Apartment Investment and Management Company, et al. (collectively, “AIMCO”) appeal from a non-final order denying their motion to cоmpel arbitration. We affirm.
On June 7, 2011, Flamingo/South Beach 1 Condominium Association, Inc. (“the Association”) sued AIMCO alleging that it ■violated provisions оf the Reciprocal Maintenance, Use and Easement Agreement (“the Agreement”). The Agreement subjects three parcels (thе North, Center, and South Towers) to various easements, restrictions, and covenants that run with the land. Under the Agreement, the South Tower was allocated thirty-two percent of the parking spaces for the use of its residents and “permittees” — which were later divided into reservеd and unreserved spaces. In addition, the Association is permitted to charge and retain fees for the use of its allocated sрaces.
In its complaint, the Association alleged that AIMCO was improperly charging the Association’s condominium residents and their “permittees” for parking. The Association claimed this violated the Agreement and deprived them of the full enjoyment of their property, depreciated the value of the individual properties, and otherwise injured their personal and property rights. According to the Association, when a resident or “permittee” (usually a guest) obtains a parking pass from AIM-CO, AIMCO does not determine whether South Tower’s allocated spaces are available, but instead charges the resident or guest and retains the fee. The Association further alleged that after it began to dispute these charges, AIMCO retaliated by selectively enforcing the policies governing issuance of parking permits, and began aggressively exercising its right to tow unauthorized vehicles owned by South Tower residents and their permittees.
As originally filed, the Assоciation’s complaint raised eight counts: (I) Injunc-tive Relief for Violation of Restrictive Covenant; (II) Violation of Restrictive Covenant Imposition of Constructive Trust; (III) Injunctive Relief for Selective Enforcement of Parking Policies; (IV) In-junctive Relief to Abate Maintenance of a Nuisance; (V) Equitable Accounting; (VI) Equitable Lien; (VII) Constructive Trust; and (VHI) Declaratory Judgment. The Association has since voluntarily dismissed Count VHI, without prejudice.
*1092 Based on the broad arbitration provision in section 18.1 of the Agreement, AIMCO moved to compel arbitration and stay the triаl court proceedings. The Association opposed the motion arguing that its claims fall under section 18.2(b), which provides an excеption to arbitration for equitable relief. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying AIMCO’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. 1 This appeal followed.
We review an order denying a motion to compel arbitration
de novo. Idearc Media Corp. v. M.R. Friedman & G.A. Friedman, P.A.,
“In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, Florida courts should resolve all doubts in favor of arbitration rather than against it.”
Medanic v. Citicorp Inv. Servs.,
Arbitration agreements are governed by general contract law, and courts must “discern the intent of the parties from the language used in their agreement.”
Citigroup, Inc. v. Amodio,
Section 18.1 of the Agreement sets forth a broad arbitration provision, which states, in pertinent part: “Any controversy, dispute, or claim of any nature arising out of, in connection with, or in relation to the intеrpretation, performance, enforcement or breach of this Agreement, including any claim based on contract, tort, or statute, shall be resolved at the written request of any Owner by binding arbitration.” Section 18.2(b), however, provides an exception to section 18.1’s arbitration provision:
Equitable Relief and Exempt Claims. Notwithstanding anything in this Section 18 to the contrary, this Section 18 shall not prevent ... an Owner[ 2 ] from seeking and obtaining equitable relief on a temporary or permanent basis, including, without limitation, a temporary restraining order, a preliminary or permanent injunction or similar equitable relief, from a court of competent jurisdiction ... in order to protect or enforce the rights of such owner under this Agrеement or to prevent irreparable harm and injury. The court’s jurisdiction over any such equitable matter, however, shall be expressly limited only to the temporary, preliminary, or permanent equitable relief sought. All other claims initiated under this Agree *1093 ment shall be determined in accordance with Section 18.1.
Section 18.2(b) demonstrates that the parties intended to allow “a court of competent jurisdiction” — here, the circuit court of Miami-Dade County — to provide preliminary or permanent equitable relief. Counts I, III, and IV of the complaint, which seek permanent injunctive relief, are cleаrly governed by the plain language of the Agreement’s arbitration exception. In addition, equitable accounting (Count V) is a remedy falling undеr the Agreement’s exception to arbitration.
See Greenberg v. Sellers,
Because the pаrties intended to exempt equitable claims from arbitration, and the complaint only seeks equitable relief, all of the claims may bе resolved by the trial court without requiring resolution by arbitration.
Cf. Swan Landing Dev., LLC v. Fla. Capital Bank, N.A.,
Affirmed.
Notes
. Prior to the denial of AIMCO’s motion to compel arbitration, the trial court granted temporary injunctive relief.
. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Association is the “Owner” of the Sоuth Tower.
. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy invoked to avoid an unjust enrichment.
Saporta v. Saporta,
. "[A]n equitable lien ‘is a right granted by a court of equity, arising by reason of the conduct of the parties affected which would entitle one party as a matter of equity to proceed against’ certain property.”
Epstein v. Epstein,