The plaintiff, Michael Silverstein, appeals the decision of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) de
I
In May 2010, the plaintiff, a physical education teacher at the Andover Elementary/Middle School, signed an employment contract that reduced him from a full-time (five days per week) employee to a four days per week employee, cut his salary by approximately $7000, and increased his costs for health insurance. Later, pursuant to a three-step grievance process in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governing his employment, the plaintiff initiated a grievance against his employer arising out of the reduction. That process affords employees three opportunities to be heard: the first before the school principal; the second before the superintendent; and a “final and binding” hearing before the school board. While the second step of that process was still underway, the plaintiff filed an unfair labor practice complaint against the School with the PELRB, apparently out of concern that the statute of limitations would run on those claims if he failed to file at that time. See RSA 273-A:6, VII (2010) (providing that PELRB shall “summarily dismiss any complaint of an alleged violation of RSA 273-A:5 which occurred more than 6 months prior to the filing of the complaint with the body having original jurisdiction of that complaint”). The PELRB, however, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction “to interpret the Andover CBA and decide the merits of Mr. Silversteiris complaint during the grievance proceedings and after the grievance proceedings are completed.” Subsequently, the PELRB denied the plaintiffs motion for a rehearing, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that: (1) the PELRB has jurisdiction, as a matter of law, over unfair labor practice complaints whenever the CBA does not provide for final and binding arbitration; (2) the PELRB’s interpretation of the CBA violates the State and Federal Constitutions; and (3) the CBA’s grievance procedure is not “workable” as required by RSA 273-A:4 (Supp. 2011) and otherwise violates public policy. We address each argument in turn.
II
The plaintiff first argues that the PELRB erred in concluding that the terms of the CBA deprived it of jurisdiction over his unfair labor practice complaint against the School. He contends that he is entitled to a de novo evidentiary hearing before the PELRB because that body “is only robbed of its jurisdiction over unfair labor practice disputes if the parties to a collective bargaining agreement have explicitly agreed to final and binding arbitration.” The School argues that the PELRB correctly declined juris
We begin by examining the language of the CBA, as it reflects the parties’ intent. Appeal of N.H. Div. of State Police,
The CBA’s three-step grievance process, in relevant part, provides as follows:
Step One: In the event a mutually acceptable resolution of the problem is not reached ..., a grievance may be submitted to the Principal for formal consideration. . . .
Step Two: If the grievant is dissatisfied with the decision rendered by the Principal a written request for a hearing may be submitted to the Superintendent. . . . The Superintendent shall schedule a hearing... and shall render a decision in writing within 10 school days of the hearing. . ..
Step Three: If the grievant is dissatisfied with the decision of the Superintendent, the grievant may request a hearing before the School Board. ... [A] hearing shall be scheduled before the full Board ... and a decision of the full Board will be made within 10 school days of the hearing. The Board’s decision will be final and binding.
This language was specifically negotiated and agreed upon by the parties, and, therefore, it is binding upon both the public employee and the public employer. See Appeal of Berlin Board of Education,
The Public Employee Labor Relations Act was enacted in 1975 to “foster harmonious and cooperative relations between public employers and their employees ...’.’ Laws 1975, 490:1. “To achieve this goal, the Act granted public employees the right to organize and engage in collective
The plaintiff argues that the PELRB has the power to review the merits of his unfair labor practice dispute, as a matter of law, “absent final and binding arbitration with a neutral third-party, whereby public employees have ‘explicitly’ waived their statutory rights to the PELRB’s review.” We have never held, however, that a provision for final and binding arbitration is a necessary precondition to a union bargaining away its members’ right to de novo PELRB review; such a holding would unduly restrict the bargaining power of both unions and public employers to negotiate terms of the employment contract. In fact, in identifying the proper limits of the PELRB’s authority, our precedents have been careful to respect the bargaining process between public employers and employees. For example, in Appeal of City of Manchester,
Absent a provision for binding arbitration following the grievance procedure, and with no explicit or implicit language in the contract stating that step four of the grievance procedure is final*198 and binding on the parties, the PELRB, in the context of an unfair labor practice charge, has jurisdiction as a matter of law to interpret the contract....
Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Appeal of Campton School District,
The above decisions reflect the structural role of the PELRB in adjudicating labor disputes between parties who otherwise are free to negotiate the details of their employment relationship. “A CBA is a contract between a public employer and a union over the terms and conditions of employment.” Appeal of City of Manchester,
Admittedly, one of our cases arguably suggests that a CBA provision for final and binding arbitration is necessary to remove the PELRB’s authority to adjudicate a labor dispute de novo. In Appeal of State of New Hampshire,
Ill
Next, the plaintiff argues that the PELRB’s interpretation of the CBA violates his due process rights under the State and Federal Constitutions because he has been deprived of a neutral government tribunal. We cannot agree, however, that the only constitutionally acceptable procedure for adjudicating his unfair labor practice complaint is a de novo hearing before the PELRB. The plaintiffs due process argument overlooks the fact that the CBA is a binding agreement subjecting both parties to its
Furthermore, even putting aside the waiver issue, the plaintiff has not cited any authority, nor are we aware of any, holding that a public school teacher has a constitutionally-based due process right to a termination hearing before a third party, such as an arbitrator or the PELRB, rather than before the school board. See Batagiannis v. West Lafayette Community School,
IV
Next, the plaintiff argues that the PELRB’s decision violates his right to a remedy at law under Part I, Article 14 of the State Constitution, which states:
*201 Every subject of this state is entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries he may receive in his person, property, or character; to obtain right and justice freely, without being obligated to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.
This article “is basically an equal protection clause in that it implies that all litigants similarly situated may appeal to the courts both for relief and for defense under like conditions and with like protection and without discrimination.” State v. Basinow,
V
Finally, the plaintiff contends that the CBA’s grievance procedure is not “workable” pursuant to RSA 273-A:4, and violates public policy. We disagree.
RSA 273-A:4 provides that “[e]very agreement negotiated under the terms of this chapter shall be reduced to writing and shall contain workable grievance procedures.” The plaintiff argues that “permitting one party to an agreement... to be the only ‘judge’ as to whether it breached a collective bargaining agreement” violates the policy behind RSA chapter 273-A, and, thus, is unworkable. We have previously held, however, that “the final determination under the grievance procedure need not rest with a decision-maker other than the public employer to make the grievance procedure workable.” Appeal of State Employees’ Assoc.,
The plaintiff argues further that the CBA’s grievance procedure runs contrary to public policy because it “permit[s] a public employer to
Affirmed.
Notes
Because the plaintiffs unfair labor practice complaint involved only the claims that (1) the School violated the CBA by reducing the plaintiffs hours, salary and benefits and (2) the CBA’s grievance procedures were unworkable, we have no occasion to address the School’s assertion that, at the conclusion of the grievance process established by the CBA, the PELRB would have jurisdiction to review the plaintiffs allegations that the School did not conduct the grievance process fairly. Because the fairness of the hearing actually conducted by the School and the outcome thereof are not at issue in this appeal, in reaching our decision we have not relied on any information beyond the record of the proceedings before the PELRB. For this reason, the plaintiffs motion to strike certain statements in and attachments to the School’s brief and his motion to supplement the record are both denied as moot.