*1 he has litigation, but the merits related vexatious technique of other pursued
also against complaints launching new
litigants of dismissing for their actions
judicial officers .¡employed complaints. Sassower prior Judges Chief against two former tactic Moreover, prior
of this Circuit. dismissal warnings repeatedly included have
orders frivolous misconduct filing' additional imposition of restric-
complaints risked
tions. hereby
Accordingly, it Ordered not file subse-
George shall Sassower in this complaints judicial' misconduct
quent such'judi- related to any document
Court or ob- complaints first without
cial misconduct file, Judge leave
taining from the Chief to Sas- directed to return the Clerk is
sower, unfiled, com- any judicial misconduct submitted related thereto
plaint or document accompanied that is not
by Sassower Judge seeking leave of the Chief
application com- granted, file is file. If leave to in the processed,
plaint shall be filed denied',, course; if leave to file.is
normal complain- returned to the
complaint shall be unfiled, shall event Clerk
ant receipt appropriate record
maintain an complaint.
and return of Plaintiff-Appellant, LATSIS,
Antonios INC., Chandris, S.A.,
CHANDRIS, Trans Ltd., Shipping Co.,
Oceanic
Defendants-Appellees. 735; Docket 93-7704.
No. Appeals, Court of
United States Circuit.
Second
Argued Dec. 1993. 24, 1994. March
Decided
Stratakis, counsel), for defendants-appel- lees. OAKES,
Before:
KEARSE and
CARDAMONE,
Judges.
OAKES,
Judge:
Senior Circuit
This case causes us to re-examine the defi
nition
charged
of seaman as
in Jones Act
light
opinions
cases
of two recent
Int’l,
Court: McDermott
Inc. v.
111 S.Ct.
Marine,
L.Ed.2d 866
and Southwest
—
Gizoni,
U.S. -,
Inc. v.
(1991)
III. Discussion
(5th Cir.1959), criticized
naviga
the “aid to
language
tion”
of the three-pronged
A. The
test:-
Definition of “Seaman” in the Sec-
ond Circuit before Wilander
Our review of the cases
this [aid
shows
navigation] test has been watered down
Prior
opin-
Court’s recent
until
the words have lost
their natural
Gizoni,
ions Wilander and
this circuit’s
meaning.... With due deference to the
definition of a “seaman” under the Jones Act
Supreme Court,
importance
we attach less
three-pronged:
catchphrases
to either of these
than we do
“the vessel must
in navigation,
be
there
piled
to the cases
on cases in which recov-
must
a more or
connec-
*6
ery is
allowed when
stretch
the
tion with the ship, and the worker must be
imagination
can be said that the claimant
naturally
primarily
aboard
and
as an aid to
anything
had
to do with navigation and is a
navigation.”
member of
ship’s
the
company only in the
Salgado,
(emphasis confirms that this element LHWCA be nevertheless a seaman important part remains an of the definition within meaning Act, of the Jones at least Also, a seaman. the Court expressly where the noted harbor worker is also a “member that, are upon vessel,” “[w]e called of a not here to crew of define explained — this Further, connection in all details.” Wilander. -, Id. at U.S. Gizoni the Court in Wilander did S.Ct. at 491. not state that The quoted Gizoni Court Wil “ employment-related ander in saying that key connection to ‘[t]he a vessel to seaman was a complete status is employment-related definition of seaman. See id. connection to a navigation.... U.S. at It is not (stating necessary 817-18 “we hold seaman necessary navigation that a aid element of the contribute to the transportation vessel, connection is that a perform seaman but ” vessel”) work seaman must added). doing of a (emphasis ship’s work.’ Id. — U.S. -, Court (quoting Wilander, at 492 offered no indication as to whether the 817). U.S. substantiality S.Ct. at No connection mention is must still be made in or, either so, Wilander if or Gizoni of established whether it would be “permanent language connection” pursuant determined to the “more Ro- or less case. bison permanent connection” element of the “John- (as son test” well as the three-pronged Sal- ease,.there In this is question test) gado pursuant to the language of the that Latsis at the time injury, of his was two-part Robison test. connected to a vessel in navigation, that his .employment-related, and that C. The “Substantial Connection” Element at least at the time of injury he was after Wilander “doing ship’s work,” namely, acting aas above, supervising As engineer discussed board the vessel. In Court fact, Wilander it is precisely did not part determine under this jury what cir- charge an employment cumstances to which stipulated. related Chandris connec- tion with a Whether vessel in this navigation substantial, would be however, sufficiently dispute. qualify In charging a plaintiff for clear, question, seaman status. however, It is the district ap pears the Court express adopted did not to have preference language for from the two-part test, criteria contained in instructing Robison Robison test. unclear, Left therefore, that to find just they what sort of must find connection will amount that: to a substantial con- Indeed,
nection.
the Supreme
First,
.
Court
plaintiff
did
was either permanently
recognize,
even
much less resolve
the conflict
to a vessel or performed a sub-
between the criteria
used
determine sub-
stantial
of his work on the vessel.
stantial connection under the Robison test
Robison,
(“the
266 F.2d at
injured
*8
and those used under the Johnson and Sal-
[must
workman
have
been]
perma-
gado
Again
tests.
above,
as noted
Court
nently to a vessel ... or [must
per-
have]
limited its holding to
navigation”
the “aid to
formed a
part
substantial
of his work on the
element of
test,
the three-prong
concluding vessel.”) (footnote omitted).
disap-
Absent
key
“[t]he
to
employ-
seaman status is
proval by
Court,
Supreme
the “more or
ment-related connection to a
naviga-
vessel in
permanent
connection” formulation of
tion,” but declined “to define this connection the substantial connection requirement
re-
in all
355,
details.”
53
observed,
two earlier deci
Salgado, quoting
Salgado test
element
connection
nent
only required
sions,
Harney,
and
Klarman
concept. Under
temporal
merely a
not
is
permanent
or less
a “more
plaintiff have
element
connection
the substantial
Salgado,
Salgado, 514 F.2d
ship.”
with the
connection
or less
a
there is
“more
where
is satisfied
added).
court Klar
See,
(emphasis
The
755
ship.”
with
connection
permanent
connec
permanent
(internal
that the
had noted
quota- man
755
F.2d at
Salgado, 514
e.g.,
strictly
not been read
requirement has
omitted).
expanded
cases
Later
tion marks
must be more
that the connection
in- but meant
to
element
connection”
the “substantial
Klarman,
transitory.”
“temporary or
than
particular
just to one
not
clude connections
v.
(quoting Bullis
Twentieth
at 33
503 F.2d-
group of vessels.3
identifiable
to an
ship, but
392,
Corp., 474 F.2d
394
Pace,
Century-Fox Film
F.2d
378
Towing
v.Co.
Magnolia
Cir.1973)
(9th
curiam)
(“Significantly,
connection
Cir.1967)
con-
(5th
(pilot
(per
12, 13
permanent, but
may
less than
be
tugboats
cannot.be
of defendant’s
several
nected with
Harney,
transitory”)).
or
temporary
Ave.
seaman);
v. Jackson
held
Braniff
decide,
noted,
(5th
not
but did
523,
Inc.,
528
F.2d
Ferry,
280
-Gretna
in
requirement
Cir.1960)
mechanic
a master
(holding that
who, though
employees
“shore-based
clude
all mainte
performed
who
an assistant
aboard,
spend less than
coming
regularly
several
nance,
work on
and overhaul
repair
Harney,
F.2d at 654.
359
full shift-there.”
ferries,
ferries
often while
of defendant’s
seamen); see also
could be
-
operating,
were
case,
men
not
An earlier Second
Co.,
640 F.2d
Oil
Guidry v. Continental
Glasser,
sup
even more
by Judge
tioned
Cir.)
(5th
(“relationship between
n.
in Buccellato
portive of his conclusions
or
an identifiable vessel
the individual
un
not
does
law
this Circuit
“the case
point
must
substantial
group
vessels
to be
Act seaman
require a
equivocally
Jones
added),
(emphasis
time,
spasmodic”)
not
group
or
to a vessel
substantially connected
denied,
454 U.S.
cert.
being
to
to
connected
opposed
as
of vessels
Co.,
(1981);
Rotolo Halliburton
L.Ed.2d 87
steady
basis.”
group of vessels
on
vessel
Cir.)
(5th
(injured person
9, 12-13
Buccellato,
972. That is
F.Supp. at
performed a
assigned to or
been
must have
New
v. Cent. R.R.
of Weiss
case
Co. of
particular
on “a
of his work
Cir.1956). There,
(2d
Jersey, 235
F.2d
vessels.”) (citing
specified
or several
19-day
in the course
plaintiff who
denied,
852, 84 S.Ct.
Braniff), cert.
ferry
days on
worked seven
employment
(1963).4
L.Ed.2d 79
six
on
or wheelsman
as a
boats
deckhand
as a door
employed
shore
days
Judge
in Buccel- other
pointed out
Glasser
As
jobs connected
bridgeman,
man
lato,
the substantial
ferries,
was held
departure docking by the courts
this
interpreted
has not been
noted
The court
Act seaman.
Buccel
Jones
temporal sense.
narrow
circuit in a
were the factors
claim
against his
weighing
Judge Glasser
lato,
F.Supp.
As
at 972.
also that
note
"assignment” to a vessel. We
as “The
to
rule
article refers
3.
Robertson
test,
Test,”
question,
referred
charge
64 Tex.
like the Robison
Robison
'Fleet Amendment'
"connection,” and
suggest
fleet
"assignment”
goes
rather than
96. It
L.Rev. at
problem"
particularly
doctrinal
con
present
might
an "obvious
cases
have been
this sense
vessel,
"[¡Involvement
single
with a
"as
jury'
because
fusing
because
vessels,
the most
was one of
opposed multiple
temporarily
except
signed” to
S.S. Galileo
*9
sea-
the
between
traditional
obvious distinctions
responsible
Rather, he was
time.
time to
from
longshoreman.”
Id.
the traditional
man and
long
has
been
it
as to which
a fleet of vessels
for
propo-.
support of
the
98. We
these cases
cite
See, e.g., Gui
may
person
be a seaman.
a
held
although
person
be a "seaman”
a
can
sition that
the instruc
It is
that
dry,
at 529.
true
640 F.2d
vessel,
particular
but
assigned
a
he was
could be
say
"vessel”
go
did
on to
that
tion here
a
or with
vessels
with several
rather connected
ships
owned
single ship
a number of
or
a
permanency
to the
do not adhere
fleet. We
requirement
employer,
to that extent
by
so
operated
the
these cases.
But
into account.
Amendment”
took
"Fleet
charge
not make the
caveat did
this
we last
test
that both
4. We underscore
confusing.
Supreme Court’s
Salgado
explicated in
rather than
speak
"connection”
test
Wilander
(citations omitted).
employed
ship
that he was
only
aboard
a
for
Through subsequent ap-
time,
period
during
short
period
plications
test,
however,
of this
the Fifth
slept
ashore,
he
and ate most of his meals
clearly
expressed its view that sub-
paid
hourly wage
that he was
an
and worked
stantial connection
temporal
is a
concept to
for
part
eight-hour day,
the most
an
that he
be determined
puta-
of the
duration
employed
part
jobs
for
of the time on
tive seaman’s connection to the vessel. Bar-
ashore,
working
that he was
Chevron,
on an
U.S.A., Inc.,
extra-man
rett v.
781 F.2d
regular basis,'
(5th
rather
on a
Cir.1986) (en
than
and that he
banc);
1074-75
Longmire
papers.
had no seaman’s
55
fact, his
the sea—in
perils of
him to the
claim—
of Latsis’s
element
a core
regarding
in the
peril
of such
injury was the result
Latsis.
prejudice of
the substantial
to
very
is
a seaman
while on board
sense
(cid:127)
“Drydock Instruction”
D. The
in the care
upon and
reliant
much
unquali-
physician is
If
ship’s physician.
court’s
district
to the
now
turnWe
malpractice, it is
in medical
engages
fied or
above, the
noted
As
instruction.”
“drydock'
mariner on board
peril to the
just
as much
jury:
the
instructed
court
district
hurricane,
wave,
gale or
the
as the killer
per-
determining whether Mr.
In
every
calling. Not
dangers of the
other
work on
part of his
a substantial
formed
exposed to
a vessel is
with
worker connected
period
the
vessel,
may not consider
you
the
sea,
the con-
however. On
perils of the
the
in
drydock
in
Ger-
was
time the Galileo
of
in
to a “vessel
only
trary,
workers connected
period she
time
during that
many, because
”
if the ex-
exposed
are so
navigation
—even
navigation.
of
out
inju-
an
nothing more than
in
posure results
to
court seems
instructing, the district
In so
See
driving to the vessel.
while
ry sustained
prong of
old
third
injected the
have
element,
navigation”
in
The “vessel
id.
into the
navigation,”
in
Salgado test —“vessel
substantiality of
therefore,
not limit
does
find
requirement. We
connection
a vessel.
with
employee’s connection
an
emphasized
further
instruction
this
element
Rather,
navigation”
in
the “vessel
temporal
putative seaman’s
to those
status
designed to limit seaman
confusing
the risk
vessel at
regularly exposes them
employment
whose
the Jones
underlying policy of
frustrating the
sea.
hazards
Act.
of the Jones
the enactment
before
Even
upon
case
which
nóte that
We
Hand,
extending
1920,
Learned
Act
relied,
instructing
evidently
district
on board
bartender
status
seaman
considering the substantial
jury that in
principle
“in
vessel,
there is
remarked
discount
should
element
an artificial
why there should
no reason
Meridian, formerly the
during which the
time
engaged
to those
rights
Germany,
limitation
Galileo,
drydock in
inwas
S.S.
ship, to
exclusion
navigation of the
inwas
the vessel
while
an accident
involved
purposes
further the
equally
who
others
hence,
navigation. See
and,
not in
drydock
Warden,
175 F.
voyage.” The J.S.
Inc.,
her
980
Seafoods,
McKinley v. All Alaskan
words
(S.D.N.Y.1910). Judge Hand’s
Cir.1992).
(9th
McKinley
567, 569-70
F.2d
Act,
com-
the Jones
spirit of
capture the
ship
holding
as
may properly be read
injured in the course work
those
pensate
conversion,
the ves-
complete
as
undergoing
in n the sea: This
perils
exposing them to
case,
out of
a vessel
takes
sel
navigation”
in the “vessel
captured
States,
spirit is
v. United
navigation. See West
Moreover,
this element
189, 192,
element.
4 L.Ed.2d
U.S.
has survived
seaman
for
three-pronged test
curiam) (non-Jones
case
(1959)
Act
(per
at
U.S.
Wilander.
while
warranty of seaworthiness
finding
(“the key to seaman
817-18
re-
major
undergoing
structural
vessel was
connection to
employment-related
is
necessarily
status
mean
does not
But this
pairs).
added).
(emphasis
navigation”)
under-
a vessel
time
that the
count towards
cannot
going conversion
“perils of the sea”
interpreted
have
Courts
con-
employment-related
substantiality of
recover un-
only may seamen
broadly. Not
During
course
with the vessel.
traditionally
nection
injuries
Act for
the Jones
der
Chandris —omit-
employment with
boom, a
of Latsis’s
swinging
the sea —a
associated
approximate-
consulting time —from
ting may recover for
ship
seamen
sinking —but
his termination
ly
until
March
by land-
commonly experienced
more
injuries
months
November, 1990,
spent some
six
Pace,
See,
e.g.,
employees.
based
week,
on board
days a
working seven
injured in
for
(recovery allowed
project
vessel).
vessel,
supervising the
en route
while
automobile accident
drydocking,
architect,
including the'
naval
did
case,
employment
expose
Latsis’s
*11
removal, cleaning
bottom
and removal of
previously
pilot]
“concluded that [the
was not
propellers, overhauling
engines,
the main
re-
a seaman because he was
permanently
not
boilers,
building the
reconstructing
particular
to any
vessel or fleet of
spaces
public
accommodation
rooms.
Co., Inc.,
vessels.” Bach v. Trident S.S.
Why
(5th
this time should not count in
terms of F.2d
Cir.1991),
cert. de
—
determining
substantiality
nied,
of his
-,
connec-
U.S.
vessels,
tion to the
(1992).
Chandris
we do not know. L.Ed.2d 592
Judge
again
Brown
dis
express
opinion
While we
no
sented,
as to whether
stating
“although
Wilander
Latsis would have been covered had he been
out
turns
guide,”
to be the decisive
what
injured while the vessel was in drydoek in
say
it does
affords
support”
“undeniable
Bremerhaven,
suggest
we do
that in terms of
the views he had set forth in his initial
meeting any requirement of
Bach,
connection to the
dissent.
(Brown, J.,
ander case extensively
may
and we
read him
IV.
saying
CONCLUSION
at least in the
pilot
case of a
unique
and his
status as a seagoing function
Although Salgado’s formulation of the sub-
ary,
requirement
“permanency”
set
stantial connection element remains the law
forth
various cases as
the test
of this
Gizoni,
circuit after Wilander and
we
simply
is
longer
effect,
of force and
clarify
think it useful to
this formulation in
least in
temporal
sense.
light of Wilander and Gizoni. Such clarifica-
tion is
all
pressing by
made
the more
The
the fact
requirement
connection
although
Wilander and
has
purposes. First,
Gizoni left
two
Sal-
requiring a
gado’s formulation of the substantial
“more or
permanent
connec-
less
awith
”
intact,
Supreme
vessels,
Court
with a fleet of
it excludes
jettison
in those cases did
aspect—
another
from Jones Act seaman status workers
navigation
the aid to
element —of
that test. whose work
bring them into contact
many
vessels but who are not connected
important
Clarification is
considering
also
with any particular vessel or identifiable
that the Fifth Circuit has continued to ad
group of vessels. Through
exclusion,
here to
interpretation
narrow
its
of the sub
substantial connection element leaves work-
stantial
requirement.
In Bach v.
with no
ers
connection to a particular vessel
Inc.,
Trident Steamship Company,
or group of
coverage
vessels to
under the
(5th Cir.), vacated,
Longshore and Harbor
Compensa-
Workers’
2253, 114
L.Ed.2d 706
two mem
(LHWCA)
tion Act
which “seaman”
—from
panel
bers of the
held
compulsory
that a
pilot
or,
precisely,
more
“a master or member of a
was not a seaman because he was not con
crew
vessel” are themselves excluded.
nected to a vessel or an identifiable fleet of
(1988).
§
33 U.S.C.
seq.
Second,
901 et
vessels, and refused to find an exception in
requiring a “more or
permanent
connec-
favor of a maritime worker
spends
who
virtu
tion with a
vessels,
vessel” or fleet of
ally all of his time performing traditional
excludes from coverage those whose contri-
seaman’s
closely
duties —work
related
bution,
limited,
although
single
to a
vessel or
movement of
does his
vessels —but
work on
vessels,
fleet of
nevertheless
a tem-
short voyages
large
aboard a
number of ves
porary or transitory connection with the ves-
sels.
Judge
dissented,
Brown
stating that
Klarman,
sel. See
503 F.2d at
(putative-
Congress
not mean
did
to exclude from the
seaman’s connection must be more than
protection of the Jones
compulsory
Act
pilots
“temporary or transitory”).
while
in directing
aboard
navigation
of a
Bach,
vessel.
terms of *13 be tak- preparation should on-shore Latsis’s' ARBOLEDA, Defendant, Durvan account, time Latsis as well as the en into Bremerhaven, Germany drydock spent Gil as known as John Wenzel Juan Finally, contribution. consummating his Pedro, Peter and Hector as known as instructed to determine also should Areanas-Posada, Defendants- DeJesus employment of Latsis’s course whether the Appellants. him to the hazards of the exposed regularly 276, 277 and Dockets 93- Nos. matters, proof of these to the sea. As 1234, 93-1237 and 93-1239. has the burden. of course putative Appeals, United States Court vacated, case remanded for re- Judgment Second Circuit. jury in accor- instructions trial with opinion. with this dance Argued Nov. 1993. March 1994. Decided KEARSE, dissenting: Judge, Denying Rehearing 1994. Order June respectfully I dissent. four artic- Though agree that the criteria I majority ante at 57 should by the
ulated of whether em-
govern the determination meaning of within the
ployee a “seaman” Act, that formulation I under
the Jones even non-dry-dock part unpersuaded
am that the instructions, which
of the district court’s objection, “plain” constituted
Latsis made Further, unpersuaded I am that the
error. instructing judge
district erred
that, determining plaintiff whether Latsis seaman, disregard period
was a should dry the Galileo was dock. “ ” concept con- Act ‘seaman’ Jones tains a distinction.” “land-based/sea-based International, Inc. v.
McDermott 807, 817, 337, 354, 111 (1991). , The 65 million-dollar
L.Ed.2d 866
dry-dock and reconstruction of conversion unquestionably a land-based
the Galileo view, my of the instruc
activity. In object only part to which
tions —the
ed—was correct. my
Accordingly, since view to which Latsis
portion of the instructions erroneous, and since the
objected was not instructions did not consti-
remainder- of the error, I would affirm. plain
tute
