Apperson v. City of Memphis, 1 F. Cas. 1068

Apperson v. City of Memphis

1 F. Cas. 1068 | U.S. Cir. Ct. | 1879

BBOWN, District Judge.

No doubt is en- ! tertained of the power of this court to control the execution of its process in such a manner that no local law be violated and no injustice be done to any particular taxpayer. Clearly no power exists in a state *1071•court to make any order or decree which shall interfere directly or indirectly with this mandamus, and unless the power is vested with us the tax-payer will be reme-•diless. This was the view taken by the supreme court of Tennessee in Lea v. City of Memphis, [9 Baxt. 103,] by the supreme ■court of the United States, in City of Memphis v. Brown, [97 U. S. 300. affirming: Case No. 9,415;] and also by Judge Emmons, in Brooks v. City of Memphis, [Case No. 1,954,] where the question of the taxability of merchants’ capital for these assessments was fully considered. Not only has this court the power to pass upon all questions connected incidentally with the collection of this tax, buc it is our duty to exercise that .power in such a way that no property justly subject to its burden shall escape that liability, and that those who have honestly paid their obligations shall, as far as possible, be protected. Acting upon this theory, the order of March 2, 1876, was made, •exempting the property upon which the assessment had been paid, and no reason is now perceived why tb.at order should not apply to all writs of mandamus issued from this court for the collection of this tax, whether such writs were issued before or since the making of such. The payment of these assessments having been voluntary, perhaps it would be difficult to justify this order upon technical principles of law without trenching upon another maxim — that all taxation must be uniform. But without touching upon this question, the order was upheld by the supreme court upon the .ground that it was exactly the order which Brown had asked for, and that he could not be heard to complain of it. The case -certainly presented the strongest possible ■equities for the exemption of the property in question. But we are now asked to go further (and that is the main question in the case) and exempt not only the property upon which the front foot tax was paid, but all other property of the owner to the amount of Brown's receipts or the city scrip still in his hands, so far as there is a balance still remaining unapplied to the payment of the frontage assessment upon his paved lot. It is argued that the only authority to impose this tax is derived from the act of March 18, 1873, and that by this act, the city was required to allow as valid payments, any sums so paid in satisfaction ■of special assessments. It will be observed that this act did not in terms exempt such property from assessments, for that might have laid the tax open to the charge of want of uniformity. But it sought to bring .about the same result by permitting Brown's receipts to be taken in payment. The act evidently contemplated that a tax should be laid sufficient to cover the entire cost of the improvement, including the amounts already paid by way of special assessments; in which case, the allowance of these amounts, so paid, would still leave enough to pay Brown the balance due him. Indeed. the certificates of indebtedness issued under the provisions of the ordinance of June 29, 1873, passed in accordance with the above act, provided upon their face that they should be receivable only in payment <»f any tax that might be levied by the city of Memphis to cover the entire cost of laying the said pavements. This course, however, was not pursued. A tax was laid sufficient simply to pay Brown the residue of his claim. Of course, he was entitled to payment in cash, and, if his receipts or city scrip were taken in liquidation of the amounts, he would realize little or nothing upon his rights. It is true,, that where the course contemplated by the act was pursued, permission was given to allow the special assessments as payments, but I do not understand that the legislature absolutely required this to be done, or that the general council intended it to be done, unless a tax was laid sufficient to cover the entire cost of the improvement. It is not true that in all cases the word “may” must be construed as “shall.” The principle adduced from the modern cases is that that exposition ought to be adopted in this case as in other cases, which carries into effect the true intent and object of the legislature in the enactment; the ordinary meaning of the language must be presumed to be intended, unless it would manifestly defeat the object of the provisions. Sedg. St. Law, p. 439; Minor v. Mechanics’ Bank of Alexandria, 1 Pet. [26 U. S.] 46, 64; Mason v. Pearson, 9 How. [50 U. S.] 248, 250. In this case, if the course marked out by the statute had been pursued, and a tax had been laid to cover the entire cost of the improvement, I should have found little difficulty in holding that the city was bound to credit the special assessments; but, where such construction would defeat the object of the writ, a different rule should be applied. This seems to have been the view adopted by Judge Trigg, in his opinion of August 23, 1877, enjoining the defendants Rawlings and Shaper from collecting anything but money in payment of this tax. While laws imposing taxation are required to be uniform, it is no objection to a tax that there is a want of uniformity in its application. For instance, a tax of twenty-five dollars is imposed upon all retail dealers in liquors. The tax is uniform, but it bears ten times heavier upon one who only does a business of a thousand dollars a year, than upon one whose sales amount to ten thousand dollars. “It is only where statutes are passed which impose taxation on false and unjust principles, or operate to produce gross inequality, so that they cannot be deemed in any sense proportionate in their effect on those who are to bear the public charges.” Cooley, Tax’n, 127. In the imposition of taxes upon real estate great inequalities fre*1072quently occur in the assessment and valuation, beyond the reach of the legislature or courts. If the collection of these mandamus taxes could be so arranged that every tax-payer holding Brown’s receipts or city scrip, could use them in payment, all would receive a like benefit; but, as has already been shown, this is now impracticable, owing to the fact that the tax was laid only sufficient to cover the balance due him upon his contracts. But to permit one to avail himself of this privilege, and to deny it to another, is to produce inequality rather than uniformity. To illustrate: A owns two lots; in front of one the pavement was laid and the assessment paid. In paying this assessment A paid one thousand dollars more than he would have paid on this lot had a general tax been laid over the whole city; he now asks that the tax now laid upon his second lot may be paid with city scrip to the amount of the thousand dollars overpaid upon the first. Upon the other hand, B owns but one lot, upon which he has paid an assessment greater by one thousand dollars that he would have paid if a general tax had been laid, but having no other property, he can only look for his thousand dollars overpaid, to the responsibility of the city. The general tax-payers, then, are called upon to make up the thousand dollars held by A in scrip, and not that held by B, simply because A happens to own another lot. I think the liability of the general tax-payers should not depend upon an accident of this kind, but that all parties holding city scrip of this issue should be placed on an equality and required to look to the city for payment. Leaving out of view the act of 1873, there seems to me no reason for holding that complainants are entitled to set off assessments illegally but voluntarily paid. The general law is well settled that no set-off is admissible against demands for taxes, as they are not in the nature of contracts between party and party, and are the positive acts of the government through its various agents, binding upon the inhabitants, and to the making and enforcing of. which their personal consent individually is not required. M’Cracken v. Elder, 34 Pa. St. 239; Peirce v. City of Boston, 3 Metc. [Mass.] 520; Cooley, Tax’n, pp. 13, 14. In Fremont v. County of Mariposa, 11 Cal. 361, it was held directly that equity will not relieve from a tax on the ground that an illegal tax was collected of the complainant in former years. The'fact that complainants were not parties to the original suit or to the proceedings which culminated in the orders of March, 1875 and 1876, does not confer upon them the right to object to these orders or set them at naught. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575. I see no authority for collecting taxes levied for 1873 — 4. The judgment upon which the mandamus for their collection wa3 based was afterwards reversed by the supreme court of the United States, and a new judgment taken in 1875 for the balance remaining due to Brown. The mandamus was in the nature of an execution and when the- judgment was reversed and held for naught, it would seem the mandamus must fail with it. But as this point was not made by defendant Brown in his brief, I am quite willing to reconsider it if I have overlooked any material fact in this connection. I think tb.e complainants are entitled to an injunction against the collection of the tax for 1873 and 1874, and also against the collection of any tax for this pavement upon property in front of which the pavement was laid and the assessment paid, but as to aE other property the demurrer is held good. Counsel will prepare the proper order and submit it to me for signature.

NOTE, [from original report.] The decision of Judge Emmons (referred to) in Brooks v. City of Memphis [Case No. 1,954] laid down several important propositions, among others these: “When a contract has been made with a municipal corporation, and the work performed by the contractors, who relied upon a certain mode of taxation, which the supreme court declared unconstitutional, and the legislature aft-erwards pass a law to take the place of the invalid law, under which a judgment is had and a mandamus applied for, when this latter law is repealed; the court will disregard the repeal and apply the same rule as though it was in full force when the contract was made. “The legislature has no power to repeal the only adequate remedy to enforce an existing judgment, unless some other reasonable mode of enforcement is provided. And this is so by virtue of the provision in the state constitution, which declares that ‘no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts should be passed.’ And although there may be a statutory limitation upon a corporation’s general power of taxation, yet, where there has been an express grant of power to such corporation to contract a debt, a power of taxation for its payment will be implied. “The federal courts will sometimes delay judgment to await decisions in state courts, but where there is a mandamus to enforce the payment of a final judgment in a ease where a tax to be collected had been levied according to the common usage of the state, and no objections have been raised to the lawfulness of the tax in other cases, or as to the taxes levied for other purpose — such a course will not be followed.”