42 Cal. 35 | Cal. | 1871
Lead Opinion
The motion to dismiss the appeal in this case must be controlled in its decision by a solution of the following questions:
First—Does the special Act of February 1st, 1870 (Stats. 1869-70, p. 41), by necessary implication, or reasonable intendment, prohibit an appeal in this case?
Second—If not, does section three hundred and fifty-nine of the code authorize an appeal in this class of cases ?
If the first question shall be answered in the affirmative, it may be necessary to consider the further question, whether the Constitution has conferred upon this Court appellate jurisdiction in cases of this character, in which event the Legislature would not have the power to take it away, or to prohibit us from exercising it.
In considering the first question it is our duty so to inter
On the other hand, if the Legislature has clearly expressed its intention that there shall be no appeal in this case, the Courts have no right to defeat this manifest intention by torturing or disregarding the language of the statute. One of the rules for construing statutes is, that the words are to be taken in their usual and popular sense, unless they have a well understood technical meaning; and another rule is, that, if practicable, effect shall be given to all the words and provisions of the statute.
It is not to be presumed that the Legislature employed language which was intended to be meaningless, and to perform no useful office. Section thirteen of the Act under consideration, after providing for a, publication of notice of the filing of the report of the Commissioners, provides that within twenty days after the publication of the notice, any person interested may file in the County Court objections to the report; and if no such objections are filed within that period, the report “ shall be final and conclusive on all parties interested; and all assessments made and set forth in said report shall be a lien upon the respective parcels of land and property in said district upon which said assessments are charged by said report.”
If the proceedings had stopped here, and no objections to the report had been filed within the twenty days, it is clear that all parties would have been concluded, and the report could not have been reviewed, either by the County Court
But the power of the County Court over the second report is limited to the rendering of “ a judgment as to said report, or as to any of the matters therein contained, and such judgment of said County Court, as to the premises, shall be final and conclusive; and upon the final judgment of said County Court, as to the premises, all assessments made and set forth in said report shall, from and after said final judgment, be a lien upon the respective lands and property in the district upon which said assessments are charged by said report.”
On the hearing of the objections to the second report the County Court could either confirm it or set it aside entirely, and perhaps might modify it, but had no power to recommit it with instructions for another report. This is perfectly obvious, from the fact that whilst the power to recommit the first report is expressly given, the statute is not only silent in this respect as to the second report, but limits the power of the Court to the rendering of “a judgment as to said report, or as to any of the matters therein contained.” If the second report had been set aside by the. judgment of the Court, the proceedings for the assessment must have been commenced de novo. Nor could there have been any appeal from the judgment. The objecting parties could not have appealed from a judgment in their favor, relieving them entirely from the assessment, and the city and county has no interest in the question of the assessments. The judgment,
But it is claimed by the appellant that, if the statute be construed as prohibiting an appeal, it is, pro tanto, unconstitutional, inasmuch as the Constitution confers upon this Court appellate jurisdiction in this class of cases. The Constitution, Art. VI, section four, confers upon this Court appellate jurisdiction “in all cases in equity; also, in all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real estate, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine.” Section six confers upon the District Courts original jurisdiction in all these cases, in precisely the same language; and section eight confers upon the County Courts original jurisdiction “of all such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for.” The argument is that this is a “ case at law,” which involves the legality of an assessment, in the true sense of Article VI, section four, of the Constitution, and not a “special proceeding,” in the proper sense of section eight. But it is too plain to admit of debate that this is not a “ case at law,” within the meaning of section four, and that it is a “special proceeding,” within section eight, of which the County Court has original jurisdiction. From an early period in the history of the State down to the present time proceedings for the opening, grading, extension, paving, and alteration of streets, and the assessment of damages caused thereby, have been treated by the Legislature and the Courts as “special proceedings,” and not as “ cases at law.” This Court, in numerous de
If the appellant and other property owners have suffered the grievous damage of which they complain, from reducing the grade of Second street, it has doubtless resulted from faulty legislation; but in the present condition of the case, their only resource would appear to be an appeal to the Legislature for the appropriate relief.
Appeal dismissed.
Concurrence Opinion
The judgment of the County Court, which is the subject of this appeal, was rendered upon a Commissioner’s report, filed before it, after recommitment of a previous report, under the provisions of an Act of March 30th, 1868, and the Act of February 1st, 1870, amendatory thereof authorizing the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco to modify the grades of certain streets. By the amendatory statute it is enacted, that “the said County Court shall have power to render a judgment as to said report, or as to any of the matter therein contained; and such judgment of said County Court, as to the premises, shall be final and conclusive.” (Sec. 13.)
The respondent has submitted a motion here, that the appeal taken be dismissed upon the ground that, in the proceeding aforesaid no appeal is allowed by the statute already referred to.
That the amendatory statute of February 1st, 1870, not only does not authorize the appeal in question, but, on the contrary, that its purpose was to absolutely prohibit any appeal whatever in this case, is most evident and unmistakable, upon examination of its provisions. Upon this point I, therefore, concur in the conclusion announced by Mr. Justice Crockett, and, in the main, in the reasoning through which he has reached it. I think, too, that the result which follows must necessarily be, that the motion to dismiss the appeal is to be granted.
Independently of rules adopted by this Court on the subject (and there are none), an appeal, as a mere procedure, is defined by statute; it is essentially the creature of the statute, and may be accorded or withheld, restrained, enlarged, or wholly abrogated by legislative enactment. It cannot be affirmed to have any existence, except as found in the expression of the legislative will. The Constitution
If, then, it be true that an appeal in the case at bar must exist, if at all, by reason of section three hundred and fifty-nine, and if that section has, as to this case, been itself repealed, or rendered inoperative by the statutes of 1868 and 1870, it results that the appeal must fall with the statute, upon which alone it rested for support. Irrespective, however, of the question of procedure involved, I come now to inquire whether or not the case under consideration be, in itself, one which is subject to the appellate power of this Court, were an appeal or writ of error provided for that purpose. If we are to look to the Constitution alone as being the source of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, we find that it extends that jurisdiction to all cases in equity; not to all cases at law, but to such of them only as involve the title or possession of real estate, or the legality of a tax, toll, impost, assessment, or municipal fine, or in which the value of the property in controversy exceeds a named sum of money, etc. (Const., Art. YI, Sec. 4.) It will be seen, upon examination of the Constitution,
It is argued by the appellant that the case is a “ case at law,” one involving the legality of an assessment, and therefore, within the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine. But even if it can be said to involve the legality of an assessment, I think it clear that it is not a case at law within the intent of the Constitution. It is said that it is a legal controversy, prosecuted according to the forms of law, and that, therefore, it is a case at law; but though it be such controversy, and so prosecuted, it does not follow that it is a case at law in the sense of not being a special case. A special case may be said to be a legal controversy, prosecuted according to the forms of law, and yet the Constitution itself has distinctly provided that the jurisdiction in special cases shall be in the County Court, unless otherwise provided for. A special case can no more be said to be a case at law, in a constitutional sense, merely because it is a legal controversy prosecuted according to the forms of law, than it could be said to be a case in equity, because its solution might involve a consideration of the principles of equity, or the judicial proceedings provided for its determination were similar in form to those usually observed in Courts of equity.
But the case at bar does not belong to either one of the two grand divisions of civil cases mentioned in the Constitution as subject to be reviewed here, in the exercise of appellate power, but does unmistakably belong to another and well defined class of cases which are accustomed to be principally designated and distinguished from the others by the fact that they are “ not cases for which the Courts of general jurisdiction had always supplied a remedy.” (Parsons v. Tuol
The case at bar not being a case in equity nor a case at law, within the constitutional designation, is not within the appellate jurisdiction of this Court as defined by the Constitution. Had the Acts of 1868 and 1870, out of which this controversy has arisen, provided that an appeal from the judgment in question might be taken to this Court, a question would then, have arisen as to whether or not it is competent for the Legislature to add to the class of cases over which the Constitution has declared that our appellate power
I am of opinion that the appeal must be dismissed.
Concurrence Opinion
I am inclined to agree with Mr. Justice Crockett in his construction of the statute under which the proceedings were had in this case. The proceeding is merely to levy an assessment to provide certain revenues for the Government. In such matters it is not usual to permit an appeal to the Courts while the proceedings are in fieri. The right to supervise the officers whose duty it is to make the assessment would, more naturally, perhaps, have fallen to the Board of Supervisors, as in the case of other assessments. It is, however, a proceeding of the same nature as though it had been had in the Board of Supervisors. It is a proceeding in the exercise of the sovereign power of taxation. As I have said, these matters are usually conducted outside of the Courts, and the regularity of the acts of the officers is usually tested in collecting or resisting the collection of taxes. The mere fact that the County Court was allowed to act as a supervising Board does not, therefore, in my opinion, raise the presumption that it was intended that there should be an appeal. It is final and conclusive as an assessment, and is the end of that proceeding. It then becomes an assessment, and the lien immediately attaches to the land.
I agree with the Chief Justice that this is not a “ case at law,” and, therefore, it is not a case of which the Constitution has vested this Court with appellate jurisdiction in terms.
The case of Conant v. Conant was an action of divorce, in which no rights of property were involved. It was contended that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction, because it did not fall within any of the classes mentioned in section four, Article VI, of the Constitution, as it then stood. It conferred upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction “in all cases where the matter in dispute exceeds two hundred dollars,” and where the legality of any tax, toll, etc., was in question. The Court say, in effect, that this was not intended to define, and, therefore, to restrict the jurisdiction of the Court, but merely to limit that jurisdiction in cases capable of pecuniary computation. Ho such construction can possibly be given to the language of the Constitution as amended. That section now reads as follows: “The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases in equity; also, in all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real estate, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine, or in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to three hundred dollars; also, in all cases arising in the Probate Courts; and also, in all criminal cases amounting to felony, on questions of law alone. The Court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus, and also all writs -necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Each of the Justices shall have power to issue
The qualifying clause cannot possibly apply to “ cases in equity,” nor to cases arising in Probate Courts. If the doctrine of Knowles v. Yeates be correct, these provisions in the Constitution are perfectly meaningless. Cases in equity were certainly not mentioned for the purpose of limiting the jurisdiction of this Court to such cases as involved an amount greater than three hundred dollars. The rules by which this section of the Constitution must be construed are familiar and obvious.. In the absence of circumstances which indicate a different rule of construction, the enumeration of the cases to which the appellate jurisdiction of the Court extends excludes others. In Knowles v. Yeates the Court did not by “ rational conjecture ” or otherwise, in my opinion, supply the presumed intention of the framers of that instrument, but they have stricken out words which have an obvious meaning, and which, in an important matter, affect the character of the instrument.
The very able Judge who wrote the opinion in Knowles v. Yeates evidently felt that the case of Conant v. Conant was not altogether in point, for he has fortified his position by a lengthy and eloquent argument, but from the reasoning of which I differ tolo coslo. A provision of the 'Constitution, which I think clear beyond the possibility of doubt, is set aside, partly because it was thought that a free people, in forming a Government for their protection and to secure to themselves the blessings of liberty, must have intended to provide an appeal in cases of grave concern to the Court of highest authority. An appeal to this Court, of course, affords
If it be admitted that the Constitution fails to express the full meaning of the people in adopting it, and we are left to “rational conjecture ” to supply what has been omitted, it does not seem to me reasonable to suppose that it was intended that an appeal to this Court should be allowed in all special proceedings. In a matter like the present proceeding the whole history of the Government is opposed to the idea that an appeal is allowed. It is a mere executive proceeding to levy a tax. In such proceedings the exigencies of the Government do not permit the delays which would be inevitable if the case could drag its slow length through the Courts. It is a mere administrative proceeding, in which the action of the officers may he reviewed on certiorari, if they exceed their powers. This has been the universal practice in the exercise of the sovereign power of taxation. The powers of the officers must be strictly pursued, or the assessment cannot be collected, and the regularity of these proceedings may ordinarily be questioned collaterally. How, as the practice of the Government has been that these matters should not be subject to judicial revision, while in fieri, there is a strong presumption that no appeal was intended to be allowed, nor is the presumption changed because, on this occasion, the County Court is made to perform the office of a Board of Equalization. If the action of the officers, whose duty it is to make the assessment to raise the taxes by which the Government is supported, could be revised by the Courts in the first instance, as to the correctness of the manner in which valuations were made, and many other things usually
Dissenting Opinion
The question presented is, whether an appeal lies to this Court from the judgment of the County Court confirming the report of the Commissioners. The appellate jurisdiction of the Court extends to all “cases” in equity, also to all “cases” at law which involve the title or possession of real estate, or the legality, of any tax, etc. The former Constitution conferred upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in all “ cases ” where the matter in dispute exceeded two hundred dollars, and when the legality of any tax, etc., was in question. By that Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 9) original civil jurisdiction was granted to the County Court in such “special cases” as the Legislature might prescribe. The present Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 8) grants to the County Court original jurisdiction of all such “ special cases and proceedings” as are not otherwise provided for; hut neither the former nor the present Constitution expressly grants to the Supreme Court jurisdiction of “special cases.” Are “ special cases ” included within the meaning of “cases,” as that term is employed in defining the jurisdiction of this Court? I am of the opinion that they are not. If they are, jurisdiction of no special case could be entertained by the County Courts, because as soon as a special case is created by statute, jurisdiction would at once vest in the District Courts, by force of the term “cases,” which is employed in the section defining the jurisdiction of the District Courts. “Special cases” would thus be provided for by the Constitution, and none would be left for the
The Supreme Court, from an early day, has entertained jurisdiction of special cases. In some of them, the statute under which the proceedings were had provided for an appeal, and in others no mention of an appeal was made. In Koppikus v. State Capitol Commissioners, 16 Cal. 248; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; s. c., 19 Cal. 47; Contra Costa Railroad Company v. Moss, 32 Cal. 323; Sacramento P. and N. R. R. Co. v. Harlan, 24 Cal. 334; Stanford v. Worn, 27 Cal. 171; S. F. and S. J. R. R. Co. v. Mahoney, 29 Cal. 112; S. F., A., and S. R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 36; C. P. R. R. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 24—the statutes under which the proceedings in those cases were had not allowing an appeal; and in S. V. R. R. Co. v. Moffatt, 6 Cal. 74; Hyneman v. Blake, 19 Cal. 580; Spring Valley Water Works, 17 Cal. 132; s. c., 22 Cal. 434; The Kearny Street Cases, 32 Cal., and many other cases of a similar character, the statute granted an appeal. In Knowles v. Yeates, 31 Cal. 82, which was a contested election case, and which arose under the present Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Court was challenged, but it was held that the Court had jurisdiction—that jurisdiction was conferred by the Constitution, though words of express grant were not formed in that instrument. Much reliance was placed on Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal. 252, which was an action for a divorce. The reasoning in the latter ease sustained the appellate jurisdiction, which had been entertained from the organization of the Court, in suits for divorce, suits to prevent threatened injuries, suits to deter
The position cannot be maintained that the Court has or has not jurisdiction of special cases accordingly as the Legislature in providing for them has or has not allowed an áppeal. The jurisdiction of the Court is derived from the Constitution alone, and the Legislature can neither enlarge nor restrict it. When a special case is devised, the question whether this Court has appellate jurisdiction in the matter must be determined by an interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution. In view of the numerous instances in which the Court, under both the former and the present Constitution, has entertained jurisdiction of special cases, and of the interpretation of the Constitution adopted in Conant v. Conant and in Knowles v. Yeates, and the reasoning upon which that interpretation is based, I am of the opinion that the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in “ special cases.”
It therefore becomes unnecessary, in this case, to determine the meaning and effect of the words “ final and conclusive,” as applied by the thirteenth section of the Act to the judgment of the County Court. If the purpose was to
The motion to dismiss the appeal should, in my opinion, he denied.
Dissenting Opinion
The proceedings authorized by the statute of March 30th, 1868, entitled “An Act to authorize the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco to modify the grades of certain streets,” and the Act of February 1st, 1870, amendatory and supplemental thereto, are special proceedings, dependent for validity entirely upon these statutes in every step of their progress.
The powers and duties of the Board of Supervisors, the Commissioners appointed by such Board, and the Superintendent of Public Streets and Highways, as also the jurisdiction and powers of the County Court in the premises, are confined to and controlled by those special statutes.
This appeal is from the judgment of the County Court affirming the report of the Commissioners appointed by the Board of Supervisors to assess the benefits and damages to each separate lot of land within the limits of the district as defined by the statute, and the only questions as yet presented arise upon a preliminary motion to dismiss the appeal.
Without entering into a discussion of the provisions of the statute, which would be out of place in the decision of this preliminary motion, I deem it sufficient to state that some of the objections filed by the appellant to the second report of the Commissioners did present to the County Court questions involving the validity of the assessment of benefit to his property, as made by such Commissioners. By section eleven of the Act as amended, it is made the duty of the Commissioners to “first ascertain and determine the amount of damages resulting to any property injured or affected by
From the above extract, it will be observed that the Commissioners are first required to “ascertain and determine the amount of damages resulting to any property injured or affected by said work over and above all benefits.” This involves an assessment of benefits and damages to each separate lot or parcel of land affected by the modification of grade contemplated by the statute, and to the aggregate excess of damages over benefits, thus ascertained, is to be added the cost and expense of all proceedings had under the Act, including the fees of the Commissioners and of the counsel and clerk employed by the Commissioners, and the aggregate of these several items is the amount which the Commissioners are required to assess upon the lands and premises benefited by said change of grade within the district, as near as may be, in proportion to the benefit which shall have accrued to each lot. Any error, therefore, or departure from the requirements of the statute in determining the aggregate amount to be assessed upon the property benefited, must, of necessity, involve the validity of the assessment upon any specific lot as its proportionate share of the aggregate amount to be assessed. Indeed, every act and duty required of the Commissioners, up to and including their final report, is a step involving the'validity of their final assessment of benefits to each separate lot, and any lot owner whose interest is affected by any intermediate or final
The Legislature, then, having conferred upon the County Court jurisdiction of these special statutory proceedings, and devolved upon it a supervisory control of the acts of the Commissioners in making and returning an assessment, the legality of which is challenged in that Court; and the Constitution of this State having in express terms conferred upon this Court appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving the “ legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or municipal fine,” it 'would seem that section three hundred and fifty-nine of the Practice Act fully authorized this appeal.
It is, however, claimed that the special statute under which these proceedings were had do not provide for an appeal—on the contrary, in effect, prohibit an appeal from the final judgment of the County Court in the premises. But if the Constitution of the State expressly confers appellate jurisdiction upon this Court of the subject matter involved in the judgment of the County Court, no Act of the Legislature can oust such jurisdiction; and it would require the most direct and unmistakable language in an Act of the Legislature to justify this Court in attributing to that department an intent to divest this Court of jurisdiction in any case or proceeding within its constitutional grant of jurisdiction. The language relied upon as in effect prohibitory of an appeal in the present case, is found in the thirteenth section of the amendatory Act, and, with its context, is as follows: “ Within twenty days after the' publication of said last mentioned notice, any interested party or parties dissatisfied with the report of said Commissioners, or any part thereof, may file with the Clerk of the County Court of said city and county written objec
It will be observed, by a careful reading of this section, that even after the report of the Commissioners of assessment has first been filed with the Clerk of the County Court, the jurisdiction of the County Court is not invoked and does not attach until, under the notice published by the Clerk of the Court, some party interested in the proceedings has filed with the Clerk of the Court objections to the report of the Commissioners, or some part thereof. Until this is done there is no case in Court, and no occasion for the action of the Court; but when objections to the report are properly filed, there is a case or matter in Court of which the statute requires it to take jurisdiction, the parties to which are substantially the municipal corporation of the City and County of San Francisco, affirmatively proceeding under the statute on the one side, and the persons filing objections to the report of the Commissioners on the other. The issues are made by the report and objections thereto, and the Court is required to proceed to hear the allegations of the parties objecting to the report, and take evidence in support of and against such objections, and of said report and the assessment thereon, and shall confirm said report, or may modify the same, or may set the same aside, either in whole or in part, or, in its discretion, may refer the matter back to the same Commissioners, with instructions, etc.; and, in case such report should be referred back, then, upon a second report being made, the same right of objection by any party interested shall exist as to said second or amended report as to the first report; and, upon the hearing of objections to the second or amended report of the Com
This, in my judgment, is the extent of the restriction imposed, and the language of the statute should not be construed as prohibiting a review of the final judgment of the County Court in the premises by a Court upon which the Constitution has conferred appellate jurisdiction of the specific matter involved therein, or as repealing by implication a general law authorizing appeals from such judgments.
The motion to dismiss, I think, should be denied.
