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Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.
757 F.3d 1286
Fed. Cir.
2014
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 1286 States, by jury. that must found v. United “element”

active); Simpson also see Cir.2013) (conclud- (7th 1 875, Alleyne, (citing 133 S.Ct. at 2160 n. See 721 F.3d 876 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 118 retroactive because Alleyne is not ing (1998)). retroactive). 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 So Finally, ev- S.Ct. not Apprendi is Jeanty’s forecloses circuits to consider Almendarez-Torres ery one of our sister Greer, v. con- claim. See United States decision has published the issue in a (11th Cir.2006). 1267, 1273-76 retroactively is not Alleyne cluded that review. Unit- on collateral See applicable AFFIRMED. Winkelman, 746 F.3d ed States v.

(3d Cir.2014); Kemper, In re (5th Cir.2013); Simpson, 721 F.3d at Jeanty conclude that therefore

876. We requirement. third Bryant’s

has not met satisfy

Jeanty also fails

Bryant’s requirement, fourth which is that Alleyne would application

a retroactive current sentence exceeds

mean that his statutory maximum Con authorized Bryant,

gress for his crime. See years

at 1274. He was sentenced to ten (12 months) in prison, but U.S.C. Software, APPLE and Next Inc. INC. 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) provides § the maxi (formerly Computer, known as Next Jeanty, con mum sentence who was Inc.), Plaintiffs-Appellants, conspiring possess intent victed with cocaine, grams at least 500 v. distribute forty. forty years. Ten is less than (now MOTOROLA, INC. known Mo- Alleyne retroactively, if applied Thus even Inc.) Solutions, torola and Motorola current not Jeanty’s sentence would ex Mobility, Inc., Ap- Defendants-Cross statutory ceed the maximum authorized pellants. 841(b)(1)(B). § Congress in 2012-1548, 2012-1549. Nos.

Finally, Jeanty assuming even Appeals, United States Court of satisfy Bryant’s require could all five of Federal Circuit. ments, petition his is without merit. He that he could not the man argues receive April datory jury minimum unless the —not judge qual that his 1997 conviction —found prior felony

ified as “a conviction for a

drug offense” under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B). Alleyne

§ But Court holding pains point

took out that its did ruling in Almenda upset previous States, held

rez-Torres v. United which prior

that the fact of a conviction is not an *6 Rosenkranz, Orrick, Herring-

E. Joshua LLP, York, ton & Sutcliffe of New New York, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. himWith on the brief were Mark S. Da- vies, M. T. Rachel McKenzie and Vann Pearce, DC; Washington, Jr. of and Mat- Powers, thew D. Tensegrity Group Law LLP, Shores, of Redwood counsel CA. Of Orrick, Kopp, Herring- was Katherine M. LLP, Washington, ton & Sutcliffe DC. *7 Nelson, Quinn Urqu- David A. Emanuel Sullivan, LLP, argued hart & for defen- appellants. him dants-cross With on Swedlow; Stephen brief were A. Brian C. Cannon, Shores, CA; of Redwood Kath- Defranco, leen M. Sullivan and Edward J. York, York; of New New and Charles K. Verhoeven, Francisco, of coun- San CA. Of Raymond sel were N. Nimrod and David Elihu, York, NY; of New and Amanda Williamson, Chicago, Scott of IL. Davidow, Cuneo, LaDuca, Joel Gilbert & LLP, DC, Washington, of for amicus euri- Hunger The American Antitrust Institute. Thomas G. ae and Matthew D. Cyn- McGill, Gibson, was LLP, him on the brief Robert J. Dunn With & Crutcher of kar. Washington, DC. Shifley, Witcoff, Banner & Taffet,

Charles W. Richard Bingham McCutchen S.. Ltd., IL, Chicago, of for amicus curiae The LLP, York, NY, of New for amicus curiae Property Intellectual Law Association of Qualcomm Incorporated. With him on the Chicago. Boston, Strawbridge, brief were Patrick of Salmons, MA and David B. Washington, of McComas, Boone, Haynes Debra J. DC. LLP, Dallas, TX, for amici of curiae Altera Corporation, et al. With her on the brief Matsui, Brian R. Morrison & Foerster was David L. McCombs. Of counsel on LLP, DC, of Washington, for amicus curi- Beckwith, Sys- the brief were Marta Cisco Cotter, ae Law Professors Thomas F. et tems, Inc., Jose, CA; of San Elizabeth al. him on With the brief was Natalie R. Launer, Inc., Newark, CA; Logitech of Ram. Lutton, Jr., Labs, and Richard Nest J. Jr., Robbins, Roy Englert, Russell, T. Inc., Alto, of Palo CA. Orseck, Englert, Untereiner & Sauber Brunell, Richard M. Senior Advisor for LLP, DC, Washington, of for amicus curi- matters, competition United States Feder- ae, BSA The Software Alliance. Commission, DC, al Washington, Trade Flinn, LLP, Patrick for amicus curiae United States Federal J. Alston and Bird Atlanta, GA, Trade him Commission. With on the brief for amici curiae Nokia Shonka, Acting were David C. General Corporation, et al. With him on the brief Counsel, Cohen, Deputy William General Broyles. was Keith E. Counsel, Adkinson, Jr., F. William Attor- LLP, Brian Riopelle, C. McGuire Woods

ney Rosenchold, and Suzanne Munck af Richmond, VA, curiae Re- amicus Property. Chief Counsel for Intellectual search in Motion him Limited. With on Lancaster, Dorsey Whitney Peter M. & Tyler the brief were Robert M. and Kris- LLP, MN, Minneapolis, for amicus curi- Calleja. ten M. ae The Institute of Electrical and Elec- Trela, Jr., L. Sidley Constantine Austin Engineers, Incorporated.

tronics With LLP, IL, Chicago, for amicus curiae Lindsay, him on the brief were Michael A. Corporation. Microsoft him on the With MN, Lach, of Minneapolis, and Eileen M. brief were Richard A. Cederoth and Na- Compliance General Counsel and Chief Of- thaniel C. Love. Of counsel on the brief IEEE, York, ficer of New NY. were T. Andrew Culbert David E. Clement, PLLC, Paul D. Brancroft of Killough, Corporation, Microsoft of Red- DC, Washington, for amici curiae Verizon mond, WV. Inc., Communications et al. With him on *8 Zachary

the brief D. was Hudson. RADER, Judge, Before Chief PROST REYNA, Judges. and Circuit M. Chappell, Tina Director of Intellectu- Property Policy, al Intel Corporation, of

Chandler, AZ, Opinion by for amicus for the court filed Circuit curiae Intel Cor- poration. Judge her on REYNA. With the brief were construction, admissibility, claim by in filed Chief court’s dissenting part

Opinion injunction decisions. As de- damages, and Judge RADER. below, affirm the district court’s tailed we part in and concurring Opinion decisions, the ex- claim construction with Judge filed Circuit dissenting part '949 Apple’s of its construction of ception PROST. exception, a minor the dis- patent. With the dam- decision to exclude trict court’s

REYNA, Judge. Circuit Apple both ages presented evidence also re- and is reversed. We Motorola Software, Inc. Next and Plaintiffs summary grant court’s verse the district complaint against (“Apple”) Inc. filed infringement judgment damages of no for Motorola, Motorola Inc. and Defendants Based our rever- Apple’s patents. (“Motorola”) on October Mobility, Inc. claim of the district court’s construction sal States District Court 2010 in the United the court’s patent, of the '949 we vacate Wisconsin, District of as- for the Western summary judgment regarding Ap- grant of infringement patents. of three serting request injunction. for an The ple’s counterclaimed, asserting six of Motorola Motorola is not enti- court’s decision that its com- patents. Apple own amended injunction infringement tled to an pat- an additional twelve plaint to include patent is af- the FRAND-committed '898 declaratory sought also parties ents. Both these, address and all related firmed. We non-infringement and inval- judgments of issues, in turn. idity. began claim construction Wis- After Claim Construction consin, to the the case was transferred claim parties The raise construction District Court United States '263, '949, regarding Apple’s and issues Illinois, Judge District of Posner Northern Motorola’s '559 and '712 patents '647 and sitting by designation. The district court question construction is a patents. Claim completed claim construction. Illinois Cybor of law that we review de novo. upon its claim construction deci- Based Techs., Inc., Corp. v. FAS sions, granted summary judg- the court (Fed.Cir.1998) (en banc). 1454-55 non-infringement respect with ment of ma- claims and excluded the vast certain Apple’s patent '949 jority parties’ damages expert of both evi- lit- remaining dence for the claims. With 1, 2, court construed claims The district admissible, tle deemed expert evidence and, of the '949 based and 10 summary judgment that nei- granted court construction, granted Motorola’s upon its any damages ther side entitled to was of nonin- summary judgment motion for being injunction. Despite infringement majority for the of the accused fringement assumed, court dismissed all the district the district court mis- products. Because trial. prejudice claims with before certain limitations as takenly construed limitations, we re- means-plus-function appeal: Only patents six are at issue on claim and vacate the verse its construction 7,479,949; 6,343,- Apple’s U.S. Patent Nos. subsequent summary judgment decision. 263; 5,946,647; Motorola’s U.S. and 6,175,559; 6,359,898; the use of Patent The '949 discloses Nos. a touchscreen 5,319,712. finger contacts to control parties contest the district *9 1, 2, 9, computer. correspond Claims and 10 of the to a command to transition below, patent are recited with '949 the from displaying respective item in a emphasized. limitations at issue Claim 1 set of displaying items to a next item recites: the set of items. device,

A computing comprising: touch '949 at col. 1. 37-col. 123 1. display; processors; screen one or more added). (emphases Claim 2 recites: memory; programs, and one or more 1, The computing device of claim where- wherein the one or more programs are in the one or more heuristics include a memory stored in the configured and to heuristic for determining that the one or pro- be executed the one or more finger more contacts correspond to a cessors, programs the one or more in- command to translate content within a cluding: frame rather than translating an entire page that the includes frame. for detecting instructions one or more finger contacts with the touch screen added). Id. at col. (emphasis Ins 3-7 display; Claim 10 recites: applying instructions for one or more device of computing claim where- to finger heuristics the one or more in the first set of comprises heuristics contacts to determine a command for heuristic for determining that the one or device; the and finger more first correspond contacts a one-dimensional horizontal screen processing instructions the com- scrolling command mand; rather than the two- dimensional screen translation command wherein the one or more heuristics com- on angle based of initial movement prise: finger contact respect with to the Scrolling a vertical screen heuristic for touch display. screen determining finger that the one or more Id. at col. 11.1-7. The district court contacts correspond to a one-dimension- first found that the claim term “heuristic” al vertical screen scrolling command indefinite, was not instead construing it as rather than a two-dimensional screen “one or more rules to applied to data to translation angle command based on an in drawing assist from that inferences finger initial movement contact Next, data.” the court found that respect display; with to the touch screen 1, 2, 9, “heuristic” limitations in claims a two-dimensional screen translation 10 described describing functions “without determining heuristic for that the one or necessary perform the structure more finger contacts correspond Accordingly, functions.” the court con- two-dimensional screen com- translation cluded that claim these limitations were mand rather than the one-dimensional means-plus-function limitations under 35 scrolling vertical screen command based ¶ 112, § despite reciting U.S.C. angle on the initial movement word “means.” The court next found finger respect contact with touch specification contained sufficient “cor- display; screen responding capable structure” perform- ing a next item heuristic for determining claimed functions. 35 U.S.C. so, § the one or finger doing more contacts 112. In court limited the *10 1296 ¶ 112, § 6. The overall means- 35 in claim 1 to “a heu- U.S.C.

“next item heuristic” analysis two-step pro- is a finger input plus-function a user’s uses as one ristic that analytical some Naturally, touch there is the device’s cess. right side tap on the construction, steps. In the overlap between these two screen.” Based summary judgment of if the claim step, first we must determine Motorola moved for means-plus-function court concluded in noninfringement. The limitation is drafted that use a must only products step, accused of this we part that the format. As manner are those that if it tap” in this claim limitation to decide “finger construe the specific program: awith pre-loaded “sufficiently come definite structure” connotes The court application. art, Kindle the Amazon in the which ordinary skill person summary motion for granted Motorola’s specification requires us to consider for the re- non-infringement evidence). judgment of In the second (among other maining products. accused means-plus- in step, if the limitation is format, specifically re- function we must again argues appeal, On Motorola “corresponding for specification view the alternative, In the is indefinite. “heuristic” Thus, while these two “struc- structure.” cor- argues that the district court Motorola related, inherently they inquiries ture” are that the heuristic limita- rectly concluded are distinct. means-plus-function in tions were drafted correctly limited the “next item format and concerned that we The Dissent is tap ges- finger limitation to the heuristic” correspond for impermissibly have looked that the claims do Apple points ture. out ing specification structure in the before and that this not use the word “means” in means-plus- that the claim is deciding strong presumption against con- creates creating a new thereby function format struing means-plus-func- the limitations as “every means-plus-func that renders rule limitations. Apple argues tion claim term indefinite.” J. Prost Dis tion sufficiently limitations connote heuristic in (emphasis original) at 1335-36 sent such that Motorola has definite structure (“Dissent”). analysis. This is not our strong presumption. not overcome this correctly step that the first *11 Linear, that a claim lack- that presumption butted the function.” 379 F.3d at 1319 Inc., ing sufficiently (quoting Sys. the term ‘means’ recites Watts v. XL 232 F.3d World, structure.”); 877, (Fed.Cir.2000)); Inventio, Lighting 382 880 definite see also (examining the written repeatedly F.3d 1360-64 649 F.3d at 1356. have We evidence); description and external Flo characterized this presumption “strong” as Solutions, Kappos, readily and, such, Healthcare LLC v. 697 and “not overcome” as (Fed.Cir.2012) 1367, (examining 1374 F.3d have “seldom” held that a limitation with- remaining language, descrip- claim written out recitation of means-plus- “means” is a tion, evidence); World, and Tech. Lighting external Linear function limitation. 382 1358, 1362; Inventio, Corp. Impala Corp., v. Linear 379 F.3d F.3d at 649 F.3d at (Fed.Cir.2004) 1311, 1356; Healthcare, (examining 1320 re- see also Flo 697 F.3d at (“When language claim maining and external evi- 1374 the claim drafter has not ¶ dence). 112, inquiries signaled § Because these are dis- his intent to invoke 6 tinct, ‘means,’ possible using it is to find that a claim the term unwilling we are sufficiently apply provision limitation does not connote def- that showing without a despite presence inite structure that the essentially limitation is devoid of in corresponding speci- anything some structure that can be construed as struc- See, ture.”). e.g., fication. Massachusetts Inst. of 1344, Software,

Tech. v. Abacus 462 F.3d (Fed.Cir.2006) (“MIT’); 1355 Welker The Dissent that suggests choosing PHD, Inc., 1090, Bearing v. 550 Co. F.3d to include “means” in a claim limitation is (Fed.Cir.2008). such, 1096-97 As not “ev a “minor drafting decision” that corre ery” mean-plus-function limitation is indef spondingly weight merits little in a Section ¶ precedent; only 112, inite under our those that analysis. 6 Dissent at 1337. We means, lack the term do not connote suffi disagree. strong presumption created ciently structure, definite and lack corre by not in including means a claim limita sponding structure. We do not state or provides clarity tion predictability and apply a different rule in this case. In this public patentee helps and the alike. It case, as we find that the claims connote the public determine when claim elements sufficiently person definite structure to a are expressly limited to structures dis art, (or in ordinary skill we do not reach specification equiva closed their lents) step means-plus-function the second of the provides patentee with the analysis. reliably invoking tools for or avoiding

means-plus-function claiming. sig It also recognized, As the district court patentee nals the court has avail, avoid, when a claim limitation lacks the term chosen to the benefits of ¶ “means,” 112, presump recognize creates a rebuttable Section 6. We ¶ tion apply. that Section 6 does not choice to draft a claim in “broad structural World, 1358; e.g., Lighting in means-plus-func 382 F.3d at terms” rather than Fitness, Corp., CCS Inc. v. Brunswick 288 tion format render the claim more (Fed.Cir.2002). pre invalidity This vulnerable to an attack. Id. sumption may if be overcome the claim Whether to draft a claim broad structur choice, “sufficiently fails to recite struc al claim drafter’s definite terms is the merely any resulting ture” or from that recites “function without risk emanates Techs., Dell, Inc., Inc. v. for the court to re- Touch not a basis choice is (Fed.Cir.2011). re for- But see In means-plus-function claim in write a claim By focusing Processing on the Patent mat. See id. Katz Interactive Call chose, (Fed.Cir.2011) presumption patentee Litig., terms claim primacy general pur- also reaffirms of a (finding that disclosure construction, as out- during claim language corresponding pose computer is sufficient Corp. 415 F.3d Phillips claims). v. AWH lined means-plus-function structure (Fed.Cir.2005). Here, in all as- *12 construction, name of claim “the pects of cases, claims recit In all these the Co., the claim.” In re Hiniker game is “means,” thereby expressly term ed the (Fed.Cir.1998) 1362, (quot- F.3d 1369 150 invoking means-plus-function claiming. Rich, Extent Pro- ing Giles Sutherland addition, of in did not parties these cases Interpretation Claims- tection and of dispute appeal on that these claims were In- 21 Int’l Rev. Perspectives, American in format. means-plus-function drafted (1990)). 497, L. 499 Prop. Copyright dus. & Hence, in where a claim is not drafted format, reasoning means-plus-function case, In this Motorola bears the burden in line of cases does not the Aristocrat overcoming presumption that Sec- automatically apply, algorithm and an is ¶ 112, apply by prepon- 6 tion does necessarily required. The therefore not Apex See Inc. v. derance of evidence. inquiry, correct when “means” is absent Inc., 1364, 325 F.3d Computer, Raritan limitation, limitation, from a is whether (Fed.Cir.2003). The court 1372 district light remaining in claim lan read that led it findings made several erroneous history, guage, specification, prosecution incorrectly re- conclude Motorola evidence, and relevant extrinsic has suffi strong The dis- presumption. butted this ciently person definite structure to a precedent by trict our misapplied court Here, ordinary skill in the art. the answer requiring the claim limitations of the '949 yes. is step-by- themselves to disclose “a step algorithm required by Aristocrat person to a of ordi “Structure” Technologies.” and related Aristocrat in nary computer-imple skill the art of that, invoked patentee cases hold has if may differ from more mented inventions computer-implemented means-plus-func- traditional, mechanical structure. For ex claiming, structure corresponding tion “physical ample, looking for traditional specification computer in the for the im- computer structure” in a software claim is an plemented algorithm function must be does not contain fruitless because software general computer is suffi- purpose unless Indeed, typical physical structures. performing cient for the function. Aristo- physical implements structure that soft Pty Techs. Ltd. v. Int’l Game crat Austl. ware, cannot be relied computer, (Fed.Cir.2008) Tech., 1333 sufficiently definite structure for a provide (requiring algorithm disclosure of an when Rather, lacking claim “means.” software disputed it is not that claims were drafted art, in the the “structure” of to one skill format); means-plus-function WMS computer through, is understood Tech., software Gaming, Inc. 184 v. Int’l Game (Fed.Cir.1999) algorithm, an outline of an (same); example, F.3d 1349 flowchart, ePlus, Inc., specific or a set of instructions Software, Inc. v. Lawson Touch, (Fed.Cir.2012); e.g., Typhoon Typhoon or rules. (“[T]he eration, only F.3d at 1385 need dis- input, output, such as its or con- structure for a person close sufficient operation nections. The limitation’s provide operative in the field to skill function; just more than its it is how the program specified software for the func- function is achieved the context of the tion.”); Corp. v. Grp., Finisar DirecTV Linear, invention. For example, in we Inc., (Fed.Cir.2008).1 found that the claim term “circuit” has a Requiring physical traditional' structure in known structural definition and that lacking software limitations the term patent described the operation, circuit’s means would result all of these limita- including input, objective. output, and tions being means-plus-func- construed as Similarly, 379 F.3d at 1320-21. in Light- tion and subsequently being limitations World, ing we found that “connector” had found indefinite. a known structural definition and that the specification operational described its re-

A limitation has sufficient struc quirements, including which claim ele- ture when it recites a claim term awith ments it was connected to and they structural how provided definition that is either *13 were in the connected. 382 F.3d at In specification generally or known in 1361-63. See, Healthcare, cases, e.g., the art. both Flo 697 we found the presumption ¶ (“We § F.3d at 1374 will apply against not 6 means-plus-function claiming was if the limitation contains a term that ‘is unrebutted. in parlance by persons

used common of skill in the art pertinent designate Even if a patentee elects to use a ”) World, (quoting Lighting structure.’ 382 term, “generic” claim such as “a nonce 1359); Media, at F.3d Personalized 161 construct,” word or a verbal properly con Media, at In F.3d 704-05. Personalized (in struing that term specifica view of the “detector,” we found that the claim term etc.) tion, prosecution history, may still itself, connoted sufficient structure to a provide sufficient structure such that the person ordinary of skill in the art. 161 presumption against means-plus-function F.3d at 704-05 (agreeing with ALJ that 1360; claiming remains intact. at Id. see “ meaning ‘detector’ had a well-known Inventio, also 649 at F.3d 1356-57 those of skill in the electrical arts connota (“Claims interpreted are in light of the structure”). There, tive of we contrasted them, description supporting written and the structural term gener “detector” with that is true whether or not the claim con non-structural, ic, “means,” terms such as interpreting struction involves a ‘means’ “element,” 705; and “device.” Id. at see MIT, (“The clause.”); 462 F.3d at 1354 Apex, (finding also 325 F.3d at 1373 ‘mechanism,’ ‘means,’ generic terms ‘ele “circuit,” coupled the term with identifiers ment,’ ‘device,’ typically and do not con “interface,” such as “programming,” and structure.”). sufficiently note definite For “logic,” connoted sufficient to a structure Inventio, example, in the claim included art). person ordinary skill in the generic the term 649 “device.” “at provid (reciting modernizing

Structure also be least one by describing ed the claim op- connecting limitation’s device and the at least one examples deciding 1. We cite these cases as of “struc- evant external evidence when aif person ordinarily ture'' to a skilled in the art claim limitation connotes structure. See Dis- herein, computer software. We do not cite these sent at fn. 2. As discussed there is principle ample support proposition cases for the that we must review for that elsewhere. Inventio, specification, prosecution history, e.g., and rel- F.3d at 1356-57. remaining language, specification, to said floor terminals claim modernizing device unit.”) computing one prosecution history, and said at least external and relevant added). However, specifica- (emphasis provide evidence de- no further structural in- modernizing tion device’s described scription to a in person ordinary skill components, and how put, output, internal art, against then the presumption were components the internal intercon- means-plus-function claiming is rebutted. such, pre- at 1358-59. As nected. Id. MIT, example, the claims recited a means-plus-function sumption against “colorant selection mechanism.” 462 F.3d not overcome. See also Flo treatment was noted, at 1353. As “mechanism” itself Healthcare, (noting F.3d at 1374-75 structure, does connote sufficient term, generic is a but that “mechanism” the term “colorant selection” was not de- looking remaining language then claim specification fined or otherwise description finding and written before person ordinary known to a skill limitation the full claim connoted struc- Further, paten- art. Id. at 1353-55. ture). that, if a These cases teach limita- tee used the terms “mechanism” tion a term with a known recites structural interchangeably specifica- “means” meaning, or ge- recites either a known or 1354; tion. Id. at see also Mas-Hamilton description neric term with sufficient Inc., Grp. v. 1214- LaGard operation, presumption against (Fed.Cir.1998) (claim recited “element” means-plus-function in- claiming remains patent provided and “member” and no fur- tact. ther structural description generic of these terms); Bearing, Welker 550 F.3d at 1096- The limitation need not con *14 (claim 97 recited a “mechanism” without rather, structure; a single, specific note further specifica- structure described in See, may describe a class of structures. tion). Thus, generic if a claim a recites e.g., Personalized Media Communica that, properly light term construed in tions, Comm’n, LLC v. Int’l Trade 161 specification, sufficiently the lacks definite (Fed.Cir.1998) (“Even 705 person ordinary structure to a in skill though specifi the term ‘detector’ does not art, the presumption the is overcome and structure, cally particular evoke a it does patentee means-plus-func- the has invoked convey knowledgeable to one in art a the claiming. tion variety of structures known as ‘detec ”); Healthcare, tors.’ Flo 697 F.3d at mind, precedent this in With we (finding “height

1374-75 that claim term turn to the claim in adjustment limitations at issue the designates mechanism” “a patent. '949 generally class of structures that are un We find that “heuristic” has art”). in persons derstood of skill the meaning known and the '949 also Indeed, if the patent even describes all operation, describes the limitation’s includ perform structures that the recited func ing its input, output, output and how its tion, this, itself, does not overcome the may be Accordingly, achieved. the heuris strong presumption means-plus-func that tic claim limitations recited above have claiming apply tion does not when the structure,” “sufficiently a per definite term “means” is not recited in the claim. art, ordinary son of in per skill the World, Lighting 382 F.3d at 1361-62. forming the recited functions. contrast,

By Broadly if speaking, the claim mere the function the ly a generic recites nonce word and the recited identify limitations is to com- invention, particular finger including con- context of the in- upon mand based the function, puts, outputs, tacts. To achieve this and how outputs certain are Depending upon “heuristics.” describes achieved. circumstances, is not neces- heuristic cases, In all input finger claimed is a sarily generic, structureless “nonce word contact. The specification explains that any construct” without mean- or verbal finger may taps, contacts be swipes, “mechanism,” “means,” “ele- ing, such as taps, finger double or rolling, may and ment,” “widget.” or The district court involve one or fingers contacting two correctly person of ordi- determined angles. screen different initial e.g., nary in the art would understand skill 30-46; '949 Patent at col. 11. col. “heuristic” to mean “one or more rules to 21-24; 66,11. col. 47-51. The claims recite drawing to data to assist applied varying objectives, heuristics with includ- sense, inferences from that data.” ing vertical scrolling, screen two-dimen- “heuristic” is similar words that define a translation, sional screen moving to the structures, “connector,” class of such as list, translating next item in a content “detector,” “circuit,” and and it does not explain a frame. The also claims within performing all means for the recit- include the invention differentiates between Healthcare, See, e.g., ed function. Flo scrolling vertical and two-dimensional ¶ (“We § apply F.3d at 1374 will not angle translation based of initial if limitation contains a term that ‘is finger movement of the contact. parlance persons used common pertinent designate

skill art description provides further written ”) World, Lighting (quoting structure’ regarding details the heuristics’ inputs Media, 1359); F.3d at Personalized 161 outputs. Regarding one-dimensional verti- F.3d at 704-05. The fact that heuristic is scrolling, specification cal screen ex- partly in terms of does defined its function “in plains response upward to an not detract “from the definiteness of [the] gesture by the user that swipe may structure” it connote. Personalized 27°) within a angle (e.g., predetermined Media, Indeed, 161 F.3d at 703-05. vertical, perfectly being page web *15 “many their names from the devices take one-dimensionally upward scroll in the ver- they perform.” Greenberg functions v. 64, tical direction.” '949 Patent at col. 11. Inc., 1580, Endo-Surgery, Ethicon Regarding 21-25. trans- two-dimensional (Fed.Cir.1996); MIT, 462 see also lation, specification the discloses that “in 1354; World, Lighting F.3d at response upward swipe gesture to an 1359-60. (FIG.39C) by the user that is not within a 27°) predetermined angle (e.g., being

We need not decide here whether the vertical, may perfectly page the web scroll “heuristic,” itself, term connotes suffi- two-dimensionally along the direction of presump- cient structure to maintain the swipe.” at col. 11. The the Id. 30-34. against means-plus-function claiming tion specification defines two-dimensional because, case, in this the claims do not movement as “simultaneous movement in nakedly recite heuristics without further both the vertical and horizontal di- lan- description remaining claim specification explains rections.” Id. The guage specification. contrary, and To the in a how a user can move to the next item language specification the claim dis- right operation finger tap gesture close the heuristics’ within the list via a on screen, M-finger gesture.” ment of the translation right-to-left finger side of the image Alternatively, icon. at col. 11.34-35. a next Id. swipe, by tapping may 30, 11. direction of translation be determined at col. 42-67. Id. angle movement of the M- specification The also discusses finger gesture, according particular to a translating “content with- structure behind rule, specific, identifying i.e. a heuristic. translating in a frame rather than 75,11. at col. Id. 39-44. page that includes the frame.” Id. entire performing figures patent provide For the '949 at col. 6-8. 12A, 39C, function, Figs. an “M- further structural details. specification describes 42A, 42B, 4214,” finger where M and 42C illustrate the finger gesture translation specification is a number different from the number of contacts described (3937), page. scrolling the entire result in vertical two-di- fingers used to translate (3939),turning mensional specification Id. at col. 11.18-26. The translation (1218, 1220, 1212), or explains also that the direction of transla- next item trans- (4214). lating tion be the direction of the “move- within a frame *16 sum, finger the claims at issue differ from movement of a on the screen. See simply a generic those recite means 1096-97; Bearing, at In Welker mechanism, description without further (“This ventio, is not a in the claim remaining language or nakedly case where a claim recites ‘de Instead, specification. language the claim description vice’ fails to and the written specification outline the that the rules place clear structural limitations on the follow, upon, example, heuristics based ”). Thus, ‘device.’ the '949 recites contact, initial angle finger meaning claim and also term with known contact, fingers making number of the di- operation, including input, describes its contact, finger rection of movement of a *17 may output, output and how its specific swiping gesture, taping a certain achieved. screen, angle location on the of the data; input receiving limita- an device for the heuristic claim Accordingly, “sufficiently definite struc- provide tions data; for the output presenting an device ture,” in ordinary of skill the person to a memory storing including a information function, art, the recited performing for including analyzer program routines strong the has not rebutted and Motorola detecting for structures in the server means-plus-function against presumption data, linking and for actions to the de- reverse the district court’s claiming. We structures; tected claim limi- that the “heuristic” construction means-plus-func- in tations were drafted enabling a user interface the selection of summary judg- vacate its tion format and action; a linked detected structure and non-infringement. ment of processor performing and an action for the selected action linked to the selected Patent

Apple’s '647 structure; processing coupled and a unit device, device, input output to the Regarding Apple’s patent, '647 memory controlling and the for the exe- meaning parties dispute program cution of the routines. “analyzer “linking claim terms server” and to the structures.” The actions detected patent (emphasis '647 at col. 11.9-24 “analyzer district court construed server” added). agreed The district court with from a client separate as “a server routine “analyzer that Motorola server” should be having that data structures from receives separate construed as “a server routine “linking the client” and actions to the de that having from client receives data “creating specified as tected structures” from Apple argues structures the client.” connection between each detected struc analyzer that “sep- server need not be computer ture and at least one subroutine Instead, Apple arate from a client.” ar- perform a se causes the CPU gues “analyzer server” should be quence operations on that detected routine(s) program construed as “a Apple argues structure.” that both con data, patterns receives uses detect disagree structions are erroneous. We data, structures and links actions to affirm with the district court’s the detected structures.” claim construction. agree We with the district court’s con- system The '647 discloses a “analyzer struction of server.” As the dis- (such structures recognizing certain as trict recognized, plain meaning court number) telephone on a touchscreen and “server,” when perspec- viewed from the (such calling then linking certain actions art, ordinary of a person tive skill number) telephone to the structure. relationship. entails a client-server Con- example, For a user be able to call or perspective, specifica- sistent with this phone save a number it has received via analyzer tion discloses an server that message simply by touching text or email separate application from the it serves. the number on the screen of its device. analyzer part “pro- server is patent, Claim 1 of the '647 with relevant gram present 165 of the invention.” '647 emphasized, claim limitations recites: 3,11. Fig. at col. 38-39. shows the computer-based system detecting program application A 165 and the 167 as memory ac- performing separate parts structures data and random-access (RAM): structures, comprising: tions on detected *18 Further, so.”);

Id. Pause Fig. specification over one that does not do Tech., TiVo, Inc., LLC v. program pres- states that “the 165 of the 419 F.3d (Fed.Cir.2005) (“In claims, in construing ent invention is stored RAM 170 and however, identify give causes 120 to structures we must each claim term the CPU due.”); Strattec Sec. presented by application respect data 167.” that it is Co., specifica- Corp. v. Auto. Specialty 3,11. Thus, Id. Gen. at col. 37-41. 126 F.3d (Fed.Cir.1997) analyzer (holding tion server and the describes it serves, separate legal which it was error for the application, district court jury instruct structures. the claim term properly “sheet” was not considered part sug- to evidence point does not Patents, Exxon Inc. claim); Chem. gesting ordinary meaning, nor different (Fed. Corp., v. Lubrizol do we discern such evidence in the record Cir.1995) (“We give meaning must to all Indeed, Apple’s pro- before this court. claims.”). By the words Exxon’s con- posed construction contradicts the claim trast, the district court’s construction com- language “analyzer because reads ser- ports ordinary with the meaning of “ser- claim ver” out the claim. The recites supported by ver” the specification. analyzer “routines server including Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s data, detecting structures and for “analyzer construction of server.” linking actions to the detected struc- Apple’s proposed agreed tures.” construction re- The district court also with Mo- routines that detect struc- program “linking cites torola that actions to the detected tures and links actions to the detected as “creat- structures” should construed structures, specified connection between each any ing without mention of “ana- structure and at least one com- lyzer Apple’s servers.” construction es- detected sentially puter takes the claim text and removes subroutine that causes the CPU server,” “analyzer operations on that leaving perform sequence the rest ba- Thus, sically unchanged. Apple’s Apple argues con- detected structure.” language struction conflicts with the claim the district court’s construction is errone- First, by ignoring the claim term “server.” ous for two reasons. the district USA, e.g., Merck & v. Teva Co. Pharms. incorrectly “specified court added the con- Inc., (Fed.Cir.2005) Second, nection” limitation. the claims re- (“A linking multiple claim actions to each gives meaning quire construction that structure, Ap- preferred to all the terms the claim is rather than “at least one.” *19 ple neering” computer contends that the correct construction that “stores a memory structures to com “associating specification explains detected address.” The pointers may that cause the to puter subroutines CPU be used link the associated perform operations on the to the sequence actions detected structures. '647 3, they patent to which are as at 11. particular (“upon structure col. 65-67 detection structure, analyzer sociated.” of a server links ac- tions with responsible pat- associated the Apple the district court. agree We with structure, tern the using detected con- require only that the claims “asso- argues 4, 5, pointers”); ventional col. 1. 1. 64—col. the ciating” between structure and the su- (“[U]pon identification of a structure in ignores that the claims re- broutines but text, parser the links the actions associated sense, “linking.” general cite From the grammar with the to the identified struc- plain meaning associating relates to a particularly, parser ture. More retrieves commonality, linking mere while infers a from grammar pointers file attached to the joining. Additionally, the specification grammar and attaches the same pointers here demonstrates that is more linking to the pointers identified structure. These just associating. than patent The consis- system direct the to the associated actions tently associating differentiates between Thus, contained associated actions file. linking implies and linking and is a structure, selection of the identified specific merely more connection than asso- user interface can locate the linked ac- ciating. example, specification For the ex- tions.”). plains that actions are “associated” with specific “grammars” “patterns,” or Although and the district court stated that that “linking” only occurs after specification these linking “makes clear that grammars patterns are “detected.” is accomplished through pointers,” it did not, e.g., '647 at col. 11. Apple argues, 59-61 as actually limit the (“upon detection Rather, structure based on a “pointers.” claims to the court particular pattern, actions interpreted associated with linking require “specified particular connection,” pattern are linked 825 to just a connection estab- structure”); the detected col. 38-39 pointers. lished with the use of speci- The (“wherein analyzer server links to a explains fication that linking may be ac- detected structure the complished actions associated through pointers the use of but 3,11. (“ana- grammar”); with the col. 65-67 require does not their use and neither did lyzer server 220 Thus, links actions associated the district court. the district responsible with the pattern to the detect- court’s construction comports with the structure, ed using conventional pointers”); specification, including repeated differ- (“analyzer col. 11.31-33 server 220 links linking entiation between associating grammars the actions with associated 410 and pointers embodiment described strings 420 to these identified struc- therein. tures”) added). (emphases Apple is also incorrect that the claims

Apple argues that requiring “specified require each structure to be linked with connection” limits the claims of multiple use actions. points to the “pointers” specifica- described plural claim’s recitation of the “actions.” (“an tion. The district court explained that a See '647 at col. 11. 17-18 pointer is “a term in computer engi- of art analyzer detecting server for structures data, linking plural to the “actions” reasonably and for actions added). structures”) (emphasis detected read action per least one structure. does not language of the claims plain fact, Fig. displays example require multiple actions for each structure only invention with one action linked to a linking multiple the claim recites because specific structure. *20 such, multiple actions to structures. As Fig. at 4. In patent Fig. '647 the “date construction reads “realtime” out of disagree the claim. We and affirm the grammar” only structure has one corre- district court’s construction. action, sponding “put electronic calen- directly Apple’s dar.” This contradicts limitation Claim with relevant em- link mul- proposal require the claims to phasized, recites: each tiple pat- actions to structure. '647 signal processing system providing A for Fig. Accordingly, ent at we affirm the services plurality realtime to and “linking district court’s construction ac- independent from a number of client tions to the detected structures.” devices, system applications and said

comprising: Apple’s '263 Patent subsystem comprising a host central (CPU) in ac- processing operating unit patent system The '263 discloses a application cordance with at least one processing for data in “realtime.” The program program, and a device handler ap parties dispute whether the “realtime subsystem comprising further said (API)” in claim plication program interface subsystem interoperating with adapter 1 must itself function in realtime or wheth device; said said host CPU and just process er must facilitate realtime signal processing subsystem a realtime ing by subsystems. other The district of data trans- performing plurality just court concluded that the API need plurality of realtime comprising forms processing facilitate realtime and con signal processing operations; “realtime API” an “API that strued interaction two or application pro- allows realtime between at one least realtime (API) subsystems.” argues gram coupled more Motorola between interface thereto, subsystem signal sponse and the realtime the API 48 which receives subsystem to allow the sub- processing supplies these commands the real-time en- said real- system interoperate gine appropriate parameters with with the time services. performing required the transforms format”). contrast, By the real-time en- (emphasis at col. 11.28-43 '263 gine performing is described as the actual added). that, gen- court noted The district processing, “text-to-speech such as conver- realtime, system erally, to be “must sat- processing.” sion” or “video '263 (bounded) isfy explicitly response-time (“a system having abst. data transmission consequences,” constraints or risk severe engine a real-time for processing isochro- degraded performance. such as data”); nous streams of col. 11.16-18 contends Motorola district (“the actual modulation and demodulation *21 court’s construction reads “realtime” out of of adapter’s the hardware interface isoch- require the claim because it does not the ronous PCM data stream is accomplished API itself to function realtime. Motoro- entirely by 9, the engine”); real-time col. 31, points independent la to claim which (“the 11.65-67 handler has no involvement recites an API without the qua- “realtime” with the isochronous data stream created lifier, that, argues by including real- Thus, engine”). the real-time although 1, in claim patentee time the intended that the API interacts with the real-time en- operate the API itself in realtime. See gine, it is the latter that actually performs Phillips, F.3d at (finding that use the time-constrained processing. of the word “steel” in the term “steel Contrary argument, to Motorola’s the “strongly implies” baffles” a difference be- district court did not read “realtime” out of baffles). tween steel baffles and non-steel the claim. The API anis “interface.” As agree We with the district court. The such, it communicates and interacts with specification describes the API as an inter- subsystems other process data in real- parameters face that sends commands and necessarily time without processing any to engine,” actually the “real-time which data itself. This is what specification performs the realtime processing. data describes and what the district court cor- specification The does not describe the rectly Further, understood. the district API meeting any itself as re- specific prevent court’s construction does not sponse-time constraints or otherwise need- realtime, API from functioning just Instead, ing functionality. realtime require does not the API to function API’s role is to send pa- commands and realtime. This is consistent with the See, engine. rameters the real-time description, only claims and written which (“each e.g., 6, patent '263 at col. 11.33-38 require the API to facilitate the functional- interface receives ap- commands from an ity of the engine. real-time affirm the We plication program, through the handler district court’s claim construction. engine carry instructs real-time necessary transforms”); out the col. 11. Motorola’s '559 Patent (“the particular 22-25 transforms to be performed are sent as commands to the Turning to Motorola’s asserted engine real-time from the adapter patents, patent handler the '559 discloses a method application via suitable programming generating “preamble sequences,” (“in 48”); interfaces col. 11. 40-44 re- which are used in communications between performance steps stations. The district of its in the order phones cell and base writ- ten, claim, language specifi- construed claim 5 of the '559 court step (“multiplying prosecution history support that the third cation and the require code”) case.”). limiting the inner take construction in this the outer code The (“form- that, correctly court only steps after the first two district noted while in place an ing “forming preferred an outer code” and inner embodiment the inner and out- code”) completed. are Based er multiplica- codes are formed before the construction, summary granted the court step begins, tion this alone does not limit non-infringement Apple. judgment e.g., Fig. claims. '559 appeals only the claim construc- Motorola acknowledged The district court also affirm. tion decision. We if likely the invention would function even multiplication step began before the limitations em- Claim with relevant full inner and outer codes were formed. phasized, recites: Notwithstanding foregoing, the court generating preamble A method for se- require construed the claims to that step quences system, in a CDMA the method only occur steps three after one and two comprising steps of: completed. are in a forming outer code mobile sta- agree with the court. We district *22 tion; multiplying claims recite “the” inner code preamble with “the” outer code to create a forming an in the mobile inner code “sequence.” Both code the inner and out- utilizing following equation: station of sequences er code are numbers. The plain meaning multiplying of “the” codes together sequences is that the entire are multiplied together they after have been formed. If claim 17 was directed to a 1, ..., are a of j=0, where M-l set only of the Sj; multiplied parts method that, P, length of orthogonal codewords where together, inner outer code it would not and positive integers; and P are and mul- M multiplying together recite “the” codes tiplying by the outer code the inner code preamble sequence. form the The more generate preamble sequence. a language sup- claim reading natural of the ports finding the district court’s patent (emphasis '559 at col. 11.20-35 fully formed inner and outer codes must be added). they multiplied together. are before Steps in claim a method need not reading. specification supports The they necessarily performed be the order discussing multiplying the inner and When Altiris, Symantec are written. Inc. v. codes, specification outer describes (Fed.Cir.2003). Corp., forming an inner and outer code and then hand, grammar, logic, the other if On together: the codes multiplying specification, prosecution history or the re present provides invention a meth- quire steps performed sequen to be The Id.; sequences in tially, generating preamble then the claims are od for so limited. system. a communication The Corp. Sony Corp., Loral Fairchild v. CDMA (Fed.Cir.1999) an outer (“Although comprises forming method inner code at a mobile every process not claim is limited to the code and an summary judgment non-infringement. multi- The station then station. mobile agree code to with the district court’s con- code the inner We plies the outer grant affirm sequence. struction and therefore preamble generate summary judgment. 52-57 (emphasis at col. 11. patent '559 added). '712 patent, Claim 17 of the with rele- emphasized, vant limitations recites: plain supported

Because it is language claim and the meaning of the system having In a communication we affirm the district court’s specification, layer, layer, link physical data claim construction. layer, providing network method protection of a data cryptographic was the basis Because this construction stream, comprising: grant summary court’s for the district judgment noninfringement, we need (a) packet assigning sequence number of “a set of reach the court’s construction packet to a derived from a data stream Accordingly, we orthogonal codewords.” layer; received from the network grant Apple’s affirm the district court’s (b) updating a transmit se- overflow summary judgment of non-in- motion for a function quence number as fringement patent of the '559 based number; sequence packet of claim steps its construction that the (c) performed sequence encrypting, prior communicating in the described and the packet packet sequence above. physical layer, packet on number packet sequence a function of the patent '712 Motorola’s the transmit overflow se- number and system The '712 discloses a quence number. encrypting data communications. The 8,1. 9,1. court found that '712 at col. 65-col. district the claimed *23 number,” that, sequence specification explains “transmit or in order to en- overflow TOSN, crypt decrypt being “never transmitted” to the re the data transmit- is ted, system. assigns “packet” ceiver in the claimed Because the the invention each counterpart “packet sequence to the TOSN the accused data both a number” and receiver, abst; products is transmitted to the overflow number. See id. at col. 5,11. granted district court Apple’s motion 13-15. 29-32; decrypt sequence number. Id. at col. “key” encrypt used to

The sequence specification col. 11.7-9. The does packet includes both the data transmitting any number. The describe TOSN number and the overflow Instead, number. Id. assigned are se- other overflow packet sequence numbers num- couples packet sequence receiver up to a maximum. Once quentially reached, generates it sequence ber receives with ROSN packet maximum is decrypt begins and uses these two numbers number count “rolls over” and example, packet. if data again from number one. For assigned maximum is after 128 is the district specification supports data, packet next packet to a that the TOSN is nev- court’s construction number of one. assigned packet sequence First, the claims recite a er transmitted. 4,11. coun- at col. 15-17. The overflow Id. TOSN, sequence generic not a overflow packet counts the number of times the ter plainly de- specification number. The over. at col. sequence number rolls Id. transmitting aspects certain scribes *24 Thus, 54-55, in as demonstrated 65-68. (the packet the se- system packet, data illustration, packet time the the above each number) suggests never quence but over, rolls the overflow sequence number part of that transmission. the TOSN is by increases one. Id. sequence number necessary for the TOSN to be Nor is were, side, If it there would be no transmitted. the transmission the overflow

On generate the receiver to a ROSN. the receiv- need for number is called the TOSN. On Further, packet side, if both the TOSN and receiving the overflow ing it is called transmitted, (“ROSN”). an sequence number were In this man- sequence number the entire eavesdropper intercept could ner, decrypt the key encrypt the This decrypt message. the key num- needed packet sequence data includes both a purpose would defeat the invention’s number. When the ber and an overflow transmitted, security by not trans- increased providing are the packets of data key. the entire packet mitting system claimed also transmits 1312 during patentee’s Motorola that the statements made dur

Statements made ing prosecution patent of a later were Japanese patent of a related prosecution an patent relevant earlier issued Before support further this construction. specification. a common shared Id. Of Office, Motorola distin- Japan Patent course, ap made in statements unrelated guished prior by explaining, art with plications are not relevant to claim con emphasis, the included that “the overflow See, e.g., Goldenberg Cyto struction. v. sequence number is never transmitted.” (Fed.Cir. Inc., 1158, gen, 373 F.3d 1167 that, explained further because Motorola 2004) that an (explaining patent unrelated transmitted, never “there is TOSN is is one that does not “have a application intercept chance to the overflow se- no relationship” patent familial with the number; thus, quence pro- [the invention] issue); L.P., Dey, Abbott Labs. v. higher security.” vides a level of Motorola (Fed.Cir.2002) 1097, 1105 (finding applica argument on more than made this one they tions unrelated when had “no formal application Japanese occasion. The claims relationship presented and were to the priority application to the PCT that issued patent patentably office as distinct inven patent. in the the '712 United States as tions”). application Japanese Both the and the '712 patent specification, have the same and the This court has also considered state Japanese application included identical foreign patent ments made before a office claim to claim 17 at the time Motorola’s construing they when claims if are rele statements. vant and unique aspects not related to See, foreign patent e.g., law. Abbott Labs. precedent precisely Our does not Sandoz, Inc., (Fed. v. 566 F.3d the impact address of statements such as Cir.2009) (“While during statements made Motorola’s here. description Motorola’s of prosecution foreign of a counterpart to a patent the TOSN came after the '712 is patent application U.S. ap have narrow foreign sued and was made in front of a plication to claim ... in U.S. construction previously office. This court has application this case the '199 part JP related, found that statements made prosecution history of the '507 later-prosecuted patents may U.S. inform itself’) (internal omitted); citations Gillette meaning of earlier issued claims. Inc., Energizer Holdings, Co. v. 405 F.3d e.g., Corp. Sys., v. Multi-Tech (Fed.Cir.2005) Microsoft (considering the Inc., (Fed.Cir.2004). patentee’s arguments European before the Microsoft, “any the court noted that (EPO) concluding Patent Office that a patentee statement of the prosecu “blatant admission this same defendant tion application scope of a related as to the clearly supported]” before the EPO of the invention would be relevant to claim construction); Co., court’s Seiyaku Tanabe construction, and the relevance Comm’n, v. U.S. Int’l Trade statement made this instance is en (Fed.Cir.1997); Caterpillar Tractor *25 hanced the fact that it in an was made Berco, S.p.A., Co. v. 714 F.2d official in proceeding patentee (Fed.Cir.1983). which the Eng’g ALA v. But see Ltd. every had incentive to exercise care in S/A, Magotteaux Int’l characterizing (Fed.Cir.2011) (“[O]ur the scope of its invention.” precedent cautions added). (emphasis Id. upon Based against pros indiscriminate reliance on the reasoning, the corresponding foreign applica- court concluded ecution of Microsoft analysis.”); granted Apple’s in claim construction The district court tions the mo- Ltd., Ranbaxy summary v. Labs. Pfizer, judgment Inc. tion for of non-in- (Fed.Cir.2006) (“[State- 1284, 1290 fringement based its construction of during prosecution foreign ments made claim 17. appeal, On Motorola does not patent to the '893 are irrele- counterparts dispute Apple that not infringe does under they to claim construction because vant this construction. Accordingly, we affirm patentability in response were made the district court’s grant summary judg- requirements unique Danish and Euro- ment of non-infringement pat- of the '712 law.”). pean ent. principles The illustrated in these Admissibility Damages Of provide ample support for hold decisions ExpeRT Evidence

ing Motorola to the statements made dur Motorola’s ing Japanese prosecution. preparation In trial on the “is never trans statements the TOSN issue, infringement par- claims still the the receiver could not be clear mitted” to presented testimony ties expert supporting Gillette, (holding er. 405 F.3d at 1374 See damages parties their calculations. Both admission” in party argument “blatant challenged admissibility the of the other EPO). explained, made to Motorola also expert side’s evidence. The court district once, transmitting more than that not hearing held a Daubert at which the ex- security improves TOSN perts parties presented testified and the system. explanation con claimed This is arguments regarding admissibility. oral sistent with the claims and the invention Subsequently, the district excluded court AIA, specification. in the described See nearly parties’ expert all of both evidence (noting regard at 1279 concerns relating damages for infringement. Not law). ing foreign patent differences all of these decisions are before us. On Thus, Microsoft, statements were appeal, argues that proposed proceeding “made in an official in which testimony damages expert regarding of its patentee every had incentive to exer patents the '949 and '263 is admissible. in characterizing scope cise care of its argues proposed Motorola that the testi- Further, invention.” 357 F.3d at 1350. mony damages for the '898 expert of its patents the two are related and share a Because the district admissible. is They familial relationship. pri both claim court erred its decision to exclude the ority to application. the same PCT Both evidence, parties’ expert we reverse. And, specifications are the same. at the legal framework for admission of made its time Motorola statements to the testimony by the Feder- expert provided office, Japanese patent Japanese appli Evidence, along al with Daubert Rules cation contained a claim identical to claim Pharm., Inc., v. Merrell Dow U.S. Thus, 17. the construction supported (1993) 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 and 113 S.Ct. specification supported by is also Mo progeny. See Fed.R.Evid. Japan pat torola’s statements before the Daubert, proper the Court addressed ent office. We hold that it was not error testimony admitting expert standard for rely upon for the district court to Motoro emphasized the focus “must be Japan la’s statements to the Patent Office. such, solely principles methodology, on As we affirm the district court’s con they generate.” struction. on the conclusions *26 1314 if may evidence it is based eeper, exclude 595, 2786. Kum at 113 S.Ct.

509 U.S. 137, methods, Carmichael, or principles 526 U.S. unreliable or v. ho Tire Co. (1999), See, 1167, the L.Ed.2d 238 143 and data. legally 119 S.Ct. insufficient facts “ga- court’s Co., that the district clarified Court 215 F.3d v. Ford Motor e.g., Smith expert to all obligation” applied tekeeping (7th Cir.2000) (“We 713, emphasize 147, at 119 S.Ct. testimony. 526 U.S. gatekeeping function fo the court’s “Rule 702 was Subsequently, 1167. expert’s on an examination of the cuses to Daubert and cases response in amended Daubert, methodology.”); 509 U.S. it, Kumho Tire.” Micro including applying (“The focus, course, must 113 S.Ct. Lextron, Inc., Chem., 317 F.3d Inc. v. methodology, and solely principles on (Fed.Cir.2003). 1387, 1391 they generate.”); on the conclusions that not Rule 702 states: Partnership v. Ltd. i i4 Microsoft expert (Fed.Cir.2010) as an qualified A is witness who Corp., 598 F.3d skill, experience, training, by knowledge, and Rule 702 are (stating that “Daubert testify in the form of may or education safeguards against or irrelevant unreliable if: opinion an or otherwise correctness”) opinions, guarantees (a) scientific, technical, or expert’s the law); Fifth Circuit Walker v. Soo (applying help knowledge will the specialized other (7th Co., R. Cir. Line the evidence trier of fact to understand 2000) (“The that Dr. Plis- point critical is issue; in a fact or to determine methodology to de employed proper kin (b) testimony based on sufficient the IQ.”). pre-incident Mr. termine Walker’s data; facts or (c) testimony product is the of reli- the judge A must be cautious not methods; and and principles able overstep gatekeeping weigh role and (d) expert reliably applied has facts, evaluate the correctness of conclu and methods to the facts of principles sions, impose preferred its own methodolo the case. gy, judge credibility, including the cred These ibility expert of one over another. 702. Rule 703 states: Fed.R.Evid. fact find solely tasks are reserved may opinion An an on facts expert base (“The Smith, 215 at 718 e.g., er. expert in the that the has or data case underpinnings of the factual personally made of or ob- soundness been aware If field experts particular analysis served. and the correctness expert’s reasonably rely on those kinds of would on that expert’s of the conclusions based forming opinion on facts or data factual to be deter analysis are matters subject, they not be admissible need fact.”); Stollings the trier of v. mined But if opinion to be admitted. (7th Techs., Inc., Ryobi otherwise be the facts or data would Cir.2013) (“An may provide expert expert inadmissible, opin- of the proponent testimony properly based on a valid and jury only them to the if ion disclose offer a con applied methodology still jury probative helping their value subject It is the clusion that is to doubt. substantially out- opinion evaluate the jury weigh these sources of role of weighs prejudicial their effect. doubt.”). noted in As the Seventh Circuit Fed.R.Evid. jury “the must still be allowed to Stollings, its essential role as the arbiter play precedent, Under these rules and credibility expert testimo- gatek- weight as a judge, acting a district court

1315 different, 765; common for to choose parties at see also Lees v. ny.” 725 F.3d (7th and, single reliable in a Coll., 516, approaches case 714 526 Cir. Carthage F.3d do, they strengths the relative when 2013). may exposed at trial or weaknesses during attacked That cross-examination. role of the gatekeeping That the account approach may one better for one excluding testimony judge is limited aspect royalty estimation does not and methods principles on unreliable based approaches make other inadmissible. For essential the context particularly is royalties example, paid actual for technolo- damages. recog This court has at gies may similar to the claims issue questions regarding which facts nized that available, inherently account for non-in- calculating are most relevant or reliable hand, fringing alternatives. On the other i4i, jury.” “for the royalty a reasonable are analytical comparison of the same non- (“When methodology at is 856 infringing may alternatives to the claims sound, upon suffi and the evidence relied directly more account for this cost. The hand, at dis ciently related to the case may fact that one of these methods be said of relevance or putes degree about the accurately aspect to more value this of a threshold) (above minimum accuracy not, royalty reasonable calculation does testimony’s weight, to the but not may go necessarily, the other approach make inad- admissibility.”); see also Micro Chemi missible. cal, F.3d at 1392. 317 legal With this framework recognized This court has also mind, we review the district court’s dam royalty” estimating a “reasonable is so, ages rulings. doing apply we Sev such, the record not an exact science. As question law the of admis enth Circuit roy may support range of “reasonable” Ethicon, See, Inc. v. sibility. e.g., U.S. alties, Like single rather than a value. (Fed. 1456, Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1465 wise, may there be more than one reliable Cir.1998). The Seventh Circuit reviews de estimating royal method for a reasonable court applied novo whether the district Ventures, e.g., In re Innovatio IP ty. framework; reviews deci proper legal but Litig., MDL LLC Patent WL testimony expert to admit or exclude sions (N.D.Ill. 2013) 5593609, at *30-40 Oct. under this framework for an abuse of dis (undertaking a detailed evaluation of Parra, cretion. States v. See United proposed by parties different methods Cir.2005) (7th (citing United issue). valuing patents For ex (7th Allen, v. States royalty rate ample, party use .2001)). Cir licenses, val sufficiently comparable from com infringed ue the features based Apple’s '949 Patent marketplace, in the parable features provided of the benefit estimate the value we find that patent, As to the '949 comparing infringed features Ap excluded improperly the district court al product non-infringing accused testimony on dam ple’s proposed expert All have certain approaches above, ternatives. First, the dis ages. as discussed and, depending strengths damages analysis and weaknesses on trict court based its facts, may produce This er upon the one or all an incorrect claim construction. ror, alone, reversal and re- require It would testimony single in a case. admissible erroneous claim con- similar” to the claimed features of the '949 mand because the *28 Further, patent. Napper district court’s contended that struction here tainted the See, e.g., Trackpad Cohesive the features most similar to the damages analysis. (such Techs., vertical Corp., Inc. v. Waters asserted claims as the scroll- features) (Fed.Cir.2008) (vacating ruling ing scrolling and horizontal are damages entitled to the most used touch features of the Track- patentee that was not Thus, remanding pad. Napper provided sup- reconsideration based factual construction); port Trackpad for his that a upon modified claim Texas contention Inc., Digital Sys., Telegenix, comparable Inc. v. 308 includes features to the (Fed.Cir.2002) (vacating claimed features. damages pro- award where district court In order to isolate the of value the vided erroneous claim constructions to the features, Trackpad’s touch Napper began Second, court jury). the district erred by comparing price Trackpad the of the full considering scope the the assert- that of a computer traditional mouse. claims, questioning ed the conclusions of Napper opined price difference substituting Apple’s expert, and its own products between these could be attrib- opinion, focusing rather than on the relia- uted to two differences: Trackpad’s bility principles of the and methods used touch features and its wireless connectivi- sufficiency or the of the facts and data ty, present neither of which in a is tradi- upon. require relied These errors also tional mouse. Because wireless connectiv- reversal and remand. ity claims, is not part the asserted Napper royalty discounted his based order to estimate the value of the the estimated value of wireless connectivi- patent, Apple’s asserted claims of the '949 (Brian ty in Napper this context. estimated this expert Napper) analyzed Ap- W. by comparing value price of two sets ple’s Magic Trackpad (“Trackpad”).2 The using wired and wireless mice and Trackpad touchpad is a for use with Mac midpoint price difference as a discount. computers place of a mouse. Much like touchscreen, it has tactile sensor Napper royalty further discounted his finger detects contacts and translates them Trackpad calculation to account for touch computer into A user commands. touches features that are scope outside the of the Trackpad fingers with her order to Specifically, Napper asserted claims. con- through scroll documents or translate con- cluded that a subset of the Trackpad touch computer tent on the screen. The Track- comparable” features were “similar or pad recognizes finger gestures, twelve in- Thus, the asserted features. he reduced cluding a scrolling gesture vertical and a royalty his a proportional estimate scrolling gesture. horizontal The decision amount to account for the extra features. to use the Trackpad comparable prod- as a Following procedure, Napper arrived supported by testimony uct was of one royalty. at a reasonable Apple’s experts, Stephen technical Dr. Feiner, ges- Napper compared who concluded that the touch then royalty his calcu- Trackpad “comparable royalty tures of the are paid by lation with rates Motorola Napper's expert report many supporting Because much of but cannot include confidential, providing we are limited to details. methodology application overview his narrow view of the claims led the court to touch screen tech- in licenses for related conclude, that, incorrectly, Nap- that much of concluded because nology. Napper analysis too far from per’s licenses was removed technology at issue those inferior, claims. and because asserted similar but was were not direct com- to the license parties Although nearly exclusively relied on willing have been Motorola would petitors, construction, district this narrow claim royalty for a license to the pay higher recognize Napper’s expert court did than it claims of the '949 asserted (and *29 full report proper) was focused on the had those licenses. paid this, light In of scope of the claims. alternative, Napper’s pro- court considered whether design Napper possible As a testimony a rehable basis posed provided removed that Motorola could have testified estimating single the value of another functionality prod- from its the asserted limitation, scrolling fea- create claim the “vertical Napper noted that this would ucts. not, ture.”3 The court found that did specif- touchscreen due to a functional less many that “the fact that con- concluding in Dr. Fein- ic technical reasons discussed Track- pay Magic this sumers will more for According Napper, to report. er’s nothing a mouse tells one experi- pad the user’s than for adversely impact would they to avoid occasion- pay create user about what will of the touchscreen and ence their frustration, ally swiping unsuccessfully in a de- because thereby resulting less actually to swiping finger that wasn’t vertical Napper concluded product. sirable Thus, the screen.” the court concluded produce not a rea- this alternative would comparison Trackpad to a was an any to dam- estimate which base sonable the val- “inadequate” estimating method of ages. or scrolling ue of either the vertical feature Napper’s court reviewed ex The district tap page for the next feature. pert report pro and excluded all of his an incorrect claim relying In Aside from on posed testimony patent. for the '949 construction, by the district court erred analysis incorporat the court’s large part, infringe- full of ed, considering scope upon, based its incorrect claim and was construction, At no did the court ask or point the claims to ment. which limited had used reliable Napper consider whether products containing preloaded ap Kindle data, methods, or sufficient go principles to and plication tap gesture that uses a scope the. entire of the asserted Inc. v. to value page. e.g., Apple, the next Motorola, Inc., 1:11-CV-08540, the district court Consequently, 2012 claims. WL 2012) (“At lim- (N.D.Ill. on individual claim incorrectly focused May at *7 1959560 evaluating the in isolation when dispositive itations point litigation in the It is cer- reliability Napper’s methods. is the use of a element of the '949 that an otherwise sound tainly conceivable tap righthand on the side of the screen (or, appear unreliable methodology could page next of a Kindle book switch to the irrelevant) indeed, single applied when phone”); that has loaded on the cell been limitations, limitation, rather subset (discussing design at *7-8 alterna see id. infringed claims. to the full set of overly than only tap gesture). tives to the This Hence, Napper's the asserted claims. did not consider court light scope expert testimony in of the full other, why proper inquiry evaluates non-claimed valuing This is features of expert’s methodology view of the Trackpad subtracting and this value. infringed full claims. See 35 scope of the royalty, To reach a reasonable Napper (“[D]amages adequate § U.S.C. compared resulting royalty then his to re- ... compensate infringement price lated licenses and rationalized the royalty for the use made of the reasonable Napper differences. also addressed the infringer.”) (emphasis invention possibility removing the asserted fea- added); Corp. Corp., Motors v. Devex Gen. tures from the accused devices argued and 648, 655, 461 U.S. S.Ct. this would frustrate consumers and (1983) (“Congress expressly L.Ed.2d 211 all, products. Napper’s devalue the §in the court ‘shall provided testimony product was the prin- reliable damages adequate award the claimant to ciples and methods. ”) (em- compensate infringement.’ for the Napper applied principles also these Matthews,

phasis original); Robert A. way supported methods in a reliable (2014) Jr., § Digest Annotated Patent 30:6 *30 legally them with sufficient facts and data. (“All claim constructions define the bounds Napper’s See application Fed.R.Evid. infringes, of what and therefore also define straightforward was adequately sup- and activity infringement the bounds of what ported by Apple’s technical experts and to.”). Thus, damages applicable are the Napper’s experience own expertise, and proper question compari- is not whether a the disputed. latter of which is not For Trackpad accurately son to the values one example, Napper’s assertion that Rather, finger gestures. the claimed Trackpad’s comparable features are to the ask, scope we must with the entire asserted features is the result of reliable asserted claims and the correct claim con- claims, application. Like the asserted mind, struction in Napper whether em- Trackpad finger translates contacts into methods, ployed principles reliable and re- commands, computer including some of the liably them, applied upon legally and relied finger computer same contacts and com- sufficient facts or data. We find that he Napper mands asserted. properly also re- did. upon Apple’s expert lied technical to factu- Contrary to the district court’s determi ally support comparison. To account nation, Napper’s methodology is inher not Trackpad’s the differences between the unsound; ently product rather it is “the claims, features and those of the asserted principles reliable and FED. methods.” Napper addressed these differences and R. EVID. 702. This court upheld has royalty discounted his estimate. use of similar methods involving compara In excluding Napper’s testimony, products ble benchmark past. reasoned, district court “that a consumer i4i, 853-54; e.g., at see also Vir pay something gestural will control Inc., Inc. Apple F.Supp.2d netX v. not an does enable estimation of how much (E.D.Tex.2013). Napper’s methodolo pay particular improvement he will for a gy focused on the technology. claimed As system of such control.” discussed, The court also Napper began existing with an found that preferable there was more product containing features he contended (the valuing were similar to method for the asserted claims the asserted features Next, that, believed, it Trackpad). Napper would be used in a non- attempted litigation Contrary isolate the value of these similar features context. to the district assertion, Here, was information in all Napper’s estimate cases. the ab- court’s “gestural value of all sence of a direct measurement of not directed this val- topple entirety to the value of the asserted ue does not control” but Napper principles employed by focused on the as- and methods Nap- claims because features, per. The requires as described above. See statute determination serted (describing Napper’s royalty,” iden- of a “reasonable not a supra 39-41 reasonable features, noted, price.4 tification of isolation of consumer As there mul- similar are by discounting tiple calculating value for unclaimed reasonable methods for their features, comparison royalty royalty, directly estimating rate to the value a agreements). places infringing license While the consumer on the similar feature summarily requirement admissibility. court concluded there is not a district way damages, a better to calculate was if Factually, Trackpad is not an ac- point any specific Nap- did not flaws benchmark, curate Motorola is free to example, per’s Trackpad comparison. For challenge argue the benchmark or for a testimony of question the court did not more accurate benchmark. But an such the Track- Apple’s expert technical argument goes evidentiary weight, “comparable pad’s features are or similar” admissibility, when, here, especially Nor did the to the asserted features. expert applied has reliable methods to any Napper’s court flaws in meth- point to a relationship demonstrate between the apportioning od of the cost of the relevant benchmark and the claims. See infringed Trackpad explain why in the features Lees, (“Carthage 714 F.3d at 526 is free to *31 preferred superi- method of valuation was benchmark, ... a argue preferable [for] Simply or. other reliable methods because again is a matter of evidentiary but royalty may a reasonable estimating admissibility.”). weight, may not Motorola not, itself, by render Napper’s exist does any technical differences between address approach inadmissible. features, Trackpad and the asserted thereof, Napper’s analysis or the correct- Napper The district court also faulted conclusions, directly during estimating Napper’s for not what a consum- ness of cross- occasionally v. Ford Motor’ pay swiping er “will to avoid examination. See Smith (7th Cir.2000) (ex- Co., unsuccessfully swiping finger because their fac- actually plaining disagreements wasn’t vertical to the screen.” about the Napper’s methodology underpinnings expert’s analysis But did estimate tual of an pay infringed go weight, admissibility). for to not But the what consumers will by evaluating features what consumers district court’s decision on the value esti- actually comparable by Napper for features. mated short-circuited Motoro- paid have generally, opportunity Napper’s opinion More the value a consumer at- la’s to rebut own infringing may through presentation tributes to the feature be of its evidence. McCoy, a v. important point estimating Gayton an data for See (7th Cir.2010) (“Determinations a on admis- royalty, required piece but it is not case, infringer may Depending upon price a con- want to retain some of that as but, (and infringing pay only royalty), $3.00 pay profit would for an feature sumer circumstances, not, itself, light upon may may by depending much what an be shed on infringer willing gain (by paying pay would to that feature. to sacrifice all of that license royalty) profit else- example, $5.00 For we that a is and make its if assume consumer feature, willing pay $5.00 for a certain where. Dr. damages expert, again Apple’s supplant the adversarial sibility not should ap two opined that there were testimony Napper, ‘shaky’ expert process; designing around the assert admissible, by opponent proaches its assailable cross-examination.”) (citing patent. Dau the '263 The first ed claims of through 2786). bert, rede require 113 S.Ct. would Motorola to approach 509 U.S. testimony phones was the Napper’s sign computer chip its Whether (the principles and methods product require application providers of reliable also admissibility; whether products the focus of such as Face- companies is behind degree YouTube) a correct testimony produced redesign appli book and of the '949 of the value streaming estimation that utilize video or au cations reserved for the a factual consideration the cost of Napper content. estimated dio Here, the district court re fact finder. infringement at the time of approach this its own admissibility upon based solved design around but concluded of value for on the correct estimate view practically have been unworkable would question that should patent, the '949 unimportant technical reasons here. jury. for the have been reserved design option around identified The other by replacing involved Napper Motorola sum, majority of the district phones adding on its an additional chip incorrect analysis upon relied court’s cost, chip. Napper To estimate this used and is therefore in er- claim construction by Apple’s identified one of technical chip district court also erred ror. The upon Dr. Nathan Polish. Based experts, scope infringement, full considering the Napper facts and data made available to underpin- the factual by questioning Polish, concluded that it would Napper Napper’s and correctness of testimo- nings expensive design more have been reliability princi- of his ny, rather than the Faced with option. around via this second sufficiency and the ples and method choices, arrived at a set Napper these he relied. The district data which figure which he concluded Motorola would Napper’s expert exclusion of testi- court’s willing pay have been as a reasonable mony the '949 is there- regarding *32 royalty represented the lesser because fore reversed. options. of the two Patent Apple’s '263 Napper’s The district court excluded testimony for the sole reason proposed Apple’s The district court also excluded hired Napper upon expert relied an damages pat- evidence related to the '263 Polish, by identity Dr. for the of the Apple, Apple’s expert upon ent because relied chip. The district court con- replacement by expert provided information technical that, only per- cluded had Polish been by court subse- Apple. hired The district competent opine proper on the sub- son motion for quently granted Motorola’s testimony chip, Napper’s stitute then summary enti- judgment Apple was admissible. The court would have been damages infringement tled to no for of the reasoned: reverse the district patent. '263 We imagine ... conversation between [a] Apple’s expert to exclude court’s decision Motorola, pretend I’ll Napper and which testimony and therefore vacate the court’s at Napper to advise on how lowest summary judgment regarding the hired grant of patent’s funetionali- duplicate cost to patent. '263 infringement: Motorola: tise outside of their ty evaluating without field when around, design will it cost us to invent options valuing ‘What around im- place ceiling royal- that will on the for portance specific, of the infringing features ty pay Apple?’ Napper: we’ll ‘Brace Monsanto, in a complex device. 516 F.3d yourself: greenbacks.’ million Mo- $35 at For example, party may want high; torola: ‘That sounds where did explain, from a technical perspective, T you get figure?’ Napper: asked why potential design one alternative is less engineer Apple.’ who works for Mo- expensive in order to justify royal- a lower fired.’ ‘Dummkopf! torola: You’re ty damages calculation. Patent calcula- tions are often highly intertwined with Inc., Apple, 2012 WL 1959560at *9. Based technical precisely damages issues because conversation, hypothetical on this the dis- scope must be based on the of infringe- Napper’s pro- trict court excluded all of ment, often an question. involved technical posed testimony. Id. Despite precedent, the district court Nap- The district court’s exclusion of erroneously found that cannot sup- per’s proposed testimony was erroneous. port damages its calculation with informa- The district court’s decision states a rule tion from a expert technical it has hired. Experts that neither exists nor is correct. particular, rely by the district court ex- routinely experts other hired party they represent expertise pressed out- concern that Dr. Polish’s technical See, e.g., side of their field. Dura Auto- incurably advice was biased because he Ind., Sys. Corp., motive Inc. v. CTS Inc., by was Apple. Apple, hired See (7th Cir.2002) (“[I]t 609-13 (Napper WL 1959560 *9 “obtained es- expert common in technical fields for an information, namely identity sential opinion part base an on what a different chip infringement, that would avoid expert on of expert believes the basis agent party from an rather than a knowledge possessed by not ex- the first source.”). may disinterested itWhile David, pert.”); Monsanto Co. v. potential true that the for bias is an inher- (Fed.Cir.2008) (“Numerous respect ent concern with to all hired ex- courts have held that reliance on scientific perts, this concern is addressed prepared by test results others consti- weight given expert’s testimony, to the type reasonably tute the of evidence that is admissibility. e.g., Tagatz v. Mar- upon by experts purposes relied (7th Univ., quette 703.”). Rule of explicit- Evidence Rule 703 Cir.1988) (“Hired experts, generally who ly expert rely allows an on information highly compensated party are —and experts he has been “if made aware of they testifying on whose behalf are —are *33 particular reasonably rely field would Ethicon, disinterested.”); notably not 135 forming on those kinds of facts or data in (“Furthermore, at F.3d 1465 a witness’s subject.” an opinion on the Fed.R.Evid. in pecuniary interest the outcome of a case 703; Monsanto, see 516 at also 1016. goes probative weight testimony, to the of predicate admissibility This Rule does not admissibility.”). not its To the extent bias or, on the source in of facts data exists, cross-examination and the testimo- particular, on whether the source is em- ny opposing expert may of an be used to ployed by parties. of the either Id.; “expose” it. see Annotated Pat- also (“That § Digest, expert ent at 44:43.150 an patent

Consistent with Rule dam- ages experts rely exper- may often on technical have a bias or self interest towards offering he or she is All of this information would be outside of on whose behalf

party more, if generally Napper’s expertise helpful, does but not criti- testimony, without cal, expert so In- require disqualifying valuing patent. not to his task of providing deed, to be long expert appears as the if the technical information needed objective analysis. goes Bias to the expertise Apple employ- an was within the testimony, necessarily not weight ees, Apple, it would be wasteful for if not admissibility.”). Tagatz, the court rec disadvantageous, provide not to otherwise that, party in of a ognized the context and, circumstances, it in certain even de- expert, “the trier of testifying as his own Overall, litigation, ceitful. outside of it fact should be able to discount for so obvi reasonable, common, quite would be and at ous a conflict of interest.” 861 F.2d rely on technical information Napper for Here, Dr. chip if the Polish has provided by Apple experts or one of its suggested cheapest is not the best or alter design value order to the cost to around native, free to address this Motorola is Indeed, technology. an Apple’s ap- such through issue on cross examination and carry proach would the same intellectual testimony expert its own witness. rigor approach employed as the in the Walker, 589-90; e.g., at courtroom in this case. 765; at Stollings, Gayton, A rule that would exclude dam- Apple’s F.3d at 616. The issue is one of evidentia ages simply evidence it relies upon because admissibility. not ry weight and expert information from an technical implied The district court also that Dr. contrary is unreasonable and to Rules 702 particular Polish’s recommendation of a controlling precedent. and 703 and As a chip replacement type of infor result, we reverse the district court’s ex- expert mation that the field would Napper’s testimony regarding clusion of reasonably rely upon outside the context of patent grant the '263 and vacate its Inc., litigation. Apple, See 2012 WL summary judgment regarding damages. *9-10; Kumho, 1959560 at see also (noting at that an

U.S. S.Ct. 1167 Motorola’s '898 Patent expert employ must “in the courtroom the The district court excluded all of Moto- rigor same level of intellectual that charac proposed testimony rola’s to dam- related practice expert terizes of an field.”). ages infringement of the '898 disagree. relevant noted We As subsequently granted Apple’s and motion above, Rule requires expert that the summary judgment that Motorola was testimony be tied to the facts of the case. damages. entitled to no affirm the 153-54, We If Apple See id. 119 S.Ct. 1167. testimony exclusion of the on relied Napper hired value the asserted claims licensing expert, Motorola’s Dono- Charles litigation the '263 outside of erred, however, hoe. The district court Napper there was technical issue did not when it excluded the of Motoro- understand, remainder it would be reasonable for proposed expert testimony la’s because Napper expert to ask a technical hired analysis comparable Motorola’s Apple. For licenses example, would be reason methods,” principles used “reliable Apple expert able for an explain the *34 reliably background Apple’s patent, applied of how the and Motorola them to suf- larger prod claimed invention fits into a ficient facts and data to estimate the over- uct, key prior patent. Accordingly, or the advances over the art. all value of the '898 tion, a expect pay the court’s exclusion of the licensee would to for we reverse less damages expert of Motorola’s a license to a few patents remainder than for an grant the court’s of testimony portfolio and vacate pat- entire of standard-essential summary judgment. concluded, ents. Mulhern upon based

expert reports of Motorola’s technical ex- was damages expert Motorola’s perts, patent represented that the '898 proposed S. Mulhern. Mulhern’s Carla important innovation- “dispropor- and was testimony analysis included an of license tionately valuable in the context of Motoro- and “all of agreements between Motorola portfolio.” la’s overall major” in phone cellular makers opined licensing Mulhern pat- one States, except Apple. for While United large portfolio ent from a SEP a was not agreement vary, gen all the terms of each because, typical industry practice in order erally cover Motorola’s entire standard- standard, to use license to all essential (hun (“SEP”) portfolio patent essential patents would be needed. In the “real patents), patent dreds of of which the '898 world,” Mulhern, according to SEPs are of licenses very part. small Some only in large portfolios. licensed Mulhern cross-licenses, were wherein Motorola ob proposed testimony cited experts other parties’ tained a license to third SEPs. The experience licensing industry with in the to royalty base each of these licenses was support Despite industry this claim. this price phone. According the sale of a cell practice, recognized Mulhern Mulhern, to these licenses show that Moto “hypothetical negotiation construct would previously royalty rola has received a rate force Motorola to enter into a license for approximately for a 2.25% license just a pat- subset of its standard-essential portfolio. entire SEP Mulhern also exam license, according ents.” Such to Mul- portfolios covering ined licenses SEP hern, capture a “nonlinear” would share of technology” “cellular communications be portfolio rate because it would force parties. tween These li Apple third to, inefficiently, pat- Motorola license its typically censes included cross-license also words, ents a few at a time. other agreements. Apple’s royalties under these patents portfo- first few licensed from the agreements range. in a were similar higher royalty lio would command a rate alleged infringe Because is not than those that followed. patents port- all of the in Motorola’s SEP reasoning, Based Mulhern folio, attempted separate Mulhern out patents the first would opined few the value of the from the total '898 typically command 40%-50% of the entire recognized Mulhern portfolio. value of the portfolio supported rate. Mulhern this 40 patents that individual in a SEP portfolio proposed & % estimate with: the testimo- values, upon, have different based ny licensing ex- another Motorola’s example, importance relative Donohoe; perts, Charles the statements technology to the standard or to the executive; licensing a Motorola the state- Specifically, opined as a whole. Mulhern licensing ments of a former Ericsson exec- pat- that economic studies have shown that utive; knowledge and her of “IBM’s well- many patents ent values are skewed with licensing policy known the 1980s and having little or no value and a small minor- Mulhern, IBM ity having significant early According value. Mulhern also 1990s.” that, single patent a license to a during hypothetical negotia- noted would offer *35 10,000 but, nevertheless, portfolio, pat- gations its which totaled over excluded all of ents, proposed testimony Mulhern’s royalty rate of 1% of net sale because she at a range “failed to consider the plausible of price. patent Each would cost successive ... facing alternatives 1%, Apple.” Specifical- up patent to the fifth additional ly, the district court that concluded Mul- Beyond patents, five or a 5% licensed. analyze” possibility hern’s “failure to royalty, the rate increase. would Apple contracting with Verizon made her analysis, Mulhern con- upon Based appears method unreliable. It the district cluded, estimate, that pat- as one the '898 court was with fail- concerned Mulhern’s ent was worth 40%-50% of Motorola’s ure to specifically value the cost of con- portfolio SEP rate. tracting place with Verizon in of AT & T. As an alternative and more conservative Inc., Apple, See 2012 WL 1959560 at *11 estimate, opined Mulhern that the '898 (“Mulhern offers no that it evidence would patent represented “actually- 5% of the costly have been Ap- million more $347 patents portfolio. essential” in Motorola’s ple” to contract with over AT Verizon & rely upon This estimate did not Mulhern’s T.). Regarding proposed Donohoe’s testi- theory, valuation “non-linear” but rather mony, the district court noted that his was based a linear patent “modified any declaration did not offer basis for se- counting method.” approach, Under this lecting royalty the correct nonlinear rate. Apple Mulhern concluded that would have addition, Donohoe “admitted that he willing been pay 5% the entire SEP knows nothing portfolio about the that in- portfolio rate for a license to the '898 patent; per- cludes the '898 his 40-to-50 patent. figure cent is a portfolios statement about of standards-essential telecommunications recognized Mulhern also that Apple patents general.” could have infringement by avoided intro- ducing only an iPhone on the Verizon net- agree We with the district court that work, which did not use the GMS/UTMS testimony Donohoe’s sup is insufficient to Apple’s networks. Mulhern addressed de- Indeed, port an award of damages. sign around cost at the hypo- time of the justified district court would have been negotiation thetical concluding first excluding testimony Donohoe’s as inher patent '898 was essential to the GMS/ ently unreliable based on his failure to tie that, UTMS mobile networks and there- technological 40%-50% rate to the con fore, Apple could not use these networks tribution of the to the standard- without a license. Mulhern outlined pur- essential portfolio. We have consis ported impracticalities with the Verizon tently explained proof of damages option, including confidential details we de- carefully must be tied to the in claimed there, cline to recite here. Stopping Mul- ResQNet.com, vention itself. See Inc. v. hern did not specifically Lansa, estimate the cost Inc., (Fed.Cir. pursuing phone 2010); Verizon v. Exploration Riles Shell & Prod. place Co., an AT phone. (Fed.Cir.2002) & T

(excluding patentee’s damages model be The district court assumed cause the expert not associate his “[did] royalty proposed by rates Motorola proposed royalty with value fair, all”). satisfied Here, reasonable and nondis patented method at where (“FRAND”) criminatory licensing nothing obli- Donohoe admitted that he knew

1325 therefore, specifi- not option at issue and did this need be portfolio about SEP eyen valued, cally Apple to link the 40%-50% rate this is an issue that purport not patent, invention of the '898 to the claimed could address at trial via cross-examina- little whether his testi- there can be doubt presentation expert tion and of its own case.5 mony See, Walker, tied to the facts of this was e.g., 208 F.3d at evidence. 589-90; Gayton, 593 F.3d at 616. That a incorporated Donohoe’s testi- Mulhern party may pursue choose to one course of own when she relied on his mony into her proving damages over another does not testimony opine that the first proposed testimony in- expert’s damages render its portfolio would patents given few from requirement admissible. Nor is there a of the entire typically command 40%-50% patentee every potential that a value non- of Dono- portfolio rate. The substance in infringing alternative order for its dam- testimony is no more reliable when hoe’s ages testimony to be admissible. through through Mulhern than admitted gener- himself. note that the Donohoe We recog The district court failed to that Donohoe and Mulhern relied theory al nize that Mulhern did construct a cost larger that the first from a upon, typically upon estimate relied when calcu may, practice, garner larger portfolio lating patent damages cost to license —the patents than later from the same royalty See, Riles, technology. e.g., 298 F.3d inherently is not unreliable. portfolio, Kohle, 1313; at m.b.H. Studiengesellschaft Testimony theory may be upon based Inc., Indus., 1564, F.2d v. Dart 862 1568 if tied to the claimed properly admissible (Fed.Cir.1988) (“The patentee’s usual li here, potentially But invention. where censing approach should be considered theory reliable is not tied to the facts assessing royalty.”). As we reasonable case, testimony is expert inadmissi- times, many using sufficiently have held Kumho, See, 154-55, e.g., 526 ble. U.S. comparable generally licenses is reliable reasons, 119 1167. For these we S.Ct. estimating patent. method of the value of a affirm the district court’s exclusion of Networks, Inc. v. e.g., ActiveVideo portion testimony that was Mulhern’s Inc., 1312, Commc’ns, Verizon based on Donohoe’s declaration. Techs., (Fed.Cir.2012); Inc. v. 1333 Lucent (Fed. Inc., Gateway, 1325 disagree with the- district We Cir.2009) (“The Georgia-Pacific second regarding court the remainder of Mul by the licensee paid factor is rates ‘[t]he testimony. Although hern’s Mulhern did patents comparable for the use of other directly Apple not estimate the cost to ”) (citing Georgia-Pac. suit.’ Verizon, choosing AT & T over Mulhern Plywood Corp., F.Supp. 318 Corp. v. U.S. “analyze” possibility and did “consider” (S.D.N.Y.1970)); v. Maxwell J. overcoming the difficulties of con Apple (Fed.Cir. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d releasing tracting with Verizon 1996) (“This supported rate is evidence iPhone on a different network. While the agreements entered into with Maxwell Mulhern’s disagree district court with royalty per at a rate of other licensees contracting $.10 conclusions that with Verizon Indus., shoes.”); that, Inc. pair of Nickson v. practical was not desirable or Indeed, out, suggesting the rate was Apple points judgment, further Motorola did specific patents at issue. See adjust never tied to the rate when the '559 40%-50% Reply summary Br. 38-39. patent dropped out of the case on (Fed.Cir. Co., sum, exception with the the testi- Mfg. Rol 1988) (“Where mony that relied Donohoe’s declara- royalty an established ex tion, we reverse the district court’s exclu- ists, the best measure of usually it will proposed testimony. sion of Mulhern’s royalty.”). what is a ‘reasonable’ *37 Consequently, grant we vacate the court’s generally This is reliable be- approach summary judgment regarding damages of royalty similarly-situated that a cause the infringement. for inherently accounts for market party pays hypothetical conditions at the time of the Judgment SummaRY negotiation, including a number of factors value, such the cost that are difficult After the district court excluded the ma- available, non-infringing of alternatives. jority damages expert of the testimony, Quanta Inc. v. LaserDynamics, See Com- parties summary judgment both moved for Inc., (Fed.Cir.2012) puter, 694 F.3d 79 injunctive regarding damages and relief. (“Actual patented to the technolo- licenses evidence, Having damages excluded their gy highly probative as to consti- are what party the court found that neither was royalty tutes reasonable those any damages injunction entitled to or an actual rights because such licenses most above, granted and As motions. noted clearly reflect the economic value of the on the basis of our reversal of the district patented technology marketplace.”). decisions, admissibility court’s we vacate case, example, For this other Motorola’s grant summary judgment the court’s of only would have had the of option licensees regarding damages for Apple’s '949 and releasing phone on the Verizon network. patents pat- '263 and for Motorola’s '898 Thus, royalty agreed rate to in these All ent. that remains is the district court’s licenses, assuming licensing the overall sit- grant summary judgment Apple of factually comparable, uation is would nec- any damages was not entitled to for in- essarily account for the of non- cost fringement of the '647 patent and infringing alternative. party injunction. neither was entitled to an below, As discussed we reverse the court’s Here, whether these licenses are suffi- that Apple any decision was not entitled to ciently comparable such that Motorola’s damages, infringement pat- of the '647 royalty calculation is a goes reasonable ent, vacate its decision that was not evidence, weight not its admissi- injunction, entitled to an and affirm its ActiveVideo, bility. See 694 F.3d decision that Motorola is not entitled to an analysis comparable Mulhern’s licenses injunction. methods,” principles used “reliable and reliably applied them to sufficient Summary judgment is “if appropriate facts and data on the record to calculate pleadings, depositions, to in- answers patent, the overall value of the '898 includ- file, terrogatories, and admissions on to- ing of non-infringing the cost alternatives. affidavits, gether if any, with the show that Fed.R.Evid. 702. With the of Apple’s aid genuine any there is no issue as to materi- expert testimony, cross-examination and al fact moving party and that the is enti- jury capable is assigning appro- judgment tled to a as a matter of law.” priate weight testimony to Mulhern’s 56(c). review the district We Fed.R.Civ.P. upon judgment grant summary judgment based their of her credibili- court’s under law, ty, analysis, factual circuit that of regional and conclusions. which is assumed, MicroStrategy, fringement requires e.g., statute Circuit. Seventh S.A., damages the court to award “in no event Objects, Inc. v. Bus. (Fed.Cir.2005). Circuit royalty.” The Seventh less than a reasonable U.S.C. 284; Co., summary judgment § de grant reviews a see also Dow Chemical See, e.g., Feliberty Kemper Corp., v. (noting novo. F.3d at 1381-82 that a district Cir.1996) (“When (7th we obligated damages court is to award once summary grant found, review a district court’s infringement reversing is the record accord- judgment, we consider finding damages of no that was based ing employed evidence). to the same standards expert a lack of Because no court.”). district royalty than a required, less reasonable royal

the fact finder must determine what *38 ty supported by is the record. Norian See Apple’s '647 Patent 1321, Corp. Stryker v. Corp., 363 F.3d 1333 summary judgment for Motorola moved (Fed.Cir.2004) (holding jury’s that “the that, was assuming patent even the '647 finding damages sup of no cannot be any to infringed, Apple was not entitled ported” requires because “the statute a nominal reasonable damages, including damages to a in a pat successful claimant royalty. argued Apple Motorola was infringement not than ent suit shall be less damages because there was not entitled to Riles, royalty”); a reasonable at 298 F.3d rely Apple may “no evidence which (“The guarantees patentees 1311 statute a any measure amount reliably establish or royalty they reasonable even when are the '647 damages” infringement prove profits unable to entitlement to lost patent. rate.”); royalty or an established Linde mann GmbH v. Am. Maschinenfabrik and con agreed The district court Co., Hoist & Derrick 895 F.2d any not Apple cluded that was entitled (Fed.Cir.1990) (“In law, the fact of damages because had measure infringement establishes the fact dam damages failed to show that its measure of age patentee’s right because the to exclude disagree and hold that a was correct. We violated.”); Patent has been Annotated finding royalty may that a estimate suffer (“When Digest, patentee § a shows 30:7 not, itself, by sup factual flaws does from infringement, presumption arises port legal conclusion that zero is a to some form of patentee is entitled royalty. Co. v. reasonable See Dow Chem. damages. The Federal Circuit has ex Indus., Inc., 1370, 1382, n. 4 Mee 341 F.3d from plained presumption that this arises (Fed.Cir.2003) (“However, the fact that the infringement the statute once is admitted agreement support specific did proven.”). by not there requested amount Dow does any support mean that it does not fails patentee’s If a evidence all.”). award at estimate, royalty support specific required to determine fact finder is still procedural Due to the posture case, royalty supported by the record.6 patents that the at what is we must assume Chem., infringed. in- Dow 341 F.3d at 1381-82 issue are valid and With See Co., contrast, patentee profits 727 F.2d By if a seeks lost Inc. v. A. Stucki burden, (Fed.Cir.1984) (affirming district court deci- and fails to meet its then an award of Dynamics, awarding profits, lack of profits justified. no lost due to no lost See R.R. sion (“The Thus, unequivocal statute is that the dis a fact finder award no damages trict award damages only court must when the supports record than a royal amount no less reasonable royalty zero award. For in a example, Norian, ty.”); 1333; at 363 F.3d Linde completely lacking any case evidence on Maschinenfabrik, 1406; award, mann F.2d at which damages to base a the record Avionics, Quinton Inc. v. Del Mar Instru may support royalty well zero award. Co., (Fed.Cir. ment Also, that, could record demonstrate 1987) (“The requirement to determine ac infringement, the time of the defendant damages tual is not diminished difficul considered valueless and the determination.”). Indeed, ty if the rec patentee would have accepted payment no fully support ord evidence does not either infringement. defendant’s Of estimate, party’s royalty the fact finder course, it unlikely seems that a willing must still determine what constitutes a licensor willing licensee agree would royalty reasonable from the record evi royalty a zero payment hypothetical Diagnostics, dence. See SmithKline Inc. negotiation, infringement where both Corp., v. Helena Labs. validity are assumed.7 (Fed.Cir.1991) (“[T]he 1167-68 factual de royalty,

termination of a reasonable how At summary judgment, as is *39 ever, indeed, need not be supported, and here, the case a judge may only a award frequently supported by is not the specific royalty zero for infringement if there is no figures by party.... advanced either genuine issue of material fact that zero is reject district court the ex [T]he only Thus, royalty. if reasonable a figures proffered by litigants treme as patentee raises a regarding factual issue incredible and an substitute intermediate any whether it is due royalty, non-zero figure as a matter of judgment its from all summary judgment must be denied. evidence.”). if Certainly, paten- any event, simply a patentee because fails weak, proof tee’s is the court is free to to show that its royalty estimate is correct low, nominal, award a perhaps royalty, as not, itself, by does justify awarding roy a long royalty as that supported alty summary of zero at judgment, as the record. See Lindemann Chem., court district did here. See Dow Maschinenfa brik, 895 F.2d at 1407-08 (affirming 341 F.3d at 1382 n. 4. $10,000 royalty reasonable award because

patentee failed provide to sufficient evi appeal, On Apple points out that award). support greater dence to a not all damages expert testimony of its proof, awarding royalty); (finding but reasonable jury royalty Gus award inconsistent 0% Prods., Inc., tafson, Intersystem Inc. v. Indus. finding infringement jury with instruc 508, (1990) (finding, 509-10 in the jury tion that the choose rate between 6% context, profits lost "no reversible error in the 15%). Corp. But see Devex v. Gen. Motors awarding damages district court’s ... no to 347, (3d Cir.1981) ("In Corp., 667 F.2d proven”). Gustafson because none were This any the absence of evidence as to what would profits is because a lost award is above and royalty given constitute a reasonable in a beyond royalty required the reasonable floor case, a fact finder would have no means of by the statute. arriving royalty, at a reasonable and none awarded.”), grounds, could be on other affd 7. We note that we know of no case where we 461 U.S. 103 S.Ct. 76 L.Ed.2d 211 supported infringe found that the record an (1983). Id.; ment award royalty. of a zero see also DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Da Sofamor nek, Inc., (Fed.Cir.2009) (N.D.Ill.2012) Specifically, F.Supp.2d (“Apple the '647 was excluded. presented has not admissible evidence that expert report, prepared Nap- Apple’s Georgiar-Pacific support factors royalty upon estimated a based per, claim.”). damages allegedly smartphone took another time manufacturer, (“HTC”), Corporation HTC support The record before us does not patent. around the design same granting summary judgment of no dam- Trade United States International Com- ages. Motorola has not met its burden of (“ITC”) mission issued exclusion order demonstrating, party as the who moved for against upon infringement HTC based summary judgment, that the un- record is patent, patent Apple the '647 the same only controverted that zero is the reason- royalty. able gave asserts here. The ITC HTC four- grace period

month before the exclusion incorrectly Other than asserting that this, upon Nap- took effect. order Based evidence, Apple expert has no admissible per concluded that four months was rele- Motorola itself provides no evidence or designing vant timeframe for around the argument support royalty. a zero For patent. Napper '647 that noted HTC and example, nothing there is in the record likely Motorola would have re- similar suggesting would have been to develop design Nap- sources around. willing accept no payment for Motoro- per estimated that Motorola would lose infringement. la’s Nor any is there evi- that, dence at the operating profit infringement, million based time of $52 Motorola concluded the '647 products the removal of its accused from had no value. contrary, Apple To the has the market four-month period. expert indicating evidence on record that it Accordingly, Napper concluded Moto- design would take four months to around rola willing pay would be million $52 patent. Apple’s expert the '647 estimated royalty. *40 profit lost during Motorola this The district court noted that it did not design period upon around based Motoro- aspect Napper’s proposed exclude this of figures la’s sales for the accused devices. Nevertheless, testimony. the court dis- evidence, Apple presented arguing also testimony credited the because the ITC’s injunction, for an that the claimed features claim construction differed from patent of the '647 drive consumer demand products. specific for its The reasonable Napper court’s and because failed to suffi- royalty any this—and other record evi- ciently any address differences between supports a factual question is re- the two companies, HTC and Motorola. dence— jury. served for the not, however, identify any The court did differences between HTC and Motorola problems The that the district court Napper’s royalty that undermined esti- Apple’s royalty identifies with HTC-based Apple mate. The court determined that (a estimate different claim construction be- not any was entitled to measure of dam- potential fore the ITC and differences be- it ages proven Motorola) because had not its HTC- only tween HTC and serve royalty based estimate was correct. See disputes illustrate that factual remain.8 Motorola, Inc., Hence, Apple, Inc. v. that district court’s conclusion missible, tacitly acknowledges by argu- factually 8. Motorola flawed. that is ing appeal Apple’s on that evidence is inad- sum, In Motorola has not demonstrated estimate was flawed Apple’s HTC-based law, establish, as a matter of genuine does not that there is no issue of material Norian, at royalty.9 See zero fact whether a reason- regarding zero is Chem,., 4; 1333; F.3d at 1382 n. Dow royalty infringement able for of the '647 (“The Mar, at trial Del presented Motorola no patent. evidence if required approximate, neces- court is royalty. zero was reasonable sary, the amount to which own- contrast, Apple presented admissible evi- entitled.”). Apple Even if had not er is roy- dence that it is entitled to a non-zero evidence, expert this alone submitted alty. Apple’s royalty That estimate that zero is a support finding would not not, by suffer from factual it- flaws does Chem., royalty. See Dow reasonable self, support legal conclusion that zero (reversing award of no 1381-82 royalty. Accordingly, is reasonable we upon based a lack of damages, which was grant reverse the district court’s of sum- evidence, expert remanding admissible mary judgment. royalty); for of 7 Donald S. determination § Chisum, Patents Chisum on 20.07[3][a] Injunction Apple’s Request for (2011) (“In considering question evi- certainty proof required dence and granted The district court Moto justify royalty, an award of a reasonable summary motion judgment rola’s (1) distinguish should between the ex- one injunction was not entitled to an damage to a which will patentee istence of '949, infringement of the and '647 '263 (2) support any evidentiary award and patents Apple had failed to show a because or quantity for a rate particular support any alleged irrepara causal nexus between issue, royalty. As to the first a reasonable harm infringement. ble and Motorola’s required. The specific proof no should analysis The district court’s necessarily re premise royalty measure the reasonable overly lied narrow construction of infringed is that a holder of a valid and patent. the claims of the '949 We have inherently legal suffered dam- has reversed the court’s claim construction de age at least to the extent of a lost license cision, altering potential scope thus royalty opportunity.”); Annotated Patent infringement injunction underlying Apple’s (“The Digest, expert § 44:79 use of testi- request. scope infringement per Thus, mony permissive. patentee’s if a injunction analysis. e.g., meates an excluded, fact damage expert is does *41 Co., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. automatically deny patentee right a a (Fed.Cir.2013) (“[T]he purpose 1363 damages.”); to recover Fed.R.Evid. of the causal requirement nexus is to show (“A qualified expert witness who is as an patentee irreparably by that the is harmed skill, by knowledge, experience, training, infringement.”) in (emphasis original). may (emphasis or education testify.”) add- example, considering For when whether to (“The ed); may § court U.S.C. enjoin product, a it proper is for the court expert testimony receive an to the aid aggregate by to consider the harm caused damages roy- determination of of or what features, infringing all of the rather than alty would be under the cir- reasonable cumstances.”) added). a (emphasis requiring patentee pat- to address each situation, answering question pointing 9. We would be a different law. In that to flaws in Napper's Napper’s analysis enough justify if had Motorola moved that HTC- could be summary judgment. based calculation was incorrect as a matter of individually. permanent injunction, claim See id. at 1365 an stating ent or that “a (“We (1) plaintiff there be circumstances believe must demonstrate: that it has (2) logical equitable and to view an irreparable injury; where it is suffered law, patents aggregate.”). remedies available at such as mone tary damages, are inadequate compen of a Infringement multiple patents (3) that, injury; sate for that considering single may strengthen patentee’s device hardships balance of between the argument injunction by, for an for exam- plaintiff defendant, remedy and in equity in- ple, supporting argument its that the (4) warranted; is public that the inter fringed features drive consumer demand est would not be disserved a permanent causing irreparable By or are harm. Id. injunction.” 388, 391, 547 U.S. 126 S.Ct. token, we im- same also consider the (2006). 1837, 164L.Ed.2d 641 pact general public injunction on the of an product many non-infringing and, on a with thus, The '898 is a SEP (“We features. See id. at see no agreed fair, 1372-73 Motorola has to license it on decision, reasonable, problem with the district court’s nondiseriminatory licens- (“FRAND”) determining injunction whether an ing terms. The district court interest, public granted motion, Apple’s would disserve con- stating: scope Apple’s sider the of in- requested how, FRAND, I given don’t see I would junction pat- relative to the scope justified in enjoining Apple be from in- prospect ented features and the that an fringing Apple the '898 unless refuses to injunction depriv- would have the effect of pay royalty that meets the FRAND ing public large of access to a number requirement. By committing to license features.”). non-infringing terms, patents on FRAND Motorola anyone committed to license the '898 to Accordingly, because we have reversed willing pay a FRAND royalty and the district court’s construction of the '949 implicitly acknowledged roy- thus patent, we grant summary vacate its alty adequate compensation for a li- judgment regarding Apple’s request for an patent. cense to use that How could it injunction. do otherwise? How could it permit- enjoin Apple using ted to from an inven- Request Injunction Motorola’s for an tion that it if Apple contends must use summary for judg moved phone wants to make a cell with UMTS ment that Motorola was not entitled to an capability telecommunications —without injunction infringement pat of the '898 which phone. it would not be cell ent. While we review the district court’s (em- Inc., Apple, F.Supp.2d at 913-14 grant deny injunction decision to an phases original). discretion, Corp. abuse Lab. Am. Holdings Corp., *42 v. Chiron To that the extent district court (Fed.Cir.2004), applied per injunctions we review the district rule that se are SEPs, grant summary judgment court’s it de unavailable for erred. While Mo- novo, Feliberty, 98 F.3d at 276. The Su torola’s FRAND commitments are certain- preme eBay ly in Inc. v. Court MercEx criteria relevant to its entitlement to an create, change, injunction, L.L.C. outlined the factors a dis no we see reason to as trict court should issuing urge, separate consider before some amici rule or ana- injunc- Considering large harm. number addressing framework for ble

lytical already that patents. industry participants tions for FRAND-committed are Supreme laid out Court in using system pat- framework claimed the '898 interpreted by subsequent de- eBay, ent, in as including competitors, Motorola has court, provides ample cisions of this provided any adding evidence that one flexibility addressing for strength and more user would create such harm. pat- FRAND committed unique aspects of Again, agreed Motorola has to add as industry general. ents and standards many participants willing market as are to 391-94, A 126 S.Ct. 1837. U.S. royalty. argues pay FRAND Motorola subject commitments patentee to FRAND Apple accept that has refused to its initial difficulty establishing irrepara- may have licensing negotiations. offer and stalled hand, injunc- ble harm. the other an On However, negotia- the record reflects may justified infringer where an tion ongoing, tions have been and there is no royalty unilaterally refuses FRAND been, example, evidence that has for unreasonably delays negotiations to the unilaterally refusing agree deal. See, e.g., Dep’t same effect. U.S. of Jus- Consequently, we affirm the district tice and U.S. Patent and Trademark Of- grant summary judgment court’s fice, Policy Statement on Remedies for injunction Motorola is not entitled to an Subject Patents Standardr-Essential infringement patent. of the '898 Commitments, Voluntary at 7-8 F/RAND AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED- (Jan. 2013). clear, To be this does not IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND alleged infringer’s mean that an refusal to REMANDED accept any necessarily justi- license offer injunction. issuing example, fies an For on

the license offered not be FRAND Costs addition, an in- public terms. has Each party shall bear its own costs. in encouraging participation terest in stan- dard-setting organizations but also in en- RADER, Judge, dissenting-in- Chief

suring that are SEPs not overvalued. part. concerns, important are While these capable district courts are more than join I opinion entirety, the court’s considering factual these issues when de- except for the affirmance of the district injunction ciding whether to issue an under request court’s denial of Motorola’s for an principles eBay. injunction. my eyes, To the record con- genu- tains sufficient evidence to create a here,

Applying principles agree those we dispute Apple’s ine of material fact on with the district court that Motorola is not posture unwilling an as licensee whose injunction infringement entitled to infringement continued of the '898 patent. of the '898 Motorola’s FRAND irreparable caused harm. Because of the commitments, yielded many which have intensely factual unique circumstances agreements encompassing license the '898 surrounding patents adopted industry patent, strongly suggest money dam- standards, I im- believe the district court ages adequate fully compensate are Mo- properly granted summary judgment. any infringement. Similarly, torola for Therefore, I point, respect- on this narrow Ap- Motorola has not demonstrated that ple’s infringement irrepara- fully part. dissent in has caused *43 standardization). outset, adopted complex as a These same a At the questions up” factual “hold by regarding value vir- undoubtedly gains standard injunc- highly “hold out” are relevant to an enhancement adoption. This tue of sum, request. differentiating tion In “hold of the technolo- the evaluation complicates up” requires from “hold out” some factual By of the standardization. gy independent analysis of the sources of value—the inven- token, deci- the standardization the same tive advance or the standardization. and validate simply also reflect sion technology ad- the inherent value The record in this case shows evidence patent. Untan- accomplished vance Apple may have been a hold out. (at components the heart gling these value Motorola, Inc., Inc. v. e.g., Apple, putative a licensee was deciding whether (N.D.Ill.2012); Appel F.Supp.2d license, irreparable and thus “unwilling” to 64-65, 72-73; Br. Appellees’ Reply lees’ factors) injunction re- harm and other 26-27; This Br. J.A. 118884-86. evidence com- analysis economic quires intense material dispute alone would create a sum, theoret- right In from the plex facts. fact. outset, likely to be question is not ical More the district court made adjudication. important, summary to susceptible the value due to no effort differentiate an legal principles In for reciting from value inventive contribution due accurately injunction, this court states to standardization. some atten- Without principles supply per no inquiries. Those perhaps dispositive question, tion to that in- favoring proscribing rule either or se map, the trial court was adrift without any setting, let junctions patents system. In compass let alone a or GPS of stan- heightened complexity alone the fact, inquiry, without that critical the dis- technology. This court notes dardized properly applied trict court could not have in a context that a owner standard eBay test as it should have. “may difficulty establishing irrepara- have proper injunction analysis, of a Instead injunction may harm .... an [but] ble effectively the district court considered infringer unilaterally re- justified where an FRAND commitment as dis- Motorola’s unreasonably royalty a FRAND or fuses by itself: “Motorola committed to positive delays negotiations to the same effect.” anyone willing pay license '898 Dep’t of Majority Op. (citing U.S. implicitly ac- royalty FRAND and thus Patent and Trademark Justice and U.S. knowledged royalty adequate that a is Office, Policy on Remedies Statement pat- a license to use that compensation for Subject Patents Standard Essential Apple, ent. How could it do otherwise?” Commitments, at Voluntary 7-8 F/RAND contrary, F.Supp.2d at 914. To 2013)). (Jan. 8, a FRAND Motorola committed to offer analysts Market will no doubt observe license, is begs question: which What (i.e., unwilling that a “hold out” an licensee If Mo- royalty? and “reasonable” “fair” to avoid a license based seeking offering of an SEP a fair and reasonable torola was technological likely “refusing] advance royalty, on the value that the then was art) unreasonably prior equally royalty as de- contributed to the FRAND (i.e., Majority Op. up” laying] negotiations.” See likely disruptive “hold sum, court could not unjustified royal- the district demanding owner SEP address; that it did not question duck the solely based on value contributed ties *44 1334 However, actually respectfully FRAND offer I

was Motorola’s dissent with re- spect proper to the construction of the FRAND? “heuristic” claim terms in the '949 patent. Furthermore, the district court acknowl- I Additionally, majority’s dissent from the conflicting Ap- edged the evidence about to vacate the district court’s grant decision ple’s willingness patent: to license '898 summary judgment regarding Apple’s negotiate to for a license “Apple’s refusal request injunction, for an Ias would affirm (if parties compet- it did refuse —the offer I depart that decision. As also from the accounts, unnecessary for me to re- ing majority’s reasoning reaching the while down) solve, why negotiations broke was issues, same result on several other I write claim by not a defense to a Motorola for a separately explain my to views. royalty.” Apple, F.Supp.2d FRAND scenario, adequately pre- at 914. Yet this I. Claim Construction record, precisely sented one that of The '949 Patent today court acknowledges may justify injunction. an A. “Means-Plus-Function” my opinion, the court should have majority The concludes that the “heuris- prove allowed Motorola to that was tic” claim terms the '949 have licensee, unwilling strongly which would sufficiently definite structure to avoid support injunction request. court means-plus-function Majority treatment. negoti- states “the record reflects that Op. I disagree. ongoing,” Majority Op. ations have been 1332; but, as the district court ac- even matter, majority As an initial mis- knowledged, Motorola asserts otherwise— states our means-plus-function law on years that Apple negotiate refused to claiming. Generally speaking, means- infringing while nevertheless pat- '898 plus-function analysis proceeds two ent, see, 64-65, 72-73; e.g., Appellees’ Br. first, phases: the court must determine Appellees’ Reply Br. 26-27. Motorola whether the claim term is drafted in should opportunity prove have had the to means-plus-function format such that 35 its case that Apple’s alleged unwillingness ¶ § 112 applies. U.S.C. See Kemco negotiate supports license or even a Sales, Co., Papers Inc. v. Control showing money damages are inade- (Fed.Cir.2000) (“Before a court quate it irreparable suffered attempts analyze appears what to be a harm. The district court refused to devel- limitation, means-plus-function claim op the necessary apply eBay facts as it must first assure itself that such claim Consequently, should have. the case issue.”). Only limitation is at then should should be remanded to develop that rec- the court disput- undertake to construe the reasons, ord. For these I respectfully dis- ed claim term identifying the “corre- sent in part. structure, material, sponding or acts de- specification”

scribed in the to which the claim term will be limited. Welker Bear- PROST, Judge, Circuit concurring-in- PHD, Inc., ing v.Co. part and dissenting-in-part. (Fed.Cir.2008) (“Because ‘mechanism for join I majority opinion respect with moving finger’ said means-plus-func- is a many limitation, of the issues discussed therein. tion this court must next exam- put, By ine the trial court’s identification ‘the or connections.” Id. at 1298-99. *45 structure, material, contrast, states, majority or the “if corresponding acts the claim merely generic recites a nonce word and specification equiva- described in the ”). the claim remaining language, specifica- lents thereof.’ tion, prosecution history, and relevant ex- Although majority accurately states the ternal provide evidence no further struc- Majority Op. see legal principles, these description person tural to a ordinary faithfully apply it them. fails art, skill in presumption the then the Rather, majority’s analysis collapses the against means-plus-function claiming is re- one, so, steps doing these into and in it two butted.” Id. at 1300. effectively category the of non- renders effect, In majority what the has done is claim means-plus-function indefinite terms imported step the second analysis the a null set. (where you scope define the of a means- majority correctly The states that the plus-function claim term based on the cor- in proper inquiry determining whether a responding specification) structure the claim in means-plus-func- term is drafted (where step into the first you identify tion format is whether the limitation has whether the term is drafted in means-plus- “sufficiently Majority definite structure.” format). function majority’s analysis The majority The then Op. 1297-98. identifies implies long that so as a claim term has ways in may several which term corresponding specifica- structure the structure, deemed to have such such as tion, means-plus-function it is not a limita- “a when has structural definition that is tion.1 But such a rule would every render either provided specification gen- the means-plus-function claim term indefinite. art,” erally in the when it “out- known majority’s approach, Under a term flowchart, algorithm, spe- an or a lin[es] only a means-plus-func- would be deemed rules,” cific set of instructions or or when if it corresponding tion limitation has no lim- specification the claim “describ[es] structure —an absurd result that would operation, input, means-plus-function claiming.2 itation’s such as its out- eviscerate (Fed.Cir.2011), Admittedly, majority suggests 1. that "it is 659 F.3d for the possible proposition to find that a claim limitation does that a claim contain suffi- sufficiently means-plus-function not connote definite structure de- cient structure to avoid claiming by reciting algorithm. Majority spite presence corresponding an of some However, Op. term at specification.” Op. 1298-99. claim Majority structure in the in that case was "means for cross-refer- issue majority’s analysis 1297. But the actual encing,” disputed which no one was a means- sufficiently identify how to definite structure plus-function limitation. This court's search means-plus-function sug- to avoid treatment algorithm support for an that claim term gests opposite that the is true. merely attempt was to save the means- Nothing clearly majori- so demonstrates the plus-function term from indefiniteness. See ty's confusion on this issue cases on Touch, Typhoon 659 F.3d at The 1385-86. support which it relies. of its view that a Corp. same is true of Finisar v. DirecTV specification court must scour the for corre- Inc., (Fed.Cir.2008), Group, 523 F.3d 1323 on sponding structure in order to save claim majority which the also relies. Id. at 1340 treatment, means-plus-function term from (evaluating “computer-implemented whether majority attempt- cites several cases that were means-plus-function claims” disclosed ing identify corresponding structure of enough algorithm provide of an the neces- ¶ 112, 6). undisputedly means-plus-function sary majori- § claim structure under example, majority Typ- ty's misreading terms. For cites of these cases is all the more Dell, Inc., Technologies, striking hoon Touch Inc. v. because it is the same error the ma- 2004) analysis, (quoting there Personalized Media legal Applying proper Comm’n, Commc’ns, limita- that the heuristic v. Int’l Trade can be little doubt LLC (Fed.Cir.1998)). limitations. means-plus-function tions are Follow- this, ing we have found that terms such as with, true that the absence begin To it is unit,” Inventio, “computing claim disputed in the of the word “means” circuit,” 1359-60, and “soft start Power these presumption terms creates Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semicon- means-plus-function limitations. are not *46 International, Inc., ductor ThyssenKrupp Eleva- See Inventio AG v. (Fed.Cir.2013), connote sufficient 1365 (Fed. 1350, 1356 Corp., tor Ams. means-plus-function structure to avoid Cir.2011). However, undisputed that it is hand, treatment. On the other terms such limitations recite functions the heuristics mechanism,” “colorant selection Massa- as performed by (e.g., the heuristics “deter- Technology Institute v. Abacus chusetts of con- finger that the one or more mining (Fed.Cir. Software, 462 F.3d 1353-54 correspond to a command to transi- tacts 2006), moving and “mechanism for said respective item in a displaying tion from Bearing, finger,” Welker 550 F.3d at 1095- displaying a next item in set items 97, have failed to recite structure sufficient items”). question The relevant the set means-plus-function to avoid treatment. whether the claim to re- therefore is fails performing structure for cite sufficient heuristic, The term which district functions, pre- in which case the those applied court construed as “rules to be against means-plus-function sumption drawing data to assist in inferences from id. treatment would be overcome. See data,” vague concept that is a that does not known, in physical connote structure previously explained: As have we way “computing same as the terms unit” important the term What is is whether Rather, or “circuit.” the term heuristic is is one that is understood to describe imprecise much more similar to the terms structure, opposed to a term that is “means,” “mechanism,” and “element.” simply a nonce word or a verbal con- Therefore, I would affirm the district recognized struct that is not as the name that court’s conclusion the heuristic limita- simply of structure a substitute subject means-plus-function tions are for the for.” The court in term “means treatment. Personalized Media Communications in pertinent holding drew the distinction If, majority my as the concludes—in “detector,” although that the term incorrectly precedent view dictates —our broad, purposes is still structural for in that the “heuristic” limitations the '949 ¶ ge- 112 it “is not a section 6 because subject means-plus-func- patent are ‘means,’ neric structural such as term treatment, perhaps tion then is time to ‘element,’ ‘device’; nor is it a coined language revisit the issue of when claim meaning term a clear such as lacking ¶ 6, § 112 particularly comput- invokes for “ ‘widget’or ‘ram-a-fram.’ er-implemented explained inventions. As above, World, I see no real difference between the Lighting Light- Inc. v. Birchwood Inc., (Fed.Cir. ing, following two claim limitations: F.3d (Fed.Cir.2008). jority committing gy, Ma- accuses the district court of reading Technologies in its of Aristocrat Aus- jority Op. 1298. Pty tralia Ltd. v. International Game Technolo- determining necessary “structure” that removed a next item means means-plus-func- claim term from the corre- finger contacts the one or more Majority Op. altogether. tion realm from to transition spond to a command 1301- 02.3 in a set of respective item displaying in the a next item set displaying

items to recently Lemley Professor has written items; in claiming on the issue of functional soft- determining a next item heuristic Lemley, patents. ware Mark A. Software finger or more contacts the one Patents and the Return Functional to transition correspond to command Claiming, 2013 Wis. L.Rev. 905 (2013). He item in a displaying respective from case law acknowledges this court’s recent item in displaying items to next “vigilant limiting set of have been which we patentees the set of items. software who write claims means-plus-function particu- format to the surely would be con- The first limitation algorithms implement lar those limitation. means-plus-function as a strued *47 However, he notes claims.” Id. at 926. Yet, pro- second limitation although the many involving pat- that in cases software first, than the no more real structure vides ents, we have not treated claims as means- that it is outside majority the concludes all, plus-function leading prob- claims at to ¶ §of 112 6. the realm patents: lems of overbroad drafting greatly minor decision That one in form presence The of structure the of the claim limitation expands scope the computer” processor” “a or “a or even limited to the because the claim is not Federal “the Internet” has led the Cir- in structure disclosed the corresponding cuit claims control over the give to these Indeed, the under patent specification. implemented. function claimed however view, provides a stark majority’s this case result, have cir- patents As a software applicants are able example patent of how Act places cumvented the limits the 1952 functionality being without to claim broad has claiming. on functional The result § 112 subject imposed to the restraints plethora patents a of software been ¶ majority, interpreted by 6. As of the technolo- claimed not on the basis limitation in claim “next item heuristic” actually developed, but gy patentee heuristic used a touch- any covers function that technol- on the basis of the “one or screen device to determine that lim- Those claims aren’t ogy performs. correspond to a com- finger more contacts or commensurate with what the ited to displaying from a re- mand to transition invented, they patentee are accord- displaying in to spective item a set of items patent plaintiffs tend ingly the ones yet, items.” And a next item the set of sys- whose against to assert defendants undisputed patent specification that the to bear little resemblance what tems swipe only discloses two such heuristics: actually [UJnder invented.... patentee tap right on the rubric the soft- right claiming from to left and functional fact, actual tech- majority patents ware with the least side of the screen. up with the broadest as nical content end exactly relied on those two heuristics “heuristic,” means-plus-func- the term is majority Oddly, defining ruled that 3. limitation, means for states that it “does not include all can indeed be con- tion term Majority performing function.” the recited broadly. so strued course, Op. this court has 1301. But of once viewing image by func- initiate of the next mak- breadth is a monopoly claims: “Its right from left ing swipe gesture specification.” tion of lack of technical added)). image.” (emphases on the Never- (footnotes omitted) (quoting Id. at 926-28 theless, rejected the district court the hori- & Herbert Hoven- Christina Bohannan swipe corresponding zontal structure Pro- Restraint: kamp, Creation Without claimed next item heuristic. The for the Liberty Rivalry in Innovation moting that a horizontal district court reasoned (“[Platen- (2012)); also id. at 905 see scope fell within the of anoth- finger swipe machine, particular claim to own not a tees namely heuristic the “two-di- er claimed steps particular or even a series mensional screen translation heuristic” goal but the achieving goal, itself. prior claim limitation. The district patents overlap and resulting overbroad court did not see how “the same user thickets.”). I create believe Profes- finger movement understood [could be] Lemley sor raises valid concerns about separate communicate two commands.” means-plus-function jurispru- this court’s Therefore, the court limited the J.A. computer-implement- dence as it relates to corresponding next item heuristic’s struc- majority Although ed inventions. here input ture to “a heuristic that uses as one generic did not base its conclusion on such finger tap right a user’s on the side of the computer” structural terms as “a or “a device’s touch screen.” J.A. 94. processor,” the end result is the same: Apple’s broadly '949 is construed Apple argues agree I —and —that performed by cover the the heu- court district failed consider function *48 ristics, specific not the heuristics disclosed in might apply heuristics different scenar- in specification. the This outcome should example, describing in photo ios. For the compel court to reconsider we our when application Figure depicted album 16A means-plus-func- treat functional claims as patent, specification of the '949 the ex- tion claims. plains viewing that the user can “initiate of image by making swipe gesture

the next Corresponding B. Structure right image.” 1616 from to left on the specifica- '949 col. 3411.14-16. The Because I would affirm the district however, goes explain, tion on to that “if court’s that the limi- conclusion heuristics just portion image displayed, of 1606 is limitations, means-plus-function tations are response detecting finger drag or I Apple’s would therefore reach alternative 1626), swipe (e.g., portion displayed of argument regarding corresponding image is translated accordance with structure for the term “next item heuris- drag swipe gesture the direction of the or tic.” vertical, horizontal, (e.g., diagonal trans- lation).” Id. at col. 11.19-24. patent specification The '949 contains other words, examples swipe two of a next item heuristic: a a horizontal will be treated tap right differently depending on the side of the touchscreen on whether a full a right-to-left swipe. image displayed and horizontal is or the user has zoomed (“In e.g., image. '949 col. 3411. in on a of There portion 12-16 some embodiments, nothing language requires the user can also initiate in the claim that viewing image by of the next that making tap the “two-dimensional screen transla- gesture right image. on the of the tion heuristic” “next item heuristic” side embodiments, Therefore, In some can also in the same context. I apply user ruling scope reverse the district court’s decision court’s that the of would the corre- corresponding structure to a sponding to limit the structure for the “next item heu- screen, right finger tap on the side ristic” is limited to a tap right-hand on the summary- grant reverse the and would Thus, side although of the screen. I arrive the ac- judgment non-infringement at the outcome in a way, different I concur products “swipe” gesture that use a cused in the majority’s conclusion that the dis- as a next item heuristic. trict court’s exclusion of Napper’s testimo-

ny must be reversed and remanded on the basis of its claim erroneous construction. ExpeRT Admissibility Testimony II. RELATING TO THE '949 PATENT However, majority, unlike the I do not believe the district court abused its discre- judgment I concur in the revers- While in excluding Napper’s tion testimony as ing remanding the district court’s ex- unreliable. The district court determined testimony Apple’s expert, clusion of the Napper’s Magic reliance on the Napper, Brian based on his erroneous Trackpad to calculate the value of the construction, separately claim I write functionality claimed was unreliable be- my agreement note with the district court product cause that sufficiently was not a Napper’s Magic reliance on the comparable Specifically, benchmark. Trackpad inherently was unreliable. court said: majority The concludes the district Napper’s proposed testimony does not in excluding testimony court erred provide a reliable for inferring basis Brian Apple’s expert, Napper, for two rea- value even of the scrolling vertical fea- First, analysis sons. district court’s ture. fact that many consumers was based on an incorrect claim construc- pay Magic will more for a Trackpad Majority Op. tion. 1315-16. Specifically, nothing than for a mouse tells one about court for fail- Napper district criticized they pay occasionally what will to avoid ing to isolate the value to consumers of the unsuccessfully swiping because their “tap functionality, for next item” and for *49 swiping finger actually wasn’t vertical to failing to consider alternatives to a $35 Maybe the screen. consumers would royalty million that would enable Motorola $2, pay they but there is no evidence provide functionality. this See J.A. 112- would, by or at least none furnished 14. These criticisms were based on the Napper. district court’s conclusion that the '949

patent’s claimed “next item heuristic” was J.A. 115. claim means-plus-function that was limit- precedent It is true that our supports to a on tap right-hand

ed side of the looking to the cost of benchmark commer screen to turn to the next item. See J.A. products determining cial the value of a majority 112. The determined that infringement. e.g., defendant’s claim construction was erroneous because i4i P’ship Corp., Ltd. v. the “next item heuristic” was not means- Microsoft (Fed.Cir.2010). However, 853-56 plus-function Majority Op. limitation. concedes, Apple Trackpad even “con above, explained 1304. As I would affirm tains of the function from none asserted the district court’s construction of the Response the '949 Motorola Br. means-plus- patent.” “heuristic” claim terms as limitations, (acknowl- 39; Apple Reply function but would reverse the Br. 70 see also true”). Napper argues being is that it edging Apple irreparably “[t]hat began analysis highly therefore his from harmed infringement Motorola’s be starting point. And because questionable infringing prod cause sales Motorola’s any of Trackpad does not contain causing ucts are Apple to lose market functionality, Nap- claimed the discounts share and downstream sales.4 But in or per applied get (suppos- from $20 $2 rely der to on lost market share and down edly Trackpad contains more because the harm, irreparable stream sales to show than those claimed the '949 features Apple provide must than more evidence completely arbitrary. patent) appear to be showing merely taking that Motorola is I the district Accordingly, do believe Rather, Apple. market share from Apple in concluding court abused its discretion must be able to show a causal nexus be testimony that Napper’s proposed failed to tween the allegedly inclusion of the in provide inferring a reliable basis for fringing phones features Motorola’s functionality. value of the claimed On re- III, alleged Apple. harm to See mand, I do not think it would be reversible Samsung 1360-61; 735 F.3d at Apple Inc. v. prohib- error for the district court to again (Fed.Cir. ecs., El it Apple relying from on such unreliable 2012) I) (“Sales (Apple infring lost to an testimony. ing product irreparably cannot harm pat- if buy entee consumers that product for Apple’s Request III. FOR patented reasons other than the feature. Injunctive Relief If patented feature does not drive the demand for the product, sales would be granted summary The district court lost even if offending feature were judgment Apple was not entitled to an absent from the product.”). accused injunction infringement '949, '263, patents. majority and '647 va- The district court that Apple found had grant summary cates the judgment— no linking Apple’s evidence lost market all apparently patents three —because share and downstream sales to the inclu- of its reversal of the claim construction for allegedly sion of the infringing features in patent. Majority the '949 Op. 1330-31. I phones. Motorola’s J.A. 152 (“Apple’s See dissent, respectfully affirm would good’ theory ‘feel does not indicate that grant summary judgment for all three (if infringement they of these claims were patents. infringed) Apple’s reduced sales or market share, impaired goodwill consumer to-

Apple argues presented ample Rather, Apple products.”). ward the dis- respect eBay evidence with to the factors *50 trict court “Apple complain- found that is summary outlined above to survive judg- ing that I Motorola’s as a only injunc- phones ment. will address the first whole whole,” irreparable ripped tion I off the harm —because iPhone as a which factor— view it dispositive. explained the court was insufficient be- Apple argues finding irrepara- 4. also compensate irreparable that a edies to harm. See, Co., supported by showing ble is e.g., Apple Samsung harm evidence Inc. v. Elecs. Apple (Fed.Cir.2013) policy against licensing that has a com- (Apple 1369-71 However, petitors practice III). patents. to any the three asserted I am not aware of cases Apple's willingness pat- establishing against to license the asserted policy licensing that a is, course, patents ents relevant irreparable to the second in- can show harm in the first junction inadequacy legal place. factor—the rem- accused of products infringing sell whether the features desire to cause “Motorola’s patent the '949 drive consumer demand for separate iPhone with the is compete that phones. Motorola’s legal one—from perfectly harm —and infringement.” patent harm caused any patent, Apple for the '263 cites stud- As 153. Id. at surveys purporting to ies and show the claimed invention facilitated the devel- that its evidence raises Apple contends opment popular apps for the iPhone and allegedly as to whether the genuine issue iPad, helped Apple’s in turn make which of consumer features are drivers infringing popular. Apple devices so But does not I dis products. for Motorola’s demand any studies for consumers of cite similar First, respect to the '949 agree. with assuming products. Motorola’s Even survey cites consumer evi patent, Apple that the '263 is a patent evidence shows “having a to show that purporting dence Apple’s products, driver of demand for op touchscreen interface —as superior patent mean the is a does not '263 keyboard con posed physical to a —drives products. driver of demand for Motorola’s Apple smartphones.” demand for sumers II, Apple Apple’s See 695 F.3d at 1376. evidence, however, says noth Br. 65. This only other evidence for the '263 specific features claimed ing about subjective allegedly shows Motorola’s be- v. e.g., Apple Inc. patent. the '949 using “Apple’s simplification liefs that Co., 695 F.3d Samsung Elecs. streaming technology” help gain would it II). (Fed.Cir.2012) only evi (Apple however, Apple Again, sales. Br. 67. relates Apple allegedly cites that dence alone, evidence, standing is to insufficient scrolling to “the heuristics specifically establish a causal nexus between Motoro- patent” testimony the '949 is claimed allegedly infring- incorporation la’s they executives about what from Motorola alleged harm suffered ing feature and the to consumers. thought important would I, by Apple. Apple See 678 F.3d at 1327- However, found similar Apple Br. 66. we evidence, alone, to be insufficient standing I, Apple a causal nexus in

to establish respect pat- to the '647 Similarly, with explaining: ent, that “Motorola Apple cites evidence patent’s “structure- itself’ identified the Samsung’s the evidence that em- While high “a and a priority detection feature” as important it to be to ployees believed Br. ‘differentiating’ feature.” into incorporate patented feature 29,857). Apple also cites a (quoting J.A. Samsung’s products certainly relevant describing the feature as newspaper article of nexus between the issue Apple’s prod- harm, feature[ ]” new dispositive. “cool[] it is not and market 29,893. pat- As with the '263 fo- ucts. J.A. inquiry That the relevant is because ent, is insufficient to estab- this evidence objective why as to cuses on the reasons nexus. requisite lish the sales, in- lost not on the patentee subjective why fringer’s beliefs as reasons, agree I with the dis- For these (or likely gain gained them would be Apple’s trict court evidence fails them). to whether the genuine raise a issue as *51 I features are drivers of Accordingly, agree allegedly infringing at 1327-28. products. evi- demand for Motorola’s Apple’s the district court that consumer with result, Moto- cannot show that Apple as to As a genuine dence fails to raise a issue infringement irrepara- infringer nego- has caused it would have no incentive to rola’s harm. therefore cannot meet ble tiate a license because the worst-case sce- eBay injunctive standard for relief. nario from a patent infringement lawsuit is Accordingly, I would affirm the district pay that it would have to the same amount grant summary judgment court’s of no paid it would have earlier for a license. injunctive relief. I that an disagree alleged infringer’s licensing agreement refusal enter into a to. Injunctive Request MOTOROLA’S FOR IV. justifies entering injunction an against its Relating to the '898 Patent Relief conduct, First, for several reasons. out, Apple points alleged infringer an majority’s judgment I concur in the fully challenge validity entitled to of a injunction to an Motorola is entitled agree- FRAND-committed before infringement patent. for of the '898 Ma- However, ing pay a license on that jority patent, I and so Op. sep- 1381-32. write arately my disagreement to note with the necessarily punished should not be for majority’s suggestion alleged that an in- Second, eager negotiations. less than fringer’s negotiate jus- a refusal to license many alleged there are an in- reasons injunction tifies the issuance of an after a fringer might prefer pay a FRAND finding infringement. undergoing license rather than extensive litigation, including litigation expenses, the matter, agree As an initial I with the possibility paying damages treble or at- majority that there is no need to create a torney’s they fees if are found liable for categorical patentee rule a can never infringement, willful and the risk that the injunction an obtain on a FRAND-commit- may damages fact-finder award in an Rather, patent.5 ted Id. at 71-72. higher amount than FRAND rates. FRAND commitment simply should Indeed, out, pointed as Motorola itself we factored into the eBay consideration of the previously have acknowledged a trial Moreover, I agree framework. that a damages court award an amount of straightforward application of eBay greater royalty than reasonable if neces- necessarily factors does not mean that in- sary compensate “to infringe- for junctive relief would never be for available Heublein, Inc., ment.” Stickle v. However, patent. FRAND-committed I (Fed.Cir.1983). Thus, if a trial disagree as to the circumstances under infringer court believes that an previously injunction might which an be appropriate. engaged negotiations, in bad faith it is en- argues Motorola majority —and titled to damages increase the to account agrees injunction an might be appro- —that any patentee for harm to the as a result priate alleged infringer where an “unilater- of that behavior. ally royalty refuses a FRAND or unrea- regardless, But none of these sonably delays negotiations consider- to the same effect.” monetary Id. Motorola insists that in the ations alters the fact that dam- injunction, absence of the threat ages likely adequate of an are compensate worth, pay royalty For what it’s I would note that the had "refuse[d] to that meets Thus, apply per requirement.” district court did not se rule that FRAND J.A. 140. Rather, injunctions majority suggested are unavailable SEPs. need not have that the Judge expressly injunctive applied Posner noted that district court erred insofar as it such might appropriate Apple categorical Majority Op. relief have been if rule. See 1331-32. *52 injuries. I see no patentee’s FRAND therefore, reason, why party’s pre-litiga- should negotiations conduct in license

tion availability injunctive relief.

affect the

Instead, injunction might appro- an be where, although monetary damages

priate inju- compensate patentee’s for the

could

ries, patentee is unable to collect entitled. For ex-

damages which judg-

ample, alleged infringer if an were likely

ment-proof, damages award would Or, remedy. if a defen- inadequate

be an dam- pay

dant refused to court-ordered infringe

ages being award after found patent, might FRAND a court

valid

justified including injunction part an sanctions. award of these circumstances are regardless,

But case, I present agree in this with here,

the district court under the facts irreparable

Motorola cannot show either I inadequacy damages.

harm or would affirm the district court’s denial

therefore injunctive

of Motorola’s claim for relief for patent.

the '898

Conclusion above, part I concur in

For the reasons in part.

and dissent

In re Mark T. DINSMORE

and David J. Caruso.

No. 2013-1637. Appeals,

United States Court

Federal Circuit. 10, 2014.

June En Banc

Rehearing Rehearing Aug.

Denied Dissent notes means-plus-function analysis re in the language claim invokes Whether whether the entire quires us determine ¶ question 6 is a of law that Section limitation at issue connotes “suffi claim Thys v. we review de novo. Inventio AG ciently person definite structure” to senKrupp Corp., Elevator Americas in at 1334- ordinary skill the art. Dissent (Fed.Cir.2011); Lighting naturally look to the doing, so we Inc., World, Lighting, Inc. v. Birchwood history, and rele specification, prosecution (Fed.Cir.2004). Sec lim evidence to construe the vant external ¶ tion 6 states: inquiry may be similar itation. While this structure in looking corresponding An element a claim for a combination precedent requires our specification, expressed step as a means or a claim limitation deciding whether when without performing specified function sufficiently connotes defi lacking means structure, material, or acts the recital ordinary skill person structure to a thereof, nite claim shall support such Inventio, See, e.g., 649 F.3d at in the art. corresponding be construed to cover (“It consult the intrinsic structure, material, proper or acts described record, including description, the written thereof. specification equivalents determining challenger reciting if a has re- performing when sufficient structure for

Case Details

Case Name: Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date Published: Apr 25, 2014
Citation: 757 F.3d 1286
Docket Number: 2012-1548, 2012-1549
Court Abbreviation: Fed. Cir.
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