ARABIAN SUPPORT & SERVICES COMPANY, LTD., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. TEXTRON SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee.
No. 19-1377
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
November 20, 2019
Before Lynch, Selya, and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
Martin F. Gaynor III, with whom Haig V. Kalbian, D. Michelle Douglas, William P. McGrath, Jr., Kalbian Hagerty LLP, Nicholas D. Stellakis, and Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP were on brief, for appellant.
John A. Tarantino, with whom Nicole J. Benjamin and Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C. were on brief, for appellee.
ASASCO‘s 2017 amended complaint asserted violation of
In recounting the facts, we rely in substantial part on the district court‘s opinion and our prior decision, Arabian Support & Services Co. v. Textron Systems Corp., 855 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) (Textron I). We describe the key events over the parties’ thirteen-year relationship in chronological order.
A. Facts
Textron was interested in selling SFWs to Saudi Arabia. The relationship between Textron and ASASCO largely developed through the interactions of Mansour Al-Tassan, ASASCO‘s President, and Avedis Boyamian, Textron‘s Director of Middle East Business Development. Starting in 2001, Al-Tassan and Boyamian discussed various methods of paying ASASCO for its assistance in furthering a SFW sale, including through a fixed monthly fee or through the formation of a joint venture.
In March 2004, Textron engaged the International Law Firm in Riyadh to ensure that its contemplated relationship with ASASCO would be legal under Saudi law. On July 8, 2004, Robert Kemp, Textron‘s General Counsel, inquired about the legality of paying ASASCO “on a commission basis.” The International Law Firm advised Kemp on September 1, 2004, that such a relationship had a “significant risk” of being prohibited under Saudi law.
On September 28, 2004, Boyamian and Al-Tassan met in Cairo. Boyamian told Al-Tassan that Textron was willing to pay ASASCO up to five percent of the value of the SFW deal but that the agreement between the companies must conform to U.S. and Saudi law. ASASCO alleges that on November 6, 2004, at a meeting in Saudi Arabia, Boyamian represented to Al-Tassan that Textron would use “offsets”1 in order to pay ASASCO lawfully for its services if Textron obtained the SFW sales contract with Saudi Arabia.
In 2005, Textron and ASASCO executed the first of what would be five consulting agreements. The first three agreements, each lasting one year during the time period from 2005 to 2008, provided ASASCO with a monthly retainer of $10,000 for its services regarding the sale of Textron‘s SFWs to the Royal Saudi Air Force.2 Throughout 2006, Boyamian and Al-Tassan further discussed the opportunity for ASASCO to receive compensation for its assistance with any offset projects. Textron‘s position with ASASCO was that
In June 2006, Textron sent ASASCO a draft offset provider agreement.3 Later at deposition, Boyamian described the offset discussions and the consulting agreements as “totally separate.” On June 26, 2006, Boyamian also forwarded Al-Tassan internal Textron emails that ordered that ASASCO‘s business with Textron be recorded separately as “two books” -- one for the proposed offset agreement and one for a renewal of the consultant agreement. Textron and ASASCO never formalized a written offset agreement.
In February 2008, Textron entered into an Offset Services Agreement (“OSA“) with Blenheim Capital Partners (“Blenheim“), a company based in the United Kingdom. If Blenheim helped Textron (1) obtain an irrevocable waiver within six months “after the date of the execution of the Supply Contract” or (2) meet its offset obligations, Textron would pay Blenheim six percent of the contract price.4 Under the OSA, Blenheim could subcontract with ASASCO, but it needed Textron‘s written consent to use any other subcontractor. Boyamian sent Al-Tassan a draft of this agreement in June 2007, before the agreement‘s finalization.
On June 21, 2007, Al-Tassan, Boyamian, Textron‘s Offset Manager, and a representative from Blenheim met in Paris. Al-Tassan asserts that Boyamian represented at this meeting that ASASCO would receive six percent of the Supply Contract under the “offset arrangement.”
On September 4, 2008, Textron and ASASCO extended the third consulting agreement, but on a “no-fee basis.”5 This arrangement lasted until August 31, 2009.
On April 6, 2009, Blenheim and ASASCO finalized a subcontract in which ASASCO would assist Blenheim in securing either an offset waiver or offset credits. Under the agreement, ASASCO was only entitled to additional compensation if offset credits or an offset waiver were achieved pursuant to the OSA.6 In August 2009, Textron and ASASCO entered a fourth consulting agreement effective September 1, 2009, through August 31, 2011, which gave ASASCO a $500 monthly retainer.
In May 2011, Textron‘s new Director of Business Offsets, Stephen Fogarty, advised Textron to terminate the OSA with Blenheim, describing the six percent fee as
While the OSA was still in effect in July 2011, Textron submitted a proposed offset project, developed by ASASCO, to the Saudi Economic Offset Committee. A Saudi official responded the next day rejecting the proposal, stating that it did not align with the Committee‘s priorities and did not provide sufficient detail.
It is undisputed that, after this rejection, ASASCO never completed another formal offset project proposal for Textron. In the fall of 2011, Textron and Al-Tassan continued to discuss possible offset projects over email, but no formal proposal ever materialized.
Textron and ASASCO also entered into a fifth consulting agreement, effective September 1, 2011, which contained an integration clause.
In November 2011, Textron sent Blenheim a letter stating that the parties had agreed to mutually terminate the OSA. Blenheim signed the letter on January 12, 2012.7
On January 3, 2012, Boyamian emailed Al-Tassan to inform him that the U.S. government and Saudi Arabia had executed a “Letter of Offer and Acceptance,” which finalized the terms of the sale of the SFWs, and to offer a “[congratulations] to all of us.” No formal contract entered at this time. Through 2012, Textron continued working with ASASCO to set up meetings with Saudi officials. On August 16, 2012, Textron and ASASCO extended the fifth consulting agreement, including its integration clause, through August 31, 2013.
On August 20, 2013, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that Textron had been awarded the contract to provide SFWs to Saudi Arabia for a total price of $640,786,442. The announced contract terms included $89,222,000 for Textron in offset costs. On August 29, 2013, Textron emailed ASASCO that it would not renew the fifth consulting agreement and stated that Textron was “not aware of any outstanding obligations between the parties.”
Textron signed a Letter of Agreement (“LOA“) with the Saudi Arabian Economic Offset Program on June 9, 2014, agreeing that Textron‘s offset obligation would be 40% of the SFW contract. The LOA further stated that Textron‘s commitment of 40% would be included in the “Offset Memorandum of Agreement which will be signed by Textron” and the Economic Offset Program.
By the time of this appeal, Textron and Saudi Arabia had not entered into an Offset Memorandum of Agreement, and Textron had kept the $89.2 million it received for offset costs. Saudi Arabia had not waived the offset requirements. And ASASCO had never delivered an offset project that was approved by Saudi Arabia.
B. Procedural History
ASASCO filed suit against Textron on July 15, 2015, alleging breach of contract, tortious interference, and violation of
On June 21, 2017, ASASCO filed an amended complaint making the claims described earlier. On March 19, 2019, the district court granted Textron‘s motion for summary judgment on all counts.
II.
We review the district court‘s entry of summary judgment de novo. Town of Westport v. Monsanto Co., 877 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A. Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 93A Claim
ASASCO argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Textron on its chapter 93A claim for two different reasons. First, ASASCO argues that the district court “misapplied the legal standard” as articulated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) in Kuwaiti Danish Computer Co. v. Digital Equipment Corp., 781 N.E.2d 787 (Mass. 2003). It says that a case relied on by the district court, Roche v. Royal Bank of Canada, 109 F.3d 820 (1st Cir. 1997), is inconsistent with the SJC‘s later Kuwaiti Danish decision. ASASCO secondly argues the district court mistakenly concluded that the “core of the misleading conduct” did not occur “primarily and substantially within the commonwealth.”
In Kuwaiti Danish, the SJC stated that “a judge should, after making findings of fact, and after considering those findings in the context of the entire § 11 claim, determine whether the center of gravity of the circumstances that give rise to the claim is primarily and substantially within the Commonwealth.” Id. at 799. ASASCO focuses on the SJC‘s language that this analysis “should not be based on a test identified by any particular factor” because use of a factor-based test tends “to shift the focus of inquiry away from the purpose and scope of c. 93A.” Id.
ASASCO argues that the district court erred when it cited to the factors outlined in this court‘s earlier decision in Roche. The Roche factors look to where the defendant committed the alleged deception, where the plaintiff was deceived and acted upon the deception, and where the plaintiff was harmed. Roche, 109 F.3d at 829-31. The district court did not apply Roche in a manner inconsistent with Kuwaiti Danish. Rather, it carefully considered the nature of each alleged instance of misconduct, as well as the number of alleged instances, in the context of the entire claim and in doing so, performed the “fact intensive” analysis required by the SJC. Kuwaiti Danish, 781 N.E.2d at 798. Contrary to ASASCO‘s argument, the district court did not “narrowly and rigidly construe[] the facts.”
Secondly, there was no error when the district court concluded that Massachusetts was not the “center of gravity.” ASASCO points to evidence that Textron itself is in Massachusetts and that the email communications to Al-Tassan and
B. ASASCO‘s Other Claims
As to ASASCO‘s claims of error in entry of judgment against its fraudulent inducement, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and quasi-contract/implied contract/promissory estoppel claims, we affirm the entry of summary judgment based on the district court‘s reasoning. A few bedrock principles of Massachusetts contract law require this result. First, the district court correctly stated that “ASASCO cannot now assert that it reasonably relied on promises of compensation in the form of a commission for assisting in selling the cluster bombs,” Textron II, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 227-28, when the terms of all five written consulting agreements flatly prohibited any payment to ASASCO based on commission from the weapons sale. See Masingill v. EMC Corp., 870 N.E.2d 81, 89 (Mass. 2007) (“It is unreasonable as a matter of law to rely on prior oral representations that are (as a matter of fact) specifically contradicted by the terms of a written contract.“).
As to ASASCO‘s alternate claims that, apart from commission, it was entitled to compensation as to offset provisions, the district court correctly concluded that “there is no evidence in the record that Al-Tassan was promised compensation of six percent of the total SFW sale . . . even if ASASCO did not acquire a waiver or offset credits.” Textron II, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 228 (emphasis added). The court properly found Textron never represented to ASASCO that ASASCO would receive offset-related compensation even if ASASCO did not secure from the Saudi government an offset waiver or offset credits. Going beyond that, it is undisputed that ASASCO never obtained a waiver or secured Saudi government approval for an offset project, nor did it even complete a formal offset project proposal after the 2011 rejection.
ASASCO reframes its argument in terms that a jury could conclude that Textron denied ASASCO the “opportunity” to provide offset services or secure a waiver, quoting our earlier opinion in Textron I. Textron I, 855 F.3d at 8 n.9. ASASCO argues that because it put forth “several offset proposals that [Textron] could have used once the Supply Contract was
ASASCO was not denied the “opportunity” to secure offset services. ASASCO‘s own evidence is that Textron gave it the opportunity to discuss proposed offset projects with Textron. But the Saudi government has never approved any of these offset proposals. Further, ASASCO does not dispute that it failed to come up with any formal offset proposals after its 2011 proposal was rejected by the Saudi government.
The unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claim goes nowhere. Under Massachusetts law, courts generally “will not grant quantum meruit recovery arising from a contingent fee contract where the contingency has not occurred.” Liss v. Studeny, 879 N.E.2d 676, 683 (Mass. 2008). Here, the two contingencies were (1) the signing of the Supply Contract and (2) ASASCO‘s achievement of a waiver or offset credits. The second, necessary contingent event never happened.
Affirmed. Costs are awarded to Textron.