133 Misc. 881 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1929
Plaintiff is a membership corporation composed of thirty-seven owners of what it calls “ apartment hotels.” By the complaint, which has been held sufficient by the Appellate Division (224 App. Div. 717), it asks to enjoin the city of New York from enforcing against these buildings the provisions of the Tenement House Law. As the buildings are not wholly alike, either in construction or operation, it is impossible to try the issues as though but a single one were involved. Necessarily the evidence has been of a general nature, with a view of ascertaining an average or typical condition. Consequently my conclusions cannot be expressed in other than general terms. Whatever the result of the suit I assume that it cannot be regarded as an adjudication of the status of any particular building. The controversy concerns immediately the question whether the buildings of plaintiff’s members come within the definition of a tenement house as set forth in subdivisions 1 and H of section 2 of article 1 of the Tenement House Law, reading as follows: “ 1. A
* * * There is no denying the fact that the people of the city who come to five in apartment hotels do so with a feeling that when they have an occasional desire to do some cooking the facilities are there for it, although not a single woman could be found who would say that the facilities of a.serving pantry are such as to be conducive towards substantial cooking.” He argues, therefore, that a discontinuance of the facilities complained of would be a retrogression from an advance in methods of housing and living in New York city. I can only say that that is wholly a legislative matter. The Legislature has prescribed the methods and standards of construction applicable to different classes of buildings, and to say that a disregard of these fixed standards represents an improvement or an advance is to beg the question. It is not the function either of courts or administrative officers to oppose their views of what is