126 N.H. 214 | N.H. | 1985
This is an appeal under RSA 541:6 and RSA 76:16-a, V (Supp. 1983) from a decision of the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals ordering abatement of táxes on two lots, one with a house and one vacant. The town excepts to the order as to the house lot, because the taxpayers never applied to the town’s selectmen for abatement of the tax on that lot. The town also excepts to the order generally, on the ground that the taxpayers did not offer sufficient evidence of disproportionate assessment. We reverse the order of abatement on the house lot, but affirm the order on the vacant lot.
In the 1982 tax year the taxpayers owned two adjoining lots in Sunapee. There was a house on one lot; the other was vacant. Each
The taxpayers appealed to the State Board of Tax and Land Appeals under RSA 76:16-a (Supp. 1983). Although the notice of appeal referred specifically to the assessment on the vacant lot, it also requested a reduction of the assessment placed on “all” of the taxpayers’ property. It did not, however, state that the taxpayers had sought an abatement from the selectmen on the vacant lot alone. The notice contained an indication that a copy was sent to the town.
The board acknowledged receipt of the appeal papers with a form apparently sent in duplicate to the taxpayers and the town. The form did not specifically identify the property subject to the appeal, but did request information from the town, including the assessed value of “each piece of property” that the taxpayers owned. After an evidentiary hearing, the board reduced the assessments on the lots to $142,100 and $14,500, respectively, and ordered abatements accordingly.
In appealing to this court, the town first claims that the board erred in ordering a reduction in assessment and an abatement as to the house lot. We agree. The powers of the board and the rights of taxpayers appearing before the board are entirely statutory and are limited by the terms of the statute. Thayer v. State Tax Comm’n, 113 N.H. 113, 114, 302 A.2d 824, 825 (1973). Under RSA 76:16-a, I (Supp. 1983) a taxpayer is authorized to seek relief from the board only “[i]f the selectmen neglect or refuse to . . . abate.” The subject matter jurisdiction of the board is thus limited to the subject of the selectmen’s refusal or neglect. Selectmen can be said to neglect or refuse only what a taxpayer has first requested. Hence, the jurisdiction of the board is limited to the subject of a taxpayer’s original request to the selectmen. It is a truly appellate jurisdiction. See McCann v. Silva, 455 F. Supp. 540 (D.N.H. 1978). Since the taxpayers did not ask the selectmen to abate taxes on the house lot, the board can order no abatement as to that lot.
The taxpayers seek to avoid this result by arguing that, by requesting assessments on each lot of the taxpayers’ land, the board put the town on notice that abatements of taxes on all lots would be
This argument fails for two reasons. First, it assumes that an administrative tribunal’s statutory jurisdiction may somehow be enlarged beyond the terms of the statute. It may not be. Thayer v. State Tax Comm’n supra.
Second, the taxpayers’ argument assumes that the board’s request to the selectmen for assessments on all lots would, as a matter of fact, put the town on notice that abatements on all lots would be considered. This might be true if the board would have no other reason to consider assessments on lots not originally subject to dispute with the selectmen. This, however, is not so. When a taxpayer challenges an assessment on a given parcel of land, the board must consider assessments on any other of the taxpayer’s properties, for a taxpayer is not entitled to an abatement on any given parcel unless the aggregate valuation placed on all of his property is unfavorably disproportionate to the assessment of property generally in the town. Bemis &c. Bag Co. v. Claremont, 98 N.H. 446, 449, 102 A.2d 512, 516 (1954). “Justice does not require the correction of errors of valuation whose joint effect is not injurious to the appellant.” Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Manchester, 70 N.H. 200, 205, 46 A. 470, 473 (1899) (citations omitted).
When a taxpayer owns two parcels, then, a request for abatement on the first will always require consideration of the assessment on the second. The mere inquiry into the assessment on the second was not, therefore, any indication that an abatement might be granted as to that lot.
The town’s further assignment of error is that the record is insufficient to support any finding of disproportionate assessment, even as to the vacant lot. We find, on the contrary, that the record does support the board’s conclusion that the two lots were assessed disproportionately to other property in the town.
A taxpayer has the burden to prove such disproportionality. Milford Props., Inc. v. Town of Milford, 119 N.H. 165, 166-67, 400 A.2d 41, 42 (1979). To carry this burden, he must establish that his property is assessed at a higher percentage of fair market value than the percentage at which property is generally assessed in the town. Berthiaume v. City of Nashua, 118 N.H. 646, 647, 392 A.2d 143, 144 (1978).
When, however, there is uncontroverted evidence that the town did use the State’s ratio in the assessment process for the tax year in question, the town cannot deny the validity of the ratio, and evidence of that ratio satisfies the taxpayer’s burden to prove the general level of assessment. Milford Props., Inc. v. Town of Milford, 120 N.H. 581, 582-83, 419 A.2d 1093, 1094 (1980). Such was the case here.
It was undisputed before the board that in 1982 the town generally assessed property at 58% of fair market value in accordance with the ratio set by the department of revenue administration. It was also undisputed that the town used that same ratio when assessing new or improved lots for purposes of taxation that year. Under the holding in Milford, this was enough to sustain the taxpayers’ burden to establish the level of assessment generally in the town.
The town nonetheless claims that its use of the State equalization ratio does not bind it to accept that ratio for all purposes, despite the rule in Milford. It states that it applied the ratio only when it reassessed parcels that had been subdivided or improved since the time of a general reassessment in 1976. The town therefore argues that it should be bound to apply that ratio only to property in the same category, that is, property that had been subdivided or improved since 1976.
In essence, the town argues that the board should have segregated property into two categories, property untouched since 1976 and all other property. The town would then allow comparisons to be made only between properties within one or the other category for purposes of testing proportionality. The town argues that if this method were followed, the lot in question would be found to have been assessed at the same percentage of fair market value as other lots that had been untouched since 1976.
Since we find that the board correctly found that the taxpayer had established the general level of assessment at 58% of fair market value, we need only note that the board correctly applied that finding in the following manner. It found that the fair market value of both lots in 1982 was $270,000. The board allocated that total as between the two lots at the same relative proportions used by the town in allocating its own total valuation. This resulted in attributing 9.3% of the total, or $25,110, to the vacant lot. The board then determined that 58% of that amount was approximately $14,500, as against the $17,400 assessment. The board accordingly reduced the assessment on the vacant lot by the $2,900 difference and ordered an abatement of tax based on that reduction.
Reversed as to the house lot; affirmed as to the vacant lot; remanded.