused by the employer’s violation of the FLSA.” Herman,
Because the court did not grant Arasi-mowicz summary judgment as to whether he worked uncompensated overtime, the court cannot reach the issue of whether liquidated damages are appropriate. However, this court does observe that many of the defendants’ arguments on this issue appear to be irrelevant to the issue of liquidated damages. See Defs.’ Opp. to PL’s Mot. Summ. J. at 12-13.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 58) is DENIED, and Ar-asimowicz’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 59) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 46) appears to erroneously title two counts as “Count 4." This court will consider the first-named “Count 4" to be correct and will refer to the latter-named “Count 4" as “Count 5.”
. In the letter, Arasimowicz also states, “I feel that I should be Salary Exempt as I have mentioned to Phil and yourself before.” It appears from his statement and from the rest of the email that Arasimowicz inadvertently omitted a word and intended to write that he felt he should not be salary exempt. Prior to
. Count 3 of the Amended Complaint, which alleges that All Panel terminated Arasimowicz in retaliation for complaining that he was improperly classified as еxempt under the FLSA, is not at issue in either motion for summary judgment.
. Exhibit A contains excerpts of LaFrancois's deposition transcript. Portions of the same transcript are excerpted elsewhere. See, e.g., Doc. No. 67-2, Ex. B to PL’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. This court will not differentiate between the two excerpts, but will cite to "LaFrancois Tr.” whenever it cites to either exhibit.
. Exhibit C contains excerpts of Arasimow-icz's deposition transcript. Portions of the same transcript are excerpted elsewhere. See, e.g., Doc. No. 67-1, Ex. A to Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. This court will not differentiate between the two excerpts, but will cite to "Arasimowiez Tr." whenever it cites to either exhibit.
. The defendants concede that the language of the state regulations regarding the administrative exemption “is very similar to the federal regulations/' and in fact has an additional requirement that must be met. See Defs.' Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 20.
. Section 541.300 also provides that an employee may be an exempt professional if his job requires “invention, imagination, originality or talent in a recognized field of artistic or creative endeavor.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.300(a)(2)(ii). Neither party argues that this exemption is at issue.
. The defendants concede that the language of the state regulations regarding the professional exemption "closely follow the FLSA regulations,” and in fact has an additional requirement of "exercise of discretion and judgment” that must be met. See Defs.’ Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 21.
. Arasimowicz has expressly not moved for summary judgment as to liquidated damages under the CMWA, noting that inquiry under the CMWA is "intensely factual.” See Pl.’s Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 10 n. 3.
. The court should point out that several of the defendants' arguments on this issue are irrelevant. Whether Arasimowiez asked to work overtime or requеsted to be paid for overtime is irrelevant. The defendants have cited no authority stating that an employee must prove that he asked if he could work overtime or requested to be paid for overtime; nor have they shown that they "made any effort to stop [Arasimowiez] from working overtime.” Berrios,
Nor is it relevant that the defendants were unaware that Arasimowiez was working overtime. Although an employer is not liable for a violation of section 207 "where an employer has no knowledge that an employee is engaging in overtime work and that employee fails to notify the employer or deliberately prevents the employer from acquiring knowledge of the overtime work,” Forrester v. Roth’s I.G.A. Foodliner, Inc.,