21 Haw. 571 | Haw. | 1913
Lead Opinion
OPINION OP THE COURT BY
(Perry, J., Dissenting.)
This is a case submitted by the parties upon an agreed statement of facts. The facts thus agreed upon and signed by the parties are as follows:
“That the said Apokaa Sugar Company, Limited, is and was at all times mentioned herein a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Territory, doing business for profit, and having its usual place of business within said Hirst Taxation Division of the Territory of Hawaii.
“That the said Charles T. Wilder is and was at all times herein mentioned the Assessor of said Hirst Taxation Division.
“That in the month of January, 1913, the said Apokaa Sugar Company, Limited, made a full return, verified by the oath of its duly empowered officers, in the form prescribed by the Treasurer of the Territory for the taxation period ending December 31, 1912, of all the matters required by Section 1282 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii as amended by Act 87 of the Session Laws of 1905.
“That there has been duly levied and assessed on the net profit or income of said corporation, above actual operating and business expenses, derived during said taxation period, and from all property owned and all business carried on by said corporation in the Territory of Hawaii, a tax of two per cent, on said net profit or income as shown by said return, the said net profit or income being the sum of $16,530 and the said tax being the sum of $330.60; and also, in addition to said tax of two per cent, levied and assessed upon said net profit or income as aforesaid, there has been duly levied and assessed, under the provisions of Act 33 of the Laws of 1909 as amended by Act 147 of the Laws of 1911, a further tax of two per cent, on the net*573 profit or income of said corporation, amounting to the sum of $330.60, said tax being so levied as a special fund to promote the conservation and development of the natural resources of the Territory through immigration and other means, and being hereafter, for greater clearness, referred to as the ‘Conservation Tax.’
“That such assessments and levies were made in accordance with law, unless the amount of said last mentioned tax, levied by virtue of the provisions of Act 33 of the Laws of 1909 as amended by Act 147 of the Laws of 1911, and known as the ‘Conservation Tax/ is affected by the provisions of Act 164 of the Laws of 1913, approved on the 30th day of April, 1913.
“That on the 14th day of May, 1913, the said Apokaa Sugar Company, Limited, on the demand of the said Charles T. Wilder, Assessor, and to prevent the penalty provided by law for delinquent taxes, paid the first installment of both of said taxes; but paid one-half, viz., the sum of $82.65, of said first installment of said ‘Conservation Tax’ under protest, and, at the same time, filed a protest and notice under the provisions of Section 1512A of the Revised Laws (a copy of which is hereto annexed and made a part hereof).
“That the said Apokaa Sugar Company, Limited, demands from the said Charles T. Wilder, Assessor, the repayment of said sum of $82.65, on the ground that the same was illegally levied and exacted from it by the said Charles T. Wilder, and asks judgment against him for said amount.
“The question submitted to this court for decision is whether the said Act 33 of the Laws of 1909 as amended by Act 147 of the Laws of 1911 has been modified by said Act 164 of the Laws of 1913 so that the rate of said ‘Conservation Tax’ is one per cent, instead of two per cent, upon the net profit or income of. said corporation derived during the taxation period ending on the 31st day of December, 1912.”
The sole question presented by the submission for determination is, whether the so-called conservation tax on the income of the Apokaa Sugar Company derived during the year immediately preceding the first day of January 1913, i. e., during the year 1912, shall be assessed at the rate of one per cent., as contended for by the corporation, or at the rate of two per cent., as contended for by the assessor.
Act 147, Laws of 1911, which amended section 6 of Act 33 by substituting 1913 for 1911, provided as follows: “This Act shall be in effect from the date of its approval and relate retrospectively to give full effect to the provisions herein contained with respect to taxes for the first taxation period hereunder; and shall continue in full force to and until the 31st day of December, 1913; provided, that all taxes assessed under the provisions of this Act which shall remain unpaid at the end
Act 164, Laws of 1913, approved April 30, 1913, amended sections 1 and 2 of-Act 33 by reducing the rate of the conservation tax to one per cent, and amended section 6 thereof to read as follows: “This Act shall be in effect from the date of its approval, and relate retrospectively to give full effect to the provisions herein contained with respect to taxes for the first taxation period hereunder; and shall continue in force to and until the 31st day of December, 1915; provided, that all taxes assessed under the provisions of this Act which shall remain unpaid at the end of said period shall be subject to collection and enforcement in. the same manner as though all the provisions of this Act were still in force with respect thereto.”
Thus, by the Acts referred to, namely, Acts 33, 147 and 164, we have a complete and harmonious statutory scheme covering the entire period from and including the year 1908 to and including the year 1915. And, obviously, just as Act 33, as amended by Act 147, contemplated six taxation periods, namely, 1908, 1909,-1910, 1911, 1912 and 1913, of which 1908 was the first of such periods, so likewise Act 164 contemplates four taxation periods, namely, 1912, 1913, 1914 and 1915, of which 1912 is the first of such periods.
The intention of the legislature, we think, is obvious. That the-year 1912 was the first taxation period under Act 164, we think is clear. The language used is plain and free from ambiguity. And “when the terms of a statute are plain, unambiguous and explicit, the courts are not at liberty to go outside of the language to search for a meaning which it does not reasonably bear.” Suth. Stat. Const., §321. “Where the meaning of the language used is plain, it must be given effect by the courts, or they would be assuming legislative authority.” 36 Cyc. 1107. “It is a very well-settled rule that so long as the language used is unambiguous, a departure from its natural
The legislature by Act 164, in direct, positive and unequivocal terms said tbat tbe statute shall “relate retrospectively to give full effect to tbe provisions herein contained with respect to taxes for tbe first taxation period hereunder.” One of tbe “provisions” of tbe statute is, that tbe rate of taxation on incomes derived during tbe “first taxation period” thereunder, 1912, was fixed at one per cent., and in order to “give full effect” to this, as well as to other “provisions” of tbe statute, tbe legislature, in unmistakable terms, expressly gave tbe statute retrospective operation. Such being tbe legislative command we have no alternative other than to give tbe language used “full effect” as directed. Tbe expression, “tbe first taxation period hereunder,” necessarily means tbe year immediately preceding tbe first day of January of tbe year in which tbe tax is payable, which, under Act 164, was tbe year 1912. And, inasmuch as tbe statute has fixed tbe rate of taxation on incomes derived during tbe taxation period of 1912 at one per cent., and tbe act having been expressly made retrospective with “respect to taxes for tbe first taxation period” thereunder, it follows, necessarily, tbat tbe assessor was not entitled to collect and receive taxes from tbe Apokaa Sugar Company on income for 1912 in excess of tbe rate of one per cent.
Neither tbe rule nor tbe authorities cited in support thereof, tbat statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective and not a retrospective operation, can have any application to tbe statute before us, for tbe reason tbat tbe legislature has expressly made it retrospective, and tbe language used being plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction. 36 Cyc. 1205-1208. If, however, tbe statute were open to construction, it being a revenue law, it should be construed strictly against the governmental authority. Cooley, Taxation, pp. 197-200; Castle & Cooke v. Luce, 5 Haw. 321, 324; Sutb. Stat. Const., §364.
There can be no question as to the power of the legislature to release or remit the Territory’s claim for taxes. 37 Cyc. 1170, 1171.
The parties having stipulated that the court may enter judgment according as it may find the law, we therefore conclude that the Apokaa Sugar Company is entitled to judgment against Charles T. Wilder, Tax Assessor, First Taxation Division, Territory of Hawaii, for the sum of .$82.65. Judgment will be entered accordingly.
Dissenting Opinion
DISSENTING OPINION OP
Act '33 of the Laws of 1909, approved by the governor on March 22 of that year, provided, for the first time in the history of Hawaii, for the imposition of a special tax on incomes, ever since known as the conservation tax, to be 'used, three-fourths for the encouragement of immigration and one-fourth for the development, conservation., improvement and utilization of the natural resources of the Territory. The first and second sections directed that, in addition to the tax of two per cent.
In 1911 section 6 was amended by striking out the figures “1911” and substituting the figures “1913,” but in no other respect. By Act 164 of the Laws of 1913, approved April 30" of that year,-sections 1 and 2 of the act of 1909 were amended by making the rate of the conservation tax one per cent, instead of two per cent., section 5 so as to provide that one-half of the
The question now submitted to this court for decision is whether the rate required by law for the conservation tax payable by plaintiff in 1913 upon its income for the year 1912 is one per cent, or two per cent.
It is an established rule of construction that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be solved against the retrospective effect. 36 Cyc. 1205. “It is a principle which has always been held sacred in the United States, that laws by which human action is to be regulated, look forwards, not backwards; and are never to be construed retrospectively, unless the language of the act shall render such construction indispensable.” Reynolds v. M'Arthur, 2 Pet. 417, 434. “We are to remember there is a presumption-against retrospective operation, and we have said that words in a statute ought not to have such operation ‘unless they are so clear, strong, and imperative, that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied.’ ” United States v. American Sugar Co., 202 U. S. 563, 577. As well settled is the rule that “where a statute is expressly or by clear implication made retrospective to a certain extent or for a certain purpose, the courts will not by construction give to it a retrospective operation to any greater extent or for any other purpose.” 36 Cyc. 1209. See also Gumpper v. Waterbury Traction Co., 68 Conn. 424, 427. It is entirely clear that under the law as it stood until April 30, 1913, the
No provision w;as made in the amendatory act or in any other statute for the re-imbursement of any sums paid for taxes (in 1913 on incomes for 1912) under the original conservation act at the rate of two per cent, or of sums deposited for costs of appeals in 1913 upon the theory that the tax rate was twro per cent, and which, if the amendatory act had not been passed, would have been forfeitable to the Territory under certain circumstances. R. L., §§1246, 1253.
The provision of section 6 relating to retrospective operation was inserted in the original act because there was no pre-existing law relating to a conservation tax and because without such an express declaration the tax would not be assessable until January, 1910, and upon incomes for 1909. The act as originally passed was consistent throughout in the respect under consideration. It provided prospectively for a rate of two per cent, upon incomes for 1909 and subsequent years and retrospectively for a rate of one per cent, upon incomes for 1908. That provision served its full purpose in 1909 and ever since has been and now
Whatever difficulties of construction might have arisen if the act as amended had been enacted for the first time on April 30, 1913, I am satisfied, in view of the history of the legislation on the subject, that the intention of the legislature, sufficiently expressed in the statutes, was that the rate of the tax upon incomes for 1912 should be two per cent, and that the rate for the remainder of the term of the act should be one per cent.
In my opinion judgment should be entered for the defendant.