delivered the opinion of the court:
This is аn appeal by the United States Steel Corporation and six of its employees (hereinafter respondents) from an order of the circuit court of Cook County entered on March 19, 1971. The order upheld the validity of six subpoenas duces tecum which had been issued by the Appeal Board of the Department of Environmental Control of the City of Chicago (hereinafter Appeal Board) during an administrative proceeding. The order was entered upon a petition filed by the Appeal Board, after the motion of thе respondents to dismiss the petition had been overruled. The subpoenas commanded the six employees to appear to testify before the Appeal Board and to bring with them certain documents, and the trial court entered an order which found that the Appeal Board had the power to issue them and that they were valid.
The respondents have appealed directly to this court. They contend: (1) that the subpoenas are vague, overbroad, unreasonable, and call for the production of irrеlevant, confidential information — all in violation of their rights guaranteed by the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the Federal constitution and by section 6 of article II of the cоnstitution of Illinois; (2) that the Appeal Board lacks statutory authority to issue the subpoenas and to seek their
Section 17 — 2.55 of the Municipal Code of Chicago provides for an Appeal Board to review determinations of the city’s commissioner of environmental control, and paragraph (d) of that section states: “The appeal board may issue subpoenas in connection with said hearings, requiring the attendance of witnesses and production of evidence reasonably related to said hearing, and shall have the power to cause to be instituted in court appropriate legal proceedings to compel compliancе with said subpoenas.” Mun. Code of Chicago, 1971 sec. 17 — 255 (d).
Municipalities have only those powers expressly granted to them by the General Assembly or those necessarily implied from оr incident to powers expressly granted. (See e.g., Chicago School Transit, Inc. v. City of Chicago (1966),
In this court the Appeal Board makes three arguments in support of the City’s authority to enact section 17— 2.55(d). First, it points to section 11 — 19.1—11 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 11 — 19.1—11) which defines “air contаminant” and authorizes the corporate authorities to provide by ordinance “for the regulation of (1) the design and installation of accessory or appurtenant рarts and equipment of buildings and structures and uses of land connected with the emission of air contaminants, (2) the operation or use of equipment
But the power to issue administrative subpoenas is an extraordinary one which is not to be implied from a simple grant of authority to enact ordinances. This is demonstrated by the fаct that when the General Assembly intended municipal agencies to have the power to issue subpoenas in connection with the enforcement of particular statutes or ordinances, it has so stated. (See e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, pars. 10 — 1—20, 10 — 1—39, 10 — 2.1-—17, 11 — 9— 3, 11 — 13—7a, 11 — 31.1—5.) If the present contention of the Appeal Board is sound, none of these specific grants of authority were necessary; all of them are surplusage. We are unable to accept that contention.
In the petition which it filed in the circuit court the Appeal Boаrd also relied upon section 14 of the Illinois Air Pollution Control Act of 1963 for its authority to issue subpoenas and to seek their enforcement. That section (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. m^, par. 240.14) provided that the State Act was not to apply in any municipality “which provides for the control of air pollution by resolution, ordinance or regulation not inconsistent with the substantive provisions of this Act or any rule or regulation hereunder.” Based upon that exemption provision, the contention was advanced that the Act “delegates authority to thе City of Chicago to control local air pollution and that inherent in said delegation of authority to control local air pollution is
That contention is not directly renewed in this court, for it is now recognized that the statute relied upon wаs repealed by the Environmental Protection Act which became effective July 1, 1970. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1970 Supp., ch. hiJi, par. 1001 et seq.) It is, however, now asserted that the “1970 Environmental Control Act is simply an expanded continuation of the former Air Pollution Control Act.” That, however, is rather clearly not the case. The exemption clause upon which the Appeal Board relied in the trial court is not contained in the new Act. It is true that section 2 of that Act states a legislative finding that “it is the obligation of the State Government * * * to encouragе and assist local governments to adopt and implement environmental-protection programs consistent with this Act * * *,” and that section 5 gives to the State agency establishеd by the Act the power to issue subpoenas. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1970 Supp., ch. mj4, pars. 1002, 1005.) But from the fact that one section speaks of encouragement of local programs cоnsistent with the Act, and another section grants subpoena power to the State enforcement agency, it does not follow that cities and villages were granted the power to issue and enforce subpoenas.
Finally, the Appeal Board argues that authority to enact section 17 — 2.55 (d) is expressly granted in section 10 — 4— 4 of the Illinois Municipal Codе. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 10 — 4—4.) That section provides: “In municipalities of more than 500,000, the corporate authorities may investigate the enforcement of the municipal ordinanсes, rules and regulations, and the action, conduct and efficiency of all officers, agents and employees of the municipality. In the conduct of such investigations the corporate authorities may hold public hearings. Each member of the corporate authorities shall have power to administer oaths, and the
This section is not applicable here. The authority that it grants is conferred upon the “corpоrate authorities,” defined to mean “the city council.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 1 — 1—2.) The section thus relates only to investigations by the city council of the conduct of city employees in the enforcement of ordinances. See Du Bois v. Gibbons (1954),
The Appeal Board has been unable to point to any legislative grant of authority for the enactment of рaragraph (d) of section 17 — 2.55 of the Municipal Code of Chicago, and we have found none. We are also unaware of any legislative grant of jurisdiction to enforce the subpoenas here in question.
The order of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed. ^ , ,
Order reversed.
Mr. Justice Goldenhersh took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.