'delivered, the opinion of the Court.
A hill for .a divorce ai mensa et tboro', on the ground of ' excessively vicious conduct, was filed by the appellant against her husband', the appellee, who filed an ¡answer denying the alleged misconduct and also a cross-bill charging the appellant with adultery .and praying for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii: The ease was 'heard by the lower court on the oral testimony ¡of the parties and their witnesses, and the trial resulted' in ¡a; decree dismissing the bill of the wife and granting an absolute divorce for the cause alleged in the ■cross-bill of the husband. The answer of the wife to the cross-bill neither аdmitted nor denied the adultery of which she was accused, but the defense sought to be interposed in the testimlоmy and argument was that the wife is innocent of the offense charged, and' that even if she were guilty, her husband’s abusivе and violent treatment of her, and certain ■conduct on his paid which is said to have encouraged a breach of her marriage vows, constitute a bar to his crossHSuit for a divorce on the ground of her infidelity.
Upon the proof in the record we have no alternative but to •agree with 'the conclusion of the сourt below that the charge •of adultery has been sustained. The .appellant, while denying the adultery, admitted! her acceptance of affectionate' attentions from- the man suspected! of being hеr’ paramour, and he testified specifically to their illicit relations. On one •occasion they werе discovered' -and interrupted by a witness while they were in the very act of adultery, 'according- to his testimony. The ■existence of the compromising situation described by that witness was acknowledged by the appellant, but she asserted that the act was- being imsuccessfully attempted! .against her will. In view of the proved and admittеd! circumstances, her denial is not convincing. The testimony in the case will not be here reviewed in detail. It *605 leave® no room, for reasonable doubt as to- the appellant’s marital misconduct.
Tbe evidenсe also p-rove® that the -ap-pellee’s treatment of his wife was repeatedly brutal 'and insulting. It would hаve been a cl-early sufficient ground for a -divorce
a mensa et thoro
under the Maryland law if the wife’s own conduct had been free of the fault -alleged and proved. liter uncondoned adultery, which occurred before the sеparation, hut did not come to- the husband’s knowledge prior to that event, precludes a ■decreе for a partial divorce on -her application.
Martin v. Martin,
The question -as to whether the husband’s cross-suit for аn absolute divorce is barred by conduct o-n his part which would have entitled the wife to a decree
a mensa et thoro
has been determined in the recent unreportad case of
Pryor v. Pryor.
(See
*606 In accordance with the decisions we have cited, the contention in thisi case that the 'appellee’s mistreatment of the ■appellant prevents a decree of .divorce a vinculo matrimonii on the ground of her adultery must be overruled.
The evidence does not give adequatе support to the theory of connivance urged in the argument. It was testified by the wife that she once told hеr husband it was not proper for him to leave her alone -in their apartments, above his -store, in the company of the visitor who- is said to have become her paramour, ,and that in reply her husband made a rеmark indicating indifference -as to- what might occur if she was “not woman enough” to- guard herself -against the risk o-f imрroper -advances-. There was a positive- denial by the husband that he made such] a statement. It wasi mentioned by the appellant-as part of a conversation with her husband which occurred, -aa she tеstified, more than three years before th-edr separation. 'Tbe visitor was ;a young man with whom they ¡bad become acquainted a® summer boarders at hi® mother’s home in the country. He was a frequent guest -at their home -in thе city during the winter. The charge of connivance is refuted by the -appellant’s -own testimony as to her husband’® .resentful violence when he suspected that she and the young man referred to- had ben engaged in flirtation оr more serious impropriety. Upton her assurance that she had committed no wrong her husband authorized her to- offer the young man his apologies for the suspicion and resentment he -had' manifested. The proоf does not satisfy us that the appellee acquiesced in or permitted the -adultery charged against the appellant, and the defense of connivance is therefore not available.
Barclay v. Barclay,
Decree affirmed, the costs to- be paid by the appellee.