60 Pa. Commw. 492 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1981
■ Opinion by
This appeal by ten Pennsylvania dentists, the Pennsylvania Dental Association (DPA), and two of its employees is rooted in an Insurance Commission order dismissing their complaint against the Pennsylvania Dental Service Corporation, a/k/a Delta Dental Association of Pennsylvania (Delta). It held that they lacked standing to litigate alleged violations of the Professional Health Services Plan Corporations Act (PHSPCA) and the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA).
Delta operates a certified non-profit dental service plan designed to provide dental care to low-income persons or their dependents without sacrificing the necessities of life. 40 Pa. C. S. §6303. The licensed practicing dentists have no contractual relationship with Delta as qualified dental care providers. Bather, they are classified as “non-participating” dentists who perform dental services for patients holding Delta dental coverage but do not receive payment from Delta for their services. Instead, payment is made directly by Delta to the patients who in turn must pay their non-participating dentists. On the other hand, “participating” dentists have a contractual arrangement with Delta through which they receive direct payment.
On December 19,1978, a group of these non-participating dentists filed a complaint with the Department claiming that the 12% payment differential was prohibited, by statute. On February 20, 1979, Delta responded with an answer and a motion to dismiss, raising lack of standing and failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
■ Following negotiations between Delta and the Department, a consent order was entered on May 11, 1979, whereby the 100% payment plan was approved and the 88% “two-tier” plan was withdrawn from Department consideration. However, the Department did permit existing service contracts to remain in effect for one year or their anniversary date, whichever came sooner, and imposed a $500 civil penalty.
On August 27, 1979, Pennsylvania Dental Association and two of its employees petitioned to intervene.
Petitioner-dentists argue that tbeir standing to litigate at tbe Insurance Department
Tbe dentists do not bave a right to pursue a complaint at tbe Insurance Department. Tbe clear word
The basic principles of standing require an “adversely affected” or “aggrieved” party to have an interest in the subject matter or particular question litigated which is substantial, immediate, and direct. Strasburg Associates v. Newlin Township, 52 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 514, 415 A.2d 1014 (1980). Although the interest must be “substantial” in its individual adverse effect and “immediate” in terms of the nature and proximity of the action, the harm caused by the aggrieved person must be “direct.” See William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975). In this controversy, standing only can be based upon the alleged PHSPCA and UIPA violations. Although this jurisdiction rests with the Department, each of the provisions seeks to protect the subscriber-patient, except for PHSPCA Section 6324(b), 40 Pa. C. S. §6324(b), which prohibits restrictions on doctors’ diagnosis or treatment and interference with the subscriber’s choice or selection of a doctor after the choice or selection is made. Clearly, the proposed two-tier payment system neither restricts nor interferes with petitioners’ practice or the subscribers’ interests. In Pennsylvania Dental Association v. Insurance Department, 41 Pa. Common
The Pennsylvania Dental Association and two of its employees claim possession of the requisite standing as “consumers” and “customers” of Delta,
Although PDA contracted with Delta for dental services for its employees and can raise certain issues
Turning to the individual employee’s standing as Executive Director and lobbyist for PDA, the Petition ■ to Intervene fails to plead or fairly infer diagnosis or treatment by non-participating dentists during the time the “two-tier” system was in effect. Since no facts were pleaded to support an injury suffered under the dental service contract, we must conclude that standing was lacking and therefore the petition to intervene was properly denied.
Accordingly, we affirm the Insurance Commissioner’s decision granting the Motion to Dismiss and denying the Petition to Intervene.
The Insurance Commissioner’s adjudication and order, dated May 6,1980, is affirmed.
The Professional Health Services Plan Corporations Act (PHSPCA), Act of November 15, 1972, P.L. 1063, as amended, 40 Pa. C. S. §6301, seeks to insure adequate professional health services for low-income persons while the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA), Act of July 22, 1974, P.L. 589, as amended, 40 P.S. §1171.1, attempts to regulate unfair and deceptive trade practices in the insurance business.
PHSPCA Section 6329, requires Department approval before rates, forms and methods of payment to health service doctors can become effective. 40 Pa. C. S. §6329(a).
They allege jurisdiction through the Department’s administration of (1) PHSPOA, including interference with subscriber payments, 40 Pa. C. S. §6325, the dentists’ method of diagnosis and treatment' and the subscribers’ selection of a dentist, 40 Pa. C. S. §6324, and failure to secure Department approval prior to placing the two-tier reimbursement system into effect, and (2) UIPA, including unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class, 40 P.S. §1171.5(a) (7) (ii).
Section 35.9 of the General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure provides that:
Any person complaining of anything done or omitted to be done by any person subject to the jurisdiction of an agency, in violation of a statute or regulation administered or issued by the agency may file a complaint with the agency. ...If, in the judgment of the agency, a violation of a statute or regulation administered or issued by the agency has been alleged and has not been satisfied adequately, the agency will either invite the parties to an informal conference, set the matter for a formal hearing, or take any other action which in the judgment of the agency is appropriate. In the event that a hearing is held the complainant automatically shall be a party thereto and need not file a petition for leave to intervene. (Emphasis added.)
1 Pa. Code 35.9.
In so holding, we make no determination of whether substantive PHSPCA or UIPA violations have occurred, but merely rule on the standing of the parties.
Section 35.28 of the General Kules of Administrative Practice and Procedure provides that:
A petition to intervene may be filed by any person claiming a right to intervene or an interest of such nature that intervention is necessary or appropriate to the administration of the statute under which the proceeding is brought.
Such right or interest may be:
[2] An interest which may be directly affected and which is not adequately represented by existing parties, and as to which petitioners may be bound by the action of the agency in the proceeding. The following may have such an interest: consumers, customers, or other patrons served by the applicant or respondent ....
[3] Any other interest of such nature that the participation of the petitioner may be in the public interest. (Emphasis added.)
1 Pa. Code §35.28.
The Insurance Commissioner alternatively concluded that issues raised in response to allegations of substantive PHSPCA and UIPA violations were moot. Since disposition of this matter has been made on the standing issues, we need not determine whether the May 11, 1979 consent agreement and order eliminating the “two-tier” plan from Department consideration and from operation within one year renders the entire matter moot.