4 N.J. Eq. 42 | New York Court of Chancery | 1837
By the pleadings in this case it appears, that Lydia the' wife of the defendant, is the natural daughter of the late John Crawford, deceased; that she was so acknowledged by him, and lived with him until' the time of his death; that when she was quite young he conveyed to her a farm, consisting of about thirty-seven acres of land, which is now the subject matter of controversy; that on the thirty-
The above stated facts are not controverted; and I am clearly of opinion, that upon this state of the case the injunction should be dissolved and the deed declared void.
The strongest case in support of the deed, is that of Inwood v. Twyne, Amb. 419, where the lord chancellor Hardwicke says, "that guardians and trustees may change the nature of infants’ estates under particular circumstances, and the court would support their conduct if the court would do it under the same circumstances ; they cannot do it wantonly, but where it is manifestly for the convenience of the infant.”
Even under the principle established in this case, the deed should be set aside, for it was certainly not “ manifestly for the convenience of the infant.”
But chancellor Kent, in the case of Genet v. Tallmadge, 1 John. Chan. R., 564, says, “ that it is not the general policy of
And in the later case of Field v. Schieffelin, 7 John. Chan. R. 154, the same chancellor says, “ the guardian in socage of the real estate may lease it in his own name, and dispose of it during the guardianship, (and the chancery guardian has equal authority,) though he cannot convey it absolutely without the special authority of this court, because the nature of the trust does riot require it.” , ,
With this view of the case it is unnecesary to inquire into rights and duties growing out of the peculiar relation existing between Crawford and the present wife of the defendant; nor is it necessary to inquire under'what circumstances a court of equity would direct the real estate' of an infant to be converted into personal.
But as there is in, this case no fraud alleged or pretended, it would be palpably unjust, and contrary to equity and the decisions of courts of equity, that the defendants should have the land and the price of it besides.
This deed must therefore be set aside upon fair and equitable terms, and in such manner, as to restore the parties to their former property and rights as nearly as it can be done.
If this had been a very recent transanction, and the complainant had neither used nor improved the farm, justice would be done by restoring to him the consideration paid by him. But in this case the defendants have had the use of the money and the complainant has had the use of the farm and made improvements thereon, by reason of which, it becomes more difficult to apply the rule in such' manner as to do justice to all parties.
Upon examining the testimony in the case, I find great contrariety and uncertainty; as to the value of the. improvements put upon the premises by the complainant, and also as to the annual value thereof ; but it is very evident that the farm at
Let it be referred to a master to ascertain the amount paid, with interest. Further directions are reserved until the coming In of master’s report.
Order accordingly.