116 Pa. 410 | Pa. | 1887
Opinion,
The only question in this cause is a question of jurisdiction. The merits of the appellants’ claim are not before us, because their offer of proof in support of it was rejected by the auditing judge, and this action was sustained by a majority of the learned court below. We find ourselves unable to assent to the conclusion reached, and for that reason the decree must be reversed in order that the claim of the appellants may be heard and decided. The evidence was rejected because it was held that the Orphans’ Court had no power to entertarin the claim, ■ no jurisdiction to hear and determine it. As we understand the facts, the appellants, who are eminent counsel of the city of Philadelphia, had been employed by the guardian' of a minor to render professional services on behalf of the minor in an attempt to recover certain real estate claimed for the ward. A retaining fee and some other fees were paid to the appellants, the services were rendered and the estate was recovered. A bill for final compensation having been presented to the guardian, he refused to pay it and thereupon, on the audit of his account, the counsel presented their claim to the auditing judge who rejected the proof offered in its support, on the ground of want of jurisdiction.
We must regard the claim, therefore, as a claim against the guardian in his official capacity, upon a contract made with him as such, for necessary services actually rendered, uhder and upon the faith of the contract, on behalf of the ward and concerning property claimed for the ward; the ward’s title being denied and resisted in the courts and the services resulting successfully in the recovery of the property. For these services the counsel were partially compensated by the guardian, and the claim is to recover from the guardian in his official capacity the remainder of the compensation alleged to be due.
It is admitted that if the guardian had paid for the services and claimed credit for the payment of them in his account, the Orphans’ Court would have had jurisdiction to determine the claim. It cannot be that the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the giving or withholding consent to the payment by the guardian. We are aware of no legal reason for holding that the Orphans’ Court does not have jurisdiction to consider and determine claims against the estates of minors under their control. On the contrary, it seems to us that court is eminently the proper one for such purposes. Certainly, claims for necessaries furnished to the guardian for the support of the ward are valid claims against the estate of the ward in the hands of the guardian, and the right to recover them from
In Furney’s Appeal, 12 W. N. 82, we allowed a recovery for fees adversely claimed by counsel as compensation for services in relation to the ward’s real estate, and the recovery was had upon a settlement of the guardian’s account. The jurisdiction was not questioned but the decision was placed upon a ground which would have given it in that case as it does in this..
By the act of 29th March, 1832, § 5, P. L. 191, it is provided that “ the Orphans’ Court of each county shall have the care of the persons of minors resident within such county and of their estates.” And by the act of 16th June, 1836, § 19, P. L. 792, it is provided that “the jurisdiction of the several Orphans’ Courts shall extend to, and embrace
“ 1. The appointment, control, removal and discharge of the guardians of minors and the settlement of their accounts.”
It seems to us that these acts contain all the elements of a jurisdiction which will enable Orphans’ Courts to take cognizance of, and decide, claims like the present where the services
Nor is there any force in the argument drawn from analogy to the case of administrators and executors. These are trustees merely for collection and distribution, having no power to bind the estates of their decedents by contracts made by themselves. But guardians are trustees for custody and management, and necessarily must and do have power to make many kinds of contracts. The very nature of their function proves this. The minors must have food and clothing and shelter, medical attendance in sickness and legal services for the protection of their estates. If they have houses and lands, these must be let to tenants and the buildings must be kept in repair and insured against fire which can only be done by contracts. If they have money it must be invested and this can only be done by contracts of loan. If they have securities these may require to be changed and this can only be done
And so, in the present case, the claim of the appellants is eminently of this character. Their professional services were given to secure, and actually did secure, a large part of the trust estate. Had it been money in the hands of the guardian and embraced in his account, it could not have been questioned under our decisions that the claim should, have been allowed: Furney’s Appeal and Manderson’s Appeal, supra. But it was land not converted into money, and of course was not represented in the account filed by the guardian. It was and is, however, a part of the very trust estate belonging to the ward, and in the possession and control of the same guardian who bolds the present fund and who contracted with the appellants for their services. Upon contracts made
It seems to us that upon plain principles the jurisdiction to entertain claims for professional services rendered by attorneys to the estates of minors upon contracts with their guardians, ought to reside iu the courts which have control of the accounts of the guardians. No personal liability of the guardian is intended in such cases, and where the contracts are within the line of their duty and their power no personal liability exists. The liability really incurred is official only, and if contested should be inquired of and determined by the court having control of the estate of the ward and of the accounts of the guardian.
The decree of the court below is reversed and the record is remitted for further proceedings, at the cost of the appellees.