*187 OPINION
By the Court,
These are consolidated original proceedings for writs of habeas corpus. Each рetitioner is a President of a State Bank, and each challenges the legality of his arrest аnd restraint for the failure of his bank to pay a Reno City business license fee. In each instance the challenge rests mainly upon the ground that the ordinance as written is unconstitutional as aрplied to banks since its language is so vague and indefinite as to violate due process.
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Hаbeas is an appropriate remedy to resolve this question. NRS 34.500(4) [authorizing discharge from restrаint when the process, though proper in form, has be.en issued in a case not allowed by law]; In re Philipie,
The relevant facts are undisputed. Sullivan is the President of the Valley Bank of Nevada, and Laiolo is Presidеnt of the Pioneer Citizens Bank of Nevada. Each bank was organized under the laws of Nevada, has its principal place of business in the City of Reno, and each is a “state member bank” under thе Federal Reserve Act subject to control of Federal law and the rules and regulations оf the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. As a member of the Federal Resеrve System, each bank also does business under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporаtion Act.
The business license section of the Reno Municipal Code, 4.01.360, regarding banks, reads: “Every person engaged in the banking business, except banks doing business under the laws of the United States, shall pay for and obtain a license to carry on such business according to the following schedule: (1) Those having a capitalization of less than $500,000.00 *188 shall pay for such license the sum of $240.00 per year; (2) Those having a capitalization of $500,000.00 or over, and not exceeding $1,000,000.00, shall pay for such license the sum of $360.00 per year; (3) Those whose capitalization exceeds $1,000,000.00 shall pay fоr such license the sum of $480.00 per year.”
It is, of course, unlawful to carry on any business (unless exempt) without a license. Reno, Nev. Municipal Code 4.01.020. The violator is subject to a fine of not less than $1 nor more than $500, to imprisonment of not more than 6 months, or to both fine and imprisonment. Each day’s violаtion is a separate offense. Reno, Nev. Municipal Code 1.12.010. Since the ordinance carries serious sanctions for disobedience, its terms must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct will render them liable to its penalties. Connally v. General Construction Co.,
The petitioners each contend that the ordinance as applied to banks is constitutionally infirm for uncertainty. They press the notion thаt one reading the phrase “except banks doing business under the laws of the United States,” cannot ascertain whether those words embrace only national banks chartered under federal law, or whether they also include state banks which have elected to become members of the Federal Reserve System and, to that extent, are doing business under the laws of the United Statеs. Furthermore, they point out that the standard for determining the amount of the license fee to be paid is vague and uncertain, since the ordinance does not define “capitalizatiоn.”
We are unable to refute the validity of the petitioners’ arguments by resort to any established rules of construction. It seems to us that the words of exception are susceptible to eithеr of the two interpretations suggested. The same difficulty inheres in the term “capitalization.” Doеs it mean “authorized
*189
capitalization,” (cf. NRS 659.070(2)), or the “declared and nominal capital, surрlus and undivided profits,” cf. David v. Guaranty Bank and Trust Co.,
The words of Connally v. General Construction Co., supra, аt 391 are apropos: “And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vаgue that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its apрlication, violates the first essential of due process of law.” 2 In our judgment 4.01.360 of the Reno Municiрal Code is unconstitutionally vague. 3 Therefore, each petition for habeas corpus is granted.
Notes
Other points were pressed but need not be considered.
See “Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,” 109 U.Pa.L.Rеv. 67 (1960); and, “Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes,” 62 Harv.L.Rev. 77 (1948).
It is apparent that the intended scope of the exception, as well as the meaning of the term “capitalization,” may each easily he clarified by appropriate amendment.