Apartment Association of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los AngelesApartment Association of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
Case Information
O UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA APARTMENT ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, INC., ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Cаse No. CV 20-05193 DDP (JEMx)
Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL., [Dkt. 46]
Defendants.
Presently before the court is Plaintiff Apartment Association of Los Angeles County, doing business as the Apartment Association of Greater Los Angeles (“AAGLA”)’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Having considered the submissions of the parties and heard oral argument, the court denies the motion and adopts the following Order.
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I. Background
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The COVID-19 global pandemic is the gravest public health crisis in over a century. At present, the novel coronavirus has killed at least 230,000 Americans and infected over 9 million more. [2] The true toll may never be known, but is likely significantly higher. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), for example, estimates that the number of “excess deaths” in the United States is closer to 300,000. [3] Neither the State of California nor the City of Los Angeles have been spared from the ravages of COVID-19. Nearly a million Californians have been infected, and nearly 18,000 have died. [4] Approximately 300,000 of those cases and 7,000 of those fatalities have ocсurred in the Los Angeles area. [5]
Eight months into the pandemic, the City of Los Angeles remains in a state of emergency. In accordance with recommendations from national, state, and local public health authorities, state and local officials have taken hitherto unthinkable steps to slow the spread of the virus. For a time, all state and city residents were ordered to stay confined to their places of residence, with limited exceptions. [6] Although restrictions have eased somewhat at present, many types of businesses and gathering places remain closed in Los Angeles, including movie theaters, bars, athletic fields, theme parks, gyms and fitness centers, museums, live performance venues, indoor restaurants, and “non-critical” offices. [7] These measures, in conjunction with other coronavirus-related concerns, have had devastating economic consequences. By one estimate, over 16 milliоn California households have lost employment income as a result of the coronavirus. [8] Over the last six months, the unemployment rate in the Los Angeles area has ranged from 15 to 20 percent. [9]
Crises of national scope require national responses. Initially, the federal government rose to meet the economic challenge presented by the COVID crisis and passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), Pub. L. No. 116-136. Among the CARES Act’s provisions were (1) a one-time stimulus payment to taxpayers and (2) an additional $600 weekly payment to Americans collecting unemployment benefits. [10] [11] Those additional unemployment payments expired, however, at the end of July, and Congress has not provided for further stimulus payments or other assistance to the American people. But the crisis has not abated. As the pandemic has worsened, its economic consequences have persisted.
These economic impacts have, unsurprisingly, affected the ability of many residential tenants to make rent payments. Somewhere between one million and 1.4 million California households are behind on their rent. [12] Approximately 14% of renter households in Los Angeles County are behind on rent, largely due to the effects of the pandemic on employment. [13] These households include over 450,000 people in the City of Los Angeles. [14]
As the CDC has explained, the novel coronavirus “spreads very easily and sustainably between people who are in close contact with one another . . . .” [15] “[H]ousing stability helps protect public health because homelessness increases the likelihood of individuals moving into congregate settings . . .” [16] Thus, “[i]n the context of a pandemic, eviction moratoria – like quarantine, isolation, and social distancing – can be an effective public help measure utilized to prevent the spread of communicable disease,” and “facilitate self-isolation by people who become ill or who are at risk for severe illness from COVID-19.” [17]
Recognizing that “[t]he COVID-19 pandemic threatens to undermine housing security and generate unnecessary displacement of City residents,” the City of Los Angeles adopted, among other measures, Ordinance 186606 (“the Eviction Moratorium,” “City Moratorium,” or “Moratorium”). The Moratorium “temporarily prohibits evictions of residential and commercial tenants for failure to pay rent due to COVID-19, and prohibits evictions of residential tenants during the emergency for no-fault reasons, for unauthorized occupants or pets, and for nuisances related to COVID- 19.” (Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 3 at 2.) Landlords may continue to seek to evict tenants for other reasons, and do not run afoul of the Moratorium at all if they seek to evict a tenant on the basis of a good faith belief that the tenant does not qualify fоr the Moratorium’s protections. [18] (Id. at 3, 4). The Moratorium’s prohibition of evictions for COVID-related unpaid rent extends for twelve months after the expiration of the local emergency. [19] (Id. at 3.) In other words, tenants have one year after the end of the emergency to make any rent payments that were missed as a result of COVID, including as a result of workplace closures, health care expenses, child care expenses due to school closures, “or other reasonable expenditures stemming from government-ordered emergency measures.” [20] (Id.) The Moratorium explicitly states, however, that it does not “eliminate[] any obligation to pay lawfully charged rent.” (Id. at 4.) If, at the end of the one year grace period, a tenant still owes rent that came due during the emergency period, a landlord may seek to evict for that unpaid rent. Landlords may not, however, charge late fees or interest fоr missed rent during the emergency or twelve month grace period. (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff AAGLA is comprised of thousands of owners and managers of rental housing units, including over 55,000 properties within the City of Los Angeles. Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) alleges that the City Eviction Moratorium and Rent Freeze Ordinance violate landlords’ rights under the Contract Clause of the Constitution, as well as the Due Process Clause, Takings Clause, and Tenth Amendment. Plaintiff now moves for a preliminary injunction on the basis of the TAC’s first two claims.
II. Legal Standard
A private party seeking a preliminary injunction must show
that: (i) it is likely to succeed on the merits; (ii) it will
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (iii)
the balancing of the equities between the parties that would result
from the issuance or denial of the injunction tips in its favor;
and (iv) an injunction will be in the public interest. Winter v.
Natural Resources Def. Council,
III. Discussion
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
AAGLA contends that the Eviction Moratorium and the Rent
Freeze Ordinance run afoul of the Contract Clause’s prescription
that states shall not pass “any Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts.”
(alterations omitted); see also Sveen v. Melin,
1821 (2018) (combining public purpose and reasonableness inquiries). Here, although AAGLA concedes that the Evictiоn Moratorium is motivated by a legitimate public purpose, it nevertheless contends that the moratorium substantially and unreasonably impairs landlords’ contract rights. [22]
1. Substantial Impairment
Whether a law substantially impairs a contractual relationship
depends upon “the extent to which the law undermines the
contractual bargain, interferes with a party’s reasonable
expectations, and prevents the party from safeguarding or
reinstating his rights.”
[23]
Sveen,
Second, the Blaisdell court, contrary to AAGLA’s
representation, did not state that contract enforcement measures
are sacrosanct. Although the Court did recount its prior
observation in Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy,
[I]t does not follow that conditions may not arise in which a temporary restraint of enforcement may be consistent with the spirit and purpose of the constitutional provision and thus be found to be within the range of the reserved power of the state to protect the vital interests of the community. It cannot be maintained that the constitutional prohibition should be so construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions with respect to the enforcement of contracts if made necessary by a great public calamity such as fire, flood, or earthquake. *** And, if state power exists to give temporary relief from the enforcement of contracts in the presence of disasters due to physical causes such as fire, flood, or earthquake, that power cannot be said to be nonexistent when the urgent public need demanding such relief is produced by other and economic causes.
Blaisdell,
That said, it would be difficult to conclude that the
Moratorium does not, at a minimum, significantly interfere with
landlords’ reasonable expectations. The reasonableness of a
party’s expectations will depend, to a significant extent, on the
degree of regulation in the relevant industry. See Energy
Reserves,
This Court respectfully concludes that the scope and nature of
the COVID-19 pandemic, and of the public health measures necessary
to combat it, have no precedent in the modern era, and that no
amount of prior regulation could have led landlords to expect
anything like the blanket Moratorium. See Baptiste v. Kennealy,
No. 1:20-CV-11335-MLW,
2.
Reasonableness
No party disputes that the Moratorium was enacted in pursuit
of a legitimate public purpose. The next question, therefore, “is
whether the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of
contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the
legislation’s adoption.” Energy Reserves,
United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersy,
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s prescription, AAGLA urges this Court to set aside the City’s determination that the Moratorium is necessary to protect public health, life, and property, and to conclude that the law is not a reasonable means of achieving its stated end. [26] AAGLA’s argument rests largely upon unsupported factual assertions and a misreading of Supreme Court precedent. First, AAGLA asserts, without citation to any source, that “there is no need for the Ordinances now . . ., with COVID cases decreasing . . . .” (Reply at 16:18-19.) It is unclear to the court whether that representation has been true at any point since the onset of the pandemic. [27] But even assuming that COVID cases were decreasing at the time of writing, that is most definitely not the case now, as fall wanes and winter approaches. [28]
Necessity aside, AAGLA primarily argues that, under Blaisdell,
no “government entity, even in an acute and sustained economic
emergency, may excuse tenants from paying a reasonable amount of
rent contemporaneous with occupancy as a condition to avoiding
eviction.”
[29]
(Mem. in support at 24:18-19 (emphasis omitted).)
AAGLA misreads Blaisdell, and subsequent cases interpreting it.
In 1933, in the midst of a state of economic emergency brought
on by the Great Depression, Minnesota passed the “Mortgage
Moratorium Law.” Blaisdell,
The Supreme Court, focusing on the Contract Clause,
disagreed. Id. at 447-48. In so concluding, the Court observed
that (1) a state of emergency existed, (2) the moratorium was
addressed to “the protection of a basic interest of society” rather
than to the benefit of particular individuals, (3) the moratorium’s
relief could only be “of a character appropriate to the emergency,
and could only be granted upon reasonable conditions,” (4) the
moratorium, on balance, met that reasonableness requirement, and
(5) the legislation was temporary. Id. at 447; see also Allied
Structural Steel,
reasonable rental value as a factor relevant to the reasonableness of the Mortgage Moratorium Law was tantamount to a requirement that any “adjustment” of rights relating to tenancy or occupancy include rent payments. For support, AAGLA points to the Supreme Court’s subsequent pronouncement in Allied Structural Steel that “[t]he Blaisdell opinion [] clearly implied that if the Minnesota moratorium legislation had not possessed the characteristics attributed to it by the Court, it would have been invalid under the Contract Clause of the Constitution.” Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 242. The characteristics to which the Allied Structural Steel court referred, however, were not the provisions bearing on the reasonableness of the Mortgage Moratorium Law, but rather the five broader considerations, of which reasonableness was but one. Id. As the Court explained,
In upholding the state mortgage moratorium law, the
[Blaisdell] Court found five factors significant. First,
the state legislature had declared in the Act itself that
an emergency need for the protection of homeowners existed.
Second, the state law was enacted to protect a basic
societal interest, not a favored group. Third, the relief
was appropriately tailored to the emergency that it was
designed to meet. Fourth, the imposed conditions were
reasonable. And, finally, the legislation was limited to
the duration of the emеrgency.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, although
the Blaisdell court might conceivably have reached a different
conclusion in the absence of a reasonable rent requirement, it did
not go so far as AAGLA would suggest. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has explained that, to the extent any of its post-Blaisdell
decisions did impose any specific limitations on legislatures’
powers vis-à-vis contracts, “[l]ater decisions abandoned these
limitations as absolute requirements.” U.S. Trust,
In thе absence of any specific prerequisite for
reasonableness, let alone a requirement that the Moratorium provide
for rent payments to landlords, this Court will defer to the City
Council’s weighing of the interests at stake. In so doing, the
court joins at least four other courts that have found eviction
moratoria reasonable in light of the COVID-19 pandemic at the
preliminary injunction stage, notwithstanding the lack of any
provision for partial rent payments. See Baptiste, 2020 WL
5751572, at *19; HAPCO,
AAGLA makes much of the fact that the Moratorium does not require tenants affected by COVID-19 to make an affirmative declaration to that effect. Although such a requirement would certainly make it more difficult for ill-intentioned, financially secure tenants to game the Moratorium, landlords remain free to seek to evict such nonpaying tenants, so long as there exists a good faith basis to believe that the tenant falls outside the Moratorium’s protections. (Moratorium at 2.) There does not appear to this Court to be anything inherently unreasonable about the City Council’s decision to spare legitimately-impacted tenants the burden of attestation.
Lastly, although the Moratorium does not mandate that tenants pay a reasonable, or any, amount of rent, neither has the City Council simply thrown landlords to the wolves. Along with the Moratorium and other coranavirus-related measures, the City implemented an Emergency Rental Assistance Program (“ERAS”), which will provide over $100 million in rental assistance payments to approximately 50,000 low-income households by the end of this year. (City Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. Y.) This rent subsidy “will be a grant paid directly to the tenant’s landlord . . . .” (Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).) The ERAS program does not impose any requirements on landlords beyond those already implemented by the Moratorium and the Rent Freeze Ordinance. (Id.) Although it is unlikely that the ERAS program will be sufficient to make up the entire shortfall of rent owed to AAGLA’s members, the amount is not insignificant, and is at the very least indicative of the City Council’s reasoned balancing of competing interests, including those of tenants, landlords, and the public health.
1 Thus, even though the court is persuaded that AAGLA will be 2 able to show that the Moratorium substantially impairs landlords’ 3 contract rights, AAGLA is not likely to succeed on its Contract 4 Clause claim because any such impairment appears, at this stage, to 5 be eminently reasonable under the extraordinary circumstances. [34] 6 B. Irreparable harm
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A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate
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not just a possibility, but a likelihood of irreparable harm.
9
Winter
,
into the merits question,” even where a plaintiff demonstrates a
likelihood of success on the merits of a constitutional claim.
Cuviello v. City of Vallejo,
AAGLA argues further that it is likely to suffer irreparable
harm because, in the absence of injunctive relief, “tenants may
simply live rent-free for the foreseeable future, without providing
any documentation to their landlords.” (Mem. in support at 19:18-
19.) Although at first glance, it is somewhat unclear how
landlords could possibly be irreparably harmed by the possibility
of a temporary delay in rent payments “for the foreseeable future,”
AAGLA’s reply makes clear that its theory of irreparable harm is
that landlords have “no realistic chance of being paid . . . .”
(Reply at 25:24.) It has long been established, however, “that
еconomic injury alone does not support a finding of irreparable
harm, because such injury can be remedied by a damage award.”
Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc.,
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. National Football League,
AAGLA contends that, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s
pronouncements, economic harm may be irreparable where there is a
significant risk that damages will never be collected. (Reply at
25.) Some courts, including this one, have occasionally found
irreparable hаrm where a plaintiff seeks monetary damages from a
defendant that is, or is likely to become, insolvent or may
dissipate assets to avoid judgment. See, e.g., DirecTV, LLC v. E&E
Enterprises Glob., Inc., No. 17-06110-DDP-PLA,
Although monetary losses alone cannot, in this context,
constitute irreparable harm, foreclosure theoretically could, as
landlords’ properties are unique. See Sundance Land Corp. v. Cmty.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
Even putting all these considerations aside, AAGLA has failed to show that the preliminary injunction it seeks will prevent the harms it alleges. The Moratorium represents but one layer of protection Los Angeles renters currently enjoy. California state authorities have not remained idle in the face of the COVID crisis. In late August, the state legislature passed Assembly Bill 3088, the COVID-19 Tenant Rights Act (the “State Law”). The State Law is similar in some ways to the City’s Moratorium, insofar as it also prohibits no-fault evictions and evictions for COVID-related rent delinquencies, without limiting landlords’ ability to seek unpaid rent through other means. Cal. Code Civ. P. §§ CCP § 116.223, 1179.03, 1179.03.5. The State Law generally does not affect pre- existing local measures, such as the Moratorium, except to (1) trigger the commencement of any existing local rent repayment grace periods, including those conditioned upon the end of a declared state of emergency, on March 1, 2021, and (2) terminate any such repayment periods on March 31, 2022. Cal. Code Civ. P. § 1179.05.
In some aspects, however, the State Law goes beyond the
Moratorium in ways that are more burdensome on landlords. The
Moratorium, for example, allows evictions for back rent that
remains unpaid at the conclusion of the Moratorium’s twelve-month
grace period. Under the State Law, in contrast, tenants can never
be evicted for any COVID-related missed rent incurred between March
1, 2020 and August 31, 2020. Cal. Code Civ. P. § 1179.04(a).
Similarly, tenants can never be evicted for failure to pay rent
that comes due between September 1, 2020 and January 31, 2021, so
long as the tenant pays, no later than January 31, twenty-five
percent of the rent due during that period.
Notwithstanding the seemingly greater impacts of the State Law, AAGLA does not challenge the constitutionality of the State Law. To the contrary, AAGLA argues that the State Law is more reasonable than the Moratorium and, at that “we can certainly assume that the state law is constitutional.” Against the backdrop of a presumptively valid State Law, however, it is unclear to the court how a preliminary injunction setting aside the Moratorium would aid Los Angeles landlords or, by the same token, how denial of such relief would put landlords in a materially worse position than that in which they would otherwise be. In arguing that the Moratorium is unreasonable, AAGLA made much of the fact that the City Ordinance does not guarantеe landlords even partial payments contemporaneous with occupancy. But neither does the State Law. Under the State Law, for example, a qualifying tenant who paid zero rent for the month of September, and pays zero rent for four months thereafter, cannot be evicted until February. AAGLA’s members will not possibly suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an order preliminarily enjoining a Moratorium that, at the current juncture, does essentially the same thing as the admittedly reasonable and presumptively valid State Law.
For these reasons, AAGLA has failed to demonstrate any likelihood of irreparable harm.
C.
Balance of equities and the public interest
“Where the government is a party to a case in which a
preliminary injunction is sought, the balance of the equities and
public interest factors merge.” Padilla v. Immigration & Customs
Enf’t,
This Court will defer to the judgment of local authorities, who have the unenviable task of weighing all of the relevant considerations and choosing the least of all possible evils. It bears repeating, however, that the COVID-19 crisis is national in scope, and demands a national response.
Landlords and tenants alike are victims of the virus, both literally and economically. Tenants should not have to live in fear of eviction because of a calamity that was not of their making. Landlords should not have to live in fear of losing their hard-earned investments in our community because of a calamity that was not of their making. Our citizens should not have to fight each other to avoid economic and personal ruin.
Courts are an imperfect tool to resolve such conflicts. So too are ordinances and statutes that shift economic burdens from one group to another. The court respectfully implores our lawmakers to treat this calamity with the attention it deserves. It is, but for the shooting, a war in every real sense. Hundreds of thousands of tenants pitted against tens of thousands of landlords - that is the tragedy that brings us here. It is the court’s reverent hope, expressed with grеat respect for the magnitude of the task at hand, that our leaders, and not the courts, lead us to a speedy and fair solution.
IV. Conclusion
Although it appears at this stage of proceedings that the City Moratorium substantially affects landlords’ contract rights, the manner in and extent to which it does so appears reasonable under the circumstances. AAGLA has not, therefore, demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its constitutional claims. Nor has AAGLA demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm, or that the balance of the equities or the public interest weigh in favor of preliminary relief. Accordingly, AAGLA’s motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED, without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 13, 2020
DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge
Notes
[1] The court has also considered submissions from amici curiae (1) National Housing Law Project (“NHLP”); (2) Professors Ananya Roy and Paul Ong, of the University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA Scholars”); and (3) the Cities of Chicago, Albuquerque, Austin, Baltimore, Boston, Cambridge, Chelsea, Cincinnati, Columbus, Dаyton, Gary, Santa Cruz, Santa Monica, Seattle, St. Paul, Oakland, Portland, Tucson, Somerville, and West Hollywood, and Santa Clara County (“Amici Governments”).
[2] See https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/?CDC AA refVal=https%3A%2F %2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fcoronavirus%2F2019-ncov%2Fcases-updates%2Fcases-in -us.html#cases casesper100k
[3] See https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6942e2.htm 24
[4] See https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/OPA/Pages/NR20-293.aspx 25
[5] See 26 http://dashboard.publichealth.lacounty.gov/covid19 surveillance das hboard/
[6] See https://covid19.ca.gov/stay-home-except-for-essential-needs/;
[6] (...continued) 20 https://www.lamayor.org/sites/g/files/wph446/f/page/file/20200527%2 0Mayor%20Public%20Order%20SAFER%20AT%20HOME%20ORDER%202020.03.19%20 21 (REV%202020.05.27).pdf 22
[7] See https://corona-virus.la/sites/default/files/inline-files/MO COVID-1 9 What%27sOpen Updated%2020201007.pdf 23 24
[8] See https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2020/demo/hhp/hhp14.html 25
[9] See https://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.ca losangeles md.htm 26
[10] See https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares/assistance-for-americ an-workers-and-families; (continued...)
[10] (...cоntinued) 17 https://www.edd.ca.gov/about edd/coronavirus-2019/cares-act.htm 18
[11] Undocumented immigrants, including those who pay federal
taxes with an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number, are not
eligible for one-time stimulus payments, nor are United States
citizens who are married to and file taxes jointly with
19
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undocumented spouses. See, e.g., Amador v. Mnuchin, No. CV
ELH-20-1102,
[12] See 23 https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2020/demo/hhp/hhp14.html 24
[13] See UCLA Scholars brief at 4:10-11. 25
[14] Id. at 5:12. 26
[15] See Dep’t of Health and Human Serv.’s, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19 , https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09-04/pdf/202 (continued...)
[15] (...continued) 0-19654.pdf
[16] Id. 25
[17] Id. 26
[18] The Moratorium also creates a private right of action for residential tenants against landlords for certain violations, but only after written notice to the landlord and a fifteen day window to cure the alleged violation. (Moratorium at 4-5.)
[19] The City also adopted Ordinance No. 186607 (the “Rent Freeze Ordinance”), which prohibits rent increases on units subject to existing rent control provisions for a similar twelve-month period following the end of the COVID emergency. (Plaintiff’s RJN, Ex. 4 at 21.)
[20] As discussed in further detail below, this grace period will, by operation of state law, expire no later than March 1, 2022. See California Assembly Bill 3088 § 1179.05(a)(2)(A).
[21] Even under the “serious interests” sliding scale test, a
plaintiff must satisfy the four Winter factors and demonstrate
“that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the
injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance for the Wild
Rockies v. Cottrell,
[22] Because the Rent Freeze Ordinance is less burdensome than 24 the Eviction Moratorium, the discussion of the former is subsumed within that of the latter, herein. 25
[23] AAGLA asserts that an impairment is substantial “if it
deprives a private party of an important right, thwarts performance
of an essential term, defeats the expectations of the parties, or
alters a finаncial term.” S. California Gas Co. v. City of Santa
Ana,
[24] The Blaisdell court further explained that none of the
cases it cited, including Von Hoffman, were “directly applicable,”
and that “broad expressions contained in some of these opinions
went beyond the requirements of the decision, and are not
controlling.” Blaisdell,
[25] This is not to say, of course, that further factual
development could not affect the court’s conclusion. In Baptiste
,
for example, the court found it “not possible to determine
conclusively the extent of the impairment of plaintiffs’
contractual right to evict” because of factual uncertainties
regarding the temporal extent of Massachusetts’ eviction
moratorium. Baptiste,
[26] See Moratorium at 2.
[27] See https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends totalandratecases
[28] See 24 https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends dailytrendscases
[29] As discussed in further detail below, in the context of the 25 irreparable harm analysis, this position is somewhat surprising in light of AAGLA’s argument that a separate, statewide eviction moratorium is more reasonable than the City Ordinance, and that “we can certainly assume that the state law is constitutional.” As discussed below, that state law, like the Moratorium, prohibits evictions for COVID-related nonpayment of rent, even where a tenant has paid no rent for a period of as much as еleven months. 26
[30] “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.”
[31] To be sure, although all four of these cases involve eviction moratoria with no partial rent requirement, the moratoria at issue differ in their particulars from each other and from the (continued...)
[31] (...continued)
24
Moratorium here. Of the four moratoria at issue in the cited
cases, the City’s Moratorium is most akin to the City of
Philadelphia’s, discussed in HAPCO,
[32] The Elmsford court converted a motion for a preliminary
26
injunction into a motion for summary judgment, and, strictly
speaking, did not reach the reasonableness question because it
concluded, as a matter of law, that New York’s eviction moratorium
did not substantially impair landlords’ contractual rights.
Elmsford,
[33] AAGLA’s Due Process claim fails for these same reasons.
19
“Substantive due process provides no basis for overturning validly
enacted state statutes unless they are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relаtion to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare.” Spoklie v. Montana, 411 F.3d
1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Moratorium clearly meets this relatively low bar. Despite AAGLA’s
urging, this Court does not read Block v. Hirsh,
[33] (...continued)
Indeed, the Blaisdell cоurt, having concluded that there was no
Contract Clause violation, summarily disposed of a corresponding
due process claim. Blaisdell,
[34] As suggested above, nothing in this Order shall be read to
suggest that further litigation of this matter could not affect the
Court’s conclusions. See note 25, above. Although the Court finds
the Moratorium reasonable on balance at this stage of proceedings,
the rationales for each of the Moratorium’s various provisions are
not all equally apparent. For example, it stands to reason that
economic difficulties will lead to some consolidation of households
and an increase in the number of inhabitants in some units, and
that to evict that entire expanded household would have serious
public health consequences. And it may well be that, absent a
prohibition on interest and late fees, tenants might “self-evict”
rather than incur additional debt. (Intervenors’ brief at 20
(citing HAPCO,
[35] Of the other two declarants, only one mentions a mortgage at all, and, despite a pre-Covid negative cash flow of $11,000 to $26,000 per year, does not appear to have any difficulty making mortgage payments. (Declaration of Natalie Adomian ¶ 3). Adomian’s declaration also undercuts AAGLA’s contention that landlords will not be able to recover monetary damages, as she states that her delinquent tenant earns at least $225,000 per year, and likely significantly more. (Id. at ¶ 5.)
[36] The court in no way intends to minimize the hardship the declarant faces, and acknowledges that the declarant is paying a portion of the mortgages out of his savings. The monetary harm the declarant describes, however, do not rise to the level of irreparable harm.
[37] Again, this Court has no intention of minimizing the difficulties faced by Mr. Garcia or any other landlord. Those difficulties do not, however, constitute irreparable harm for purposes of a preliminary injunction enjoining the Moratorium.
[38] These protections only apply to tenants who provide landlords with a declaration that the tenant has missed rent due to decreased income or increased expenses attributable to COVID-19. The City Moratorium has no equivalent attestation requirement.
[39] Of course, as discussed above, the City Moratorium and the 25 State Law are not coterminous. But none of the most salient differences changes the result here. Although the State law does not restrict landlords’ ability to seek late fees or interest at some point in the future, neither does it allow them to pursue evictions for such sums now. Furthermore, such purely economic damages cannot constitute irreparable harm, as explained above. 26 (continued...)
[39] (...continued) And, although AAGLA makes much of the Moratorium’s lack of an attestation requirement, AAGLA does not explain how that lack “deprive[s] landlords of meaningful tools and resources” in a way that causes immediate, irreparable harm. (Reply at 26:6-7.)