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Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States of America, Acting Through the Internal Revenue Service
964 F.2d 1556
5th Cir.
1992
Check Treatment

*1 merely because it case, they at- 2 relief entitled voting. In this § iments to than percentage significant portion out lower that a turns tempted prove Further, high incidence population was unavailable whites to vote. Hispanic of election, because in the District is Hispanic registration date of of to vote on the However, Hispanic the district voters migrant persuasive work. evidence that of evidence, because participation not credit that in the court did deterred from are not (1) reliably proved presented that none was effects of political process because at migrant population of the discrimination, unemploy- the extent including prior percentage trial;26 (2) what time of ment, illiteracy, low income. registered voters. migrant workers are court’s ultimate Accordingly, district inadequa- prove the failed to Plaintiffs also Hispanic vot- finding that the cause to allow voting procedures cy of absentee success is failure to ers’ lack electoral the District migrant workers absent opportunity, advantage political take findings that court’s to vote. district clearly is not rather than a violation § majority was registered voter Hispanic erroneous.28 clearly erroneous. illusory are con- example, plaintiffs could As another III. that, despite registered ceivably prove reasons, judgment foregoing For the low at elections majority, turnout voter district court is prior official discrimina- the result of was Barnes, F.Supp. E.g., tion. Graves v. AFFIRMED. partic- (“the that the voter reason at 733 is so ipation among the Mexican-Americans es- voting patterns that their

low is precisely the sort under same

tablished

discriminatory State actions we condemna-

already found both relevant and Blacks”

tory regard to the Dallas original)).

(emphasis in Plaintiffs would but, as proof; burden of face a difficult LTD., APARTMENTS, APACHE BEND Westwego this court noted Citizens al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, et (Westwe- City Westwego Better Gov’t Cir.1989), (5th I), F.2d go America, Acting UNITED STATES recognized and the courts have “Congress Through INTERNAL REVENUE by minorities ‘political participation SERVICE, Defendant-Appellee. minority depressed to be where tends prior dis- effects of group members suffer No. 91-1083. (Quoting Gingles, 478 crimination’”. Appeals, Court of United States 2776). Here, plaintiffs at Fifth Circuit. accuracy disputed evidence introduced elections, that, Hispanic some Board 25, 1992. June percentage roughly seven turnout However, Anglos.27 that of points below linking directly no evidence offered past turnout with official discrimi-

this low is not Obviously, protected

nation. affirm, noted, do not reach the law- we 1976 28.Because relied 26. As migrant popu- study projected disqualification the District yer stable issue raised GOMA 1981-86, the trial was (even assuming, light until whereas lations to take a of its failure so). in 1990. conducted cross-appeal, that we could do noted, court found the statis- the district 27. As disclosed because of errors after tics unreliable appellees' analysis of the data. *2 protection component

Clause and Process Clause the United the Due argued They States Constitution. *3 tax- Congress favoritism to those exhibited strong lobbies, congressional payers with against tax- discriminated and thus Barbolla, Worth, Tex., for Patrick A. Ft. plaintiffs, “were not fortu- payers, like that plaintiffs-appellants. Congress.” to have an ear nate Allen, Gary R. McLaughlin, E. Teresa 8,389-90 (daily Sept. Cong.Rec. H ed. Chief, Chief, Rothenberg, Asst. Gilbert S. 1986)(statement Rep. Kolbe). Plaintiffs Div., Justice, Sec., Dept, of Tax Appellate relief, declaratory re- sought injunctive D.C., Washington, defendants-appel- questing enjoin the enforce- that the court lees. rules so that no of the transition ment from them.

taxpayer could benefit published opinion, the district court In a facts, parsed the articulated the relevant Act, history the Tax Reform GOLDBERG, JOLLY, and Before precedents germane to the the is studied WIENER, Judges. Circuit raised, legal the basis sues detailed GOLDBERG, Judge: Circuit (N.D.Tex. F.Supp. its decision. end, 1988). it that al In the concluded impact dampen the of the In an effort to standing though plaintiffs had these changes brought by the Tax radical about claims, although the court raise their 1986, Congress provided Act Reform jurisdiction to award the re otherwise had exemptions the new taxpayers certain relief, rules of the quested the transition instances, Congress many tax laws. In of 1986 not constitu Tax Reform Act designed exemptions, known as these tionally infirm.1 rules,” to favor one “transition by taxpayers. The method very few which simplified by appeal on Our task that taxpayers selected those the district court.2 exemplary efforts of of the transition enjoy would the benefit steps all of its We need not retrace subject of this lawsuit. rules Rather, limit our judgment. affirm we its first, whether issues: discussion two taxpayers Plaintiffs are that were standing enjoin plaintiffs have granted any relief under the transition these rules, and sec they application of the transition Claiming similarly sit- rules. ond, transition rules violate tran- whether the to those to whom the uated equal protection component of the Due they brought apply, sition rules do respects, we constitutionality In all other challenge the of Process Clause. lawsuit to reasoning.3 Uniformity agree court’s with the district rules under the transition ruling agree analysis district initially of the 3. We 1. The reserved court 1294-95, court, rejecting F.Supp. at in order to allow the claim government’s this suit is barred parties contention that on whether there was to submit evidence Declaratory Anti-Injunction by Act and the classification. a rational basis for order, Judgment plaintiffs seek to have unpublished Act insofar as F.Supp. at 1298. In an nullify rules. See Zele granted summary judgment court the transition in favor of the nak, court & 614-15 n. finding nothing supra note 44 Tax L.Rev. at government, evidence as to do serious doubts undermining 251. We entertain the rationali- tendered to the court jurisdiction have the court would ty whether of the classification. enjoin Act the Tax Reform the enforcement whole, plaintiffs requested scholarly by as a work of of 1986 2. We are also assisted Zelenak, complaint. 615 n. Our See id. at law review Lawrence whose Professor however, us, subject need not detain because has our concern on the facilitated article jurisdic analysis having the court determined and contributed to our research enjoin of the transition tion to rules, the enforcement Lawrence Are Shot issues. See Rifle constitutionality Legislation must address their Other Ad Hoc Transition Rules and Angeles Lyons, Constitutional?, any City Los L.Rev. event. 44 Tax Cf. I. STANDING der the transition rules. Viewed light, it appear plaintiffs have concluded that district court no standing because sought the relief challenge would not redress the economic injury suf- constitutionality of the transition rules. essence, fered. litigating Under the district court what described as liability the tax parties of third tax- general standing principles, —the the court rea payers favored the transition rules. injury, soned that suffered an Act, to the traceable Tax Reform which fact, But in the injury alleged plain- court could prohibiting redress the en tiffs is exclusively an economic one. forcement transition rules. 702 Rather, plaintiffs contend the disparity *4 F.Supp. 1291. in treatment is itself judicially cognizable injury, government attributable to by the standing question is complicated in virtue of its enforcement of the transition the of sought the nature relief rules, the which federal court can redress. by plaintiffs. They do not ask for the The court can injury, redress this plain- in the benefit of transition rules that favor view, tiffs’ by making either the transition Rather, only taxpayers. the select they applicable (insofar rules plaintiffs to as equality seek in through treatment the nul- they situated), similarly byor eliminat- is, lification of the transition rules. That ing the altogether transition rules so that they merely wish enjoin to have the court gets no one a tax break. com- their government the providing from the tax plaint, indicated, as plaintiffs we have presently breaks accorded the select tax- pursued latter They the course. seek the payers through the transition so that rules satisfaction knowing of that the Re- Tax all taxpayers Thus, will be treated alike. form any Act treats no one better than expect any do not to tangi- obtain them: If going are not get to the ble benefit or economic relief break, similarly tax then no lawsuit, other situated only the they elimination of what one, taxpayer should receive perceive either. discriminatory to be treatment. We believe the nullification requested relief raises concerns abrogate transition rules so as tax to redressibility. about It is well settled that breaks accorded the select few under the plaintiff standing to bring a claim in provide appropriate transition rules would only federal court if he can show an actual injuries alleged redress by plain- for the injury, threatened attributable respect pro- plaintiffs’ equal tiffs. With defendant, which the court can redress. claim, Mathews, tection Heckler v. Mathews, 728, 104 Heckler v. S.Ct. (1984), 79 L.Ed.2d If L.Ed.2d right case, point. In that the Su- injury view by plaintiffs suffered in preme nondependent held male Court this case liability as increased tax at bring equal retirees laws, had an tendant to the new then one challenge might protection favoring to a law non- argue convincingly nullifying dependent retirees, though in female even way transition rules will redress plaintiffs’ injury, they will redress available to them would continue to abrogation bear liability nondependent the increased tax in of benefits to the even Indeed, severability absence of the transition female A in rules. retirees: clause only impact provided nullification would be to the statute if the statute impose liability upon unconstitutional, that same tax those were declared favor- taxpayers enjoying favorable treatment un- able treatment accorded to female retirees (1983) rejection We also concur the district court’s (question jurisdiction whether a court has plaintiffs’ challenge tran- constitutional to the form award one of relief to be determined Uniformity sition rules under the Clause independently jurisdic- whether court has Constitution, I, F.Supp. § Art. clause relief);

tion some to award other form of Socie- at 1295-96 & n. 11. Herman, ty Separationists v. 959 F.2d 1283 Cir.1992) (en (5th banc) (same). Thus, plain poses, equal male identical to the eliminated. obtaining the bene Mathews. Plaintiffs contest claim had no chance made tiffs under retirees “constitutionally to female un- fits afforded as classification hope they statute; could the most derinclusive,” po- plaintiffs’ attributable to through the discon equality in treatment impotence, inability garner po- an litical Reason to females. tinuation benefits Con- from members of litical favoritism ing injury Mathews, ask the court gress. Like alone but ease is not the denial benefits though down the even to strike scheme well, the equal as treatment the denial of only strip remedy benefits such rem appropriate that “the Court concluded class; it direct- from the favored would not treatment, is mandate edy ly enlarge pocketbooks.4 their own Of accomplished with that can be result course, remedy to elimi- such a would work favored class from the drawal benefits disparity and thus treatment nate to the of benefits well extension statutory equality to the scheme. restore Mathews, 104 S.Ct. at class.” excluded And Iowa- (citing (emphasis original) *5 taxpayer plaintiffs] person- because Bennett, [the Bank 284 Des Moines Nat’l denied benefits that sim- ally been 133, (1931)). 239, L.Ed. 265 [have] 52 S.Ct. 76 U.S. taxpayers] ilarly re- situated explained: The Court [favored ceive, generalized claim is not a inju- suggested [theirs] never have [W]e citizen, by every right possessed by constitutionally underin- a ries caused by require the Government be ad- scheme can be remedied clusive benefits to the extending program’s according to law. ministered contrary, have class. To the we excluded Mathews, (quotations 9 104 at 1396 n. S.Ct. sustaining a such a noted that court omitted). and citations remedial alternatives: claim faces “two rule might suggest that the Some nullity statute may it either declare the conferring standing equal not extend to order that its benefits Mathews — legislature only remedy intended to in which the the class that the cases benefit, coverage of may it extend the or class is the elim to the disfavored available ag- statute to include those who are class— to the favored ination of benefits grieved by the exclusion.” those cases involv reserved for should be of the “archaic” varie Welsh v. ing stigmatic injury Id. (quoting at 1394-95 States, 333, 1792, S.Ct. on a characteristic United ty: 90 discrimination based (1970) (Harlan, J., race, 1807, disfavored, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 person such as al result)). concurring residence, origin, gender, ienage, national do not share that age, legitimacy.5 or We challenge by equal protection levied of this explain in Part II.A. is, pur- As we standing view. plaintiffs in this case "[tjhere is lan- eliminating Zelenak observes though the transition rules Professor 4. Even suggesting opinion guage that per- in the Mathews directly, plaintiffs’ pocketbooks not would affect injuries to those noneconomic the 'serious indirectly. tax collector it do so would personally equal denied treatment are sons who public garner contributions for the would more membership solely in a disfa- because of their . exempted purse the transi- the entities from injuries essentially group,’ be- are vored theory, tax the additional revenue tion rules. In stigmatized.” supra ing stereotyped or exempted taxpayers from those collected posits 619 He 44 Tax L.Rev. at note make it more the transition rules taxation the reach of Math- that the Court could confine budgetary requirements likely that the standing by limiting equal protection ews every taxpayer. taxation for met with lower stigmatized stereo- plaintiffs been or who have words, eliminating preferences for the few other that, classification, typed unlike clas- many. As the would lower taxes for mean gender, the classifi- based on race or sifications government "In the in this court: in- concedes stigma stereo- or case carries cation case, very taxpayers however, few have received end, stant type. Professor Zelenak In the benefit, majority give an vast could extra while the such that the Court would concludes opinion cramped reading The burden is be said to be extra burdened. to the Mathews (R. 163) standing Id. among many.” in this case. spread find thus

1561 opinion, Here, violates plaintiffs classification scheme allege that they have been denied breaks afforded to if the other even classifications similarly situated taxpayers by the transi- quasi-sus- along suspect are not or drawn tion rules. Wright, Contrast Allen v. lines; pect any sort that classifications U.S. 3326-27, legitimate rationally are not related to a (1984) (no L.Ed.2d 556 standing because governmental interest unconstitutional. plaintiffs themselves had been denied Equal protection is not concerned exclu- equal treatment). They say that there is sively stigmas.6 with archaic When a no rational denying basis for them the tax plaintiff alleges he “person- has been agree breaks. Were we to equal treatment,” Mathews, ally denied merits, on the we injury could redress that added) (emphasis S.Ct. he by extending either to them the —that transitional particular has denied a been benefit accord- relief accorded to the select by nullifying the transition rules altogeth- similarly ed to others who are situated —he could, course, er. Under either achieve alleged equal protection injury, re- the “mandate of treatment.” Math- gardless stigma of the nature of the ews, (emphasis origi- to the attaches disfavored class. See Alle- nal). gheny Pittsburgh County Coal Co. v. persuaded, We are also similar rea- Comm’n, sons, that these (1989) (holding L.Ed.2d 688 that formula bring challenge to the un- classification property used for was unconsti- valuation Uniformity der the Clause the Constitu- comparable prop- because tutional it valued being “If unequally tion: treated is itself *6 differently); City erties also New see of sufficient to injury equal protec- establish Dukes, 297, 96 Orleans 427 U.S. S.Ct. tion then standing,' being taxed nonuni- 2513, (1976) (entertaining L.Ed.2d 49 511 formly injury should itself sufficient to rejecting equal challenge but to uniformity standing.” establish clause city “grandfa- ordinance which contained a Zelenak, 2, supra note 44 Tax L.Rev. at clause”); ther United States R.R. Retire- (1989).7 620 Fritz, 166, ment Bd. v. 449 U.S. 101 S.Ct. all, plaintiffs In we conclude that 453, (1980)(entertaining L.Ed.2d 66 368 but standing press to their constitutional equal rejecting protection challenge to stat- equal protection compo- claims under the utory provided scheme which select em- nent of the Due Process Clause and under ployees benefits). with Uniformity windfall Clause of the Constitution.8 Interestingly, challenge analysis, meaningful only 6. Mathews involved a final as to inasmuch statutory favoring nondependent scheme fe- they rights persons create in those States. within brought by male retirees. The lawsuit non- uniformity meaning only tax clause has retirees, dependent hardly suffering male a class guarantee persons that will not be discriminated stigma archaic that them would make against they hap- where taxation because of they worthy participants feel that were "less 2, pen supra to 44 be located.” note . Orr, political community.” See also Orr Tax L.Rev. at 268, 1102, 1111-1114, 440 U.S. 59 (1979) (striking L.Ed.2d down state statute "tax 8. The district court held that had imposition alimony that authorized the of obli- payer standing” bring uniformity their clause husbands, wives). gations on but not challenge. F.Supp. (applying the at 1292 argu- 7. Professor Zelenak notes that there is Cohen, 83, two-prong test Flast v. extending against ment the rationale of Math- (1968) (taxpayer 20 L.Ed.2d 947 Uniformity ews to Clause context. He ob- bring challenge standing to establishment clause Uniformity serves Clause makes no schools)). parochial spending to federal rights to the but focus- references individuals neatly appears It fit that these with- rights es on the of states. United instead See standing two-prong taxpayer set in the test for Ptasynski, States v. uniformity forth in insofar as their clause Flast Moore, (1983); 76 L.Ed.2d 427 Knowlton v. challenge challenge They ex- concerned: 41, 89, L.Ed. taxing congressional power under ercise “of therefore, (1900). Arguably, individuals have I, spending § clause of Art. of the Consti- challenge to raise a under the Uni- tution," Forge College rejects Valley formity v. Americans United Clause. Zelenak Professor are, State, Inc., argument "[rjights Separation in the because of States Church for baum)). expressed the dis- Others conceded use of

But their raw reasons court, political power shall to obtain transition rules for trict as we elaborate claim, we do constituents. Id. Even in this respect favored court, government acknowledges scheme constitu- not find the classification definitely “political played a considerations tionally infirm. significant process role the selection ... the focus the debate was on sub- [and] EQUAL II. PROTECTION opposed objective jective factors [as passage As debated 135) (R. factors].” quite Tax Reform Act of it became Plaintiffs contend that no rational basis package legislation clear Congress’ classification as be- exists exemp- necessarily transition rules: include taxpayers tween those afforded relief un- designed tions from new tax laws der rules and those the transition who taxpayers those that had relied on assist They not. maintain that for the fact but previous making significant tax laws right people did not have “the part, investment decisions. For the most speaking Congress, 132 for [them]” provisions tax were not avail- these ad hoc S13,874 26, 1986) Cong.Rec. (daily Sept. ed. taxpayers, only all to those on able to but (statement Metzenbaum), they of Sen. particular Con- behalf of whom members of similarly taxpayers those situated to gress requested exemptions. had presently enjoy tax accorded breaks Congress appeased re- Members view, plaintiffs' transition rules. questing by according them constituents providing benefits classification— relief, yet threatening transitional avoided in Con- those with connections by evading viability package the tax exploit gress political savvy and the the extension of transitional relief across relationships to a violation —amounts general A the board. transition rule protection. application, opposed to these “rifle shot” rules, transition would have been far more A. revenue,

costly in emi- terms albeit *7 nently fairer. adjudge plain In to properly order claim, doling the of out tax tiffs’ we first establish relevant

This method breaks eyebrows legal more a in Con- When a fundamental raised than few framework. stake, gress. right ex- at Several members of is or the classification at pressed similarly inherently suspect tax- is concern that situated issue —classification race, origin, 702 alien- payers being equally. were not treated based on national and Cong.Rec. age legislation at 132 un F.Supp. (quoting 1287-89 courts evaluate the —the S8,128 23, 1986) (statement (daily exacting strict ed. June der the most standard: Levin); S13,810 (daily scrutiny. Rapides of id. at ed. Parish Sen. Town Ball of (5th 26, 1986); Cong.Rec. H8,389-90 Jury, 1049, Cir. Sept. 132 Police 746 F.2d 1059 25, 1986)(statement 1984). (daily Rep. “will almost Sept. ed. Such classification Kolbe); S7,654 Cong.Rec. (daily legitimate governmental 132 ed. never be based on 17, 1986) (statement reasons,” review, judicial June of Sen. Metzen- and survive 464, 478, 752, 761-62, Constitution, provision other than the U.S. 102 S.Ct. added), Clause, (1982) allege (emphasis operates 700 which as a limi- and Establishment taxing “challenged specific spending power as constitu- and so enactment exceeds tation Zelenak, standing. upon taxing plaintiffs taxpayer with tional limitations the exercise vest 2, (“It (that prohibited spending power" supra is note L.Rev. 624 is unlike- the tax 44 Tax at Constitution, Uniformity ly Supreme recognize ever Clause of the Court will Congress' standing any taxing power). taxpayer part Id. 454 in suits based on limitation on 479, added). (emphasis at 762 other than the Establishment U.S. at 102 S.Ct. Constitution 2, Clause.”). supra note Tax L.Rev. at these Contra 44 Because we conclude (“The difficulty, 623 n. in a case stand- & 278 like under traditional decide, Bend, express Apache identifying spending ing principles, nec- not need on, standing.”). opinion essary support taxpayer We note whether these Supreme yet taxpayer standing under Flast. that the Court has not identified a otherwise have

1563 compelling governmental Ball, further a “must interest.” Town 746 F.2d mental] sure, Supreme alterna- 1058. To interest which cannot be served Court recently applied the suspect tive rational relation means less burdensome to test case, one, involving like equal an right fundamental or interest.” class or protection challenge to omitted). a tax scheme. (footnotes Thus, See Id. under strict Allegheny Pittsburgh County Coal Co. v. scrutiny, legislative classifications must Comm’n, 336, governmental compelling serve a interest (1989). L.Ed.2d 688 The Court reiterated narrowly and be tailored to the achieve- principle long so as “the selection ment of that interest. or capricious classification neither nor legislative The courts examine clas arbitrary, upon and rests some reasonable involving “suspect” sifications not classes consideration policy, of difference or there involving “giv[ing] but other classifications is no denial of of the law.” recurring rise to constitutional difficul (quoting Id. 109 S.Ct. at 638 Brown-For gender illegitimacy ties”— —under Kentucky, 563, 573, man v.Co. U.S. “heightened” scrutiny. “intermediate” or 578, 580, (1910)). 54 L.Ed. 883 Although exacting Id. 1059-60. Supreme That the Court has in rare scrutiny, as strict this intermediate scruti instances struck down regula- economic ny “quasi- nevertheless demands that hardly surprising, tions is for the rational important suspect” gov classification serve test is nearly rigorous basis as the substantially ernmental interests and be scrutiny strict intermediate tests. related to achievement of those inter case, Though not a tax the Court’s decision Id.; Cleburne, ests. City Tex. v. Cle Dukes, in City New Orleans v. Center, Living burne U.S. (1976), L.Ed.2d L.Ed.2d 313 provides example an illustrative The classifications at issue in this application of Court’s the rational basis “suspect” “quasi-sus are neither nor upheld “grand- test. Dukes the Court pect.” This is an chal exempted pushcart father clause” that two lenge legislation, tax a form economic food prohibiting vendors from law regulation. Supreme Court has exhib pushcarts in sale of food from the historic special ited deference bodies Quarter, Carre,” French “Vieux Indeed, legislation this arena. government New Orleans. The asserted “presumption carries it a of constitu appearance “the preserving an interest tionality,” Regan Repre v. Taxation With Quarter’s and custom valued resi- Washington, sentation maintaining dents” and the charm and *8 76 L.Ed.2d 129 character that attracted tourists. Id. (1983) (quoting Kentucky, Madden City’s pushcart 2515. The S.Ct. at ban 83, 87-88, 406, 407-408, Quarter ap- food from the French vendors (1940)), “[[legislatures L.Ed. 590 and have plied except all for those who to vendors especially creating broad latitude in classi operated the same “continuously had busi- in fications distinctions the tax stat eight ness the Vieux Carre ... for within Contrary plaintiffs’ argu to utes.” Id. years.” Only quali- vendors more two ment, implicate taxation does a funda exception. panel fied for the A of this and, thus, right in mental classifications City in “pivotal court found a defect” the subject tax schemes are not to strict scrutin of We New Orleans’ classification scheme. Rather, y.9 “presumes Court hypothesis the the in found foundation the challenged any likely statutory distinctions consti the “favored class” was more only requires operate tutional and “to in a manner more consistent Quarter [govern- than rationally legitimate related to a with the traditions of the Coryell, on v. 1825) of Article 1 of the § 9. Plaintiffs’ reliance Clause Clause Constitu- Corfield (No. 3,230) (CCED tion, protection component is una- F.Cas. 546 Pa. not the of the scope vailing, for the that case delineated Due Process Clause. rights Privileges the and Immunities under (1957), only “the in the operator” and “no reason any other century wholly to half invalidate eco- operation ‘instills last length of to believe solely (or regulation their nomic vendors in licensed the [favored] ap- Morey 96 S.Ct. at 2518. in- grounds.” kind of operators) the likely transient Quar- regulating the is- state statute volved for the conservation preciation orders, oper- money exempting their cause suance but tradition’ that would ter’s Express Company by consistent with name from to or remain American ations become City (quoting statutory provisions. Dukes The Id. that tradition.” all (5th 711-12 Orleans, protect- 501 F.2d in government asserted an interest Newof Cir.1974)). transacting money We thus concluded in ing consumers when equal protection be- posited classification violated The that because orders. state relation it bear rational Express “unquestionable cause did not was of American government interest. standing,” the asserted it solvency high financial exempt it for the state was reasonable agree. It Court did not Supreme The regulations. Supreme Court The explained that argument. buy Morey in did not Mor- pro- may implement [legislatures 469, 77 at 1352. It ey, 354 U.S. economic ar- gram step by step such bore found that the classification only par- eas, regulations that adopting relationship” the asserted “remote and de- perceived evil tially ameliorate pub- government protecting interest of of the evil ferring complete elimination disapproved bluntly of “the lic. The Court than regulations ... to future [R]ather by singling creation of closed immediate and abso- proceeding company.” a named Id. out of ... pushcart food ven- of all lute abolition dors, rationally choose ini- city could Dukes, explicitly overruling Morey By of more recent tially eliminate vendors Supreme opened the door Court gradual approach to the vintage. This single out in- legislative classifications constitutionally impermis- is problem not treatment, preferential so dividuals sible. doing grounds for so have some long as the The im- in reason. foundation conceivable the classification at 2517. Like Id. 96 S.Ct. case at bar case, plication of Dukes to the instant at issue scheme “[t]he evident; explains: Zelenak legitimat- Professor grandfather clause Dukes protecting purpose challenger ‘substantial presented ed to a problem The ” class. overruling in the favored reliance interests’ an ad hoc tax revision 44 Tax L.Rev. supra note Morey, Morey apparent. See Supreme elucidated: The Court adopted suggested attitude Court single out one suspicion to laws which reasonably decide that city could person special treatment. over- likely to have less newer businesses ruling seem indicate that thus would interests up reliance built substantial notion that rejects now the Court in Vieux Carre operation continued any viewed with laws should be qualified under such vendors that the two particular suspicion. whom “grandfather clause”—both *9 twenty in for over operated the area had 2, at Zelenak, supra 44 Tax L.Rev. note eight years than themselves rather Dukes, legislative classifica- —had 582. Under character part of the distinctive become a to "the creation of tions which amount distinguishes the Vieux that and charm singling out of ... by the closed class judg- say We cannot that these Carre. 469, 354 at company,” Morey, U.S. named they rationality that consti- so lack ments 1352, scrutiny 77 at can withstand S.Ct. impermissible de- constitutionally tute test. the rational basis under equal protection. nial judicial Another that reaffirms 96 S.Ct. at 2518. Dukes, regulation un- accorded economic deference illustrates test and der the rational basis Court overruled Significantly, the Dukes in this 457, 1344, challenges faced Doud, 77 S.Ct. Morey 354 U.S. v. 1565 178, in Dukes, Supreme decision case is the Court’s 101 S.Ct. at Citing 461. Bd. v. United R.R. Retirement States Court Congress reasoned that “[b]ecause Fritz, 166, 453, S.Ct. 66 449 U.S. 101 could have eliminated windfall benefits for involved classifi- Fritz L.Ed.2d 368 all employees, classes of it is not constitu- cations measures and transitional impermissible tionally for to have Act, Act 1974. The Railroad Retirement groups drawn lines between employees designed to restructure the railroad retire- purpose for phasing out those bene- system, generally ment eliminated a wind- fits.” Id. 449 177, 101 U.S. at S.Ct. at 460 employees fall benefit inured to who Dukes, (citing 2517). 96 at S.Ct. “The ‘task had worked for both railroad and nonrail- classifying persons for ... benefits ... employers: employees qualified road inevitably requires persons that some who both and for railroad retirement social se- equally have an almost strong claim to curity The benefits. Act eliminated those placed favored treatment be on different for all but limited dual benefits class line,’ sides and the fact line employees. class One consisted of those might have been differently drawn at some unretired, employees were ten who had points legislative, is a matter for rather years employment of railroad and suffi- judicial, than Id. consideration.” 449 U.S. employment to qualify cient nonrailroad for 179, at 101 Mathews (quoting S.Ct. at 461 security benefits, performed and social Diaz, 83-84, 67, 1883, 426 U.S. service in year some railroad the calendar 1893, (1976)). 48 L.Ed.2d 478 1974 or current had a connection with 31, railroad as of 1974. December 449 U.S. B. 172, at 101 at 458. S.Ct. Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes The Employees qualify who did not for this (overruling Morey) and Fritz “suggest exemption not employed because analysis mode employed by 1974 had no railroad and “current virtually Court ... immunizes social and it at end connection” with of 1974 legislative ju economic classifications brought a action challenging suit Fritz, dicial review.” at U.S. under classification (Brennan, J., dissenting). S.Ct. at component of the Due Process Clause. Id. Nevertheless, regulations not all economic They at

at 458. claimed to test; pass regu rational similarly situated relation some employees to those who continued to receive the lations fail even this lenient examination. windfall agreed dual benefits. district court has Court invalidated classifica held differentiation equal protection grounds tions when it solely employee based on whether an was absolutely basis found reasonable See, active the railroad business e.g., Allegheny for the classifications. “rationally congressional related to the Comm’n, Pittsburgh County Coal Co. insuring purposes solvency 336, 109 633, 102 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d system protecting retirement railroad (formula (1989) property valuation Id. vested benefits.” resulting most sale in rela based on recent overvaluation, higher tive thus tax as sessment, comparable properties); reversed, The Supreme finding Court Vermont, Williams v. constitutionally classification scheme ac- (1985) (high ceptable. explained “Congress It purchase automo er tax on of out-of-state properly persons could conclude that Met residency); biles on out-of-state based actually acquired statutory had entitlement Ward, ropolitan Ins. v. employed to windfall benefits while still Life *10 1676, (1985) (lower 105 84 L.Ed.2d 751 industry greater eq- a S.Ct. the railroad had gross premiums rate on domestic insur uitable to those tax claim benefits than the Cleburne, City Texas companies); [plaintiff’s] members of ance Center, 432, v. Cleburne Living longer 473 U.S. employment railroad when (zon- 3249, (1985) Id. eligible for at became dual benefits.” 105 S.Ct. 87 313 L.Ed.2d 1566 (1959)). In L.Ed.2d 480 group homes Williams excluded

ing which ordinance retarded); Court wrote: Zobel v. mentally for 2309, 72 55, Williams, 102 S.Ct. in-state and out- “[EJqual U.S. treatment for (state (1982) dividend distribu similarly situated is L.Ed.2d 672 of-state residents favoring established a use plan precedent tion condition valid residents); Dept. imported States goods new United from out over tax on 528, Moreno, 413 U.S. may v. not treat those Agriculture A State state.” (denial (1973) 2821, unequally solely 37 L.Ed.2d on the S.Ct. its borders within containing a to households stamps their residences or food different basis non-relative). incorporation. States (quoting 2471-72 Halliburton 105 S.Ct. contend that Williams Plaintiffs 70, 64, Reily, Oil Well Co. striking support for Ward, lend supra, 1201, 1204, (1963)). S.Ct. Williams, rules. the transition down (dura Zobel, at 2314-15 102 S.Ct. See also a state law struck down the Court rationally related to residency tion of taxes of state sales exempted payment interest). state's bought cars out-of- residents who state moving apposite, on state, imposed Allegheny the tax is the most most but bought recent, cars out-of- invalidated who had case wherein the Court the state into The Court Court reasoned: a classification scheme. state. The property on real held that assessments purchase time of a residence price acquisition vio- on most recent based on to distin- wholly arbitrary basis which equal protection. The court reasoned lated regis- among present Vermont guish necessarily acquisition price did not trants____ the statute purposes The recently value: correlate with the market served, identically and with higher much property would be valued sold burden, by taxing each. The identical had been property that than identical no rela- them bears distinction between long time. The Court concluded sold statutory purpose. to the tion truly arbitrary and distinction at 2472. 105 S.Ct. capricious: Ward, another Because Williams one's allocable share of fairness of classifications, striking in- down tax can property tax the total burden residency, on discrimination based volved by comparison meaningfully evaluated precedential value with they provide limited similarly situ- share of others The other classifications. respect holdings. property relative to ated the classifi- inclination to invalidate Court’s compara- undervaluation The relative perhaps and Ward cations Williams County over property Webster ble distaste for explained by Court’s best petitioner denies time therefore Ward, “parochial discrimination.” of the law. Court wrote in at 1681. As the emphasized Court at 639. The Ward: ‘applies Equal Protection Clause that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause forbids bears un- only to taxation which fact of its own favor to discriminate State of the same persons property equally ” burdening resi- solely by “the residents (quoting Charleston class.’ Id. at of our fed- of other state members dents Alderson, 324 Loan Ass’n Fed. Sav. & validity of the view eration.” ... 89 L.Ed. constitutionally may not fa- State cases)). But (1945)(collecting even Al- foreign by taxing its vor own residents us be- of limited assistance to legheny is higher solely be- corporations at a rate classifications it did not involve cause residence is confirmed cause of their “line- product which were a holding. so long line of this Court’s cases Fritz, 449 U.S. at drawing.” Compare Rather, it involved Ohio, 101 S.Ct. at 461. (quoting Stores Id. at 1682 Allied fundamentally Bowers, found 3 formula for valuation Inc. v. *11 produced flawed insofar as the formula identify “a we must first the classification. disparity position in assessed values of similar Plaintiffs take prop- that: erty.” 109 S.Ct. at 639. assisting taxpayers all gen- [w]hile eral transition relief would be a valid and

C. appropriate governmental purpose, the legal apply principles We now these of objective providing exemp- selective challenge few, only to the constitutional levied in tions to upon a based their politicians, to access to illegitimate determine whether the transition is an prohibited objective plaintiffs’ rules can ... withstand attack. Un There can test, legitimate never be a public purpose der rational basis we must first served arbitrary challenged legislation selection of consider whether the general favored few from the applicabili- legitimate government purpose. If of ty taxing so, statute. we consider challenged whether the promotes legislative pur classification Plaintiffs would have us define the “fa- Ball, pose. Town 746 F.2d at 1058-59 n. vored” those with “ac- (quoting Western & S. Ins. Co. v. to cess influential of Congress.” members Life Equalization, State Bd. argument Their is not without some L.Ed.2d 514 foundation. The catalogued district court (1981)). many references histo- political ry to favoritism The district exhibited mem- court concluded that Con- Congress. bers F.Supp. See 702 gress legitimate governmental pur- had a example, 1287-89. For pose in the Chairman of creating the transitional rules: the Senate Finance Committee confessed making The Court finds adjustments under a new tax law for those who would that, would foolish of to say be me on [i]t unduly legitimate gov- be burdened is ‘a occasion, politics did not enter purpose’ ernmental and does not violate judgments. Speaker If the House pervasive Constitution. Such requested Ways chairman of changes in the tax law have seldom been rule, Means my Committee transition country. taxpay- seen our Numerous give hunch is that would it reason- [he] may upon ers have taken actions based ably high priority in thinking. his taxpay- the old tax Some law. of these me, requested If Senator Dole one of I unduly may ers burdened the new give high it reasonably priority Act. certainly right has the to thinking. my legislation protect draft to group taxpayers who are so affected. Cong.Rec. S13,786 Sept. 26, (daily ed. 1986) (statement Packwood). of Sen. An- F.Supp. agree at 1297. We that the using position other Senator “admitted his legislature legitimate governmental has a special on the committee to obtain treat- purpose in making exceptions from the F.Supp. ment his constituents.” general application of the Tax Reform Act protect reliance “substantial interests.” saying my colleagues I do not mind Dukes, nothing 96 S.Ct. at 2518. findWe my position I Fi- have used on the inherently in Congress wanting invidious advantage nance Committee to the “soften the blow of new law busi- Minnesota____ people my I have used projects nesses that undertook under the my position get special peo- rules for law, only be told the rules [old] ____ ple changed in the middle of the S8,128 game.” (daily Cong.Rec. ed. Cong.Rec. S8,221 (daily ed. June 23, 1986) (statement Levin). 1986) (statement June Sen. Durenberger). Sen. But that end inquiry, does not our for we Moreover, plain quite it is that absent purpose must evaluate not which “access the conference committee legislation, purpose legitimacy but the enabled them to a so-called transi- obtain that, do activity classifications well. To tion rule so could continue to *12 law,” Cong.Rec. lowering aggregate level of federal rev- taxed under the old

be 26, 1986)(statement S13,810 Sept. (daily ed. enue collections. Levin), little, any, if there was of Sen. course, preserva- “a concern for the Of taxpayer would receive tran- that a chance hardly can of resources alone tion Senator asked: relief. As one sitional allocating justify classification used could not come to about those who “[W]hat Doe, Plyler resources.” U.S. those Washington case? and make their What lobby- could hire the about those who (1982). But to made: choices had be appeal? Where present ists to tough And far we can tell choices. as fairness to them?” Id. Congress history, made from recognize politics played that we While based on the merits of the their decisions determining the transition part in to whom for relief made to applications transitional apply, we nevertheless believe rules would the Finance Committee. We realize that, great accord- deference view taxpayers political those connections legislation, tax Supreme Court to ed had better access to the Committee than contain no the classifications constitutional Nevertheless, nothing suggests others. Congress sought give malady. to transi- Congress aimed to exclude others taxpayers peti- to tional relief those Congress designed the classifications demonstrated, for relief and most tioned purpose with such a in mind: substantially they convincingly, that relied impact on the If the adverse disfavored making major the old tax laws invest- apparent legisla- class is an aim of the every application for ment decisions. Not ture, impartiality suspect. its however, granted, transitional relief was If, however, may impact rea- the adverse notwithstanding. Congres-

political clout acceptable sonably be viewed as an cost examined more than sional staff members impartial achieving larger goal, requests one thousand for rifle shot transi- rationally lawmaker could decide that recommending the inclu- tion relief before cost should incurred. As sion of several hundred. the Senate explained: Committee Finance Chairman Fritz, at 462 go through I down all did not sit and (Stevens, concurring). J. one, 1,000-plus requests one nor did I Moreover, appears it that Plaintiffs nev- 1,000 try public hearing hold the on all Tax sought er transitional relief from the give if I the wit- them. Even could places espe- in an Reform Act. That them each, nesses 10 minutes there would be position challenge the rifle cially difficult 100,000 10,000 witnesses, minutes. and for, They rules. not ask shot did say staff, we did is to to the So what receive, congressional therefore did “Here are the rules which transitions manna: Try violating to avoid to be selected. Congress expected cannot be to search By large they rules.” taxpayers out on its own those whose try asked them to successful. We give strong peculiar them circumstances pass upon merits of the rest. equitable arguments special relief S13,904 Cong.Rec. (daily Sept. ed. rather, general provisions; such 1986) (statement Packwood); of Sen. see taxpayers Congress. Thus must come S13,786 Cong.Rec. (daily ed. also id. providing special taxpayer, rule for one 1986) could, (“[A]s honestly we Sept. other, rationally for the related but not tried be fair the transitions and we purpose providing legitimate to the did not tried to make sure violate deserving ex- taxpayers, relief for to the bill.”). Congress the basic tenets of the done the need tent that can be without grant every request for transi- could not initiate hunt for those relief, for that would have threat- tional Act, taxpayers____ legislature should be which, by ened the success of [A] special provide able to relief for those design Congress, the President found, neutral, deserving it raising neither nor with- to be revenue *13 providing out relief for others it has not say This is not to that we undis- found. turbed methodology employed by Congress dispensation in its of transitional supra note 44 Tax L.Rev. at relief. We be less than candid if we 575-76. did not confess that we are somewhat trou- We hold that the made by classifications bled, astonished, if political not that connec- arbitrary. were not It accorded tions played large such a role the cre- deserving transitional relief to those tax- ation of this ad tax legislation. hoc But as payers applied for such relief and es- judiciary, members of the “may sit convincingly tablished most that they relied a superlegislature judge to the wisdom substantially on the old in making tax laws or desirability legislative policy determi- major investment decisions. nations made in areas that neither affect rights proceed fundamental nor along sus- III. CONCLUSION pect Dukes, lines.” 96 S.Ct. at 2517. Nor do we write on a jurisprudential clean slate. pref- in a government, Even democratic We may apply rigorous a more scrutiny inequalities erences and are inevitable. In to legislation this ad hoc tax than the Su- legislative arena, as demonstrated preme prescribes, though Court even case, drawn, “[t]he lines must be very legislation existence of such suggests arbitrary. lines often appear may That that process has been sub- instances, mean that in seeming- some two verted purely private to serve ends.” Zele- ly persons identical seemingly will receive nak, supra note 44 Tax L.Rev. at 581. unequal equity treatment. Pure is some- times for the goal eschewed ultimate of We conclude the Supreme that Court legislation. adopting likely would not condemn the transition rules, but would find instead these permeate Preferences also the other two “statutory sufficiently classification are government, branches of especially when justified being power the outcome plays judicial discretion role. The branch struggle among competing private inter- engages process making decisions Posner, (citing ests.” Id. The De- appear to favor some and disfavor Funis Constitutionality Case Sentencing provides prime others. exam- Treatment Racial Minori- Preferential ple. Similarly rarely situated defendants ties, Sup.Ct.Rev. 28). sentence, precisely receive the same al- judgment though Congress district court endeavored to AFFIRMED. uniformity achieve through Sentencing judiciary Guidelines. The also determines JOLLY, Judge, E. GRADY Circuit

whether applied laws and rules are to be dissenting specially concurring in the retroactively merely prospectively. result:1 Prisoners on inequali- death row tell of the they perceive ty judicial from those deci- Despite majority’s ef- resourceful dispenses sions. The executive branch standing forts to find to assert a claim for preferential eyes treatment in a citi- equal protection case, I in this am com- charged zen govern- with crime pelled respectfully when to ma- dissent prosecute ment fails to another al- jority’s citizen conclusion that the —who legedly guilty of the same crime. claim injury no economic for themselves only deny but seek economic benefits all, government, falling our short of standing bring others—have this case. for, utopia might hope that we can equality majority strive classifications. But it holds that expect per- pursue unrealistic for us to their claims under equality. equal protection component fect of the Due majori- I in the result tiffs' concur reached claim fails on the merits. opinion, ty's plain- which determines gone to this extreme No court has ever Amendment. of the Fifth Clause

Process requires pioneers. now majority claim that the such a Standing to assert a member harmed as plaintiff be the limits of the Failing recognize given can injured of an case, cites v. Math- majority Heckler I fail see cognizable definition. lawfully ews, *14 a “class” rules created that the transition (1984). Although sup- the case L.Ed.2d equal protection applied the term is as economic benefit is ports the view that’lost the A traditional laws. injury, an required in order to suffer by some characteristic of defined class is may unequal con- treatment alone disfavored, race, such as state persons the discriminatory injury, an the stitute such residence, holding or even age, legitimacy, in by Brennan effect described Justice See, e.g., property. later-acquired is not the character of discrimina- Mathews Vermont, 14, 105 v. Williams in by plaintiffs our case. described the tion (1985). In each 86 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. effect, i.e., injury, discriminatory the The case, by is defined plaintiff class such protec- gives equal rise to claim -form the class that characteristics tion is discrimination that injury, such the basis of discrimination stereotypic by ‘archaic and perpetuating prevented persons are illegitimate who as by stigmatizing or members notions’ qualified or receiving an inheritance ‘innately inferi- group disfavored persons prevented from vot- black worthy partici- therefore as less or’ and ing. political community, in can pants in ma- as defined plaintiff The class injuries to serious noneconomic cause taxpay- appears to be those jority opinion personally denied persons who are relief under the not afforded ers who were solely because of their equal treatment in- This class would even transition rules. group. in membership a disfavored personal taxpayers who have clude those Mathews, 739-740, at at but, in political influence University quoting Mississippi who, efforts, lobbying were unsuc- in their 718, 725, Hogan, 458 U.S. Women securing a' rule for transition cessful (1982). Thus, plaintiff the disfavored themselves. taxpayers States all United class is suggest that the noneco- plaintiffs The except obtaining a tran- those successful injury suffer as members nomic alleged This affected sition rule benefit. remedied with a. class can be disfavored amorphous, generalized, and so so is the Tax Reform Act judicial order lacking totally in a common identifiable so Thus, them. no one better than treat legally non-cognizable. grievance as to be knowledge only injury is the burden more people are treated favor- argue this view that other majority short, inju- ably; suffering envy is their equal nature of the ignores the plaintiffs allege that their ry. The do not plaintiffs “dis- that the assert —the injury shared, known, by widely “burden” is parity that can be remedied in treatment” citizens, they allege that this nor can knowing that the other “satisfaction of by the “stigma” an “archaic” perpetuates any no one better burden Reform Act treats Tax belonging to plaintiffs page inju- This that identifies See than them ...” participants in worthy of “less every taxpayer in a class apparently ry is one that community.” do not political country If this is constitu- suffered. stigmatized by ob- and cannot claim to be cognizable injury under the tionally Simply, injury de- scure tax laws. protection requirement, then the beyond injury scribed an judicially redressi- country suffer a scope injury described Congress passes bill allowable injury each time ble v. RIHT to all. the Mathews court.2 See Biszko granting to some but not benefits Legislation greatly Shot Rules Ad Hoc majority upon work of and Other 2. The relies Rifle article, Constitutional?, Even Are 44 Tax L.Rev. 563 in his Professor Lawrence Corp., (1st Financial 758 F.2d

Cir.1985). In the Matter of MAGNOLIA MARINE CO., INC., Mississippi TRANSPORT Giving to up face, plain- it a dressed Transport Company, Marine Third Par injury tiffs’ injury “abstract Plaintiff, ty nonobservance of the Constitution” government, or its failure to “be adminis- CORPORATION, LAPLACE TOWING according tered to law.” Such injuries may al., Party et Defendants, Third form basis of in our See, Allen, Barbara e.g. courts. Bordelon FRYE and E.N. Bisso Sons, Inc., & Claimants-Appellants, 3326; Valley Forge Christian College v. Separa- Americans United *15 v. State, Inc., tion Church & 464, MAGNOLIA MARINE TRANSPORT. 485, 482, 752, 764, 765, 70 L.Ed.2d CO., INC., al., et Defendants- (1982) citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Appellees. War, Stop Committee to 208, MAGNOLIA MARINE TRANSPORT. 2925, L.Ed.2d 706 CO., INC., al., et Plaintiffs plaintiffs have, best, alleged “personal Appellees, injury consequence alleged as a con- error,” stitutional which is not more than FRYE, etc., Barbara Bordelon and E.N. psychological consequence “the presum- Sons, Inc., Bisso & Defendants- ably produced by the observation of con- Appellants. duct Valley disagrees.” with which one No. 91-3154. Forge, 454 U.S. at 102 S.Ct. at 765. United of Appeals, States Court Because the alleged have not Fifth Circuit. injury under re- June quirement, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s recognition plaintiffs’

standing to maintain this action.3 notes, majority majority argu- Professor does 3. Because the does not reach the presented taxpayer standing concerning ments not consider Mathews extend noneconomic Cohen, under Flast injury majority far the would have it reach (1968), uniformity purposes standing. page

for the See n. clause, unnecessary I it find address these 5; Zelenak, Shots, 44 Tax L.Rev. at 619. Rifle issues.

Case Details

Case Name: Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States of America, Acting Through the Internal Revenue Service
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Jun 25, 1992
Citation: 964 F.2d 1556
Docket Number: 91-1083
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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