Appel v. AppelAppel v. Appel
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting from the second subdivision of the ninth decretal paragraph thereof the language, “or the appropriate sum after the actual amount of income he and the plaintiff shall be making at that time,” (2) by deleting from the ninth subdivision of the eighteenth decretal paragraph thereof the language, “or the appropriate sum after the actual amount of income defendant and plaintiff shall be making at that time after the termination of maintenance,” and (3) by adding a provision thereto awarding the plaintiff interest on the distributive award of $414,835 at the statutory rate pursuant to
The amount and duration of maintenance are matters for the sound discretion of the trial court (see Sidhu v Sidhu, 304 AD2d 816 [2003]; Mazzone v Mazzone, 290 AD2d 495 [2002]). The factors to be considered in awarding maintenance include “the standard of living of the parties during the marriage, the income and property of the parties, the distribution of marital property, the duration of the marriage, the health of the parties, the present and future earning capacity of both parties, the ability of the party seeking maintenance to become self-supporting, and the reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance” (Unterreiner v Unterreiner, 288 AD2d 463 [2001] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
A high standard of living during the marriage is a factor to be considered in determining the appropriate amount and duration of maintenance (see Hartog v Hartog, 85 NY2d 36, 50-51 [1995]); however, that in itself does not guarantee “per se entitlement to an award of lifetime maintenance” (Chalif v Chalif, 298 AD2d 348, 348 [2002]). The court must consider the reasonable needs of the recipient spouse in light of the other statutory factors (see Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710 [2007]; Fridman v Fridman, 301 AD2d 567 [2003]; Chalif v Chalif, 298 AD2d 348 [2002]).
The plaintiff did not work outside the home during the marriage but dedicated herself to the care of the parties’ children and the household. However, in light of the fact that she was 43 years old and in relatively good health at the time of the trial, the parties’ three children were in school full time, and she has
With respect to child support, the evidence proffered at trial supported the court‘s decision to impute income to the plaintiff for the purpose of computing child support (see Rand v Rand, 29 AD3d 976 [2006]; Kalish v Kalish, 289 AD2d 202 [2001]). Moreover, the court sufficiently set forth the factors it relied upon (see
Contrary to the plaintiff‘s contention, the court recalculated and specified the amount of child support to be paid upon the termination of spousal maintenance. However, in doing so, the court improperly included inconsistent language in the judgment indicating that, upon the termination of maintenance, child support could be calculated de novo based on the income earned by the respective parties at that time. The judgment is modified to delete that inconsistent language.
The trial court properly directed the defendant to pay 90% of the expenses of child care, education, extracurricular activities and nonreimbursed medical and dental expenses of the children (see
The court properly exercised its discretion in determining the value of marital property, including jewelry and automobiles, based upon, inter alia, the parties’ stated values (see Spilman-Conklin v Conklin, 11 AD3d 798 [2004]; Felicello v Felicello, 240 AD2d 625 [1997]) and the stipulations between the parties. However, the plaintiff was entitled to interest on her distributive award of $414,835 from the date of the decision (see
Under the circumstances of this case, the award of counsel fees, and the denial of an award for expert fees, were provident exercises of discretion (see
Spolzino, J.P., Lifson, Dickerson and Chambers, JJ., concur.