102 Pa. 199 | Pa. | 1883
delivered the opinions of the court, March 5th 1883.
Sophia and Hannah E. Marsden’s Appeal.
The learned judge of the court below found, and as we think, upon sufficient testimony, that the $6,000 of North Pennsylvania Railroad Co. coupon bonds were the property of John Maz'sden, deceased, at the time of his death, and were not the property of his widow. While she and her daughter assert an ownez’ship in hez*, in their answers to the bill, no pi’oof of the actual acquisition of such ownership by purchase, or otherwise than by gift of the husband, was offered. The evidence of gift consisted solely of the assertion of the widow, and a statement by the daughter to the effect that she had heard her father say they wez’e her mother’s. But the other testimony in the case, as described in the opinion of the court below, clearly proved that both the mother and the daughter, after John Marsden’s death treated the bonds as the propeify of the estate and negotiated in relatiozi to them as such. The statement the daughter made in the letter of December 13th 1874, that her father had money invested in railroad stock, among which was a coupon bond of $6,000, and that as her mother had nothing she could call her
As to the plea of the statute of limitations, it was not necessary- for the plaintiff to anticipate in his bill that the statute would be pleaded and to make averments by way of reply to it. When it was set up as a defence he could reply to it by testimony showing it could not prevail. It is.true there is no averment in the bill that the defendants of either of them forged the alleged will of May 6th 1874, but it was proved that the wall was a spurious paper, never executed by John Marsden, and that this was determined by the verdict of a jury in an issue framed to try the question. As against the plaintiff this was undoubtedly a fraudulent will. The widow who was named as executrix in it took out letters, and acted under it, from December 1874 till June 1881. The daughter testified on the trial that it was in her father’s handwriting. In a letter she wrote to the plaintiff her brother in December 1874, she said it was found accidently between the leaves of a Concordance. Both the mother and the daughter upheld the paper as a genuine will for more than six years and resisted the efforts made to have its validity tried. By means of it they induced the plaintiff to abandon the genuine will of 1866, to surrender his letters testamentary granted upon that will, and to give up his lights under it. Whether the mother and daughter were personally conscious of the forgery of the spurious will or not, they asserted it after its genuineness was disputed and they were apprised of its fraudulent character, and are justly chargeable with every inference of consciousness which such circumstances naturally and fairly imply. But independently of that, the fact remains that the plaintiff was ousted of his office as executor, and of his rights under the true will, by means of the false and fraudulent will, upheld and asserted against him by the only persons who received any benefits under the latter instrument. It was a fraud and it was employed by the defendants to deprive the plaintiff of his rights, in such circumstances can they successfully interpose the plea of the statute of limitations in furtherance of the fraud? We think not. This is not a common law action but a proceeding in equity. While equity will follow the law in administering statutes of repose, it will also take care that such statutes are not used as instruments in the perpetration of frauds. On the contrary, it will prevent such results by refusing to apply the bar of the statute where justice requires it. In Story’s Equity, § 1521, the doctrine is thus stated.
The foregoing doctrine is of course applicable to one who has himself committed the fraud which is sought to be protected by the statute. We think it is also applicable to one who makes use of a fraudulent transaction for his own purposes, and then asks the protection of the statute of limitations to shield himself from the consequences of the fraud. Such protection would be equally harmful to the victim of the fraud in either case, and would equally tend to the perversion of justice ; nor is it easy to perceive any serious difference of' culpability between the perpetrator of a fraud and one who consciously makes use of a fraud committed by another. However it may be at law, it is very certain that equity is not bound to permit the statute of limitations to be used as a shield or protection to fraud, and is at liberty to deny its application in order to prevent manifest injustice.
There is a grave question, which we do not decide, whether the statute would run in any event during the continuance of the executorship of Sophia Marsden. The apparent ownership of the cause of action was in her under the false will, and as
Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellants.
William C. Marsden’s Appeal.
John Marsden, the testator, died on June 13th 1874. He left an estate amounting in value to $65,000 or $70,000 exclusive of two small farms in Sullivan county. By his will dated May 29th 1866, after devising the two farms to the appellant, his son, he gave the household goods to his wife, Sophia Mars-den, ali the rest of his estate to her for life. The appellant was appointed -executor and took out letters testamentary on June 19th 1874, which were revoked in December 1874, upon - the discovery of what was supposed to be a genuine will of a later date. This paper was subsequently, in 1881, determined to be a forgery, and thereupon the probate of the original will, and the letters granted thereon, were re-instated. Sophia Marsden, the widow, who was named as sole executrix in the second alleged will, had taken out letters under it and acted as executrix from December 1874 to June 1881.. Both the appellant and Mrs. Marsden had filed accounts which were adjudicated. The present bill in equity was filed on June 28th 1881, to' compel a surrender of certain shares of stock which were purchased with the proceeds of $6,000 of North Penna. E. E. Co. bonds, the property of John Marsden, deceased, but claimed by the widow as hers. After a hearing upon bill, answer and proofs, a decree was made.finding that the $6,000 of bonds .were the property of the deceased, and that one hundred and twenty shares of Pennsylvania E. E. stock had been purchased with the proceeds of the bonds, and directing a - surrender of the stock. The Master also reported an account of the income of the bonds and stock and recommended a decree that the income thus received amounting to about $3,000 be paid to the appellant as executor. An exception being filed to this finding the same was sustained by the court, and from that decision the present appeal was taken. We think there was no error in this action of the court.. By the will of- the deceased, John Marsden, the whole of the residue of his estate was given to the widow during her life. The bill did not aver, nor was
' Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant. -..... r